21,251 research outputs found
Coping with the Limitations of Rational Inference in the Framework of Possibility Theory
Possibility theory offers a framework where both Lehmann's "preferential
inference" and the more productive (but less cautious) "rational closure
inference" can be represented. However, there are situations where the second
inference does not provide expected results either because it cannot produce
them, or even provide counter-intuitive conclusions. This state of facts is not
due to the principle of selecting a unique ordering of interpretations (which
can be encoded by one possibility distribution), but rather to the absence of
constraints expressing pieces of knowledge we have implicitly in mind. It is
advocated in this paper that constraints induced by independence information
can help finding the right ordering of interpretations. In particular,
independence constraints can be systematically assumed with respect to formulas
composed of literals which do not appear in the conditional knowledge base, or
for default rules with respect to situations which are "normal" according to
the other default rules in the base. The notion of independence which is used
can be easily expressed in the qualitative setting of possibility theory.
Moreover, when a counter-intuitive plausible conclusion of a set of defaults,
is in its rational closure, but not in its preferential closure, it is always
possible to repair the set of defaults so as to produce the desired conclusion.Comment: Appears in Proceedings of the Twelfth Conference on Uncertainty in
Artificial Intelligence (UAI1996
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Cognitive biases, heuristics and decision-making in design for behaviour change
Copyright @ 2012 Social Science Electronic PublishingMuch human behaviour can be seen as decision-making, and so understanding and influencing those decision-making processes could be an important component in design for behaviour change. This paper examines the 'heuristics and biases' approach to modelling decision-making, and attempts to extract insights which are relevant to designers working to influence user behaviour for social or environmental benefit -- either by exploiting biases, or helping to counter those which lead to undesirable behaviour. Areas covered include a number of specific cognitive biases in detail, and the alternative perspective of Gigerenzer and others, who contend (following Herbert Simon) that many heuristics potentially leading to biases are actually ecologically rational, and part of humans' adaptive responses to situations. The design relevance of this is briefly considered, and implications for designers are summarised
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