Social Comparisons as a device for cooperation in simultaneous-move games

This paper analyzes the effects of players' relative comparisons in complete information simultaneous-move games. In particular, every individual is assumed to evaluate the kindness she infers from other players'choices by comparing these choices with respect to a given refer- ence level. Specifically, this paper identifies under what conditions the introduction of relative comparisons leads players to be more cooperative than in standard game-theoretic models. I show that this result holds under certain conditions on the specific reference point that players use in their relative comparisons, and on whether players'relative comparisons leads them to regard each others' actions as more strategic complementary or substitutable. The model is then applied to different examples in public good games which enhance the intuition behind the results. Finally, I show that some existing models in the literature of intentions-based reciprocity and social status acquisition can be rationalized as special cases.Relative comparisons, Reference points, Simultaneous-move games, Kindness, Strategic complementarities.

Contracts as Reference Points

We argue that a contract provides a reference point for a trading relationship: more precisely, for parties' feelings of entitlement. A party's ex post performance depends on whether he gets what he is entitled to relative to outcomes permitted by the contract. A party who is shortchanged shades on performance. A flexible contract allows parties to adjust their outcome to uncertainty, but causes inefficient shading. Our analysis provides a basis for long-term contracts in the absence of noncontractible investments, and elucidates why "employment" contracts, which fix wage in advance and allow the employer to choose the task, can be optimal.

Reference Points and Effort Provision

A key open question for theories of reference-dependent preferences is what determines the reference point. One candidate is expectations: what people expect could affect how they feel about what actually occurs. In a real-effort experiment, we manipulate the rational expectations of subjects and check whether this manipulation influences their effort provision. We find that effort provision is significantly different between treatments in the way predicted by models of expectation-based reference-dependent preferences: if expectations are high, subjects work longer and earn more money than if expectations are low.Reference Points; Expectations; Loss Aversion; Disappointment; Experiment

Multiattribute preference models with reference points

In the context of multiple attribute decision making, preference models making use of reference points in an ordinal way have recently been introduced in the literature. This text proposes an axiomatic analysis of such models, with a particular emphasis on the case in which there is only one reference point. Our analysis uses a general conjoint measurement model resting on the study of traces induced on attributes by the preference relation and using conditions guaranteeing that these traces are complete. Models using reference points are shown to be a particular case of this general model. The number of reference points is linked to the number of equivalence classes distinguished by the traces. When there is only one reference point, the in- duced traces are quite rough, distinguishing at most two distinct equivalence classes. We study the relation between the model using a single reference point and other preference models proposed in the literature.

Contracts as Reference Points: Experimental Evidence

In a recent paper, Hart and Moore (2008) introduce new behavioral assumptions that can explain long term contracts and important aspects of the employment relation. However, so far there exists no direct evidence that supports these assumptions and, in particular, Hart and Moore's notion that contracts provide reference points. In this paper, we examine experimentally the behavioral forces stipulated in their theory. The evidence confirms the model's prediction that there is a tradeoff between rigidity and flexibility in a trading environment with incomplete contracts and ex ante uncertainty about the state of nature. Flexible contracts – which would dominate rigid contracts under standard assumptions –cause a significant amount of shading on ex post performance while under rigid contracts much less shading occurs. Thus, although rigid contracts rule out trading in some states of the world, parties frequently implement them. While our results are broadly consistent with established behavioral concepts, they cannot easily be explained by existing theories. The experiment appears to reveal a new behavioral force: ex ante competition legitimizes the terms of a contract, and aggrievement and shading occur mainly about outcomes within the contract.contracts, reference points, experiment

Contracts as Reference Points

We argue that a contract provides a reference point for a trading relationship: more precisely, for parties’ feelings of entitlement. A party’s ex post performance depends on whether he gets what he is entitled to relative to outcomes permitted by the contract. A party who is shortchanged shades on performance. A flexible contract allows parties to adjust their outcome to uncertainty, but causes inefficient shading. Our analysis provides a basis for long-term contracts in the absence of noncontractible investments, and elucidates why “employment” contracts, which fix wage in advance and allow the employer to choose the task, can be optimal.

音声モーフィングにおける基準点付与の自動化

Automatic reference point placement method for voice morphing is reported in this paper. Voice morphing is one of fundamental voice editing methods to blend feature vector sequences of two voices based on corresponding reference points. Reference points are basically assigned by hands, and depends on the quality of voice morphing output. Moreover, assigning reference points is a time-consuming task. The proposed method realizes to assign reference points on spectrogram in time- and frequency-domain automatically based on temporal decomposition (TD) and line spectral frequency (LSF). As results of two-speakers’ voice morphing, the proposed method was worked well by using voice and its transcription as inputs

Reference Points and Effort Provision

A key open question for theories of reference-dependent preferences is what determines the reference point. One candidate is expectations: what people expect could affect how they feel about what actually occurs. In a real-effort experiment, we manipulate the rational expectations of subjects and check whether this manipulation influences their effort provision. We find that effort provision is significantly different between treatments in the way predicted by models of expectation-based reference-dependent preferences: if expectations are high, subjects work longer and earn more money than if expectations are low.reference points, expectations, loss aversion, risk aversion, disappointment, experiment

Points of reference for future action

Monetary policy ; Financial crises