Dual Environmentalism: Demand Response Mechanisms in Wholesale and Retail Energy Markets

This note argues that a dual jurisdictional approach to demand response programming is better suited to mitigate environmental harms than an “either-or” regulatory model. Through an exploration of FERC’s authority over wholesale demand response, state authority over retail-level demand response, and implications for electricity and capacity markets arising out of the Court’s decision in FERC v. EPSA, this note will offer effective legal mechanisms for mitigating environmental costs, while fostering environmental benefits. The next section of this note analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of state and federal regulatory approaches to demand response in isolation. Based on this assessment, this note suggests the policy mechanisms most conducive to environmentally-conscious electric energy regulation. This note concludes with a model regulatory scheme that utilizes demand response to mitigate global climate change and advance environmental sustainability

The Regulatory Component of Health Care Reform

Explains the rationales and goals of regulatory intervention. Assesses the likelihood that proposed changes to regulations will be implemented as a component of healthcare reform or that they will help control costs and improve efficiency

Regulation, competition, and liberalization

In many countries throughout the world, regulators are struggling to determine whether and how to introduce competition into regulated industries. This essay examines the complexities involved in the liberalization process. While stressing the importance of case-specific analyses, this essay distinguishes liberalization policies that generally are pro-competitive from corresponding anti-competitive liberalization policies

Work intensification and employment insecurity in professional work

Professional work is a category of employment that has traditionally been associated with high levels of worker autonomy, economic and social status. During the past decade, changes in customer expectations, government policy and technology have generated pressures resulting in enhancement of the quality and efficiency of service provision, expansion in task requirements and a need for higher levels of discretion. In this sense, professional work has been upgraded. However, the changes have also led to a deterioration in the economic and social status of professional work, adversely impacting on the social and psychological well-being of professional workers. This paper examines these developments in five professions including two established professions (lawyers and pharmacists), one aspiring profession (midwives) and two emerging professions (counselling psychologists and human resource managers). The empirical findings are based on a survey of 1270 professional workers conducted in 2000 and 2001

Distributive Injustice(s) in American Health Care

Havighurst and Richman seek to show the nature--and to suggest the cumulative attitude--of the many regressive tendencies of the financing, regulatory and legal regime governing the private side of US health care

Regulation, Competition and Liberalization

In many countries throughout the world, regulators are struggling to determine whether and how to introduce competition into regulated industries. This essay examines the complexities involved in the liberalization process. While stressing the importance of case-specific analyses, this essay distinguishes liberalization policies that generally are pro-competitive from corresponding anti-competitive liberalization policiesCompetition, Regulation, Liberalization

Competition in a Pure World of Internet Telephony

From the angle of competition policy, Voice over IP looks like a panacea. It not only brings better service, but it also increases competitive pressure on former telecommunications monopolists. This paper points to the largely overlooked downside. In a pure world of Internet telephony, there would be no charge for individual calls, nor for telephony, as distinct from other services running over the uniform network. Specifically, establishing property rights for either of these would be costly, whereas these property rights were automatic and free of charge in switched telephony. Giving voice over IP providers classic telephone numbers would enhance systems competition with switched telephony. But this would make it more difficult for clients to swap providers. The anti-competitive caller pays principle would extend to IP telephony.property right, non-linear pricing, pure bundling, club good, cross-subsidisation, packet switched telephony

Windows Vista: Securing Itself against Competition?

About the end of 2006, Microsoft began delivering its new Windows Vista PC operating system to large commercial customers, followed by final users and small businesses. Even before the product reached the market, the dominant provider of PC operating systems worldwide was accused over and over of abusing its market power in order to hinder competitors. After the integration of Internet Explorer (Windows 95) and the Windows Media Player (Windows XP), competitors today are objecting most strongly to the new security components associated with the Windows Vista Security Center, and the EU Commission has joined in these objections. Opponents have criticized the bundling of previously independent components (transfer of market power through bundling), and security software providers like Symantec and McAfee have argued that limiting access to the core of the operating system will hinder their product development activities. In line with the tradition in EU competition policy, Microsoft's dominance of the PC operating system market justifies supervision of that provider in the interests of preventing abuse. However, the final assessment must take into account unique circumstances arising from the specific market and competitive conditions in the standard software markets. In particular, competition policy should intervene in the PC operating system market only if a demonstrable improvement in the public welfare can be attained as a result. In essence, this means that policymakers should intervene to ensure fair innovation competition, including the introduction of reasonable transparency requirements with respect to operating system interfaces in order to allow regulators to manage potential conflicts between the operating system manufacturer and providers of competing software components (e.g. web browsers, media players or security software). There is need for reform in this area in order to create a reliable and functional system of rules for all market participants. However, unbundling decrees which require strict separation of certain system components are an unsuitable instrument for this purpose.competition policy, Microsoft, operating system markets, platform competition