9,302 research outputs found
Hiddleston’s Causal Modeling Semantics and the Distinction between Forward-Tracking and Backtracking Counterfactuals
Some cases show that counterfactual conditionals (‘counterfactuals’ for short) are inherently ambiguous, equivocating between forward-tracking and backtracking counterfactu- als. Elsewhere, I have proposed a causal modeling semantics, which takes this phenomenon to be generated by two kinds of causal manipulations. (Lee 2015; Lee 2016) In an important paper (Hiddleston 2005), Eric Hiddleston offers a different causal modeling semantics, which he claims to be able to explain away the inherent ambiguity of counterfactuals. In this paper, I discuss these two semantic treatments and argue that my (bifurcated) semantics is theoretically more promising than Hiddleston’s (unified) semantics
Do we need dynamic semantics?
I suspect the answer to the question in the title of this paper is no. But
the scope of my paper will be considerably more limited: I will be concerned
with whether certain types of considerations that are commonly cited in
favor of dynamic semantics do in fact push us towards a dynamic semantics.
Ultimately, I will argue that the evidence points to a dynamics of discourse
that is best treated pragmatically, rather than as part of the semantics
Wierenga on theism and counterpossibles
Several theists, including Linda Zagzebski, have claimed that theism is somehow committed to nonvacuism about counterpossibles. Even though Zagzebski herself has rejected vacuism, she has offered an argument in favour of it, which Edward Wierenga has defended as providing strong support for vacuism that is independent of the orthodox semantics for counterfactuals, mainly developed by David Lewis and Robert Stalnaker. In this paper I show that argument to be sound only relative to the orthodox semantics, which entails vacuism, and give an example of a semantics for counterfactuals countenancing impossible worlds for which it fails
Against Molinism: A Refutation of William Lane Craig\u27s Molinism
The debate concerning human free will, human moral culpability, and God’s sovereignty has raged for millennia within the Christian church. The recent rediscovery of the medieval philosophical theory known as Molinism brought Molinism to the fore of this debate. One major contemporary proponent of Molinism is William Lane Craig, the famous philosopher, theologian, and apologist. The purpose of this essay is to present a refutation of Craig\u27s brand of Molinism by arguing that Craig’s Molinism relies on a flawed view of human freedom and further fails to reconcile this flawed view of human freedom with God’s sovereignty
Modals and Modal Epistemology
I distinguish (§1) two projects in modal epistemology—one about how we come to know modal truths, and one about why we have the ability so to come to know. The latter, I suggest, (§§2–3) is amenable to an evolutionary treatment in terms of general capacities developed to evaluate quotidian modal claims. I compare (§4) this approach to a recent suggestion in a similar spirit by Christopher Hill and Timothy Williamson, emphasizing counterfactual conditionals instead of quotidian modals; I argue that while there are some reasons to prefer the quotidian modals approach, there are none favoring the Hill/Williamson counterfactual approach. I conclude (§5) with a suggestion that the remaining questions both approaches leave unanswered ought not to be too troubling
Antirealism and the conditional fallacy : the semantic approach
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Is there a reliability challenge for logic?
There are many domains about which we think we are reliable. When there is prima facie reason to believe that there is no satisfying explanation of our reliability about a domain given our background views about the world, this generates a challenge to our reliability about the domain or to our background views. This is what is often called the reliability challenge for the domain. In previous work, I discussed the reliability challenges for logic and for deductive inference. I argued for four main claims: First, there are reliability challenges for logic and for deduction. Second, these reliability challenges cannot be answered merely by providing an explanation of how it is that we have the logical beliefs and employ the deductive rules that we do. Third, we can explain our reliability about logic by appealing to our reliability about deduction. Fourth, there is a good prospect for providing an evolutionary explanation of the reliability of our deductive reasoning. In recent years, a number of arguments have appeared in the literature that can be applied against one or more of these four theses. In this paper, I respond to some of these arguments. In particular, I discuss arguments by Paul Horwich, Jack Woods, Dan Baras, Justin Clarke-Doane, and Hartry Field
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