R.J. Rummel: An Assessment of His Many Contributions

genocide; democracy; libertarianism; peace; Cold Wa

Cognitive Theory of War: Why Do Weak States Choose War against Stronger States?

The key question to be addressed in this paper is why weaker states with a slight chance of winning do not avoid war against stronger states. Even though most war theory does offer a few insights about the conditions under which weak states choose war when there is only a slight possibility of winning, explanations based on either emphasis on rationality or ignorance of “interacting structure” of international relations leave many practical remedies unexplained. This paper explains asymmetric conflict on the combination of Prospect theory and Game theory. The interacting game structure of asymmetric conflicts can be summarized. Under the threat of massive retaliation by a strong state, a weak state is forced to choose between war (defection) and withdrawal (cooperation). In asymmetric conflicts, defection (war against a strong state with a slight chance of winning) is a risky gamble, and cooperation is safe choice. In contrast to Expected Utility theory, this paper argues that weak states in a loss frame chooses risky war (defection) against a superior adversary in the hope of recovering from their crisis. This paper follows crisis analyses of other Prospect theorists. The nature and seriousness of the crisis of a weak state are analyzed. The rare occurrence and deviant characteristics of a weak state’s war choice make it suitable to use a qualitative structured analysis. The research hypothesis is applied to three case studies: the Gulf War between Iraq and the United States-led alliance in 1990, the Falkland/Malvinas Island war between Argentina and the United Kingdom in 1982, and the Middle East War between Egypt and Israel in 1973. The implication of this study is that enforcing strategy based on superior capability is not a reasonable means to prevent a weak state in a loss frame from choosing war against superior adversary

Genocide in the Modern Age: State-Society Relations in the Making of Mass Political Violence, 1900-2015

This dissertation presents a new conceptual framework for understanding genocide and mass political violence. I build upon existing theories of mass violence that take into account motivations for committing mass atrocities, combine these with the task of counting civilian casualties, and propose a new framework based on the perpetrators’ socio-political standing in society. This model develops a four-part typology of perpetrators by examining the level of government participation and societal participation in the process of violence. Four patterns of perpetrators emerge from this deductive assessment of large-scale violence. These mass political violence perpetrator categories are: a) state perpetrators; b) state-society coalitions; c) state-sponsored groups; and d) non-state actors. Based on the evidence and analysis in this dissertation I found four central conclusions. First, perpetrator type implicitly limits the scope of violence and target group(s). Second, when assessing the severity and destructive power of each perpetrator category, we must use both absolute and relative thresholds. Neither on its own is sufficient for understanding why and how perpetrators target and eliminate vast segments of society. Third, based on this typological framework, there are variations between perpetrator categories (i.e., state perpetrators and state-society coalitions) and there is variation within each perpetrator category. The final conclusion is that scholars must question the so-called unitary role of the state when theorizing about genocide and mass political violence perpetrators. The role of state and society is not unitary nor as parsimonious as previous theories of mass violence suggest

Democracy under stress: The global crisis and beyond

This book focuses on the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 and its implications for democracy. Why and how did the crisis come about? Are there any instructive lessons to be drawn from comparisons with the Great Depression of the 1930s? What are the democratic response mechanisms to cope with serious crises? Do they work? Is China a new trend setter? Do values matter? Are global democratic rules a possibility? These are some of the key questions addressed in the volume

Democracy under stress

This book focuses on the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 and its implications for democracy. Why and how did the crisis come about? Are there any instructive lessons to be drawn from comparisons with the Great Depression of the 1930s? What are the democratic response mechanisms to cope with serious crises? Do they work? Is China a new trend setter? Do values matter? Are global democratic rules a possibility? These are some of the key questions addressed in the volume

Theorizing \u27Transitional Justice\u27

Early literature in the field of transitional justice was dominated by debates over the meaning of justice, with retributivists arguing for the need for criminal prosecutions following mass human rights violations and advocates of restorative justice claiming that non-prosecutorial forms of justice like truth-telling are better suited for post-conflict societies. This debate was eventually settled, at least in the field, by a belief that post-conflict societies require both criminal prosecutions and truth-telling. More recently, the debate over justice has centred on the question of whether the field and practice of transitional justice has prioritized civil and political rights over economic and social rights. While this is a significant development in the field, it points to a more fundamental reality. Debates over justice are interminable. To try to sculpt justice to fit a preconceived definition limits its capacity to respond to the needs of survivors. This realization serves as the starting point for this project—that justice must remain open to re-interpretation for it to maintain its relevance in post-conflict societies. There is, however, a central problem in the field: Transitional justice implies a justice that is in the service of the transition. What this suggests, then, is that the debates over justice, or, the justice question, have been substantially circumscribed by the transition question, thereby limiting the possible definitions of justice. While the justice question has received a great deal of attention, this project suggests that if debates over justice are to indeed remain interminable, the more fundamental concern of the field should be the way the transition question has, in fact, shaped our theorizing about justice

Transgovernmental Networks and Regional Integration in Europe and South America

This research aims to understand the influence of sub-units of state bureaucracy (transgov-ernmental networks) dealing with foreign policy and defence issues to regional political inte-gration using the case-studies of the European Union, Mercosul, Andean Community and Unasul. Discovering the variables that influence integration in two different regions with dif-ferent characteristics, might offer a comprehensive view of how regional political integration begins and develops. Besides we also open the window of intra-regional comparision ex-plaining why in the Southern Cone political cooperation is much more advanced than between the Andean countries. With this in mind, this research aims to contribute to move the theoretical discussion on regional integration beyond the dichotomical divide between inter-governmentalism and supranationalism, offering a new perspective on how to understand the logic of integration in the very sensitive issue areas of Foreign Policy and Defence. In this sense, this research ultimately aims to contribute to understand how political elites dealing with the issue areas of foreign policy and defence are replicated and socialized and their impact in the process of integration. This task will be fulfilled in this research by opening the black box of interest and identity formation, observing from where agent interests come from and the agents’ interaction with institutional structures. Through an emphasis on argu-ing/deliberation and appropriate behaviour driven by complex learning processes and social-ization, we argue that both agents have an impact in the institutionalization process and that institutions have deeper effects on the core properties of agents, thus affecting meanings, interests and identities. It is possible to identify three main venues of research deriving from this dissertation. These research possibilities stem from the conclusion that regional integration processes are in fact influenced by the role played by transgovernmental networks. Thus, we observe that this research raises questions for the study of sovereignty, democracy/accountability, and re-gionalism

Paths to Democracy, the Post-Cold War and 21st Century New Standard of Civilization, the New Wave Expansion of International Society: China, South Korea and Iraq

In my dissertation, I examine two main research questions: 1. Can we regard democracy as the new standard of civilization and the new wave expansion of international society in the post-Cold War era and in the 21st century? and 2. Should we think that each path toward democracy is relatively different based on the characteristics of each international society and the internal and external variables of each state? In my dissertation, I use typology to demonstrate that each country has taken its own unique path toward democracy, and that democracy has become the post-Cold War and 21st century new standard of civilization and new wave expansion of international society. A pluralist international society, a solidarist international society, and a liberal anti-pluralist international society have influenced paths toward democracy, along with institutions such as international law, diplomacy, Great Powers and international organizations. In addition to those, internal variables such as each country\u27s history, culture, politics, economy, military power and foreign policy can also influence paths toward democracy. However, in my dissertation, I primarily focus on the characteristics of international society and institutions rather than internal variables in order to examine the different paths toward democracy. Case studies on countries such as China, South Korea, and Iraq can help demonstrate that each type of international society as well as external and internal variables can have an impact on paths toward democracy. In the case of China, democratization can be viewed in the context of interest-oriented socialization. In South Korea, it can be viewed as value-oriented socialization, and, finally, in Iraq, it can be viewed as the use of force. To conclude, democracy is gradually becoming the post-Cold War and 21st century new standard of civilization and new wave expansion of international society, and each country\u27s path toward democracy is relatively different based on each circumstance

Human rights and regionalism in Southeast Asia

I have two aims in this dissertation. The first is to record an extraordinary period of human rights institution-building in Southeast Asia. This period began in 2007, with the signing of the Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The Charter explicitly links the purpose of ASEAN with the strengthening of democracy and the protection of human rights and provides for the establishment of an ‘ASEAN Human Rights Body’. This body was established in 2009, as the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights. The Commission’s first task was to draft the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, which was completed and adopted by ASEAN Heads of State in November 2012. In the context of the political diversity of Southeast Asia, the region’s historical resistance to international human rights law, and the long shadow cast by the ‘Asian Values’ debate of the 1990s, I ask the following questions: What factors explain the establishment of these institutions? How deep is ASEAN’s new commitment to human rights and democracy? What do these institutions augur for the way rights are realised in Southeast Asia? My second aim is to explore and test my theory that regional institutions possess a particular legitimacy in the promotion and protection of human rights. The theory is driven by a simple observation. Since the end of World War II, the discourse of human rights has become, to borrow a phrase used by Charles Beitz, ‘the common moral language of global society.’ Yet the original post-World War II vision of a legalised international human rights order (with judicial oversight, mechanisms for enforcement, and sanctions for non-compliance) has faded. The global human rights system works by setting standards, which are then invoked (by domestic and international non-governmental organisations, members of civil society, political oppositions, the international community) to persuade, shame or coerce states into compliance. The problems are: change is very slow, many states (both predatory and decent) are resistant to influence, and in circumstances of exception (civil conflict, war, political crisis) when human rights are most vulnerable to abuse, the system is least effective. The failures of the global system are many and patent. On the other hand, states seem more willing to subscribe to binding norms promoted by regional organs of restricted membership. Regional systems now exist under the auspices of the Council of Europe, the Organisation of American States, the Organisation of African Unity, the League of Arab States and most recently, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Scholars have observed that there seems to be a ‘directness of association’ between members of regional organisations, which positively influences (or has the potential to influence) causal processes such as socialisation, binding, monitoring and enforcement. My theory is that regional factors such as smaller numbers, deeper levels of integration, greater consensus around the importance of certain societal values, similar geographic characteristics and shared economic and security interests, create the conditions for legitimate governance. I test my theory using a case study of Southeast Asia and its new institutions. In the end, my conclusion is that in circumstances where regions possess low levels of democracy, then regional human rights systems do not possess a particular legitimacy. The nature of democracy, the relationship between democracy and human rights, and the deficit of democracy in Southeast Asia are at the heart of my explanation about why Southeast Asia’s nascent human rights system (currently) lacks legitimacy