14 research outputs found
Blameworthiness in Strategic Games
There are multiple notions of coalitional responsibility. The focus of this
paper is on the blameworthiness defined through the principle of alternative
possibilities: a coalition is blamable for a statement if the statement is
true, but the coalition had a strategy to prevent it. The main technical result
is a sound and complete bimodal logical system that describes properties of
blameworthiness in one-shot games
Knowledge and Blameworthiness
Blameworthiness of an agent or a coalition of agents is often defined in
terms of the principle of alternative possibilities: for the coalition to be
responsible for an outcome, the outcome must take place and the coalition
should have had a strategy to prevent it. In this article we argue that in the
settings with imperfect information, not only should the coalition have had a
strategy, but it also should have known that it had a strategy, and it should
have known what the strategy was. The main technical result of the article is a
sound and complete bimodal logic that describes the interplay between knowledge
and blameworthiness in strategic games with imperfect information
Strategic Coalitions with Perfect Recall
The paper proposes a bimodal logic that describes an interplay between distributed knowledge modality and coalition know-how modality. Unlike other similar systems, the one proposed here assumes perfect recall by all agents. Perfect recall is captured in the system by a single axiom. The main technical results are the soundness and the completeness theorems for the proposed logical system
Armstrong\u27s Axioms and Navigation Strategies
The paper investigates navigability with imperfect information. It shows that the properties of navigability with perfect recall are exactly those captured by Armstrong\u27s axioms from database theory. If the assumption of perfect recall is omitted, then Armstrong\u27s transitivity axiom is not valid, but it can be replaced by a weaker principle. The main technical results are soundness and completeness theorems for the logical systems describing properties of navigability with and without perfect recall
Together We Know How to Achieve: An Epistemic Logic of Know-How
The existence of a coalition strategy to achieve a goal does not necessarily mean that the coalition has enough information to know how to follow the strategy. Neither does it mean that the coalition knows that such a strategy exists. The paper studies an interplay between the distributed knowledge, coalition strategies, and coalition know-how strategies. The main technical result is a sound and complete trimodal logical system that describes the properties of this interplay