Reallocation Mechanisms

We consider reallocation problems in settings where the initial endowment of each agent consists of a subset of the resources. The private information of the players is their value for every possible subset of the resources. The goal is to redistribute resources among agents to maximize efficiency. Monetary transfers are allowed, but participation is voluntary. We develop incentive-compatible, individually-rational and budget balanced mechanisms for several classic settings, including bilateral trade, partnership dissolving, Arrow-Debreu markets, and combinatorial exchanges. All our mechanisms (except one) provide a constant approximation to the optimal efficiency in these settings, even in ones where the preferences of the agents are complex multi-parameter functions

Labor Force Participation Dynamics in the Romanian Labor Market

We use micro data from the Romanian Labor Force Survey to analyze the effect of the restructuring process on the Romanian labor market. We identify the reallocation mechanisms at work in the Romanian labor market, and we analyze the way personal characteristics influence inviduals' ability to adjust to labor market transformations. Participation decisions made by individuals are modeled as Markov decision processes. The resulting multivariate probit models are estimated using Markov Chain Monte Carlo techniques.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39866/3/wp481.pd

Labor Force Participation Dynamics in the Romanian Labor Market

We use micro data from the Romanian Labor Force Survey to analyze the effect of the restructuring process on the Romanian labor market. We identify the reallocation mechanisms at work in the Romanian labor market, and we analyze the way personal characteristics influence inviduals' ability to adjust to labor market transformations. Participation decisions made by individuals are modeled as Markov decision processes. The resulting multivariate probit models are estimated using Markov Chain Monte Carlo techniques.labor force participation, transition economy, Markov chain Monte Carlo

Growth Processes of Italian Manufacturing Firms

This paper presents a multidimensional empirical analysis of firm growth. Exploiting census data on Italian manufacturing firms, 1989-1997, we estimate a reduced-form VAR to analyze the co-evolution of employment growth, sales growth, growth of profits and labour productivity growth. Our main findings suggest that (i) employment growth precedes sales growth; (ii) productivity growth lacks any strong association with subsequent growth of the other indicators; (iii) profits growth represents the `absorbing dimension' of the growth processes. This picture contrasts with 'accelerator models', predicting sales are the driver of the growth process, and is also at odds with theories of firm-industry evolution assuming productivity or profits advantages to be the driver of strong market selection/reallocation mechanisms. Instead, the findings reveal the existence of (weak) Penrose and (strong) Kaldor-Verdoorn effects, and more generally convey the view that employment growth is the key driver of firm expansion, while profits, once made, are not reinvested.Household Consumption Expenditure, Budget Shares, Sum of Log-Normal Distributions

Developing Mechanisms for the Transfer and/or Adjustment of Rock Lobster Shares between Sectors in Western Australia and South Australia FRDC Project No. 2007/050

The purpose of this report has been to investigate potential reallocation mechanisms for the transfer and/or adjustment of catch shares between sectors and the requirements to allow for their implementation, with particular reference to their application in the Western and South Australian rock lobster fisheries. While the report focuses on the commercial and recreational sectors of these fisheries, potentially all non-commercial fishing sectors could be included under a given mechanism in the same manner as that outlined for the recreational sector, subject to the appropriateness of allowing the sector’s allocation to be transferable

Double Auctions in Markets for Multiple Kinds of Goods

Motivated by applications such as stock exchanges and spectrum auctions, there is a growing interest in mechanisms for arranging trade in two-sided markets. Existing mechanisms are either not truthful, or do not guarantee an asymptotically-optimal gain-from-trade, or rely on a prior on the traders' valuations, or operate in limited settings such as a single kind of good. We extend the random market-halving technique used in earlier works to markets with multiple kinds of goods, where traders have gross-substitute valuations. We present MIDA: a Multi Item-kind Double-Auction mechanism. It is prior-free, truthful, strongly-budget-balanced, and guarantees near-optimal gain from trade when market sizes of all goods grow to $\infty$ at a similar rate.Comment: Full version of IJCAI-18 paper, with 2 figures. Previous names: "MIDA: A Multi Item-type Double-Auction Mechanism", "A Random-Sampling Double-Auction Mechanism". 10 page

Resolving Interjurisdictional Disputes Over Water and Environmental Quality

Intergovernmental disputes involving water allocationand the environment are widespread and impose costsand uncertainties on water users, communities, andgovernments. This article presents criteria for evaluatingdifferent types of efforts to resolve disputes. The criteriawere developed after extensive analysis of several dozeninterjurisdictional disputes involving water allocation andenvironmental quality. These criteria are used to examinethe strengths and weaknesses of litigation, negotiatedagreements, and market transactions as tools for effectingchanges in water allocation and management needed toresolve transboundary disputes

The Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution Manipulated by Pre-Donations is Concessionary

This study examines the manipulability of simple n-person bargaining problems by pre-donations where the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is operant. We extend previous results on the manipulation of two-person bargaining problems to the n-person case and show that in a world where a prebargaining stage is instituted in which the bargainers may unilaterally alter the bargaining problem, bargainers with greater ideal payoffs transform the bargaining set into one on which the Kalai- Smorodinsky solution distributes payoffs in accordance with the Concessionary division rule of disputed property.Bargaining Solutions, Pre-donation, Kalai-Smorodinsky

AN IRRIGATION MODEL FOR MANAGEMENT OF LIMITED WATER SUPPLIES

A two-stage simulation/mathematical programming model is presented for determining the optimal intraseasonal allocation of irrigation water under conditions of limited water supply. The model is applied to a series of water shortage scenarios under both surface and center pivot irrigation. Economically efficient irrigation management is shown to involve the coordination of a number of managerial decisions, including irrigation scheduling, crop substitution, the adoption of improved irrigation labor practices, and idling land. The results indicate that significant opportunities exist for conserving water in the study area under both surface and center pivot irrigation.Crop Production/Industries, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,