Reclaiming our Assumptions at the Intersection of Technology, Learning and Equity

Educatio

Reasons for Reliabilism

One leading approach to justification comes from the reliabilist tradition, which maintains that a belief is justified provided that it is reliably formed. Another comes from the ‘Reasons First’ tradition, which claims that a belief is justified provided that it is based on reasons that support it. These two approaches are typically developed in isolation from each other; this essay motivates and defends a synthesis. On the view proposed here, justification is understood in terms of an agent’s reasons for belief, which are in turn analyzed along reliabilist lines: an agent's reasons for belief are the states that serve as inputs to their reliable processes. I show that this synthesis allows each tradition to profit from the other's explanatory resources. In particular, it enables reliabilists to explain epistemic defeat without abandoning their naturalistic ambitions. I go on to compare my proposed synthesis with other hybrid versions of reliabilism that have been proposed in the literature

Complexity and Philosophy

The science of complexity is based on a new way of thinking that stands in sharp contrast to the philosophy underlying Newtonian science, which is based on reductionism, determinism, and objective knowledge. This paper reviews the historical development of this new world view, focusing on its philosophical foundations. Determinism was challenged by quantum mechanics and chaos theory. Systems theory replaced reductionism by a scientifically based holism. Cybernetics and postmodern social science showed that knowledge is intrinsically subjective. These developments are being integrated under the header of “complexity science”. Its central paradigm is the multi-agent system. Agents are intrinsically subjective and uncertain about their environment and future, but out of their local interactions, a global organization emerges. Although different philosophers, and in particular the postmodernists, have voiced similar ideas, the paradigm of complexity still needs to be fully assimilated by philosophy. This will throw a new light on old philosophical issues such as relativism, ethics and the role of the subject

How Can Brains in Vats Experience a Spatial World? A Puzzle for Internalists

In this chapter, Pautz raises a puzzle about spatial experience for phenomenal internalists like Ned Block. If an accidental, lifelong brain-in-the-void (BIV) should have all the same experiences as you, it would have an experience as of items having various shapes, and be able to acquire concepts of those shapes, despite being cut off from real things with the shapes. Internalists cannot explain this by saying that BIV is presented with Peacocke-style visual field regions having various shapes, because these would have to be non-physical sense data. They might instead explain this by saying that BIV “phenomenally represents” various shape properties. But since BIV lacks any interesting physical relations to shapes, this would imply that phenomenally representation is an irreducible relation

Beyond model answers: learners’ perceptions of self-assessment materials in e-learning applications

The importance of feedback as an aid to self‐assessment is widely acknowledged. A common form of feedback that is used widely in e‐learning is the use of model answers. However, model answers are deficient in many respects. In particular, the notion of a ‘model’ answer implies the existence of a single correct answer applicable across multiple contexts with no scope for permissible variation. This reductive assumption is rarely the case with complex problems that are supposed to test students’ higher‐order learning. Nevertheless, the challenge remains of how to support students as they assess their own performance using model answers and other forms of non‐verificational ‘feedback’. To explore this challenge, the research investigated a management development e‐learning application and investigated the effectiveness of model answers that followed problem‐based questions. The research was exploratory, using semi‐structured interviews with 29 adult learners employed in a global organisation. Given interviewees’ generally negative perceptions of the model‐answers, they were asked to describe their ideal form of self‐assessment materials, and to evaluate nine alternative designs. The results suggest that, as support for higher‐order learning, self‐assessment materials that merely present an idealised model answer are inadequate. As alternatives, learners preferred materials that helped them understand what behaviours to avoid (and not just ‘do’), how to think through the problem (i.e. critical thinking skills), and the key issues that provide a framework for thinking. These findings have broader relevance within higher education, particularly in postgraduate programmes for business students where the importance of prior business experience is emphasised and the profile of students is similar to that of the participants in this research