Putting the War Back in Just War Theory: A Critique of Examples

Analytic just war theorists often attempt to construct ideal theories of military justice on the basis of intuitions about imaginary and sometimes outlandish examples, often taken from non-military contexts. This article argues for a sharp curtailment of this method and defends, instead, an empirically and historically informed approach to the ethical scrutiny of armed conflicts. After critically reviewing general philosophical reasons for being sceptical of the moral-theoretic value of imaginary hypotheticals, the article turns to some of the special problems that this method raises for appraisals of warfare. It examines some of the hypothetical examples employed in the construction of Jeff McMahan’s revisionist just war theory, and finds that they sometimes stipulate incompre- hensible conditions, lead to argumentative impasses of diverging yet uncertain intuitions, and distract attention away from the real problems of war as we empirically know it. In contrast, empirical and historical studies of warfare rein- force the deep connections between facts and values, and compel theorists to face uncomfortable moral ambiguities. Perhaps most importantly, the analytic method of focusing on imaginary hypothetical examples can not only be distracting, but it can also be genuinely dangerous. Hence, the article pays special attention to the way in which a seemingly innocuous fiction like the famous Ticking Time Bomb scenario can come to frame a new paradigm of inhumanity in the treatment of prisoners of war

Ramsey's conditionals

In this paper, we propose a unified account of conditionals inspired by Frank Ramsey. Most contemporary philosophers agree that Ramsey's account applies to indicative conditionals only. We observe against this orthodoxy that his account covers subjunctive conditionals as well-including counterfactuals. In light of this observation, we argue that Ramsey's account of conditionals resembles Robert Stalnaker's possible worlds semantics supplemented by a model of belief. The resemblance suggests to reinterpret the notion of conditional degree of belief in order to overcome a tension in Ramsey's account. The result of the reinterpretation is a tenable account of conditionals that covers indicative and subjunctive as well as qualitative and probabilistic conditionals

Teaching Law and Digital Age Legal Practice with an AI and Law Seminar

This article provides a guide and examples for using a seminar on Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Law to teach lessons about legal reasoning and about legal practice in the digital age. Artificial Intelligence and Law is a subfield of AI/ computer science research that focuses on computationally modeling legal reasoning. In at least a few law schools, the AI and Law seminar has regularly taught students fundamental issues about law and legal reasoning by focusing them on the problems these issues pose for scientists attempting to computationally model legal reasoning. AI and Law researchers have designed programs to reason with legal rules, apply legal precedents, predict case outcomes, argue like a legal advocate and visualize legal arguments. The article illustrates some of the pedagogically important lessons that they have learned in the process. As the technology of legal practice catches up with the aspirations of AI and Law researchers, the AI and Law seminar can play a new role in legal education. With advances in such areas as e-discovery, legal information retrieval (IR), and semantic processing of web-based information for electronic contracting, the chances are increasing that, in their legal practices, law students will use, and even depend on, systems that employ AI techniques. As explained in the Article, an AI and Law seminar invites students to think about processes of legal reasoning and legal practice and about how those processes employ information. It teaches how the new digital documents technologies work, what they can and cannot do, how to measure performance, how to evaluate claims about the technologies, and how to be savvy consumers and users of the technologies

Processing counterfactual and hypothetical conditionals: An fMRI investigation

Counterfactual thinking is ubiquitous in everyday life and an important aspect of cognition and emotion. Although counterfactual thought has been argued to differ from processing factual or hypothetical information, imaging data which elucidate these differences on a neural level are still scarce. We investigated the neural correlates of processing counterfactual sentences under visual and aural presentation. We compared conditionals in subjunctive mood which explicitly contradicted previously presented facts (i.e. counterfactuals) to conditionals framed in indicative mood which did not contradict factual world knowledge and thus conveyed a hypothetical supposition. Our results show activation in right occipital cortex (cuneus) and right basal ganglia (caudate nucleus) during counterfactual sentence processing. Importantly the occipital activation is not only present under visual presentation but also with purely auditory stimulus presentation, precluding a visual processing artifact. Thus our results can be interpreted as reflecting the fact that counterfactual conditionals pragmatically imply the relevance of keeping in mind both factual and supposed information whereas the hypothetical conditionals imply that real world information is irrelevant for processing the conditional and can be omitted. The need to sustain representations of factual and suppositional events during counterfactual sentence processing requires increased mental imagery and integration efforts. Our findings are compatible with predictions based on mental model theory

Explanation for case-based reasoning via abstract argumentation

Case-based reasoning (CBR) is extensively used in AI in support of several applications, to assess a new situation (or case) by recollecting past situations (or cases) and employing the ones most similar to the new situation to give the assessment. In this paper we study properties of a recently proposed method for CBR, based on instantiated Abstract Argumentation and referred to as AA-CBR, for problems where cases are represented by abstract factors and (positive or negative) outcomes, and an outcome for a new case, represented by abstract factors, needs to be established. In addition, we study properties of explanations in AA-CBR and define a new notion of lean explanations that utilize solely relevant cases. Both forms of explanations can be seen as dialogical processes between a proponent and an opponent, with the burden of proof falling on the proponent

"The whole truth?" : hypothetical questions and the (de)construction of knowledge in expert witness cross-examination

This paper examines the relation between hypotheticals and epistemic stance in jury trials, and it reveals how hypothetically framed questions (HQs) are used in cross-examination to construct "the admissible truth" (Gutheil et al. 2003) which is then turned into evidence. It looks at a selection of interactional exchanges identified in the transcripts and video recordings which document two days of expert witness cross examination in two high-profile criminal cases. In the study, two approaches to data analysis were combined: a bottom-up approach focusing on markers of HQs offering “points of entry” into discourse through a corpus-assisted analysis and a top-down approach looking at cross-examination as a complex communicative event, providing a more holis tic view of the interactional context in which HQs are used. The paper explains the role which such questions play in the positioning of opposing knowledge claims, as well as discusses the effect they create in hostile interaction with expert witnesses. As is revealed, HQs are used to elicit the witness’s assessments of alternative scenarios of past events and causal links involving the facts of the case; to elicit the witness’s assessments of general hypothetical scenarios not involving the facts of the case, or to undermine the validity of the witness’s method of analysis. In sum, the paper explains how the use of HQs aids cross-examining attorneys in deconstructing unfavourable testimony and constructing the “legal truth” which supports their narrative