39,558 research outputs found
Reciprocity and Resistance to Comprehensive Reform
Comprehensive reforms often fail or become piecemeal during preparatory phase of the legislation. A promising candidate to explain the failure of comprehensive reforms is vote trading on a subset of individual bills included in the original comprehensive reform. When legislators expect profitable vote trading on a subset of bills to be possible, they may ex ante strategically block comprehensive reforms. We analyze in a laboratory experiment whether trust and reciprocity among legislators leads to vote trading in sequential bill by bill procedures when commitment devices are missing and whether such vote trading possibilities cause resistance to comprehensive reform. We find that (i) transparent voting procedures facilitate vote trading based on trust in other legislators' reciprocity whereas (ii) secretive procedures reduce trust in others' reciprocity and makes vote trades difficult. (iii) Resistance to comprehensive reform occurs when legislators know that the alternative procedure to voting on the comprehensive reform is a transparent sequential bill by bill voting procedure, whereas (iv) legislators opt for voting on a comprehensive reform when the alternative procedure is a sequential secret ballot.Comprehensive Reform, Sequential Voting, Vote Trading, Experiment
A Political Reciprocity Mechanism
We consider the problem of designing legislative mechanisms that guarantee equilibrium existence, Pareto-efficiency, and inclusiveness. To address this question, we propose a finite-horizon voting procedure that embeds clauses of reciprocity. These clauses grant voters the right to oppose actions that are not in their interest, retract actions that face opposition, and punish harmful actions. We study voters\u27 strategic behavior under this voting procedure using two classical approaches. Following the blocking approach, we introduce two related solution concepts---the reciprocity set and the sophisticated reciprocity set---to predict equilibrium policies. We then show that these solution concepts (1) are always non-empty; (2) only select Pareto-efficient policies; (3) strategically protect minority interests; and (4) are compatible with classical notions of fairness and Rawlsian justice in distributive problems. Following the non-cooperative approach, we provide an implementation of each of these solution concepts in subgame perfect equilibrium, which makes them applicable in a wide range of legislative settings. We also extend them to effectivity functions, a large class of games that includes strategic form games. A comparative analysis shows that the reciprocity mechanism has other desirable features and properties that distinguish it from other well-known voting mechanisms and solution concepts
Agenda control and reciprocity in sequential voting decisions
We study how reciprocity affects the extent to which a chair can exploit her control over an agenda if a committee votes sequentially on a known series of binary proposals. We show in a parsimonious laboratory experiment that committee members form vote trading coalitions favoring early proposals not only when the sequence of proposals is exogenously given, but also when a chair controls the sequence of proposals. Vote trading occurs even though chairs manipulate the agenda in their favor. Punishment for chairs exploiting agenda control is weak as chairs reciprocate support by others more frequently than nonchairs. (JEL C92, D71, D72
Maximising Consent: Operationalising Reciprocity in Secession Referenda
A constitutional referendum on secession from Indonesia was held in East Timor
in 1999, with a pro-independence vote triggering widespread violence by the
Indonesian army and pro-union militia. Montenegro underwent a similar process in
2006, also opting for independence but with much smoother results. This article will
suggest that the deliberative democratic principle of reciprocity can help deliver
referendum law based on justifications that can be accepted by all parties concerned. In
particular, it proposes that reciprocity can be operationalised in referendum law if the
participants in the negotiations that formulate the laws accept fair terms of social
cooperation (FTSCs) and resolve disagreements using economy of moral disagreement
(EMD). Respectively, these mean parties to negotiations should be willing to justify
their position in mutually acceptable terms and if consensus is impossible, agreements
should minimise their rejection of other partiesâ views. This argument will be made
using the negotiations that created East Timor and Montenegroâs referendum laws as
case studies
Institutions and Opportunistic Behavior: Experimental Evidence
Risk mitigating institutions have long been used by societies to protect against opportunistic behavior. We know little about how they are demanded, who demands them or how they impact subsequent behavior. To study these questions, we run a large-scale online experiment where insurance can be purchased to safeguard against opportunistic behavior. We compare two different selection mechanisms for risk mitigation, the individual and the collective (voting). We find that, whether individual or collective, there is demand for riskmitigating institutions amongst high-opportunism individuals, while low-opportunism individuals demand lesser levels of insurance. However, high-opportunism individuals strategically demand lower insurance institutions when they are chosen collectively through voting. We also find that the presence of risk mitigating institutions crowds out reciprocity. Reciprocity is lower when the no-insurance option is chosen among other insurance options than when it is not available. Finally, we also observe higher gains from exchange in lowopportunism groups than in more opportunistic ones
Familiars: representing Facebook usersâ social behaviour through a reflective playful experience
In this paper, we describe the design and development of a social game called Familiars. Inspired by the daemons in Pullmanâs âDark Materialâ trilogy, Familiars are animal companions that sit on your Facebook profile and change into different animal forms based on your social activity within the social network of Facebook.
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Familiars takes advantage of the powerful capabilities of the developers platform of Facebook to build a multi-dimensional picture of a playerâs state based on social activity, facial expression analysis on photographs and suggestions from friends. This rich information is then distilled and presented to the player in the form of animal that the familiar chooses to take.
We show how the types of animals and personalities were associated in a cross-cultural user study, and present quantitative results from the social behaviours of the players within the game in addition to qualitative data gathered from questionnaire responses
Solidarity in Terms of Reciprocity*
In this paper we introduce a new concept of solidarity in terms of reciprocity and characterize the set of social choice functions that are reciprocate (in both a strong and a weak sense), anonymous and efficient in a standard public good provision model when the agents have single-peaked preferences on the amount of the good provided. The resulting procedures are the well-known Generalized Condorcet Winner Solutions, and therefore, we provide an alternative characterization of that class of social choice functions based in new ethical properties regarding solidarity.Single-peaked preferences, solidarity, welfare domination under preference replacement.
Vote-Buying and Reciprocity
While vote-buying is common, little is known about how politicians determine who to target. We argue that vote-buying can be sustained by an internalized norm of reciprocity. Receiving money engenders feelings of obligation. Combining survey data on vote-buying with an experiment-based measure of reciprocity, we show that politicians target reciprocal individuals. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of social preferences in determining political behavior.vote-buying, reciprocity, redistributive politics, voting, social preferences
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