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PATHS TO DEMOCRACY, THE POST-COLD WAR AND 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY  
NEW STANDARD OF CIVILIZATION, THE NEW WAVE EXPANSION OF  
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY: CHINA, SOUTH KOREA AND IRAQ

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A Dissertation

Presented to

the Faculty of the Josef Korbel School of International Studies

University of Denver

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In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

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by

Jaewon Lee

November 2012

Advisor: Jack Donnelly

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Author: Jaewon Lee

Title: PATHS TO DEMOCRACY, THE POST-COLD WAR AND 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY  
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## ABSTRACT

In my dissertation, I examine two main research questions: 1. Can we regard democracy as the new standard of civilization and the new wave expansion of international society in the post-Cold War era and in the 21<sup>st</sup> century? and 2. Should we think that each path toward democracy is relatively different based on the characteristics of each international society and the internal and external variables of each state? In my dissertation, I use typology to demonstrate that each country has taken its own unique path toward democracy, and that democracy has become the post-Cold War and 21<sup>st</sup> century new standard of civilization and new wave expansion of international society. A pluralist international society, a solidarist international society, and a liberal anti-pluralist international society have influenced paths toward democracy, along with institutions such as international law, diplomacy, Great Powers and international organizations. In addition to those, internal variables such as each country's history, culture, politics, economy, military power and foreign policy can also influence paths toward democracy. However, in my dissertation, I primarily focus on the characteristics of international society and institutions rather than internal variables in order to examine the different paths toward democracy. Case studies on countries such as China, South Korea, and Iraq can help demonstrate that each type of international society as well as external and internal variables can have an impact on paths toward democracy. In the case of China, democratization can be viewed in the context of interest-oriented socialization. In South Korea, it can be viewed as value-

oriented socialization, and, finally, in Iraq, it can be viewed as the use of force. To conclude, democracy is gradually becoming the post-Cold War and 21<sup>st</sup> century new standard of civilization and new wave expansion of international society, and each country's path toward democracy is relatively different based on each circumstance.

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## Introduction

Democracy itself has been one of the big topics in the departments of Political Science and even in the departments of International Relations. In particular, since the end of the Cold War, democracy has attracted more and more attention in the academic arena, as in reality the end of the Cold War gave a greater opportunity of the spread of freedom even at the corner of international society than ever. Democracy is recognized as a global phenomenon, and we can even say that democracy can be strongly felt as one of the predominant norms of international society and even as the emerging new standard of civilization.

In my project, I will regard democracy as the criterion of full membership in international society. I will describe democracy as the 21 century new standard of civilization and as the new wave expansion of the international society.<sup>1</sup> Also, as many English School scholars take on, in my dissertation, I will use the metaphor of circles, such as insider/democracy and outsider/non-democracy.<sup>2</sup> I will show how the inner circle has been widened, as the outer circle has been diminished. In addition, I will use three international societies – i.e. pluralist international society, solidarist international society, and liberal anti-pluralist international society - which can have an impact on paths toward democracy. Due to three international societies, we can see

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<sup>1</sup> Gong uses the concept of civilization as the criteria for the full membership into international society. By using the concept of the standard of civilization, he attempts to show how Japan, China, and Siam became the members of international society in the nineteenth century. See Gerrit W. Gong (1984).

<sup>2</sup> The mechanism of two circles can be traced into Hugo Grotius's approach to international relations and more deeply into James Lorimer's approach to international relations. See, for more detail, Lorimer (1883), Bull (1977), Buzan and Segal (1998), Buzan (1996), Buzan (2004a), and Simpson (2004).

three general types of paths toward democracy – interests, legitimacy, and force. For example, China has become gradually democratic, though slow, in its pursuit of its national interests, since China belongs to a pluralist international society. In South Korea, people have authentically accepted democracy since that country belongs to a solidarist international society. Iraq was forced to adopt democracy since Iraq belongs to a liberal anti-pluralist international society.

Indeed, in my scheme, I will choose three cases, China, South Korea and Iraq, to examine whether or not democracy is the post-Cold War new standard of civilization, and further, to examine whether or not each state has its unique path toward democracy. These three cases will ultimately help examine how democracy has become the emerging new standard of civilization as well as the new wave expansion of international society. For instance, I will investigate whether or not three countries are heading toward democracy, and I will scrutinize “why” and “how possible” three countries will, or have become the full members of international society via adopting their own unique path toward democracy, if they are moving toward democracy. In this process, I will make an attempt to illustrate how internal and external variables can have a great impact on the unique path of each country toward democracy. I will conclude that democracy ultimately can be a universal norm along with human rights, but that each path toward democracy can be different on the basis of relatively different internal and external variables such as cultural, historical, political, economic and foreign relations as well as institutions, while emphasizing the fact that each different character of international society can have relatively different effects on each path toward democracy as well.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> As Anwar Ibrahim point outs, many scholars’ arguments can be parallel with my argument that each state has its own path toward democracy on the basis of various factors such as its own political, social



My dissertation is divided into five chapters and an appendix. In my dissertation, I will contend with two main research questions, “can we regard the democracy as the new standard of civilization in the post-Cold War era and in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, and as the new wave expansion of international society?” and, “can we think that each path toward democracy is relatively different, on the basis of the characters of each international society and the internal and external variables of each state?” Simultaneously, I will stress the distinguishing factors of each chapter. In Chapter I, first of all, I will introduce the English School as one of the emerging dominant international relation theories in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, and explain how it has greatly contributed to the study of international relations. Also, I will reveal its distinguishing characters, such as international society, the standard of civilization, Great Powers and outlaw states. And in Chapter I, importantly, I will be engaged in the debate among pluralist, solidarist and liberal anti-pluralist perspectives on international society, while displaying their relatively different basic frameworks. I will claim that each character of international society can be comprehended as an independent variable that can shape relatively distinct paths toward democracy. Finally, in Chapter I, I will attempt to investigate whether or not democracy can be recognized as an emerging new standard of civilization as well as the new wave expansion of international society. And, I will use the concept of democracy in an inclusive way rather than an exclusive way, while illustrating close connection between human rights and democracy, and disclosing reasons why I choose democracy rather than human rights as the emerging new standard of civilization.

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and cultural factors. But, they do not pay attention to external variables to which in my dissertation, I pay great attention. See Anwar Ibrahim (2006: 6).

In Chapters II-V, I will touch on external variables that can promote and consolidate democracy across international society. Chapters II - V incline to put emphasis on external variables. In terms of that, I can say that Chapters II-V really talk about the story concerning international relations' perspective on promotion and consolidation of democracy. In the academic arena, democracy has been a popular and predominant issue in comparative politics which has been obsessed with domestic factors rather than international relations. In my dissertation, as revealed above, I call immense attention to democracy as the new standard of civilization in the post-Cold War era and the 21<sup>st</sup> century. However, instead of comparative politics, I address international relation theory for illuminating democracy as the new standard of civilization. Unlike comparative politics, international relations theories (IR) incline to pay more attention to external factors than internal factors, though this does not necessarily mean that IR entirely disregards internal factors. In Chapters II-V, I will put enormous stress on the importance of external factors to investigate how they can affect each path toward democracy. Chapters II-V are relatively about international law (Chapter II), diplomacy (Chapter III), Great Powers (Chapter IV), and international organization (Chapter V). Each chapter will show how each institution can have a great impact on the promotion and consolidation of democracy and the path toward democracy, while stressing the fact that each institution will be ultimately essential in international society to manage international society and even augment the wellbeing of international society. Precisely speaking, in Chapter II, I will examine how international law can promote and consolidate democracy across international society. In Chapter III, I will explore how diplomacy can promote and consolidate democracy across international society. In Chapter IV, I will investigate how Great Powers can promote and consolidate democracy across international society. In

Chapter V, I will examine how international organizations can influence the promotion and consolidation of democracy across international society. I will conclude that democracy will be the post-Cold War and 21<sup>st</sup> century new standard of civilization and the new wave expansion of international society. In my dissertation, I will express how democracy is gradually becoming the new standard of civilization and the new wave of expansion of international society, but that each path toward democracy is relatively different on the basis of each circumstance.

Though in my dissertation, I emphasize external variables rather than internal variables for democratization, this does not necessarily mean that we can completely ignore internal variables. Thus, in an appendix, I will examine internal variables which can have an impact on paths toward democracy. As internal variables, I will touch on history, culture, politics, economy, military power and foreign policy. In the appendix, I will look into China's unique path toward democracy via internal variables; I will present South Korea's unique path toward democracy via internal variables; and I will uncover Iraq's unique path toward democracy via internal variables.

## **Chapter I. The English School and Democracy**

### **Introduction**

This chapter is divided into three parts. In Part I, I will investigate the English School. I will also attempt to divulge and underline the English School as the IR theoretical background for the promotion and consolidation of democracy. In my dissertation, indeed, I adopt the English School perspective for the following three reasons. First, I personally believe that the English School is wider and deeper than any other IR theory, and due to this reason, the English School is more able to explain international affairs than other IR theories. As a simple example, in comparison with social constructivism, the English School is seriously concerned with moral features in international society. Second, the English School can be used to understand the promotion and consolidation of democracy. Due to the English School's adoption of pluralistic methodology and interdisciplinary characteristics, we can observe international affairs via various spectrums, which can lead to more accurate assessment and explanation of them. With these distinguishing traits, we can use them for democratic development, since democratic development itself cannot be generalized with a single path. Third, in my dissertation, I intend to use English School's terminologies, like 'international society,' 'Great Powers,' 'the standard of civilization,' and 'outlaw states.' This is not only for my emphasis on democratic development, in particular, standard of civilization, but also, I put myself into the ring of the English School scholars such as Barry Buzan, Jack Donnelly,

Nicholas Wheeler, Richard Little, John Vincent, Andrew Hurrell, Gerry Simpson, Hidemi Suganami, Alex Bellamy, Gerrit Gong, and Tim Dunne.

Part I is composed of three sections. In the first section, I will start with the question, “*how can we define the English School ?*” I will define the English School, while comparing it with other IR theories. Also, I will briefly disclose the shared grounds and the differences between the English School and other IR theories. In the second section, I will look into the origin and evolution of the English School. The English School has a short history, around fifty years, but it has had fluctuation and has gradually transformed itself. Currently, its members are not limited to the UK, but they are more than 180 scholars across international society regardless of national, cultural and geographical differences. In the third section, I will focus on distinguishing traits of the English School, like ‘international society,’ ‘the standard of civilization,’ ‘Great Powers’ and ‘outlaw states.’ They will be very often used in the later chapters, when dealing with democratic development, which can help comprehend the promotion and consolidation of democracy. All in all, in Part I, I will reveal definition, origin, evolution and characters of the English School, which can help understand democratic development with which I will deal in later chapters.

In Part II, I will examine pluralist, solidarist and liberal anti-pluralist facets of international society as a whole and their relative impacts on paths to democracy in the era of the post-Cold War and the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. I will claim that international society in the 21<sup>st</sup> century reflects three aspects, pluralist, solidarist and liberal anti-pluralist facets rather than one of them alone, while revealing that how three different aspects, pluralist, solidarist and liberal anti-pluralist can have their relatively distinguishing impacts on paths to democracy. Also, in Part II, China, South Korea and Iraq can be taken to illustrate pluralist, solidarist, and liberal anti-pluralist paths

to democracy. Each has its unique path toward democracy, due to the relatively different character of the international society pressures they face as well as distinctive internal conditions. In general, English School scholars claim that international society can be characterized with pluralism or solidarism. There have been even debates on pluralism vs. solidarism among English School scholars. However, it is not enough for pluralism or solidarism to display international society properly. As for me, even both solidarism and pluralism are still short of proper assessment and explanation on international affairs, even though we might consider both of them, 'pluralism' and 'solidarism' simultaneously for international society. Thus, I add one more feature to pluralism and solidarism, which is called liberal anti-pluralism. I believe that all three façades of international society – i.e. pluralism, solidarism, and liberal anti-pluralism - can be better in evaluation and account of international affairs in international society. Thus, if asked about my perspective on international society, I would say 'co-existence of pluralism, solidarism and liberal anti-pluralism' within the whole international society, claiming that this is an apt way to study international relations, since not only one of them can describe international society in a proper way.

In Part II, I will focus on the concept of pluralism, solidarism and liberal anti-pluralism, and I will investigate how pluralist, solidarist and liberal anti-pluralist frameworks of international society as whole can have an impact on the promotion and consolidation of democracy. Under each different framework of international society, states tend to behave in relatively different ways, since each different structure as an independent variable can lead to a certain different pattern of behavior of states as dependent variables. This can be similar to Kenneth Waltz's emphasis on the role of structure. Kenneth Waltz claims that international structure can shave

and shove behavior of states and eventually produce a certain pattern of behaviors of states.<sup>4</sup> According to neorealist logic, different international structures bring out systematically different patterns of conflict (Waltz 1979 and Gowa 1999). Like Waltz's concept of the role of international structure, in my dissertation, pluralist, solidarist and liberal anti-pluralist structures of international society as whole have a relatively different impact on each state's behavior. In consideration of three different structures of international society, I will investigate how pluralist, solidarist and liberal anti-pluralist frameworks can have an effect on democratic development across international society. In the process, we can expect that certain different strategies can be squeezed out in order to promote and consolidate democracy. Below, I will scrutinize pluralism, solidarism and liberal anti-pluralism, disclosing different paths toward democratic development on account of them. I will look into whether or not the concept of the standard of civilization can be applicable to each of them as well. Further, I will investigate three cases, China, South Korea, and Iraq in order to help comprehend how pluralist, solidarist and liberal anti-pluralist frameworks can have an impact on democratic development across international society.

In Part III, I will deal with the question, "is democracy becoming the new wave expansion of international society and the new standard of civilization in the post-Cold War era and the 21<sup>st</sup> century?" I will examine the concept of democracy, and demonstrate democracy as the new wave expansion of international society and the new standard of civilization in the post-Cold War era and the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In other words, in Part III, I will attempt to examine whether or not, why, and how

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<sup>4</sup> See, for more information, Kenneth Waltz (1979)

possibly democracy has become the Post-Cold War and 21<sup>st</sup> century standard of civilization as well as the new wave expansion of international society. In the post-Cold War era and the 21<sup>st</sup> century, democracy has been a more and more predominant norm of international society. Currently, more than 65% of the 192 states in international society can be called democracy. This implies that democracy can be called a new global phenomenon in the late 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> century, in particular, when considering that in 1970s there were less than 30 democratic states across international society.<sup>5</sup> Also, according to the United Nations, between 1980 and 2002, 81 states experienced a transition from authoritarianism to democracy (Morton, 2005:521). This conveys the clear message that democracy has gradually become the new wave expansion of international society and the emerging new standard of civilization. In Part III, I will demonstrate that democracy should be recognized as the new wave expansion of international society and the emerging new standard of civilization in the post-Cold war era and the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

## **Part I. English School**

### ***1> How can we define the English School ?***

If asked about what the English School is, I would say that the English School can be understood as one way to study for international relations, by adopting the dynamic mixture of several social sciences, such as political science, international law, history and sociology. Its methodology is considered as pluralistic. As a gate-keeper of the new-aged English School, Barry Buzan describes the methodology

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<sup>5</sup> In 1950, merely 14.3 of the countries in the world were democracies, which means 31% of the world's population. In 1990, the Freedom House estimated 46.1% of the nations in the world as democracies. See Dalton and Shin (2004:1). Also, currently, there are more than 120 electoral democracies in the world, representing more than 63 percent of the world's states, or 59.6 percent of the global population. See, for more information, "Global Democracy Continues Forward March." *Freedom House*. Available at the website: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/article/global-democracy-continues-forward-march?page=70&release=90>



of the English School as pluralistic, emphasizing the co-existence of the international system (Machiavelianism, realism, positivism), international society (Grotianism, rationalism, hermeneutic interpretivism) and world society (Revolutionary Kantianism, liberalism, critical theory).<sup>6</sup> In terms of interdisciplinary character, originally, Hedley Bull invited various scholars and practitioners to the British Committee, due to its lack of scholars in International Relations during its early period and due to its need for contact among people with different training and different perspectives.<sup>7</sup> This has gradually become one of the English School's key methods to study for international relations.<sup>8</sup>

The English School is not very different from American IR theories. Instead, the English School has shared some common ground with American mainstream constructivism and post-structuralism.<sup>9</sup> In consideration of constructivism, let's recall the English School scholars' works that reveal some facets of constructivism. For instance, Martin Wight personified the sovereign state, and

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<sup>6</sup> Machiavelianism, Grotianism and Revolutionary Kantianism as three traditions were introduced by Martin Wight (1992). Here, as Suganami points out, we should not be confused with terms, rationalism. Here, rationalism (Grotian) is quite different from rationalism in the American IR according to which states are the key actors and rational utility-maximizers. Rationalism (Grotian) implies a considerable degree of order and justice. See Linklater and Suganami (2006:29, 42). Also, see, for more information concerning American IR's rationalism, Keohane (1989). And, see, for more information concerning Grotian rationalism, Suganami (1983).

<sup>7</sup> See Adam Watson (1998).

<sup>8</sup> Suganami claims that English School's investigation into world politics can be categorized into three ways as structural, functional and historical. Structural investigation can be seen in Manning (1962), James (1986) and Bull (1977). Functional investigation can be seen in Bull (1977), and Vincent (1974) and (1986). Historical Investigation can be seen in Wight (1977), Bull and Watson (1984), Gong (1984), and Watson (1992). Suganami is really good at categorizing three investigations to world politics. However, in my dissertation, I do not deal with these three ways to study of international society much, even if you will notice these aspects in my dissertation, in particular, case studies. See, for more detail, Suganami (2001b:404), and Linklater and Suganami (2006: 43-80).

<sup>9</sup> Ole Waever claims that ES has shared some common grounds with social constructivism and post-structuralism. See, for more information, Waever (1999).

had been well aware of international society as the outcome of social construction, that is, a social fact, believing that international society emerges within common culture alone (Wight 1966, Buzan 1993, and Dunne 1995). Hedley Bull's concept of international society exhibits his constructive thinking. Bull mentions:

A society of states (or International Society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions (Bull, 1977: 13).

The above reveals the holistic and interpretive view of the social world (Dunne, 1995: 382), and this also discloses that cultural change shapes perceptions of different common interests in a context of coexistence and cooperation (Devlen, James and Ozdamar, 2005: 182). As for Bull, this implies that identity and interests are derived from social practice (Dunne, 1995: 384). Thus, his concept of anarchy indicates that the highly cooperative form of behavior is possible even in anarchy, which is shared with a mainstream constructivist Alexander Wendt (Dunne, 1995:372). We can even assume that international environment can be, in a large part, defined as "what states make of it" in Wendt's terms.

However, the above does not necessarily mean that the English School can be reduced into Social Constructivism. As a matter of fact, the English School shares some common ground with Realism as well. In the English School's methodology, we can perceive the legacy of realism. English School scholars, in general, express that international relation should be observed in a conversation among three traditions of thought, realism, rationalism and liberal revolutionism. Martin Wight, Hedley Bull and Barry Buzan stress the co-existence and conversation of three traditions of thought in international society. At this point, we can see that

realism is one of the English School's key tendencies.<sup>10</sup> Wight adopts Machiavellianism to describe one aspect of the international environment, an international system in which immorality is one of predominant characteristics.<sup>11</sup> And Wight acknowledged it as international anarchy which is one of the fundamental causes of war (Wight, 1949:33). Also, more obviously, in his inaugural paper to the British Committee in January 1959, "Why is There no International Theory?" Wight's realist thought can be easily found.<sup>12</sup> He made a reference to the contrasting dichotomy between political theory and international theory. He claims that political theory is on the basis of progress and justice, whereas international theory is on the basis of recurrence and of intellectual and moral poverty.<sup>13</sup> This articulates that his perspective on the international environment is pretty much realist. Also, his work, "Power Politics" clearly proves that Wight can be recognized as a realist. In his work, Wight stresses the significance of power in international politics. He puts power prior to morality, even if he does not completely disregard the role of morality. He mentions, "in International Politics, moral forces are never effective

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<sup>10</sup> Some English School scholars in particular, Herbert Butterfield, Martin Wight and Hedley Bull can be clearly recognized as classical realists. Here, I did not deal with Butterfield's classical realist thought, but he can be obviously put into a classical realist camp. For instance, in his work, "Christianity and History," he stresses the negative human nature. See, for more information, Butterfield (1949).

<sup>11</sup> Wight's Christianity might be closely related with his adoption of Machiavelism for international system. As Sean Molloy put it, Wight's concept of pessimistic and immoral international environment might be rooted in his Christianity, such as original sin. See Molloy (2003)

<sup>12</sup> However, I have to admit that Wight's deep intention to show such dichotomy of internal and external arenas is ultimately to claim that ethics and morality should be considered in international society. In other words, Wight has intention to show that progress is possible in international society. Nonetheless, in general, we cannot deny that along with such dichotomy, Wight could be put into the category of realist camp.

<sup>13</sup> Jao Marques de Almeida, however, rejects the assumption of Martin Wight's realist tendency. Jao Marques de Almeida claims that his inaugural paper implies Martin Wight's stress on the necessity of rationalism in order to explain the nature of international society. See Jao Marques de Almeida (1999).

unless they are backed by power” (Wight, 1949:29). All of these obviously display Wight’s classical realist thought which can be shared with Hans Morgenthau. Like Wight, Bull can be also put into a realist camp as well. Bull’s early work, “the Control of the Arms Race”(1961) reveals Bull’s great interest in international security, via dealing with nuclear disarmament. Also, in his work, “The Anarchical Society”(1977), Bull did not only reject utopianism, but also adopted the anarchical nature, that is, the absence of an international government, as international environment. On the whole, we can perceive the legacy of realism in the English School.

As Bull and Wheeler put it, however, there are clear distinguishing lines between realism and the English School. For instance, in terms of rule, as for the English School, if states break the rules, they recognize that they owe other states an explanation of their conduct in rules which they accept (Bull, 1977: 45 and Wheeler, 2000: 24). By contrast, as for realism, the rules are just instrumental for their own interests, nothing more than that. Unlike realism, the English School states that whether or not states are Great Powers or Small Powers, they have their duties for international society. To put it differently, in international society, states conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in terms of their relations with one another (Wheeler, 2000: 25). This aspect can be hardly found in realist logic. At this juncture, my point is that we should keep in mind that the English School is based on the conversation of three traditions, Machiavelian realism, Grotian rationalism and Kantian revolutionism. In other words, we cannot reduce the English School into realism. Also, Hedley Bull’s nature of anarchy is different from Thomas Hobbes’s nature of anarchy that reflects war of all against all. In Hedley Bull’s concept of anarchy, a certain level of cooperation among sovereign states and

society without government can be expected. As James put it, Bull's concept of international society can be understood as a quasi-society, which means the combination of genuine society and anarchy (James, 1993:281-283). As a matter of fact, most English School scholars greatly emphasize international society as international environment, which can be rarely found in realist logic. They even claim that the role of international law should be recognized as a significant institution in such international society. In general, the emphasis on the role of international law and the concept of society can be characterized as the English School's strong Grotian rationalist tradition.

Grotian tradition rebuffs *Realpolitik* as well as the international state of nature in which there is no binding obligation in the relations among sovereign states (Bull, 2000:98).<sup>14</sup> Instead, it asserts the existence of international society and of law in which there is binding obligation in relations among states.<sup>15</sup> Unlike realists, Grotius greatly stresses the rule of morality and the rule of law in international society. At this juncture, Grotius's concept of international society is not only a society of states, but also the society of all human kind (Bull, 1990:83).

Indeed, Bull said "the central Grotian assumption is that of the solidarity, or potential solidarity, of the states comprising international society, with respect to the enforcement of the law" (Bull, 1966: 52). When considering that Grotian tradition greatly puts emphasis on the role of the law and the high possibility of cooperation, that is, solidarity, the English School is clearly different from realism. Also, the English School's emphasis on ethical and philosophical aspects can be distinguishing

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<sup>14</sup> Also, as Suganami points out, Grotius argued that even in the absence of a higher authority, the relations of sovereigns are subject to legal constraints. See Linklater and Suganami (2006), or Grotius (1646/1925).

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.


from social constructivism which has never cared about ethical and philosophical questions such as order, justice or humanitarian intervention.<sup>16</sup> In particular, when considering John Vincent's, Jack Donnelly's and Nicholas Wheeler's deep concern about human rights, pretty much, we can say that the English School is different from social constructivism, even though as mentioned above, constructivism and the English School are deeply aware of the significance of idea. However, when considering that classical realists like Thucydides and neo-classical realists like Randall L. Schweller, Thomas J. Christensen and William Curti Wohlforth are also concerned with ethical and philosophical questions, they have shared some ground with English School scholars. On the whole, the English School can be understood with constructivism and realism in a certain way, but it is not accurate to say that the English School can be reduced to social constructivism or realism. The English School is more than just social constructivism and realism.<sup>17</sup> Ole Waever attempts to draw the location of the English School between a materialist position and a socially-constructed position.

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<sup>16</sup> See Andrew Hurrell (1993).

<sup>17</sup> In fact, Suganami attempts to show the distinguishing points between 'English School' and 'Conventional IR theories or Social Constructivism.' He mentions, using Bull's approach as the center of the English School's approach: "Bull's approach differs from realism and neo-realism mainly in drawing special attention to the relevance of rules, norms, common understandings and mutual expectations in understanding international politics; it differs from neo-liberal institutionalism in stressing the importance, to the growth of international cooperation, of the historically evolved sense of community among states; and it differs from constructivism in its interest in the actual historical evolution of the institutions of international society, the special importance it attaches to international law as a concrete historical practice, and the extent to which it draws attention to the brute material facts as constants on practice as well as its analysis"(Linklater and Suganami, 2006:83, fn. 1). The above is a short summary for the distinctions between English School and conventional IR or constructivism., which is very easy to understand each's distinguishing aspects.

**Fig. I.**



Source: Ole Wæver's paper "The English School's Contribution to the Study of International Relations, presented at the 24<sup>th</sup> Annual Conference of the BISA, 1999

As shown in Fig. I., we can see that the English School is located between classical realism and mainstream constructivism. We can perceive that the English School should be more than simply realism or social constructivism. This is one of reasons why I choose the English School, and I apply it to the promotion and consolidation of democracy. Also, with this reason, in a later section. *Main Characters of the English School*, I will demonstrate that the English School is deeper and wider than any conventional IR theories and social constructivism, while illustrating that it has gradually become one of predominant IR theories in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

## **2> *The Origin and Evolution of the English School.***

In this section, I will primarily investigate the origin of the English School and its evolution. When tracing the root of the English School, at first, I can perceive that today the English School is not able to be present in the absence of the British Committee's achievement as well as in the absence of E.H. Carr's and Charles Manning's works. E.H. Carr and Charles Manning significantly influenced the British Committee members' works as well as new-aged English School scholars' works. Carr's historically oriented perspective and his emphasis on the dynamic mixture of realism/power and utopianism/morality can be easily found in the works of Classical English School scholars, like Martin Wight, and of new-aged English School scholar, Barry Buzan. For instance, we can think of Martin Wight's three

traditions, Machiavellism (realism), Grotianism (rationalism) and Kantianism (revolutionsim) to study for international relations. Barry Buzan also claims that in English School perspectives, the international system, international society, and world society are in continuous co-existence and interplay (Buzan 2004a:10). As we can see so far, E. H. Carr's works have directly or indirectly influenced both classical and new-aged English School scholars' works. As Tim Dunne put it, we should keep in mind that E.H. Carr's contribution to the English School is to "provoke English School writers into seeking a via media between realism and utopianism"(Dunne,1998:38). Also, we should recognize that since we cannot disregard one of them, conflict or cooperation in studying international relations, one fundamental aspect of English School, 'a via media' reflects that in international study, theory and practice should be simultaneously considered as well. Due to this reason, we say that the English School is deeper and wider than any other IR theory.<sup>18</sup>

Along with E.H Carr, Charles Manning's contribution to English School cannot be diminished. Charles Manning's concept of international society can be seen in Hedley Bull's or Alan James's concept of international society (Wilson, 1989:53). His concept of international society is an anarchical but orderly social environment, and this influences Hedley Bull's concept of anarchical society (Suganami, 2001a and 2002:4-5). Also, Manning states "For the person of international society is typically a sovereign state and this by the nature of its constitution," while stressing a pluralist international society (Manning, 1962:166).

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<sup>18</sup> It is not wise to say that one theory is better than another theory since each theory has its unique merit. However, when considering that a better theory means its application to more cases in international politics in a proper way, we can say that English School should be understood as a better theory, in particular in the post-Cold War era.



This is clearly parallel with Bull's concept of a pluralist international society. Further, Manning's emphasis on the role of international law in management of international order and in well-being of international society have been found in many English School scholars' works, like those of Michael Byers, Christian Reus-Smit, Gerry Simpson and Thomas Franck. Along with international law, Manning puts stress on history as well (Suganami, 2001a: 91-107). When considering the English School's distinguishing aspects that are embedded in international law, history and philosophy, we cannot deny Manning's massive contribution to the English School.

As the foundation of the English School, the British Committee was set up in 1958 and its meetings were funded by the Rockefeller Foundation and the Ford Foundation.<sup>19</sup> The members of the Committee were composed of scholars from various disciplines, although they were mainly associated with the London School of Economics (LSE) and the Foreign Office. Its original members included Herbert Butterfield (modern history professor at Cambridge), Martin Wight (LSE), Adam Watson (diplomat), Hedley Bull (Australian Scholar), Donald MacKinnon (moral philosopher), Desmond Williams (diplomatic historian), F.S. Northedge, Robert Purnell, Michael Donelan, Michael Howard (military historian), William Armstrong (Treasury), John Vincent (Australian Scholar), Robert Wade-Gery (Foreign Office), and Noel Dorr (Foreign Office) (Dunne, 1998:94-95). In general, they are put in the category of classical English School scholars. Herbert Butterfield, Martin Wight, Adam Watson and Hedley Bull chronologically held the chair in the Committee (Czaputowicz, 2003: 5). The British Committee's main purpose was to study for

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<sup>19</sup> See Watson (1998).

the relations between states. To be precise, Herbert Butterfield revealed its purpose in his letter to Martin Wight.

Not to study diplomatic history in the usual sense, not to discuss current problems, but to identify the basic assumptions that lie behind diplomatic activity, the reasons why a country conducts a certain foreign policy, the ethical premises of international conflict, and the extent to which international studies could be conducted scientifically (Watson, 1998).

Along with this purpose, the British Committee consistently contributed to the study for international relations until its factual end with Hedley Bull's death in 1985.<sup>20</sup>

At the initial stage, the English School started with the British Committee. It has gone through four stages. From 1959 to 1966, the British Committee had been obsessed with the development of international society, and during this period, Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight were key contributors (Buzan, 2001:473). From 1966 to 1977, the system of states in a world historical context and anarchical society along with its emphasis on the nature of Western international society had great attention, and Martin Wight and Hedley Bull were main contributors (Buzan, 2001:473). From 1977 to 1992, the British Committee had been transformed into the English School. The English School received its own official name from Roy Jones (Buzan, 2001: 473). From 1992 to the present, the English School has renovated itself and the new-aged English School has emerged. At present, the new-aged English School scholars have adopted the classical English School and added more to the direction of the classical English School. They are Andrew Hurrell, Andrew Linklater, Barry Buzan, Alan James, Alex Bellamy, Chris Brown, Edward Keene, Gerrit Gong, Gerry Simpson, Hidemi Suganami, Jack Donnelly (the chair of my dissertation committee), James Mayall, Johnes Roy, Michael Byers,

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid

Nicholas Wheeler, Richard Little, Robert Jackson, Timothy Dunne, Yannis Stivachtis, Yongin Zhang and others.<sup>21</sup> In this section, I attempted to very briefly reveal the origin and historical mainstream of the English School. In the next section, I will reveal the distinguishing characters of English School in order to explain why I adopt the English School and apply it to the promotion and consolidation of democracy.

### ***3> Main Characters of English School***

In section 1, I briefly mentioned some distinguishing aspects of the English School, but here, I want to disclose other primary traits of the English School. When considering the facades of the English school, we can easily discern ‘international society,’ ‘the standard of civilization,’ ‘Great Powers’ and ‘outlaw states,’ as the English School’s distinguishing characters. First, let’s take a quick look at the concept of international society. Conventional IR theorists such as the neo-realists describe the international environment with the concept of anarchy that is a Hobbesian self-help system or war of all against all. However, the English School depicts the international environment with the concept of international society. Nonetheless, it does not completely disregard the aspect of anarchy in the international arena. As for English School scholars, anarchy can be interpreted in a different way. Ronnie Lipschutz explains such character of anarchy well, by saying:

Anarchy has another meaning: the absence of any cohering principle, as in common standard of purpose. The conventional assumption in international politics and law is that if a system of rule does not have a centralized body enforcing the rules or law, there can be no cohering principles. This assumption of anarchy is maintained even when such a set of principles does exist and is subscribed to by a majority, because, it is argued, it is impossible to protect against ‘defection’ and the ‘free rider’ (Lipschutz, 1996:109).

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<sup>21</sup> See “English School.” Available at the website:  
<http://www.leeds.ac.uk/polis/englishschool/bibliojune05.doc>

Also, when considering Robert Axelrod's tit for tat strategy, we cannot only think of cooperation, but also social elements under the condition of anarchy.<sup>22</sup> In other words, as Lipschutz puts it, even states in anarchy do not act in a blank social vacuum (Lipschutz, 1996:109). Alexander Wendt is used to claiming that even self-help itself is a rule or an institution that can be endogenous to an international system (Wendt, 1992: 391-426). Thus, we can expect even some level of governance under anarchy, such as "governance without government" in James Rosenau's term. Governance refers to a system of rule on the basis of inter-subjective meanings (Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992: 4). At this juncture, the rule works only when it is accepted by the majority or by the most powerful of those, such as Great Powers it affects (Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992:4). At this juncture, my point is that anarchy itself does not necessarily mean the absence of social elements. We should not expect only the war of all against all or a self-help system from anarchy.

In consideration of social elements in international society, English School scholars like Hedley Bull introduced and have developed the notion of anarchical society since the late 1970s. English School scholars have increasingly stressed the concept of international society, and have been deeply obsessed with the concept of international society, which is ultimately distinguished from conventional IR theorists and social constructivists. As for them, international society itself must be prior to any other, since they began with the nature of international society as a primary groundwork for building up their theory. However, we should keep in mind that English School scholars do not disregard any one of three traditions, in order to study international affairs.

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<sup>22</sup> See Robert Axelrod (1984).

Second, the standard of civilization is one of the crucial semblances for the English School. The standard of civilization has been used as a criterion for the membership in international society. As Simpson puts it, it is a way of imposing a certain set of values on the international order, and it can be used as to determine who is the insider or the outsider of the core circle. At this juncture, I adopt Lorimer's metaphor, which reflects that an inner circle is civilization; an outer circle, barbarianism; and a further outer circle, savagery. Originally, James Lorimer divided humanity into three levels: civilized humanity, barbarous humanity and savage humanity.<sup>23</sup> Hugo Grotius, Martin Wight, Gerrit Gong and Barry Buzan follow his logic, dividing international society into the civilized society and the non-civilized society as well.<sup>24</sup> Barry Buzan does not use the standard of civilization to distinguish the insider from the outsider. However, Buzan divided the whole international arenas, into inner circles (core) and outer circles (periphery) on the basis of their level of development (Buzan, 1996:270-271). Further, he claims that each state can be relative insiders or outsiders to the extent that they share some of the values and participate in some of the regimes generated by the core (Buzan, 1996: 270-271). As Buzan puts it, when considering that the social structure of international system is described with core-periphery form, the core is relatively homogeneous than the periphery (Buzan, 2004a: 224-225). Here, some of the values which the core generates must be recognized as the standard of civilization. And the more states comply with the standard of civilization, the wider the core inside circle has expanded toward the outsider circles, barbarian and savage circles.

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<sup>23</sup> See James Lorimer (1883: 101)

<sup>24</sup> See, for more detail, Wight (1977), Bull (1977), Gong (1984) and Buzan (2004a).

When we face two questions “Who decides the standard of civilization?” and “How can the standard of civilization be determined?” we observe that the roles of the Great Powers in international society can answer those questions. The standard of civilization has usually been determined by Great Powers, and has reflected the predominant norm and value of the Great Powers. For example, in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, the compliance with international law itself reflected the norm and value of European Great Powers as the standard of civilization. Siam, Japan and China could be good examples to demonstrate that barbarian states could become full members of international society via their conformity to European-based international law.<sup>25</sup> In the post-war era, also, human rights could in the same way be perceived as the standard of civilization. After witnessing massacres during the world wars, the Great Powers became well aware of the significance of human rights, and pushed human rights as universal norms, which could be seen as the standard of civilization. Now, in the post-Cold War era and the 21<sup>st</sup> century, democracy can be possibly comprehended as the emerging new standard of civilization. As Fukuyama implied in “The End of History and the Last Man”(1992), the collapse of the communist bloc and that of the Soviet Union have been interpreted as the symbol of a great victory of democracy over communism. Also, since the end of the Cold War, two Great Powers, the US and the UK, have been in pursuit of the promotion and consolidation of democracy, for the well-being of international society beyond their narrow interests. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, many non-democratic states have increasingly become democratic, and we can say that democracy has become the emerging new standard of civilization. On the whole, my point is that the standard of civilization

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<sup>25</sup> See Gong (1984)

is the criterion for full membership in international society, and it is closely related to the predominant norm and value of the Great Powers.

Third, English School scholars are well aware of the significant roles of Great Powers in international society. English School's concept and roles of Great Powers are quite different from conventional IR theories', in particular, neo-realist concept of great powers. Bull defines the concept and role of Great Powers, and in his work, "The Anarchical Society," Bull states three characters of Great Powers. First, Great Powers themselves entail the existence of two or more powers comparable in status, and the existence of a club with a rule of membership (Bull, 1977:194). Second, the members of this club are all in the highest rank in terms of military strength (Bull, 1977:195). Third, Great Powers are powers recognized by others to have, and perceived by their own leaders and people to have, certain special rights and duties (Bull, 1977:196). The first one and the second one are shared with conventional IR theorists' concept of great powers. When focusing on Bull's third concept and role of Great Powers, the third one is a distinguishing line between English School's concept of Great Powers and conventional IR theories' concept of great powers. As he stresses special rights and duties of Great Powers, Hedley Bull attempted to stress the hierarchical relationship between Great Powers and Small Powers. In Gerry Simpson's term, we can call such a relationship the legalized hierarchy.<sup>26</sup> The legalized hierarchy is on the basis of mutual recognition between Great Powers and Small Powers, in order to boost up general interests for whole international society beyond Great Powers' narrow own interests.<sup>27</sup> At the moment, we should recognize

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<sup>26</sup>See Simpson (2004).

<sup>27</sup> Ibid

the significance of the role of 'recognition' in relationships among states in international society. As 'recognition' is one of the fundamental elements for sovereignty, one of the essential aspects for Great Powers is 'recognition' as well. Without mutual recognition between Great Powers and Small Powers, the status of Great Power cannot be materialized. Such recognition also determines distinctive duties and rights of Great Power and those of Small Powers. Also, via this aspect of Great Powers, we can assume that the idea of Great Power needs the presupposition of the idea of an international society which is in opposition to an international system (Bull, 1977, 202).

As Hedley Bull puts it, also, Great Powers have been recognized as institution along with the balance of power, international law, diplomacy and war, so as to maintain whole international society and even boost up the welfare of international society.<sup>28</sup> This can be hardly found in the neo-realist concept of great powers. This is one of the reasons why for Waltz, Nazi Germany is one of great powers but as for Bull, it is not a Great Power but an outlaw state which poses a great threat to international society and further to civilization itself.<sup>29</sup> In fact, Nazi Germany should be recognized as an outlaw state rather than Great power. Unlike Nazi Germany that can be categorized as an outlaw state, Great Power itself should imply more than just superior military or material capability. We should keep it in mind that Great Power should embrace mutual recognition of hierarchical relationships between Small Powers and Great Powers on the basis of their fitting right and duty. To be precise, Great Powers must be deeply concerned with general interests or common

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<sup>28</sup> See Hedley Bull (1977) and Bruce Cronin (1999, 2003).

<sup>29</sup> Like Hedley Bull, Gerry Simpson points out the same reason why Nazi Germany cannot be put into a category of Great Powers, even though it was militarily powerful enough to be called Great Power. See Simpson (2004).



good beyond their own narrow self-interests, for international society as a whole and in turn, they can be given special rights to manage the affairs of international society, which is to maintain order in international society and to augment the well-beings of the whole international society in the long run. As Andrew Hurrell puts it, Great Powers can manage order through various means such as diplomacy, conferences, missions and joint intervention, even if it is also hard to prevent any possibility of Great Powers' exploitation of hierarchical relationship at a certain level (Hurrell, 1999:254). However, in Great Powers' contribution to the order in international society and welfare of international society, we can see another distinguishing point between conventional IR theories and the English School. In other words, unlike neo-realist disregard of the close relationship between great power and international society, English School Scholars stress that Great Powers as an institution cannot be considered in the absence of the consideration of international society. Great Powers and international society have had mutually interdependent relationships. The rights of Great Powers can be guaranteed only within international society, and Great Powers would be meaningless without the existence of international society.<sup>30</sup> In turn, the duty of Great Powers is to manage international affairs in international society, that is, guaranteeing the existence of international society and even making international society better. Also, the nature and characteristics of international society reflects the main values and norms of Great Powers. On the whole, we can notice the inseparable relationships between international society and Great Powers. As for the English School, Great Powers are perceived as a meaningful and essential

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<sup>30</sup> See, for more detail, Bull (1977:196).

institution in order to maintain the international society and improve the wellbeing of international society. I will investigate more about Great Power in Chapter IV.

Fourth, English School scholars have broadly used the concept and characteristics of outlaw state. In my dissertation, I give more prominence to the concept of outlaw state in Gerry Simpson's term than to any other concept of outlaw state. As Gerry Simpson puts it, the outlaw state can be characterized as "indecent, illiberal and criminal" and they are classified into the outer circle (Simpson, 2004:5, and Rawls 1999). The outlaw state rebuffs predominant norms and values of international society, and so it is not qualified for appropriate membership in international society (Simpson, 2004:281). For example, Adolf Hitler's Germany, Saddam Hussein's Iraq and Kim Jong-Il's North Korea can be put into the category of the outlaw state, since they are obviously indecent, illiberal and criminal with their tendency to discount the predominant norms and values of international society altogether.<sup>31</sup>

The status of outlaw state implies the withdrawal of 'recognition' from the state, not to mention political and legal rights (Schwarzenberger, 1943:100). As Alan James puts it, when considering that one of the significant elements of sovereign statehood such as population, government, territory and international role

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<sup>31</sup> Here, I have to mention more about the concept of outlaw states. The indecent, illiberal and criminal states can be marked as outlaw states, but as Donnelly argues, failed or quasi state can be marked as the outlaw state as well. As for me, failed or quasi states belong to the circle of savage, since as savage itself can be hardly recognized as a full human being, quasi-state, failed or quasi states cannot be the full recognized sovereign states. Thus, if law is applied to the relations between states, the law can be hardly applicable to quasi-states or failed states. The circle of savage implies outlaw states, "state outside law." To sum up, outlaw states can be found in both categories of a barbarian circle and a savage circle. However, there are clear differences. The member of barbarian circle does not necessarily mean outlaw state all the time, since some members in the barbarian circle which have tendency to violate all predominant norms and values of international society on the routine basis, can be only outlaw states. But, in the savage circle, all members of a savage circle must be outlaw states.

is ‘recognition,’ the outlaw state is rejected statehood itself in international society.<sup>32</sup> In fact, as Thomas Franck implies, outlaw states can be excluded from using the UN Charter (Franck, 1991:169).<sup>33</sup> They could be denied legitimization and membership due to their violation of basic international norms and values (Franck, 1991:169). This can be interpreted in the way that the use of force can be possibly justified in dealing with outlaw states. Thomas Franck even says that “the horrendous sort of undemocratic regime” might warrant “implementation of collective military measures” under the Chapter VII of UN Charter, such as an analogue of Hitlerite Germany (Franck, 1991:170). However, in dealing with those states in international society, there are very few constraints on choices of methods to compel them to abide by the norms and values of international society. In international society, the principle of sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention have been still highly valued and respected in most places and of most times, but the sovereign right of the outlaw state can be easily overlooked. Especially, as Gerry Simpson put it (2004), it is more likely to happen whenever the outlaw state confronts Great Powers that have a sense of duty to maintain order and to enhance the wellbeing of international society. Great Powers, however, on and off should pay a high price when they are unable to legitimize the use of force to a majority of states in international society.<sup>34</sup> However, this shows that how outlaw states can be eventually transformed into full member states of international society, through the core inner circle members, in particular Great Powers’ imposition of the standard of civilization on them.

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<sup>32</sup> See, for more information, Alan James(1986).

<sup>33</sup> Thomas Franck mentions “pariah.” But I adopt his assumption of the use of force against the outlaw states. See Franck (1991).

<sup>34</sup>Gerry Simpson clearly made this point. Also, John Rawls share this view with Gerry Simpson. See, for more detail, Simpson (2004) and Rawls (1999).

So far, I have briefly presented the English School's distinguishing facets, such as international society, standard of civilization, Great Powers, and outlaw states. This indicates that the English School is different from conventional international relations theories and mainstream social constructivism. When considering that it can explain what conventional IR theories or social constructivism are reluctant to deal with or unable to do, I can say that the English School is one of predominant IR theories for its widening and deepening the range of IR. At this juncture, we can definitely say that these distinguishing facets of the English School have made significant contribution to the study for international relations. In the 21st century, the English School has already risen as the predominant grand theory in IR, and has been seriously getting more and more attention in the IR academic arena. Furthermore, it is even expected to recapture the glory that Martin Wight and Hedley Bull enjoyed.

## **Part II. Pluralist, Solidarist and Liberal Anti-Pluralist Facets of International Society as a Whole and Their Relative Impacts on Paths to Democracy in the Post-Cold War Era and in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.**

### ***1> Pluralism***

Pluralism leans toward the realist side of rationalism on the basis of state-centrism and empiricism, and respects the co-existence and the ethics of difference on the basis of consent among states. We can simply say that it is deeply embedded in several principles, such as co-existence, equal sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-intervention.

With its emphasis on the rule of co-existence, pluralism basically guarantees the preservation and cultivation of political and cultural differences, while respecting

the principles of non-intervention and equal sovereignty (Jackson 2000, Mayall 2000, Buzan 2004a). Pluralists such as Hedley Bull and Robert Jackson claim political and cultural diversity as a basic feature of international society (O'Hagan, 2005:215). It is quite noticeable that certain levels of toleration and respect of differences should be considered as one of the primary aspects of pluralism. Among English School scholars' works, we can easily notice that Hedley Bull's work "The Anarchical Society"(1977) and John Vincent's work, "Non-Intervention and International Order" (1974) are embedded in pluralist characters such as toleration and coexistence. On a pluralist line, Robert Jackson also claims that states should fulfill their domestic obligations towards their own citizens and comply with the norms of non-intervention and non-aggression in their external behavior as the essential morality of the society of states.<sup>35</sup>

In principles of equal sovereignty and non-intervention, let us look at the principle of equal sovereignty. As mentioned above, pluralism can be easily conceptualized with the principle of sovereignty, and the principle of sovereignty reflects the idea that all states have equal rights to self-determination that has become paramount in the formal conduct of states towards one another (Zheng, 2004:27, Krasner, 1999). To be precise, Simpson claims that sovereign equality is a guarantee of state autonomy in the domestic sphere, and pluralism and diversity in the international system as whole (Simpson, 2004:29). This concept of pluralistic equal sovereignty had been deeply advocated by many political philosophers. For instance, in a pluralist international society, equal sovereignty can be understood as Vattel's formulation "A dwarf is as much a man as a giant; a small republic is no less

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<sup>35</sup> See Robert Jackson (1990).

a sovereign state than the most powerful kingdom”(Butler, 1978: 52). This can be also understood in Hobbesian equality in which the weakest is strong enough to kill the strongest.<sup>36</sup> On the whole, in a pluralist international society, no matter whether they are big or small, all of them are treated as equal sovereign states. This emphasis on equality is one of primary aspects of pluralism.

In his work, “The Anarchical Society,” Bull’s priority of ‘order’ over ‘justice’ can be interpreted as one aspect of a pluralist international society. Because of this, many English School scholars such as Hedley Bull believe that pluralistic nature can reduce the level of violence in international society, when recalling the violence of the medieval world and the increased private violence that is derived from the decline of the territorial state.<sup>37</sup> Along with this line, Bull stresses the danger of humanitarian intervention in international society. As for Bull, the society of states had not experimented with the right of humanitarian intervention, because of an unwillingness to jeopardize the rules of sovereignty and non-intervention by conceding such a right to individual states (Bull, 1984: 193 and Wheeler, 2000: 29). This shows a fundamental aspect of a pluralist international society. So far, I have attempted to identify the principles of pluralism. We should not forget the key principles such as equality, sovereignty, ethics of domestic differences, co-existence, and non-intervention. In deliberation of pluralistic principles, below, I will investigate the relationships between pluralism and the standard of civilization, including the relationship between pluralism and the democratic development as the standard of civilization.

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<sup>36</sup> See Thomas Hobbes (1985)

<sup>37</sup> See Brad R. Roth (2003).

### ***1 A. Pluralism and Standard of Civilization (Democracy)***

In a pluralist international society, the concept of the standard of civilization can be rarely permitted, since the concept of the standard of civilization itself seems to violate pluralistic principles, the principle of sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention. In other words, the standard of civilization can hardly exist in a pluralist international society and cannot be applied to the members of a pluralist international society, even if it can be imposed on the outsiders/ non-members of a pluralist international society. In a pluralist international society, a type of regime cannot matter, whether or not Great Powers promote and consolidate democracy, due to ethics of domestic differences. In a pluralist international society, thus, any norm or value such as democracy and human rights can be hardly imagined as the standard of civilization. In particular, the imposition of the standard of civilization via the use of force is almost impossible to be expected in a pluralist international society. This is the general concept of the relationship between ‘the standard of civilization’ and ‘pluralism’

However, in my dissertation, I claim that the standard of civilization can be adopted even within a pluralist international society. In a pluralist international society, it is true to respect the ethic of differences on the basis of non-intervention and equality, which has made the relationships between the standard of civilization and non-intervention incompatible. However, we should not totally disregard cultural hierarchy in respect of pluralistic principles. In other words, even in a pluralist international society, every culture cannot be treated with equal value and respect, and some cultures can be recognized as superior whereas other cultures, inferior (O’Hagan, 2005: 209). As it is extremely hard to expect equal material capability among states in a pluralist international society, each culture should be

understood with a relatively different level of significance in a pluralist international society, such as Han's cultural superiority over others' in China – the Manchus conquered China in the 17<sup>th</sup> century and built the Qing dynasty, but Manchu culture has been absorbed into Han culture, disappearing. In short, we can perceive that some values and norms are more likely to become predominant than others. This indicates the possibility of certain values and norms as the standard of civilization, due to their superiority over others in a pluralist international society.

Also, certain values and norms as the standard of civilization in a pluralist international society can be facilitated by interest-based socialization and value-oriented socialization via a learning process. As David Armstrong points out, we should recognize how great the role of socialization has an impact on behaviors of states and on even domestic forms of government.<sup>38</sup> For instance, if democracy becomes an institution driven by the consent among states on the basis of 'rational calculation-oriented socialization and value-based socialization, democracy can eventually become one of the universal norms or even the standard of civilization. At this juncture, we can perceive that in a pluralist international society, there are its distinguishing ways to impose the standard of civilization. Instead of the use of physical force, interest-oriented socialization and value-based socialization can play significant roles in spreading certain norms or values of international society. Thus, in the process of the pursuit of certain interests and values via socialization, the alteration in the identity and character of states can be possibly expected. At this juncture, we can perceive how the identity and character of states have been gradually changed in a pluralist international society, and how it is possible to make

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<sup>38</sup> See David Armstrong (1993).



the promotion and consolidation of democracy as the standard of civilization, even in a pluralist international society. In this line, we can highly expect that democracy can become the emerging new standard of civilization even in a pluralist international society. Below, China's case can help comprehend how democracy can become the emerging new standard of civilization in a pluralist international society.

### ***1. B. Pluralism and China (Democratic Promotion)***

China's case can be helpful to understand democratic development as the emerging new standard of civilization in a pluralist international society, since China itself represents various pluralist aspects and its recent transformation reflects the high possibility of democratic development even in a pluralist international society. Nevertheless, China has been still slowly moving toward democracy. Such democratic development in China has been feasible via its distinguishing ways in a pluralist international society, which is quite different from the paths to promote and consolidate democracy in a solidarist international society or in a liberal anti-pluralist international society.

Let us briefly investigate general characteristics of China that reveals why China belongs to a pluralist international society. First, China has deeply cherished pluralistic principles, like non-intervention, equal sovereignty, order and co-existence rather than cooperation and justice. Nonetheless, as David Goldfischer (a member of my dissertation committee) points out, China is not always cherishing pluralistic principles, in particular when pluralistic principles can hurt China's national interests such as economic interests – e.g. the dispute over the Spratly Island. Since the Opium Wars (1839-42 and 1856-60), China has been very sensitive to Western Great Powers' interventions, and China has relished the traditional Westphalian system on

the basis of territorial integrity and political independence, with its emphasis on sovereign rights and on the logic of 'consent' among states. For instance, in 1999, China aggressively protested against the NATO bombing campaign in Serbia, insisting on a peaceful solution to the Kosovo crisis, with its stress on Yugoslavian sovereignty (Yunling, 2000:117-118).

Second, when considering China's physical power in international society, China can be classified in the category of great powers due to its material capability such as its huge territory, 1.3 billion massive population, economic power (the second largest economy in the world) and military power (around US \$90 billion in 2011 for defense budget). With its physical capability, China has more and more actively engaged in the international arena, in pursuit of its rank of Great Power, which can help achieve its past status as the Middle Kingdom in international society. As a matter of fact, as a regional power, it has been deeply engaged in regional affairs such as the nuclear issue of North Korea, which has facilitated stability and order in international society. China's status in international society can make it hard to expect the alteration in its identity and character via the use of force. Also, as mentioned in the above, it has been strongly opposed to any regime change in international society via military intervention, with its emphasis on the principles of non-intervention and equal sovereignty.<sup>39</sup> This denotes that China obviously belongs

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<sup>39</sup> Here, my point is that in terms of material capability alone, China can be put into a category of Great Powers. Nevertheless, as a matter of fact, China is becoming one of Great Powers in international society, in particular, when considering that recently China's Prime Minister Wen Jiabo has promised \$ 600 million in aid and loans to Cambodia, much of it earmarked for the construction of dams and bridges. See "China gives Cambodia \$600m in aid." *BBC News*. April 8, 2006. Also, when considering that China has been a leader of the third world countries, China has been deeply concerned about international society as a whole, even if China is still reluctant to fully accept human rights and democracy as predominant norms and values of international society. That is, for certainty, China cannot be fully recognized as one of Great powers, but it is one of a highly potential Great Powers.

to a pluralist international society in which democratization is highly likely to be accomplished via interest-based socialization rather than the use of force or interest-based socialization.

Third, China is not an outlaw state but an authoritarian regime. It has been very often criticized for its violation of human rights such as the Tiananmen Square massacre and the torture of the members of Falun Gong.<sup>40</sup> China has not yet fully permitted religious freedom and political freedom. However, China cannot be put into any category of “outlaw state” in Gerry Simpson’s term, which is an indecent, illiberal, and criminal state. Instead, China has been gradually engaged in international society, in particular, since Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 Open Door Policy, through its participating in various international organizations and peace-keeping operations, such as the U.N. Development Program (UNDP), World Trade Organization (WTO), the United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), with many other different international bodies.<sup>41</sup> Furthermore, China had been supporting the U.N peacekeeping operations such as in Cambodia, Somalia and East Timor, which displayed liberal traits and strengthened the principle of co-existence (Hempson-Johnes, 2005:715-717). All of these clearly indicate that China is not an outlaw state, but rather has been a progressively engaged state in international society, cherishing pluralistic principles.

All in all, when considering the above factors, such as China’s cherishing of pluralistic principles, its material capability, its status in international society and its

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<sup>40</sup> Falun Gong has been prohibited by Chinese government. Due to this, China could be described as more than authoritarian regime, that is, totalitarian regime, when considering that as Lawrence W. Beer put it, the guarantee of freedoms, like freedom of assembly is the most significant feature to distinguish democracy from the totalitarianism. See Larence W. Beer (1989).

<sup>41</sup> See Hempson-Jones (2005).

decent engagement in international society, we have to think of China's distinguishing path for its transformation toward democratic development. Unlike South Korea's case, a majority of Chinese are not likely to voluntarily pursue democratic norms and values yet, and unlike Iraq's case, no Great Power can impose democracy on China via its use of force.<sup>42</sup> To China, the pursuit of rational calculation-based socialization can be the primary mechanism to alter its behavior and language against international society and to transform its domestic facets, which can lead to the change in China's identity and character toward democratic development.

China's economic and political interests via its engagement in international society such as its participation in various international organizations, in its desire for Great Power status, can indirectly have an impact on China's behavior and language toward international society and can influence its identity and character. China's increasing engagement itself can make China gradually accept the norms and values of international society, which will be seen in later chapters. For instance, China's engagement in international society has pushed China to increasingly accept human rights and democracy, such as its 2004 Constitutional Reform. As in the post-Cold War era and in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, democracy has become a more predominant norm and value across international society, China's political liberalization has been expected, in particular when considering that China is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) that is one of democracy-supporting international organizations. This entails the feature that even in a pluralist international society, democracy can be the emerging new standard of civilization.

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<sup>42</sup> I will deal with South Korea and Iraq in the below.

## **2> *Solidarism***

Solidarism reflects deep concern with justice in international society and with protection of individuals and non-sovereign communities. It rejects pluralist primary principles such as territorial integrity and non-intervention, while denying the assumption that the state should be recognized as the primary authority over all matters within its own territory. It assumes that sovereignty itself should be recalled to be ultimately derived from people rather than anything else, and also that human dignity and individual rights should be deeply respected beyond state boundaries.<sup>43</sup> The European Union (EU) can be one solidarist example. In fact, Marti Koskenniemi characterized solidarism by a general aversion to the absolutism of individual rights and an emotional preference for social responsibility (Koskenniemi, 2001, 289). At this juncture, we can find something missing from pluralism, which is modern human rights culture and existence of an ethical international society (Linklater and Suganami, 2006:168). Thus, we can say that unlike Oppenheim's emphasis on positivism, solidarism is primarily based on Grotius's natural law and Kant's morality, like cosmopolitan moral principle, with its emphasis on moral community of human kind.<sup>44</sup>

However, at this juncture, I have to say that we should be careful in defining solidarism. There are several different kinds of solidarism, such as coercive and

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<sup>43</sup>Linklater and Suganami made a short good summery on the aspects of solidarism. See Linklater and Suganami (2006).

<sup>44</sup> The Covenant of the League of Nations, the Kellogg Briand Pact and the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg can be good examples to demonstrate the existence of solidarist international society. In the below, I will show more examples to advocate solidarism. But, here, also, I should mention the historical evolution of pluralist principles, and so we can observe more and more solidarist aspects of international society, in particular, when national boundaries have been increasingly more and more permeable for various reasons. However, one primary character of international society, pluralism cannot be expected to ultimately disappear and the other character of international society, solidarism cannot be expected to cover the international society either. In my dissertation, I emphasize on the co-existence of three primary characters of international society such as pluralism, solidarism and liberal anti-pluralism.

consensual solidarism in Andrew Hurrell's terms (Hurrell, 1998:31, Bellamy, 2005: 291). In this section, I will mainly cope with consensual solidarism, and I will divide the consensual solidarism into two different ontological solidarisms, individual-based solidarism and state-based solidarism. In general, solidarism can be comprehended as cosmopolitan theory, and it is ontologically based on individuals rather than states. This solidarism can be explained well with Westlake's doctrine:

while states are the immediate members of the society, men are its ultimate members....The duties and rights of states are only the duties and rights of the men who compose them...The consent of the international society to the rules prevailing in it is the consent of the men who are the ultimate members of that society (Westlake, 1914:78).<sup>45</sup>

At this juncture, we can perceive that solidarism is greatly influenced by natural law rather than positive international law. Also, solidarism itself reflects a broad degree of consensus and solidarity (Hurrell, 1998:26). Solidarism can be grasped as cooperation or convergence rather than just co-existence in which a pluralist international society is embedded.<sup>46</sup> Further, unlike the pluralist emphasis on the minimalist goal of enduring an orderly co-existence among states, solidarism underscores 'higher' goals such as international and cosmopolitan justice. The concept of justice can be one of the predominant aspects in a solidarist international society. Indeed, I do not completely deny the fact that justice tends to be given priority over order in a solidarist international society, whereas order is more likely to

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<sup>45</sup> The evidence of Kant's thought on English School can be seen in the limited progress such as the abolition of slave trade, disarmament and peaceful settlement of international disputes. Also, according to Kantian principle, human rights should be respected everywhere. See Linklater and Suganami (2006).

<sup>46</sup> In fact, I have to say that there are several kinds of solidarisms. Buzan mentions cooperation and convergence as relatively different kinds of solidarism. Andrew Hurrell also mentions two kinds of solidarism which is based on relatively on consensus and coercion. Further, Alex Bellamy mentions different kinds of solidarism. See, Buzan (2004a), Hurrell (1998), and Bellamy (2004). In my dissertation, I will adopt Buzan's concept of convergence as solidarism, when dealing with South Korea's unique path toward democracy. Nevertheless, it seems to be too strong.

be given priority over justice in a pluralist international society. As Nicholas Wheeler puts it, we should keep in mind the assumption that if pluralists stress how the rules of international society provide for an international order among states sharing different conceptions of justice, solidarists stress that individuals have rights and duties in international law, with common conceptions of justice (Wheeler, 2000:11). However, solidarists also concede that individuals can have these rights enforced only by states (Wheeler, 2000:11). Thus, as for solidarists, states must accept a moral responsibility to guarantee the security of their own citizens, but also the broader one of guardianship of human rights everywhere (Bull, 1966:30 and Wheeler, 2000: 12). Along this line, solidarists have been deeply concerned with the duty to avoid causing unnecessary mental and bodily harms and further to avoid indifference to the suffering of others or benefiting unfairly from their vulnerability (Linklater and Suganami, 2006:256).

As known as taboo in a pluralist international society, humanitarian intervention seems to be permitted in a solidarist international society, even though in a solidarist international society, intervention itself is far less adopted than in a liberal anti-pluralist international society.<sup>47</sup> Since the end of the Cold War, more intervention can be easily noticed. For instance, the Kosovo humanitarian intervention in 1999 obviously shows this aspect in international society. At this juncture, we can see that solidarism is reflecting the idea that people have common interests independent of their national or other identities, coming together beyond national boundaries to address common problems, which can convey the aspect of global governance without supra-government in international society.

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<sup>47</sup> The use of force is far more flexible in a liberal anti-pluralist international society than in a solidarist international society.

As mentioned in Westlake's doctrine, we should not forget the significance of each individual as an ultimate member of international society. Thus, we can call solidarism cosmopolitan theory, if pluralism is called communitarian theory. In other words, in Suganami-Vincent metaphors, solidarism can be comprehended with the global community omelette cooking metaphor, if pluralism can be recognized with an egg-box metaphor (Booth, 1991:542). In a solidarist international society, for that reason, sovereign states' boundaries cannot be used as an outer perimeter of social cooperation (Vincent and Wilson, 1993: 128). If we pursue this logic, we can conclude that the adoption of interventionist or coercive politics against a state in violation of the rights of its subjects as a pariah, against all the other members of international society, could be justified (Keene, 2002:37). This is hardly expected in a pluralist international society, even if it is shared with liberal anti-pluralism in some level.<sup>48</sup>

So far, I have primarily explained individual-based solidarism, but, from now on, I will illustrate the other consensual solidarism, 'state-based solidarism.' When considering the relationship between pluralism and solidarism, in a certain way, we can think that solidarism has been built on pluralism, even though it has been developed in its distinctive way. Solidarist ontology can be a state as well, not to mention an individual, and this solidarism's ontology is anchored primarily in states rather than non-state actors.<sup>49</sup> Nevertheless, it can be recognized as thick concept of pluralism to some IR scholars. At this juncture, I do not think that I need to explain the ontology of individual again. Instead, I will mention the ontology of state as the

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<sup>48</sup> Nicholas Wheeler advocates humanitarian military intervention as ethical responsibility. See Wheeler (2000). I will use Kosovo's case for liberal anti-pluralism later.

<sup>49</sup> See Bull (1977) and Wheeler (2000).



feature of a solidarist international society. As Cronin and Keene put it, a solidarist international society can be understood with solidarity among states, and this can be understood with neo-Grotian terms as well. This solidarism underlines the welfare of the society of states on the strength of the solidarity of states.<sup>50</sup> This kind of solidarism can be originally observed in Immanuel Kant's concept of a federation of free states. In fact, Kant's federation of free states can be understood as a modern capitalist democratic security community in Buzan's term.<sup>51</sup> Also, this can be comprehended as Buzan's term, 'convergence' (Buzan, 2004a:160). According to Buzan's logic of convergence, even more than cooperation, like a liberal capitalist security community in international society can be expected.<sup>52</sup> The Warsaw Declaration on June 27, 2000 can reveal this aspect. 106 states signed the Warsaw Declaration, calling itself toward a Community of Democracies and claiming that we should jointly cooperate to discourage and resist any hazard to democracy from the overthrow of constitutionally elected governments (Rich, 2001: 30). This can be clearly an aspect of solidarism, which can be called the facet of "mature anarchy" in Buzan's term.<sup>53</sup> So far, I have investigated general characters of solidarism, which is quite different from pluralism. This can help understand another appearance of international society. Below, I will reveal the relationship between solidarism and the standard of civilization, and will explore democratic development as the emerging standard of civilization in a solidarist international society in the post-Cold War era and in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

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<sup>50</sup> Here, non-state actors are individual and transnational actors. See, for more detail, Buzan (2004a).

<sup>51</sup> See, for more detail, Bruce Cronin (1999, 2003).

<sup>52</sup> See Buzan (1991)

<sup>53</sup> Ibid. Also, see, Buzan (2004a).

## **2. A. *Solidarism and the Standard of Civilization (Democracy)***

In the relationships between ‘solidarism’ and the ‘standard of civilization,’ we can assume that solidarism itself can entail the ‘standard of civilization,’ since it can overlook the significance of pluralistic principles such as non-intervention and equal sovereignty. In a solidarist international society, the key feature is that principles of equal sovereignty and non-intervention can be often ignored, but it does not necessarily mean that ‘the use of force’ is the best option to spread certain norms and values of international society, particularly the promotion and consolidation of democracy.<sup>54</sup> When considering that the standard of civilization can indicate a kind of a mission of homogenization and improvement across international society and when that solidarism displays the solidarity on the basis of the broad acceptance of common values and norms, we can apparently identify the compatible relationship between solidarism and the standard of civilization (Salter, 2002:15). In a solidarist international society, as mentioned above, the primary mechanism to promote and consolidate certain values and norms as the standard of civilization, can neither be ‘the use of force,’ nor ‘rational calculation-based socialization,’ but instead, ‘the legitimacy and belief via persuasion and consensus/ value-oriented socialization,’ which is the most reasonable mechanism to promote and consolidate certain values and norms. Nevertheless, once again, like a liberal anti-pluralist international society which I will explain below, in a solidarist international society, as mentioned earlier such as the Kosovo case, the enforcement mechanism via the use of military force can’t be totally denied.

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<sup>54</sup> In general, as for solidarists, unilateral intervention can be justified in order to prevent genocide or similar human tragedies. For instance, one of solidarists, Wheeler made a clear point in his work, “Saving Strangers.” See, for more information, Wheeler (2000).

When considering that in the post-Cold War era and 21<sup>st</sup> century, democracy has gained more attention across international society and it can be even the emerging new standard of civilization, we can perceive a certain distinguishing path toward democracy in a solidarist international society. Many states in a solidarist international society have become democratic via ‘its value-based socialization’ rather than ‘interests-oriented socialization’ or ‘use of force.’ As each individual has been regarded as an ultimate member of international society in a solidarist international society and each one is deeply concerned with human rights for the well-being of international society as a whole, democratic development rarely expects the request of enforcement mechanism and even pure interest-oriented socialization. In other words, in a solidarist international society, the best option for democratic development must be persuasion via the value-oriented socialization, which can provide strong legitimacy and positive belief toward democracy, rather than ‘the use of force,’ or ‘the interest-based socialization’.

To sum up, in this section, I displayed the plausibility of the standard of civilization in a solidarist international society. Also, I disclosed as well that democratic promotion and consolidation as the emerging standard of civilization in a solidarist international society can be achieved via primarily strong value-based socialization, which can lead to legitimacy and positive belief toward democracy.<sup>55</sup> Below, South Korea’s democratic development can help us understand how certain norms and values such as democracy can be the emerging new standard of civilization in a solidarist international society.

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<sup>55</sup> Sukanami and Linklater seem to claim that diplomacy alone is the primary mechanism in a solidarist international society, which is to emphasize dialogue and consent rather than balance of power. See, Linklater and Sukanami (2006). However, such argument seems to be too simple, disregarding many other mechanisms to facilitate socialization. As for me, many other mechanisms such as transnational conferences and athletic games should be considered as essential for socialization. Thus, here, I use socialization in a vague term, rather than use a specific mechanism to assist socialization.

## ***2. B. Solidarism and South Korea (Democratic Development)***

South Korea's case can be helpful to comprehend solidarist principles and democracy as the emerging new standard of civilization in a solidarist international society. South Korea itself exhibits evident aspects of solidarism. In South Korea, a majority of civilians have voluntarily and authentically accepted norms of human rights and democracy. This is not only derived from their experience of resistance against military authoritarian dictatorship for decades, like the Kwangju massacre in May 1980, but also from its democracy and human rights-based socialization, such as its deep engagement with capitalist democratic security community. This denotes that unlike China and Iraq, any rational calculation-based socialization or physical enforcement mechanism cannot be the primary force for democratic development in South Korea. All in all, we can see that in a solidarist international society, via South Korea, democratic promotion and consolidation is different from in a pluralist international society and a liberal anti-pluralist international society.

Above, I mentioned that a majority of civilians in South Korea have voluntarily accepted democratic norms, due to their past resistance against military regimes and to their value-oriented socialization. At this juncture, I have to mention more about their past struggle against military regimes, which could help South Korea enter into a solidarist international society. South Korean citizens' past suffering under military regimes in particular, the Park and Chun regimes, and their past resistance against those military authoritarian dictatorships have primarily made them cherish human rights and political freedom. This could ultimately bring out their voluntary acceptance of democracy as the decent political regime for themselves, in the absence of any external military intervention or of rational calculation-based interest socialization, which could help place South Korea into a

solidarist international society. In the post-Cold War and 21<sup>st</sup> century, South Korea belongs to a solidarist international society, since its citizens authentically care about individual rights and human rights, with their belief that democracy is the decent and legitimate form of government. This has greatly influenced South Korea's promotion and consolidation of democracy. At this juncture, we can firmly say that South Korea belongs to a solidarist international society in which democratization is carried out via legitimacy rather than interest or force.

Above, I explained why and how South Korea can enter into a solidarist international society. However, these considerations do not explain enough for South Korea's mature democracy and its full membership in international society. Under the internal pressure and circumstance in South Korea, as mentioned above, its value-oriented socialization with the capitalist democratic community has brought out positive belief and legitimacy toward democracy in South Korea as well.<sup>56</sup> For instance, in its close relationships with the US and Japan, South Korea has been progressively moved into the capitalist democratic security community in Buzan's term. Via its close socialization with the US and Japan even beyond economic and political interests, South Korea has transformed itself, with its guaranteeing more and more political freedom. Currently, South Korea's foreign policy has become more similar to the US and Japan's foreign policies, which is to promote and consolidate human rights and democracy. At this juncture, we cannot deny such the big contribution of South Korea's value-oriented socialization with its close democratic allies to South Korea's democratic development. We can claim that at present,

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<sup>56</sup> I did not mention any other internal pressure such as economic growth. Such internal factors will be mentioned in an appendix. Here, I intend to briefly describe the key factor to help understand why I use South Korea as a good example for democratic development in a solidarist international society.

South Korea can be seen as a mature liberal democratic regime as well as a full member of international society, not to mention that South Korea is a good citizen of international society.<sup>57</sup>

Also, we can claim that South Korea shows how democracy can be the standard of civilization in a solidarist international society, exposing how a state can become mature democracy under solidarist principles. And, we can see that a solidarist international society itself implies its own distinctive path toward democracy, as the fact that South Korea has been engaged with its capitalist democratic community beyond the purpose of economic and political interests, has, in large part, facilitated South Korea's democratic development. All in all, South Korea's democratic development is not only a good example for democracy as the emerging new standard of civilization in a solidarist international society, but also a good model for a solidarist characteristic path toward democracy.

### **3> *Liberal Anti-Pluralism***

In this section, I will introduce the concept of liberal anti-pluralism, which is not familiar to most IR scholars. First of all, let's start with the relationship between liberal anti-pluralism and solidarism. In Section 2, *Solidarism*, I mentioned two kinds of solidarism. One of them, the coercive solidarism can be identified with liberal anti-pluralism in Simpson's term. In his work, "Great Power and Outlaw

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<sup>57</sup> Liberal democracy can be the litmus test for the good citizenship of international society, in particular when considering that liberal democratic states, rather than authoritarian and tyrant states, created the legal convention for individual rights free from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, which is greatly stressed in Article 4 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. However, as Linklater and Suganami point out, I admit that it is not true that liberal democracy alone can determine a good citizenship of international society. See Linklater and Suganami (2006). Nevertheless, in my dissertation, I primarily emphasize democracy as the new emerging standard of civilization, which is the criterion of the full membership of international society. In other words, I am fully aware of other factors such as human rights, which can be the good criteria for full membership of international society, but here, I attempt to amplify democracy as the new emerging standard of civilization in the post-Cold War era and the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Later, I will discuss more on democracy as the emerging standard of civilization.

States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order,” Gerry Simpson introduces the neologism, liberal anti-pluralism with his emphasis on legalized hierarchy and exclusions operating within the state system on the basis of culture and ideology rather than power (Simpson, 2004:63). We can say that liberal anti-pluralism can be simply understood alongside a legalized hierarchy, laying emphasis on the legalized hegemony of Great Power, along with the missionary quality and desire to universalize a particular form of political order, which, in some sense, violates the principles of equal sovereignty and non-intervention (Simpson, 2004:250).

Let us investigate liberal anti-pluralism in more detail. First, when considering that liberal anti-pluralism reflects the hierarchical relationship, we can presume different material hierarchical relationships among states in international society, especially, in military power and wealth, which reflects the existence of different levels of influence in free political system (Simpson, 2004:49). In terms of that, liberal anti-pluralism shares the importance of material capability with Kenneth Waltz’s neo-realism, which can help confirm the significant role of material powers in international politics. This reveals the significant role of material hierarchical relationship as one of liberal anti-pluralist principles. Nevertheless, material capability does not explain everything. For instance, Nazi Germany’s military power and the US military power imply relatively different contexts in international society.

Second, the mutual recognition of hierarchical relations should be noticed as a liberal anti-pluralist principle. The structure of a liberal anti-pluralist international society reflects a legalized hierarchy. But such legalized hierarchy is based on ‘mutually recognized order and relation’ between Great Powers, Middle Powers and

Small powers, beyond material capability, even if the structure of a liberal anti-pluralist international society is fundamentally on the basis of the principle of sovereign equality.<sup>58</sup> In other words, the hierarchical relationship of liberal anti-pluralism reflects the mutual hierarchical recognition between Great Powers, Middle Powers and Small Powers, in particular, for their rights and duties. As Simpson put it, Great Powers, Middle Powers and Small Powers do recognize their relatively different roles in international society, in various issues from international law-making processes such as international constitutional law and treaty-making, not to mention the creation of custom, to the maintenance of international order and the promotion of well-being of international society as a whole.<sup>59</sup> Simpson mentions “The Great Powers made the law and the middle powers signed the resulting Treaty. The small powers, meanwhile, were erased from consideration”(Simpson, 2004: 112).

In fact, at this juncture, we can notice the legislative inequality to even impose norms on non-consenting states, which can help distinguish between Great Powers and Middle Powers (Simpson, 2004:51). When recalling Hedley Bull’s remark that Great Powers assert the rights and they are accorded the rights in determining the issues that influence the peace and security of international society as a whole, we can assume the relatively different duties and rights of each state in international society (Simpson, 2004:223). At this juncture, we should keep in mind the mutual recognition of relatively different duties and rights.

Third, ‘the use of force’ can be much more easily justified and tolerated in a liberal anti-pluralist international society than in a pluralist international society or in

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<sup>58</sup> See, for more detail, Simpson (2004).

<sup>59</sup> See Simpson (2004: 112).



a solidarist international society. As Gerry Simpson puts it, liberal anti-pluralism takes domestic structures seriously and promotes a particular form of domestic political order via intervention (Simpson, 2004:249-250). Also, liberal anti-pluralism has a missionary quality and desire to universalize a certain form of political order, via imposing certain standards on membership to enforce liberalism within states (Simpson, 2004:250, 260). This reflects some aspects of a pre- or post- Charter international order. Currently, this aspect can be seen obviously in the US and UK's attempt to promote and consolidate democracy, not to mention human rights, across international society, since they believe that the lack of democracy across international society could lead to instability and insecurity in international society and that the promotion and consolidation of democracy can be one of ways to fight against terrorism as well. At this juncture, the US and UK's invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan and their promotion of democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan can be seen in the logic of liberal anti-pluralism. Simpson points out this aspect for the intervention in Kosovo as well, by saying:

In the case of Yugoslavia, it became an article of faith among western policy-makers that the lack of democracy was a primary cause of Balkan strife. Security Council Resolution 1160 emphasized that the way to defeat violence and terrorism in Kosovo is for the authorities in Belgrade to offer the Kosovar Albanian community a genuine political process (Simpson, 2004:208-209).

Actually, as former US President Bill Clinton claimed, the primary goal of the US-led NATO's strike against Yugoslavia was to end "Europe's last dictatorship" and to "bring democracy to Serbia" (Yunling, 2000:117). Indeed, the US-led NATO intervention in Kosovo can be regarded as opening the new age to a new type of interventionism. In general, the use of force had been prohibited under Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter, and it can be permitted only by Security Council Resolutions or

by Chapter VII of the UN Charter. However, ‘the use of force’ in Kosovo without Security Council Resolution and Chapter VII of the UN Charter implied the possibility of a new principle of interventionism.<sup>60</sup> All in all, the US-led NATO military intervention in Kosovo can be a good example of liberal anti-pluralism.

So far, I have described primary features of liberal anti-pluralism. At this juncture, we can see that liberal anti-pluralism is aware of the principles of ‘sovereign equality’ and ‘state as a primary actor.’ But, liberal anti-pluralism very often disregards the principles of non-intervention and equal sovereignty, whenever necessary, along with its great emphasis on legalized hierarchy and on mutually recognized different rights and duties among states. At this juncture, we can easily perceive hierarchical relationships within horizontal relationship in a liberal anti-pluralist international society. Also, when considering that the missionary role has been greatly stressed; outlaw states cannot be tolerated; and intervention can be easily justified in a liberal anti-pluralist international society, we can notice that Great Powers’ role on the basis of legalized hierarchy can be more magnified in a liberal anti-pluralist international society than in a pluralist international society and a solidarist international society. Currently, the roles of the US and the UK across international society, in particular in Afghanistan and Iraq, can be interpreted with liberal anti-pluralist principles. At this juncture, under all of these features of liberal anti-pluralism, the use of force cannot be totally disregarded as one of the plausible mechanisms for promotion and consolidation of democracy across international society in the post-Cold War era and 21<sup>st</sup> century. In consideration of all features of

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<sup>60</sup> As a matter of fact, the NATO attempted to rewrite international law in order to legitimize a new type of interventionism like its military intervention in Kosovo, even if it has been rejected by China, Russia and others. See Zhang Yunling (2000).

liberal anti-pluralism, below, I will investigate the relationship between liberal anti-pluralism and the standard of civilization.

### ***3. A. Liberal Anti-Pluralism and Standard of Civilization (Democracy)***

In the relationships between ‘liberal anti-pluralism’ and ‘the standard of civilization,’ we can see a close relationship between them. Gerry Simpson reveals such relationships, by saying “the standard of civilization can be perceived as an early example of liberal anti-pluralism” (Simpson, 2004:243). As Simpson emphasizes, when considering the primary aspects of liberal anti-pluralism, we can perceive much common ground between liberal anti-pluralism and the standard of civilization. First, we can recall that liberal anti-pluralism reflects the missionary role, and it should be understood with reformist and revolutionist tendencies. We can say that liberal anti-pluralism reflects the radical reformation of the international order via the imposition of substantive political preferences on every state within the international system (Simpson, 2004:15). At this juncture, we can see the aspect of the standard of civilization. In other words, the standard of civilization is a way to impose a certain set of values on the international legal order, and the liberal anti-pluralism reflects the missionary tendency on the basis of legalized hierarchy such as unequal sovereignty and role of Great Powers, not to mention its emphasis on exclusion (Simpson, 2004:243). In this sense, we can say that liberal anti-pluralism can be recognized as the most compatible with the standard of civilization, when in comparison with pluralism and solidarism. Second, unlike pluralism, liberal anti-pluralism is rather exclusive, and liberal anti-pluralism denies certain states the rights to participate fully in international legal life because of some moral or political capacity such as lack of civilization, absence of democracy or aggressive tendency (Simpson, 2004:232). In particular, when considering the circle metaphor, such as

the civilized, the barbarian, and the savage circles on the basis of the level of the standard of civilization, we can see the close correlation between liberal anti-pluralism and the standard of civilization. Third, the legalized hierarchy and the roles of Great Powers have been massively stressed in liberal anti-pluralist international society, and the standard of civilization itself is derived primarily from values and norms of the Great Powers, especially when considering that the structure of international society even reflects the norms and values of the Great Powers. This obviously entails the inevitable relationship between ‘liberal anti-pluralism’ and ‘the standard of civilization.’

Let us briefly look at democracy as the standard of civilization in a liberal anti-pluralist international society, in deliberation of the above relationships between the ‘standard of civilization’ and ‘liberal anti-pluralism.’ In the post-Cold War era and 21<sup>st</sup> century, democracy has become the predominant norm in international society. It can be called even the emerging new standard of civilization.<sup>61</sup> In a liberal anti-pluralist international society, the promotion and consolidation of democracy might appear aggressive, because even ‘the use of force’ is often permissible for democratic development, even though when we recall the reality that in current international society, ‘the use of force’ is still reluctantly accepted for political freedom across international society, and the price for the use of force is still too high to be adopted for democratic development across international society. However, in this part, my point, via liberal anti-pluralist principles, is that we should not totally exclude ‘the use of force’ from apparatuses of democratic development in international society, as the US has done so far in Germany, Japan, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, especially

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<sup>61</sup> Below, I will demonstrate why I call democracy the emerging standard of civilization and the new wave expansion of international society in the post-Cold War era and 21<sup>st</sup> century.

when the ultimate outcome can end up in a positive way.<sup>62</sup> Below, I will shortly examine Iraqi democratic development under liberal anti-pluralist principles so as to help us understand democratic development in a liberal anti-pluralist international society.

### ***3. B. Liberal Anti-Pluralism and Iraq (Democratic Development)***

Iraq's case can help take in liberal anti-pluralism, in particular when considering the US and UK's invasion of Iraq that could lead to the promotion of democracy in Iraq. As shown below Fig-II: "*International Society and Democracy as the New Standard of Civilization*," the US and UK have been core members of international society as civilized states, and have been recognized as Great Powers that have their privileges and duties to maintain and promote the order and well-being of international society as a whole. As their missionary role, the US and UK have made great efforts to promote and consolidate democracy as well as human rights across international society.<sup>63</sup> In fact, democracy and human rights are the

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<sup>62</sup> I sincerely hope that Afghanistan and Iraq will eventually become mature democratic countries and be good examples to advocate democratic development in a liberal anti-pluralist international society.

<sup>63</sup> As David Goldfischer points out, a leftist critic might argue that the UK and the US have sought to impose a world order that can advance the economic interests of their most influential citizens. Indeed, David Goldfischer shows some examples: "the US strongly backs the Saudi dictatorship today" and "the US says nothing about Bahrain, even though a democratic movement by the vast majority of the people was viciously crushed by the U.S supported King." But, these examples remind me of the US foreign policy during the Cold War era. As I will mention below, during the Cold War era, on and off, the US appeared to ignore or even support some dictatorship, due to strategic reason. In other word, Saudi Arabia is a very important ally to the US in terms of dealing with terrorism. And Bahrain is also a very important ally to the US in terms of dealing with Iran. As for me, security or order is prior to justice, since justice cannot be obtained without order and security. However, as a matter of fact, Saudi Arabia has been slowly changed, when considering that King Abdullah announced that women are to be given the same opportunities for political participation as men. And there is some change in Bahrain, when considering that Bahrain's King, Hamad promised the human rights reform. Furthermore, unlike some people's doubt on the US role in promotion of democracy, I can even say that the US opposed some friendly dictators who supported U.S. interest, when considering that the US sided with people of Egypt rather than Hosni Mubarak during the Egyptian uprising in 2011, and even when considering that the US, which harbours its fifth Fleet in Bahrain, has mentioned a \$53 m arms sale to the Bahrain relies on its response to the recommendations of the inquiry, which found that detainees had been thoroughly abused and in some cases tormented to death. See "Bahrain to review military court verdicts." *Aljazeera*. January 2, 2012.

norms and values of the Great Powers, the US and UK. Their norms and values have become predominant even as the emerging standard of civilization across international society. When considering this, we can think of the US and UK's invasion of Iraq and their assistance to the post-Saddam regime as one way to promote and consolidate democracy across international society, which could be an example for democratic development in a liberal anti-pluralist international society.

Let us investigate more on Iraq's democratic development and the relationships between its democratic development and liberal anti-pluralist principles. Since 2003, the US and the UK have attempted to get Iraq to conform to the norms of democracy and human rights, which could be seen as political criteria for international community. In their pursuit for democracy as one of universal norms, the US and UK coalition forces' invasion of Iraq in 2003 can be considered a turning point for Iraq to kick off toward its distinguishing path toward democracy from its past cycle of violence, dictatorship and rebellion. At this juncture, their invasion of Iraq can be an example for how to spread norms and values of the Great Powers via their use of coercion in a liberal anti-pluralist international society.

During Saddam's regime, Iraq could be recognized as the outlaw state that could pose a great threat to the international community and international order in international society, when considering its invasion of Kuwait in Aug. 2, 1990 and its chemical attacks against Iranian and Kurdish civilians between August 1983 and March 1988, which took the casualty tolls of the ten of thousands, not to mention the fifteen Security Council Resolutions against Saddam's regime for more than 12 years. This can facilitate the legitimate use of force in two senses. First, as Simpson puts it, the outlaw state can lose its equal sovereign rights in international society, and second, the Great Powers have legitimate responsibility to cope with such outlaw

state, even via its use of force and tend to spread its own values and norms across international society as well.<sup>64</sup> For instance, in Great Powers' tendency to spread their own values and norms, as Richard Falk claims, "George W. Bush administration has its own vision of a form of global solidarism," via liberal democracy and neo-liberal economics (Bellamy, 2005:292). These assumptions can be seen in the US and UK invasion of Iraq and their great effort to promote and consolidate democracy in Iraq, as primary aspects of liberal anti-pluralism.<sup>65</sup>

However, some scholars still claim that the US/UK invasion of Iraq could be barely given legitimacy, and some states in international society had been in opposition to the US/UK coalition forces' invasion of Iraq in the absence of Security Council Resolution.<sup>66</sup> Especially, the use of force for the promotion and consolidation of democracy itself might be controversial. But, the assumption that the use of force can be completely ruled out is almost unrealistic and imprudent in current international society. The use of force against certain states might be justified even for democratic promotion, if they are marked as the outlaw states that could pose a great threat to national interests and further general interests of

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<sup>64</sup> See Simpson (2004).

<sup>65</sup> Neo-conservatism can be similar to liberal anti-pluralism. In fact, Bush administration's foreign policy, in particular, Iraqi democratic promotion is deeply derived from neo-conservatism. Neo-conservatives tend to support the assertive unilateralism, and they even believe that the regime change is considerable via the use of force. See Lake (2006: 27). And they believe that the use of force is closely related to the maintenance and promotion of the US supremacy in international arena. See Farer (2004a). According to neo-conservatives, also, the US can use even the military force to impose its predominant ideology as a universal norm in international arena and such use of force can maintain and boost up its primacy on the global arena. Such neo-conservative characters can be observed in the process of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. For instance, regardless of some states in opposition to the use of force against Iraq in international society and the absence of Security Council resolution, the Bush administration which neoconservatives has dominated, could make possible the fall of Saddam's regime and facilitate building up a decent democratic Iraqi regime.

<sup>66</sup> Hedley Bull reveals that the legitimacy of Great Powers' use of forces is determined by the majority voice of proportion of states in the international society. Here, international democratization can be seen in Bull's notion of legitimacy for Great Powers' use of force. See, for more detail, Bull (1977: 222).

international society as a whole, under the condition that the cost and benefit in the use of force should be well calculated because the regime change itself is still a very difficult and highly expensive task.<sup>67</sup> Also, we have been well aware of the limitation of non-military means such as ‘education, economic incentives, financial and technical assistance’ to democratic movements and improvement of human well-being in international society, as a series of UN sanctions against the Saddam’s regime brought out more than one million innocent deaths in Iraq without any impact on Saddam’s regime. This demonstrates the possibility of the use of force as a legitimate measure for regime change from authoritarian dictatorship (outlaw state) to democratic regime in international society. In fact, as Germany and Japan’s democratic success and Great Powers’ role in democratic promotion across international society demonstrate, we cannot totally disregard the imposition of democracy on outlaw states via the external force by Great Powers.

So far, I briefly examined the relationship between Iraq’s democracy and liberal anti-pluralism. Via the Iraq case, I tried to emphasize the primary aspects of liberal anti-pluralism such as ‘hierarchy,’ ‘Great Powers’ and ‘the use of force,’ and the promotion of democracy via the use of force as a crucial mechanism for democratic development in a liberal anti-pluralist international society. When considering that Iraq was marked as an outlaw state and that the US and UK as Great Powers have promoted democracy in Iraq via their use of force, we can understand liberal anti-pluralist path toward democracy. In a liberal anti-pluralist international society, the primary mechanism for democratic development is ‘the use of force’ rather than

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<sup>67</sup> Kim Jong-il’s North Korea regime can be clearly put into the category of outlaw states, due to its engagement in international terrorism and crimes, not to mention its violation of NPT treaty. However, the use of force against North Korea is a very difficult option, when considering the high potential cost and risk, such as one million troops, the most militarized zone per square in international arena, its sensitive location (Russia and China), and its close alliance with China, and its potential possession of nuclear weapons.



‘interest-based socialization’ or ‘value-oriented socialization.’ Nevertheless, the use of force is not liberal, but toleration itself is liberal.<sup>68</sup> But, ‘the use of force’ should not be totally excluded from the apparatuses to alter the identity and character, like regime change toward democracy in international society, even though the targets of the use of force should be highly limited to outlaw states. Also, as mentioned in previous sections, this suggests that each different structure of international society as an independent variable can have relatively different impacts on paths toward democracy as a dependent variable.

**Table I. The Coexistence of Three Perspectives within International Society**

	<b>Pluralism</b>	<b>Solidarism</b>	<b>Liberal Pluralism</b> <b>Anti-</b>
<b>The Acceptability of Standard of Civilization</b>	In principle, no concept of the standard of civilization is allowed. However, possibly democracy as a gradual universal norm.	Democracy as the Standard of Civilization	Democracy as the Standard of Civilization.
<b>The Level of Violation of the Principles Of Non-Intervention and Sovereignty</b>	The principle of sovereignty and non-intervention.	No principle of non-intervention and sovereignty.	In general, the principle of non-intervention and sovereignty are respected. However, the violation of those principles can be justified in some level. Legalized hierarchy and legalized hegemonic order.
<b>Ontology</b>	States	Individual or State	State
<b>The Level of Solidarity</b>	Coexistence	Cooperation/ Convergence. The Welfare of the international society, democracy, Human Rights.	Cooperation, the Welfare of the International society, Democracy, Human Rights
<b>The Acceptability of Enforcement beyond boundaries</b>	No enforcement is acceptable beyond boundaries.	Enforcement beyond boundaries is acceptable.	Enforcement beyond boundaries is acceptable

<sup>68</sup> Tanja. E. Aalberts points out this aspect, such as the lack of toleration. See Aalberts (2006:153). But as for me, as the primary mechanism, the use of force of liberal anti-pluralism might not be liberal, but as for me, we should keep in mind that the use of force in liberal anti-pluralism should be applied to the outlaw states, even though the use of force should be highly limited to the outlaw states alone.

<b>The Primary Mechanism</b>	Price or Interest/ Socialization/ Consent/ Order/Particularism	Socialization/ Consensus / Legitimacy/ Justice/ Universalism	Force
<b>Case Study</b>	China	South Korea	Iraq

**Part III. Is Democracy becoming the New Wave Expansion of International Society and the New Standard of Civilization in the Post-Cold War era and the 21<sup>st</sup> Century?**

**1> Democracy**

I will start with defining the concept of democracy. The Greek word *demokratia*/democracy (rule/power/control by/of the demos) started being used in the fifth century B.C. by the Greek historian Herodotus, conveying the meaning of the rule of people, since in the Greek, demos means ‘the people’ and kratein means ‘rule’ (Holden, 1988:5). Nonetheless, the *word* demos can be actually interpreted with two meanings, the population as a whole or the majority (Carey, 2000: 1). Thus, “democracy is a form of government in which the people rule” (Sorensen, 1993:3) or democracy refers to the location of a state power in the hand of people, that is, “the will of the people” (Holden, 1988:12). Also, democracy can be understood as simply a rule of a majority rather than a rule of population as a whole, in particular when considering that Greek Athens never extended political rights to women, resident aliens or slave, and Athens’ democracy is limited to adult Athenian males alone (Carey, 2000:97). However, I have to mention that it could be very dangerous if democracy is misunderstood as just a rule of a majority, since on and off, it could be misinterpreted as a rule of mob. As Woodruff puts it, the rule of mob is clearly a majority tyranny, which frightens, excludes, and puts the minority under the absolute power of the majority (Woodruff, 2005:12). The rule of mob kills freedom as dead as any other form of tyranny, and no freedom can be expected at all, if you have to

join the majority in order to feel that you are free (Woodruff, 2005:12). At this juncture, I have to point out two things. One is that democracy is not simply the rule of majority without any constraint on the majority. Democracy itself implies a certain level of restraints on the power of majorities via various mechanisms, especially like the rule of law (Woodruff, 2005:12). We should not forget the fact that if the majority is above the law, it cannot be different from tyranny (Woodruff, 2005:12). Another is that democracy implies the harmony of interests, ensuring that the interests of minorities should not be trampled (Woodruff, 2005:12). Woodruff claims that democracy is not just a majority rule, but also it implies harmonious interests and toleration. That's why democracy itself can be seen to strengthen the close link among political institutions, political parties and individuals so as to assist harmonious interests.<sup>69</sup> Woodruff defines democracy with the following:

Democracy is a beautiful idea – government by and for the people. Democracy promises us the freedom to exercise our highest capacities while it protects us from our own worst tendencies. In democracy as it ought to be, all adults are free to chime in, to join the conversation on how they should arrange their life together. And no one is left free to enjoy the unchecked power that leads to arrogance and abuse (Woodruff, 2005:3).

**Democracy is government by the people and for the people.** That is hardly a definition, but it will do for a start. As a next step, I shall propose that a government is a democracy in so far as it tries to express **the seven ideas** of this book: **freedom from tyranny, harmony, the rule of law, natural equality citizen wisdom**, reasoning without knowledge, and general education. I might add virtues such as justice and reverence...(Woodruff, 2005:15).

At this juncture, we should keep in mind the fact that the protection of the majority

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<sup>69</sup> David Chandler made good comments on national building and democracy, stressing neo-Wilsonian Internationalism. Nonetheless, Chandler recommend the regulated promotion of democracy. See Chandler (2006).

rights alone can't be recognized as democracy at all, but instead, it is simply tyranny, which is quite different from the purpose of democracy.

Several modern political philosophers define the concept of democracy well, and it is worth looking at some definitions. Joseph Schumpeter defines democracy as a method for choosing political leadership, claiming:

the democratic method is institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote (Schumpeter, 1950: 250).

Also, David Held avers democracy as system in which individuals are free and equal, with his or her capacity to determine his or her condition of life (Sorensen, 1993:120).

Held states:

Individuals should be free and equal in the determination of the conditions of their own lives; that is, they should enjoy equal rights (and, accordingly equal obligations) in the specification of the framework which generates and limits the opportunities available to them, so long as they do not deploy this framework to negate the rights of others (Held, 1987:271).

Also, Robert Dahl defines democracy with the concept of poliarchies. The attributes of poliarchy are 1) elected officials, 2) free and fair elections, 3) inclusive suffrage, 4) the right to run for office, 5) freedom of expression, 6) alternative information, and 7) associational autonomy (Dahl, 1971:221). Dahl greatly stresses public participation and public competition as the key aspects of poliarchies, which can bring out the endless responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, and he added political and social freedom such as freedom of expression, access to alternative information and associational autonomy as the precondition for the successful elections (Dahl, 1971: 1-8). Dahl states:

Poliarchies, then, may be thought of as relatively (but incompletely) democratized regimes, or, to put it in another way, polyarchies are regimes that have been substantially popularized

and liberalized, that is, highly inclusive and extensive open to public contestation (Dahl, 1971:8).

As we can see, Dahl's concept of poliarchy could be seen as the precondition for liberal democracy. More accurately, we can say that poliarchy refers to the mixture of democracy, liberalism and republicanism, even though I have to concede that liberalism and republicanism are far weaker than democracy (O'Donnell, 2001:124). Like Robert Dahl, George Sorensen defines political democracy as participation, competition, and civil and political liberties as well (Sorensen, 1993:16). And as Woodruff put it earlier, Sorensen proclaims that the concept of democracy should reject just the rule by the poor majority that hurts the freedom of people in the end (Sorensen, 1993: 4). For example, Lincoln-Douglas debates can demonstrate the above point that democracy itself does not mean majority rule alone, which can help comprehend the concept of democracy properly. Douglas claimed that he cared not "whether the people voted slavery up or down, as long as the decision reflected the will of people," while Lincoln, instead, argued that "slavery in itself violated the higher principle of human equality on which the American regime was based" (Fukuyama, 2004:114-115). As Fukuyama puts it, this clearly refers to the possibility that democratic majorities can determine horrible things, not to mention the severe violation of human rights and norms of decency on which their own democratic order is based (Fukuyama, 2004:114). Fukuyama interprets it in the way that the legitimacy of the actions of democracy are not in the end on the basis of democratic procedural correctness, but on the basis of the prior rights and norms that are derived from a moral realm higher than that of the legal order (Fukuyama, 2004:115). Tocqueville states "the government of a democracy brings the notion of political rights to the level of the humblest citizens" (Tocqueville, 1945:255). This

sentence does not imply a majority tyranny, but rather an inclusive tendency to respect the marginalized population. On the whole, we should not forget that democracy itself is closely related to liberalism.

At this juncture, it is worthwhile to look into the definition of liberal democracy, in order to, at least, help comprehend 'liberal' and 'democracy.' In the term, 'liberal democracy,' 'liberal' is aimed at restricting state power over civil society and 'democracy' is aimed at creating structures that would secure a popular mandate for holders of state power (Sorensen, 1993:5). Simply, we can say that 'liberal' itself refers to the limitation of a state's power (Holden, 1988:12). As the concept of 'liberal' implies the constraint of a state power, we can think of free elections, rule of law, and the protection of individual rights such as "rights to life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness."(Plattner, 2001:79-80).

When considering the above concept of 'liberal' and 'democracy,' we can easily think of Locke's democracy that is close to modern liberal democracy. Plattner emphasizes John Locke's natural rights as the foundation for modern liberal democracy. In fact, John Locke's natural rights such as equality and freedom can be clearly recognized as the fundamental foundation of modern liberal democracy. According to John Locke, if men are not equal in their natural rights, that is, if some men have a right to rule over other men, then men cannot naturally be free, and if all men are naturally free, then none can have a natural right to rule over others (Plattner, 2001:80). Further, he mentions that men are born free, and therefore could have the liberty to choose either governors or forms of government (Plattner, 2001: 80). At this point, we can recognize that liberal thought ultimately undermines any attempt to exclude people from political participation on the basis of such factors as race, religion, or sex (Plattner, 2001:86). Also, we can see the close co-relationship

between equality and freedom, and further the close connection between liberalism and democracy. In fact, Sorensen pointed this out well. As for Sorensen, 'liberal' largely reflects individual freedom to pursue his or her own preferences in religious, economic and political affairs, claiming that state power is only on the basis of the will of the sovereign people.<sup>70</sup> Sorensen states:

Democracy is desirable as a mechanism for securing that the majority will decide what the law should be. It is vital, however, that **democratic majorities respect the limitations on government activity. If they do not, democracy will be in conflict with liberty.....**In summary, it is possible to point to very early and very recent contributions in the liberal democratic tradition whose primary concern is with the restriction of political authority over citizens. **Liberty is individual freedom in the realm of civil liberty. Democracy can be a means of the way of achieving this end but is not the end itself.** If there is a democratic core in this way of thinking, it is the principle of the political equality of citizens. In what follows it will appear that this principle can lead in a quite different direction from the one taken by the proponents of protective democracy and can result in much more central and positive role for democracy (Sorensen, 1993:7).

Fareed Zakaria shares Sorensen's notion of liberal democracy. Zakaria states:

liberal democracy is a political system marked not only by free and fair elections but also by the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion and property (Zakaria, 2004:17).

Via above authors' notion of liberal democracy, we can see that liberal democracy is the political system to guarantee civilians' political participation, rule of law, separation of powers, protection of basic liberty, transparency, individual freedom and limited government, not to mention the protection of minority and the guarantee of plurality. When considering these characteristics of liberal democracy, we can't

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<sup>70</sup> Sorensen defines liberalism and democracy, revealing different political writers' concept of democracy and liberalism. See, for more detail, Sorensen (1993).

expect mob rule or the dictatorship which were mentioned as characters of democracy above. In my dissertation, my concept of democracy is very close to that of liberal democracy, even if in my dissertation, I do not restrict the concept of democracy to the notion of liberal democracy alone. In other words, I adopt the concept of democracy in inclusive term rather than exclusive term, avoiding any mistake derived from any narrow concept of democracy, since I do not claim that a contemporary democratic regime should only resemble liberal democracy, in particular when considering Condoleezza Rice's speech on March 31, 2006:

I do not mean to imply that there is only one model of liberal democracy. There is not. Even two countries as similar as Britain and the United States embraced liberal democracy on our own terms, according to our own traditions and our cultures and our experiences.<sup>71</sup>

Indeed, as Zakaria puts it, currently, the half of democratizing countries in the world are illiberal democracies (Zakaria, 2004:99). In consideration of this aspect, I put some decent illiberal democracies into the category of the standard of civilization, along with liberal democracy, even if in my dissertation, my aim is ultimately 'liberal democracy.'

However, once again, we should keep in mind the fact that an electoral system itself does not necessarily mean democracy. When thinking of the range from democracy to authoritarianism, the four-fold classifications, such as "advanced democracy, liberal democracy, semi-democracy/electoral democracy and authoritarianism" in Schedler's terms might be seriously considered (Schedler, 2001: 151). At this juncture, electoral democracy cannot be seriously considered as the only criterion for full-membership in international society. As Donnelly puts it,

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<sup>71</sup> Former US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice made speech at Ewood Park, Blackburn, United Kingdom (March 31, 2006).



“elections, no matter how free and open, are merely mechanisms for ascertaining the will of people, which could be recognized as empty formalism”(Donnelly, 2003:190-191). At this juncture, my point is that an electoral system itself is not a democracy, but the decent and electoral democracy/decent illiberal democracy (as mentioned above) should be flexibly considered as the condition for the standard of civilization such as Turkey (in 2012).<sup>72</sup> In this chapter, I adopt John Rawls’ concept of ‘decent.’ Rawls defines ‘decent’ by saying:

decent to describe non-liberal societies whose basic institutions meet certain specified conditions of political rights and justice (including the right of citizens to play a substantial role, say through associations and groups, in making political decisions) and lead their citizens to honor a reasonably just law for the Society of Peoples (Rawls, 1999: 3, fn. 2).

Along with this concept of ‘decent,’ my definition of decent illiberal democracy is democracy with good government, multi-party, fair election, rule of law, human rights and transparency as systemic mechanism that can prevent any possibility of the emerging dictatorship and authoritarian government. In “the Law of Peoples,” John Rawls introduces four categories of societies, such as liberal society, well-ordered hierarchical society, burdened societies and out-law states.<sup>73</sup> Rawls implies the necessity of the toleration for the decent illiberal people under the law of people. Therefore, as Rawls put it, decent non-liberal states should not be confused with outlaw states. Also, toleration itself can be recognized as one of virtues of democracy, pluralism. In “Political Liberalism,” John Rawls explains the virtue of toleration, by saying:

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<sup>72</sup> Turkey was used to having problem with human rights issue. But the condition of human rights has been increasingly improved. In the future, even Turkey will be able to join the EU as the first non-Christian state, which can be very meaningful, in particular when considering that the EU becomes the symbol of democracy and human rights.

<sup>73</sup> See, for more information, Rawls (1999).

**reasonable persons think it unreasonable to use political power, should they possess it, to repress other doctrines that are reasonable yet different from their own.** These points may seem too narrow; for I recognize that every society also contains numerous unreasonable doctrine. In regard to this point, however, what is important to see is that how far unreasonable doctrines can be active and tolerated is not decided by what is said above, but by the principles of justice and the kinds of actions they permit (Rawls, 1999: 16. fn. 8, and Rawls, 1996: 63-65).

I owed the concept of ‘toleration’ to John Rawls, along with his concept of ‘decent.’ Influenced by Rawls’ arguments, I consider some decent illiberal democracy as the standard of civilization along with liberal democracy. However, once again, my purpose in my dissertation is ultimately to promote and consolidate liberal democracy in the whole international society, even if as Fukuyama (1992) and Little (1995) emphasize, illiberal democracy is expected to become liberal democracy in the long run.<sup>74</sup>

## ***2> Democracy as the Wave of Expansion of International Society and the Standard of Civilization***

In this section, I will mention ‘the wave expansion of international society’ and ‘the standard of civilization’ for currently predominant democratic movement on a global scope. First of all, I will define my concept of ‘wave’ as a historical presentation. Samuel Huntington used the term, ‘wave,’ for the level of democratic development (Huntington, 1991a), but unlike Huntington, I regard each ‘wave’ as

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<sup>74</sup> As David Goldfisher pointed out, in my dissertation, I did not mention “substantive democracy with an equitable domestic distribution of wealth.” However, I am aware of “Occupy Wall Street” movement and I think that “substantive democracy with an equitable domestic distribution of wealth” is very important. But, accurately speaking, I can say that liberal democracy can be understood as the standard of civilization, in particular when considering that Great Powers, the US and the UK belong to liberal democracy, and when considering that I do Not think that Great Powers, the US and the UK promote “substantive democracy with equitable domestic distribution of wealth” across international society, even though, as mentioned above, I adopt a broad concept of democracy as the standard of civilization, and “substantive democracy with equitable domestic distribution of wealth” has more and more attention and is an ideal goal as the standard of civilization.

each tide of relatively different norm and value across international society. Each wave entails the emerging dominance of each different norm during each different historical period. Also, each wave has had impacts on the whole international society as well as the unit level/state (character of unit). For instance, the end of slave trade, the compliance with Western-oriented international law, decolonization/self-determination, human rights and democracy can be acknowledged as a series of relatively different waves that can be strongly felt across international society during each relatively different historical period, which implies the limited progress in international society.<sup>75</sup> In other words, for instance, we can think of the acceptance of ‘Western-oriented international law’ beyond the West as *the first wave* expansion of international society; ‘decolonization’ as *the second wave* expansion of international society; ‘human rights’ as *the third wave* expansion of international society; and ‘democracy’ as *the fourth wave* expansion of international society. The first wave expansion of international society could be the gradual compliance with the Western-oriented international law by even non-Western states beyond Western states in the nineteenth century. The second wave expansion of international society could be a decolonization movement on the basis of self-determination, which started in the post-WWII era and reached the peak point in the 1960s.<sup>76</sup> The third wave expansion of international society could be that human

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<sup>75</sup> My conception of the limited progress is influenced by Kant’s concept of progress, such as meliorism, even though I am aware of realist concept of progress – that is why I said the limited progress.

<sup>76</sup> Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights enunciated the universal right of self-determination. “All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.” Also, Article 27 also advocates self-determination, saying “ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities...shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language.” Available at the website: <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm>

rights had become a gradually universal norm in particular in the 1980s. The fourth wave expansion of international society can be the post-Cold War and 21<sup>st</sup> century global-level democratic movement.<sup>77</sup> At this juncture, the fourth wave expansion of international society entails international society's deep engagement in a form of government, with an emphasis on good governance. The fourth wave expansion of international society itself reflects the more aggressive engagement to maintain order and stability and to further augment the wellbeing of the whole international society than any previous wave expansion of international society.<sup>78</sup>

The wave can be understood with the standard of civilization. For instance, one of Hedley Bull's students, Gerrit Gong used international law as the standard of civilization, while he greatly stresses the role of international law in international society, revealing non-western states' compliance with international law as the primary mechanism to become a member of international society (Gong, 1984). My dissertation chair, Jack Donnelly used the concept of the standard of civilization, while examining the question of whether or not human rights could become a new criterion for full membership in international society (Donnelly, 1998).<sup>79</sup> In addition, in my dissertation, particularly in this section, like Gong and Donnelly, I adopt the concept of the standard of civilization as a criterion for full membership in

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<sup>77</sup> Below, I will touch on democracy again when I emphasizes on democracy as the emerging new standard of civilization, since this part itself is about democratic promotion.

<sup>78</sup> To emphasize human rights as the third wave expansion of international society can be recognized as aggressive intervention in domestic arena, such as Kosovo. Nonetheless, it does not request a particular form of government. In terms of that, we can say that the promotion of democracy is more aggressive than that of human rights.

<sup>79</sup> Here, I have to say that I did not mention self-determination as the standard of civilization, since I already mentioned it earlier, when coping with the second wave expansion of international society and I do not need to repeat it, even if self-determination/decolonization could be obviously recognized as the standard of civilization. Thus, I will skip self-determination, and will focus on human rights while investigating whether or not human rights becomes the standard of civilization. Also, at this juncture, I intend to reveal the limited progress in international society.

international society, while investigating whether or not democracy becomes the criterion for full membership in international society.

There are lots of debates on whether or not democracy can be a predominant value and norm of international society as much as human rights, and whether or not it could even become a new emerging standard of civilization in the era of the post-Cold War and 21<sup>st</sup> century. However, as mentioned at the beginning, at present, more than around 65 % of 192 states in international society can be called democratic regimes and more states have been expected to become democracies, in particular when considering democratic promotion in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya in 2011. This indicates that democracy itself can become a highly probable emerging new standard of civilization. Indeed, in the post-Cold War era and the 21<sup>st</sup> century, democracy has gradually become one of the predominant norms of international society. Below, I will prove my position with several data.

Let's take a look at several reasons why democracy can be recognized as emerging new standard of civilization in the era of post-Cold War and 21<sup>st</sup> century. First, along with the end of the Cold War, the international environment has been changed, in particular with the end of the ideological struggle of two super-powers. Due to this reason, there are very few incentives left for Great Powers to neglect or advocate authoritarian or totalitarian regimes for their own strategic national interests.<sup>80</sup> During the Cold War era, the US and the USSR had been deeply engaged in proxy wars in various arenas such as in Africa, Central America, and Southeast Asia (Fukuyama, 2006:219). The US military interventions had occurred on

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<sup>80</sup> During the Cold War era, on and off, the US had supported the authoritarian and repressive regimes, overthrowing democratic regimes for its own strategic interests, which was deeply rooted in its own fear of the Soviet influence, such as Chile, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. Nevertheless, during the Cold War era, the US foreign policy had been fundamentally based on human rights and democracy.

average once per decade such as in the Dominican Republic, and Lebanon (Fukuyama, 2006:219). Nonetheless, the US had primarily preserved the status quo due to the mutual nuclear threats as well as the pressure of super-power confrontation (Fukuyama, 2006: 218). Also, during the Cold War era, the image of democracy itself could be understood as a just ideological tool to compete against the Soviet bloc. By 1978, a strong majority in US felt that a US human rights emphasis had in fact hurt efforts to achieve an arms control treaty, and even rejected the proposition that Washington should break off the negotiations due to Soviet human rights violations (Holsti, 2000:164). Furthermore, the US had condoned repressive regimes and their atrocity against their own citizens, undercutting its aspirations for democracy and human rights in the third world.<sup>81</sup> The US policy-makers assumed that violation of human rights and the ignorance of authoritarian regime might be necessary in the fight against communism and terrorism.<sup>82</sup> The US was used to having friendly tyrant regimes as its good friends such as Saigong in Vietnam, the Shah in Iran, Ferdinand Marcos in Philippines and the Contras in Nicaragua. Even, former President Jimmy Carter who was a strong human rights advocate, mislabeled the tyrant regime of the Shah of Iran as a good friend, especially when recalling his friendly visit to the Shah and his extravagant toast to him and when recalling his praising the Shah of Iran as “an island of stability”(Holsti, 2000:180, Newsom, 1988:101). At this juncture, we can see that during the Cold War era, there were

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<sup>81</sup> However, we cannot totally demean the US effort to promote and consolidate democracy as well as human rights during the Cold War period. For instance, there had been a US national consensus to support policies that had facilitated the freedom of dissidents in the USSR and Eastern Europe, support for the emigration of Jewish communities, and pressure for a lessening of the Soviet Influence on governments and societies in Eastern Europe. Here, my point is that in the post-Cold War and 21<sup>st</sup> century, we can see more aggressive tendency of the promotion and consolidation of democracy. See David D. Newsom (1988).

<sup>82</sup>Ibid.

some limitations to the promotion and consolidation of human rights and democracy as the norms and values of international society.

However, the collapse of the communist bloc itself meant the disappearance of the ideological conflict between democracy and communism which had been a big obstacle to the promotion of democracy. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, a sound circumstance for the US effort for promotion of democracy has emerged, and the US has attempted to alter the status quo position so as to build up a better world (Fukuyama, 2006:219). In April, 1990, for the post-Cold War world, former US President George H.W. Bush defined the new U.S. mission to be the promotion and consolidation of democracy (Huntington, 1996:193). In his 1992 campaign, Bill Clinton constantly proclaimed that the promotion of democracy would be a top priority of a Clinton administration, and democratization was the only foreign policy topic to which he devoted an entire major campaign speech, and in his terms, his central theme of foreign policy was the enlargement of democracy (Huntington, 1996: 193). The George W. Bush administration's foreign policy, in particular toward the Middle East and Africa, could be recognized as aggressive democratic promotion and consolidation, when considering that it has made its enormous effort to help build up Iraq's democracy and Afghanistan's democracy, and when considering that the US government spends more than \$500 million annually across over 50 countries.<sup>83</sup> Also, on July 10, 2006, former US President George W. Bush had approved an \$ 80 million fund toward boosting democracy in Cuba, even though Cuban and US ties had been very strained for nearly 50 years.<sup>84</sup> When considering

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<sup>83</sup> See Thomas Carothers (2000).

<sup>84</sup> See "US in \$80m 'Cuba democracy' plan." *BBC News*. July 11, 2006.

the above factors in the post-Cold War era and the 21<sup>st</sup> century, few could dispute Boutros-Ghali's assertion that the promotion of democracy is itself an end (Mayall 2000: 82), and as more democracy can be observed in many various arenas on the global stage, we can perceive that democracy is becoming a new standard of civilization on the global stage.<sup>85</sup>

Second, democracy as a norm is not constrained to the West alone. In general, democracy has been regarded as a Western norm. Many believe that democracy is limited to the West alone and so it cannot be expected beyond the West, as a universal norm on the global level. Singapore's former Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew (1959-1990) used to stress 'Asian Values' as distinguished from other cultural values, claiming that democracy should be considered as a Western value and it should be limited to the West alone. However, as we observe the democratization of non-western states, democracy is not clearly limited to the West alone, but it should be perceived as a universal norm, such as human rights, in particular when considering that Japan and South Korea can obviously be marked as a mature democratic regime and further that Indonesia and Malaysia have adopted the notion of political freedom and a liberal market economic system. Jack Donnelly advocates this assumption, declaring "culture is not destiny"(Donnelly, 2003:88). Donnelly states:

I also think that it is important to resist the argument that internationally recognized human rights are a western artifact that is irrelevant and meaningless in most of the rest of the world. Ideas and social practices move no less readily than, say, noodles and gunpowder. If human rights are irrelevant in a particular place, it is not because of where they were invented or when they were introduced into that place. Culture is not destiny (Donnelly, 2003:88).

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<sup>85</sup> I will touch on this in the below again.



As Donnelly implies, gunpowder was invented in China, but it has been used around world. In other words, we have never said that gunpowder must belong to China alone since it was invented in China, as we have never said that television and mobile phone should be limited to the Western society alone, because they were first invented in the Western world. Like gunpowder, democracy can be adopted by any state. As Donnelly tends to diminish the significance of the cultural impact in terms of human rights, I have to resist the argument that different cultural values can be a fundamental obstacle to the promotion of democracy. For instance, Islam and Confucianism are not fundamentally incompatible and insurmountable obstacles to democratic development.<sup>86</sup> Nevertheless, each different culture itself can have an impact on paths toward democracy.

Third, democracy is the outcome of limited progress in international society. When considering the relations between human rights and democracy, we can hardly think of democracy without human rights, since human rights itself is closely interrelated with democracy. Also, democratic development across international society can be recognized as the outcome of the limited but continuous progress in international society like the end of the slavery system, the end of slave trade, self-determination, human rights and democracy. For instance, the development of international human rights law and of procedures for the international monitoring of elections highlights the links between national and international efforts to promote democracy, and this implies that democracy is the predominant post-Cold War and 21<sup>st</sup> century norm following the predominant Cold War era norm, human rights in

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<sup>86</sup> We can think of Tunisia's and Egypt's democratic development. In an appendix, also I claim that culture is not an obstacle to democratic development.

international society.<sup>87</sup> At this juncture, I primarily emphasize the close connection among them as limited progress in international society.

As Larry Diamond asserts, democracy should be recognized as an instrument for freedom, such as political freedom, freedom of expression, freedom of organization, and freedom of opposition, maximizing the opportunities for self-determination and facilitating each individual citizen's basic rights in order to make normative choice and self-governing possible (Diamond, 1993:3). This denotes that democracy can be understood as a mechanism to guarantee political freedom and human rights. Also, as Immanuel Kant emphasizes on a close linkage among democracy, peace and human rights in his various works, human rights itself eventually tends to constrain not only totalitarian, but also democratic excessiveness (Franck, 1992:88, fn. 229). In fact, when considering the co-relationship between human rights and democracy, we can easily find several international legal documents to demonstrate such relationship. Article 21 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights obviously reveals the close co-relationship between human rights and democracy.<sup>88</sup>

Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen government....The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedure (Article 21).<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>87</sup> We should recognize the limited progress in international society. As mentioned in this Chapter, we should recognize a series of norms such as the end of slavery system, the end of slave trade, decolonization, human rights and democracy on the basis of historical period.

<sup>88</sup> As Donnelly points out, the close relations can be repeatedly found in following documents. The Declaration and Program of Action of the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights, General Assembly resolutions 52/148 (nine preliminary paragraph) and 55/108 (fourth operative paragraph) and Commission on Human Rights Resolutions 1998/72 (Fourth Operative paragraph) and 2000/5 (fourth operative paragraph).

<sup>89</sup> See the website available at: <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a21>

The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (adopted by the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights) demonstrates the co-relationship between democracy and human rights as well. It said:

Democracy, development and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. Democracy is based on the freely expressed will of the people to determine their own political, economic, social and cultural systems and their full participation in all aspects of their lives. In the context of the above, the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms at the national and international levels should be universal and conducted without conditions attached. The international community should support the strengthening and promoting of democracy, development and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the entire world (8. U.N. Doc. A.Conf.157/23, 1993).<sup>90</sup>

Jack Donnelly is clearly aware of the inevitable relationship between democracy, human rights and development, by saying “most obviously, international human rights norms require democratic government,” even if he seems to put too much emphasis on human rights over democracy and development (Donnelly, 1999: 609).<sup>91</sup>

Donnelly shows the relative characteristics of democracy and human rights, which can help recognize a close relationship between human rights and democracy.

Donnelly mentions:

Democracy aims to empower the people, to ensure that they, rather than some other group in society, rule. Democracy allocates sovereign authority to the people who, because they

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<sup>90</sup> See the website available at:  
[http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/\(symbol\)/a.conf.157.23.en](http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(symbol)/a.conf.157.23.en)

<sup>91</sup> As for me, Donnelly tends to emphasize too much on human rights as the overriding goal over democracy and development, and so he might lose the balance among human rights, development and democracy. We should recognize that without development and democracy, human rights can be hardly achieved. As shown in South Korea he mentioned, it needed some level of development until before human rights started being respected properly as a universal norm. See, for more information, Donnelly (1999).

are sovereign, are free, as the Vienna Declaration put it, to determine their own political, economic, and social and cultural system. Human rights, by contrast, aim to empower individuals, thus limiting the sovereign people and their government (Donnelly, 2003:191).

At this point, we can catch a glimpse of mutual constraints between human rights and democracy. However, we should conceive the relationship as mutually interdependent and mutually re-enforcing. For example, democracy and human rights ultimately share the notion of equal political dignity for everyone (Donnelly, 2003:191). Besides, we should not forget that democratic government is preferred for human rights, while human rights are needed to civilize democracy and markets by constraining their operation to a limited, rights-defined domain (Donnelly, 2003: 202). In fact, as international lawyer, Fernando R. Teson puts it, when assuming that the right to participate in government, itself can be a significant human right itself, not to mention important instrument for the enjoyment of other rights, we can obviously perceive the inevitable relationship between democracy and human rights (Teson, 1996: 34). Therefore, when considering that the close correlation between human rights and democracy can be well perceived and that human rights have been already accepted on the global level, we cannot totally discard the possibility that democracy can be eventually accepted as one of universal norms and as the newly emerging standard of civilization in the long run. Accordingly, if human rights became the post-war standard of civilization, we can unsurprisingly conceive democracy as the post-Cold War and 21<sup>st</sup> century new standard of civilization.

Fourth, democracy itself can be recognized as the most decent form of government in the post-Cold War era and 21<sup>st</sup> century, and it can be grasped as to provide the mechanism for the protection of citizens' fundamental rights, along with its assistance toward human rights. We can even say "democracy is more preferable

than authoritarian regime,” even if free people may reasonably choose an efficient benevolent autocrat over a corrupt incompetent democratic regime, which can be rarely faced (Donnelly, 2003:202, fn.30). In fact, in the post-Cold War era and 21<sup>st</sup> century, around more than 65 % of states can be called democracy, and the tendency of increasing numbers of democracy indirectly demonstrates that democracy is more plausible than any other form of government. In Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, 19, or 70 percent of the 27 states have become democratic, with the downfall of communism (Brumberg and Diamond, 2003:IX). In Latin America and the Caribbean, we are able to observe the fact that 30 of the 33 states are democracies (Brumberg and Diamond, 2003:IX).<sup>92</sup> In Asia, the number of democratic states has gradually increased from 5 in 1974 to 12 in 2002. Even in Sub-Saharan Africa, the number of democracies has increased from 3 to 19, around two-fifth of the 49 states (Brumberg and Diamond, 2003:IX).<sup>93</sup> According to the 2002 survey, 89 (46.4 percent) of the world’s internationally recognized states was rated free, 55 (28.6 percent) partly free, and 48 (25 percent) not free, whereas in the 1972 survey, the number of free rated countries was 42 (29 percent), 36 (24.8 percent) partly free category, and the number of the not free countries was 67 (46.2 percent).<sup>94</sup> For example, Indonesia moved from Partly Free to Free, and Afghanistan has advanced from not free to partly free (Piano and Puddington, 2006:119). Also, around 63 percent (120 states) of all states (192 states) were electoral democracies in 1999,

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<sup>92</sup> El Salvador and Honduras are good examples for transition from military dictatorship to democracy.

<sup>93</sup> Tanzania is a good example for the model of democracy in Africa.

<sup>94</sup> See Larry Diamond, “Advancing Democratic Governance: A Global Perspective on the Status of Democracy and Directions for International Assistance.” Available at the website: [http://www.law.stanford.com/~ldiamond/papers/advancing\\_democ\\_%20governance.pdf](http://www.law.stanford.com/~ldiamond/papers/advancing_democ_%20governance.pdf)

whereas around 27 percent in 1974.<sup>95</sup> When considering the above data, we can say that in the post-Cold War era and the 21<sup>st</sup> century, democracy has gradually turned out to be an emerging new standard of civilization. All in all, all of the above reasons convey the clear message that in the Post-Cold war era and 21<sup>st</sup> century, democracy itself can be highly accepted as the universal value across international society – i.e. the emerging new standard of civilization and the new wave expansion of international society.

### **Conclusion**

Chapter I is divided into three parts. Part I was about “English School.” Part II was to deal with “Pluralist, Solidarist and Liberal Anti-Pluralist Facets of International Society as a Whole and Their Relative Impacts on Paths to Democracy in the era of the Post-Cold war and 21<sup>st</sup> Century.” Part III examined the question, “Is Democracy becoming the New Wave Expansion of International Society and the New Standard of Civilization in the Post-Cold War era and the 21<sup>st</sup> Century?” In Part I. I mainly introduced the English School as one of emerging predominant international theories in the post-Cold War era and 21<sup>st</sup> century. Also, I attempted to demonstrate that the English School is different from conventional IR theories and mainstream social constructivism, even if it shares some common ground with conventional IR theories and mainstream social constructivism. In my dissertation, I adopted and used the English School, due to its pluralistic methodology and interdisciplinary characteristics, which can make possible the wider and deeper investigation and explanation on international affairs in international society. Also, along with the aspects, its distinguishing facets, like international society, the

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<sup>95</sup> Ibid.

standard of civilization, Great Power, and outlaw state can help understand democratic development. In particular, when considering that democracy can be promoted and consolidated via each state's own path which can be influenced by their internal and external pressures, such as culture, history, international organizations, international law, and Great Powers, the English School is plausible enough for a more accurate assessment and better explanation on democratic development across international society, than any other IR theories.

The title of my dissertation is "Paths to Democracy, the Post-Cold War and 21<sup>st</sup> century New Standard of Civilization, The New Wave Expansion of International Society: China, South Korea and Iraq." At this juncture, you might smell the odor of the English School, especially from the terms, 'international society' and 'standard of civilization,' even if the concept of "wave" is my own term. The term, 'Paths to democracy,' indicates the requirement of comparative studies. When states eventually end up becoming democratic regimes, but they have their own relatively different paths toward democracy, the necessity of comparative study can be strongly felt. The English School's adoption of pluralistic methodology and interdisciplinary attributes can satisfy this and ultimately help explain 'paths to democracy.' The term, 'international society' itself can be also recognized as the starting point to build up the English School's theoretical construction. Also, when considering that the concept of the standard of civilization reflects globalization with homogenization, cultivation and improvement across international society, and the English School itself is understood as globalization in some sense, we can grasp the inclination of the English School in the title of my dissertation. All in all, in Part I, I tried to divulge and underline the English School as the IR theoretical background for the promotion and consolidation of democracy I will touch on in later chapters. In the later

Chapters, I will apply the English School to democratic development across international society so as to demonstrate that democracy is the new standard of civilization in the post-Cold War era and 21<sup>st</sup> century and that each country has its own unique path toward democracy.

In Part II, I coped with “Pluralist, Solidarist and Liberal Anti-Pluralist Facets of International Society as a Whole and Their Relative Impacts on Paths to Democracy in the Era of the Post-Cold War and 21<sup>st</sup> Century.” I explored three frameworks of international society, as pluralist, solidarist and liberal anti-pluralist structures, and did examine their relative effects on paths toward democracy. As for me, international society should be divided into pluralist, solidarist and liberal anti-pluralist ones, and the coexistence of all of them is a proper way for accurate assessment and explanation on international affairs in international society, even though among many English School scholars, in general, pluralism or solidarism is a major spectrum to observe international society. In other words, instead of one of them, all three, pluralism, solidarism and liberal anti-pluralism should be simultaneously considered so as to appropriately observe and assess international affairs in international society. I hope that this can contribute to the study of international relations, let alone the promotion of democracy.

Pluralist principles are co-existence, equal sovereignty, non-intervention, respect of differences and order, interest-based socialization and value-based socialization, consent, etc. Solidarist principles are human rights, justice, consensus, cooperation, value-oriented socialization, etc. And liberal anti-pluralist principles are legalized hierarchy, legalized hegemonic order, excessive role of Great Powers, etc. Each structure squeezes its own strategy to promote and consolidate democracy. Each structure within international society can shape and shove behavior of states,




and further can alter even identity and character of states on the basis of its own distinguishing principles. At this juncture, we should recognize that different principles lead to relatively different methods to change identity and character of states.

When considering democratic development under three structures within international society, we can think of three different strategies for the promotion and consolidation of democracy, which can be derived from each different structure. Each structure squeezes its own distinctive strategy for political freedom on the basis of its own principles. For instance, in a pluralist international society, ‘interest-oriented socialization’ can be the principal mechanism to promote and consolidate democracy, even if I have to say that the value-oriented socialization is also significant. In a solidarist international society, ‘value-based socialization’ can be a major mechanism for democratic development, and in a liberal anti-pluralist international society, ‘the use of force’ can be a prime mechanism for the promotion and consolidation of democracy. China, South Korea and Iraq represent relatively pluralist, solidarist and liberal anti-pluralist international societies. China is on the pluralist path toward democracy; South Korea on the solidarist path toward democracy; and Iraq on the liberal anti-pluralist path toward democracy. Three cases demonstrated that each state has its own path toward democracy on the basis of relatively distinctive strategies derived from comparatively different frameworks within international society, and furthermore they facilitate my argument that democracy has been the emerging new standard of civilization and the new wave expansion of international society in the post-Cold War era and 21<sup>st</sup> century. All in all, Part II stresses the different paths toward democracy on account of each different structure within international society as a whole.

In Part III, I dealt with the question, “Is Democracy becoming the New Wave Expansion of International Society and the New Standard of Civilization in the post-Cold War era and the 21<sup>st</sup> Century?” I examined the concept of democracy and described democracy as the emerging new standard of civilization as well as the new wave expansion of international society. Democracy itself is not simply majority rule, but also it requests harmonious interests and toleration to protect the right and interests of marginalized populations. In the post-Cold War era and 21<sup>st</sup> century, democracy has become the most decent form of government in international society, and around two-third nation-states of 192 have so far adopted democracy. In fact, as the environment of international society in the post-Cold War era, and 21<sup>st</sup> century is far better off for the promotion and consolidation of democracy than in the Cold War era, and the merits of democracy have been increasingly acknowledged across international society, more and more states are expected to adopt democracy, regardless of different regions and different cultures. When considering the above features, we can assume that democracy can be an emerging new standard of civilization as well as the new wave expansion of international society.

Fig. II. International Society and Democracy as the New Standard of Civilization



## **Chapter II. International Law and Democracy**

### **Introduction**

In international society, international law can be easily misunderstood as simply a tool for Great Powers in pursuit of their own interests, or as an incompetent international institution that Great Powers may easily ignore whenever they feel necessary. Also, Kenneth Waltz's description of anarchy as international environment, on and off, elicits doubts even on the existence of international law. However, we cannot deny the fact that international law has played a considerable role in maintaining international order and security and even in the general well-being of international society. Many international relations (IR) and international law scholars have been well aware of the significant role of international law in international society. As IR scholars, English School scholars have greatly underscored international law as one of the major institutions, highlighting its contribution to international order and security, and to the welfare of international society. Hedley Bull asserts that the expansion of the scope of international law concerning economic, social, and environmental issues indicates a great contribution of international law to the international order and the well-being of international society (Bull, 1977: 147). At this juncture, I claim that the primary role of international law is to maintain the co-existence of states and to promote cooperation among states, which can smooth the progress of order, security, peace and welfare in international society.

In this chapter, I will investigate the origin, definition, character and role of international law, and its contribution to international order and the well-being of international society. However, the primary focus is to discover the triangular relationship among international law, international society and democracy. Three case studies, China, South Korea and Iraq, can help grasp this triangular relationship, and since the three above cases relatively display three different facets of international society (pluralist, solidarist and liberal anti-pluralist) we will be able to perceive how international law can differently influence democratic promotion and consolidation. Ultimately, we will discern that in the post-Cold War era and 21<sup>st</sup> century, democracy itself has become the new wave expansion of international society and the emerging new standard of civilization.

### ***1> International Law***

In this section, I will briefly mention main characteristics and roles of international law in international society, let alone the origin and definition of international law. International law developed in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, originally started emerging as a result of an intellectual effort to reconstruct the Stoic/Christian universal human community as a community of territorial states (Brown, Nardin and Rengger 2002: 312). Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), Samuel Pufendorf (1628-91), Samuel Rachel (1679-1754), Christian Von Wolff (1679-1754) and Emmerich De Vattel (1714-1767) greatly contributed to the emergence of international law in international society, as they expanded the scope of natural law beyond the relations among individuals to the relations among states, while emphasizing the existence of community beyond the existence of state. However, the influence of natural law on international law gradually disappeared, and in the nineteenth century, international law began to massively reflect the character of

positive law. However, I have to say that international law has emerged from more than natural law and positive law. There are various sources: (1) the decisions of the international court of justice such as the outcome of disputes into international law; (2) international conventions to establish rules which the contending states recognized; (3) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; (4) judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations; (5) customary law; (6) international agreement; and (7) General principles common to the major legal systems of the world (Carter, Trimble and Bradley, 2003:3).

Currently, when being asked about the definition of international law, we can simply say that international law is designed to serve the purpose of governing relations between states alone, such as the rights and obligations of states, which is the traditional definition of international law. Nevertheless the modern definition of international law includes the rights and obligations of even non-state actors, such as the conduct of international organizations (Buerghenthal and Maier, 1990:1-2). In consideration of the above definition of international law, we can perceive that international law consists of ‘public’ and ‘private’ international law. “Public international law” primarily governs “the activities of governments in relation to other governments,” whereas “private international law” copes with “the activities of individuals, corporations, and other private entities” when they cross national borders (Carter, Trimble and Bradley, 2003:2). This shows that in the modern world, international law is not limited to the relationship among state actors alone.

In consideration of the definitions of international law, let us investigate the nature of international law. When looking at the nature of international law, we can find three traditions in international law. Indeed, Martin Wight claims that

international law should be regarded as a historical tradition, such as realism, rationalism and revolutionism (Wight, 1992:233-238). Thus, international law might be understood with the combination of ‘power,’ ‘legality’ and ‘morality,’ and one of them cannot properly explain the whole aspect and role of international law at all. At this juncture, we should keep in mind the fact that international law is not just a reflection of power, but also a reflection of morality.

When considering the facet of power in international law, many international lawyers and IR scholars like Schwarzenberger, Byers, Koskenniemi, Morgenthau, Knor, Simpson, and Toope assert the intimate relationship between power and international law.<sup>96</sup> For instance, Martti Koskenniemi contends that law itself, if reduced to social fact and moral ideas, becomes nothing but a servile instrument for power to realize its objectives, which fortifies the close relationship between power and law (Roth, 2003:246). Also, Alain Pellet mentions “law is the result of power”(Pellet, 2003: 421). Sir Arthur Watts even states “the international community prospers when law and power are in partnership, not when they are in conflict”, which indicates the necessity of power (Watts, 2000:7). Gerry Simpson underlines the impact of power on international law, revealing legalized hierarchical relations among ‘Great Powers,’ ‘Middle Powers’ and ‘Small Powers’ well, by saying “All three facets of legislative equality were heavily compromised at Vienna. The Great Powers made the law and the middle powers signed the resulting Treaty. The small powers, meanwhile, were erased from consideration” (Simpson, 2004: 112). All in all, we can see that power is important in international law. Indeed, in an excessive expression, the law itself might be quite often wrongly accused of its bias toward

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<sup>96</sup> See, for more information, Stephen Toope (2003: 304).

power, in particular when considering that law can be acknowledged as just the expression of the will of the ruling groups, and the justification of the dominance and exploitation of international society by a small group of Great Powers (Wilson, 2003, 14). Under this circumstance, at best, international law itself appears to be just the reflection of pure power.

However, international law is not just the reflection of pure power. In the relationship between international law and morality, we can counter the assumption that the international law is only the reflection of sheer power. In consideration of the relationship between international law and power, we have to simultaneously conceive of the relationship between international law and morality as well. As known as the father of international law, Hugo Grotius stood for the legal community of mankind on the basis of morality (Keens-Soper, 2001:116). Alan James asserts that normative rules such as “the sine qua non” on the basis of prudence, etiquette and ethics, provide a behavioral framework in international society, which can be easily found in aspects of international law (James, 1973:66-67). In moral aspect of international law, even Koskenniemi admits that “law made constant reference to ethical and moral principles and the successful search for these principles is as essential for the scientific understanding of international law as of any legal system” (Koskenniemi, 2001). In this similar line, Ronald M. Dworkin claims that legal philosophers have been deeply concerned not only with “law as it is” but also with law as “it should be”(Dworkin, 1977:9). In reality, as Nardin puts it, we can obviously observe moral elements in international law, when considering the general principles of international association for customary international law. For example, we can think of the followings:

the rights of independence, legal equality and self defense, and



the duties to observe treaties, to respect the immunity of ambassadors, to refrain from aggression, to conduct hostilities in war in accordance with the laws of war, to respect human rights, and to cooperate in the peaceful settlement of disputes (Nardin, 1983:233).

International human right law, the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or international humanitarian law might help address the above concerns. All in all, international law cannot be limited to pure power or morality alone, but instead, it indicates both of them, power and morality, which entails the features of the international system, international society and world society – e.g. three traditions.

As another character of international law, international law is inherently not fixed and given, but has historically evolved. Louis Henkin states “law is politics”, since law is made by political actors, through political procedures, for political ends (Henkin, 1995:4). He believes that international law is the product of its particular society (Henkin, 1995:5). Hedley Bull also claims that we cannot properly perceive of any law without consideration of social context (Bull, 1977:144). At this juncture, we can notice two natures of international law. One is that international law is not fixed, but it has continuously transformed itself on the basis of new norms and values which are dominant in international society. The other is that on the whole, international law itself is not only reflecting the context of international society, and it can be hardly expected in the absence of the context of international society. As Peter Wilson puts it, in other words, sense can be made of international law by making sense of international society, which reflects the close inevitable relationship between international law and nature of international society.<sup>97</sup> As one example, we can think of the fact that before World War II, international law was silent on the

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<sup>97</sup> See Peter Wilson (2003).

subject of human rights, but since then there has been a dramatic internationalization of human rights across international society, which has ultimately made human rights one of the central issues of international law, such as the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Vogelgesang, 1979:241). This does not only show the evolution of international law but also the inevitably close relations between international law and the nature of international society.

For the last time, let us briefly examine the role of international law in international society. In general, many people doubt whether or not international law can play a significant role in international society as much as a law does in a domestic society, because of the absence of the ‘super-national government,’ of the absence of an ‘effective world court,’ and of the absence of an ‘international enforcement mechanism’(Carter, Trimble and Bradley, 2003:25). Indeed, they might not avoid the feeling of the incapability of international law to maintain the order of international society and promote the well-being international society.<sup>98</sup> Thus, they might conclude that international law might be recognized as just a weak law that can rarely regulate the behavior of the state in international society.

However, as Lassa Oppenheim argues, we should not forget “a weak law is still law” (Nardin, 1983: 121). And, we should keep in mind the fact that a weak law itself is clearly strong enough not to be completely ignored. Also, as many English School scholars and international lawyers point out, international environment cannot be described with realist logic alone, such as pure anarchy and the self-help system in which endless power struggle alone can be easily found. And, international society does not have any authority of supreme government over states, which could be

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<sup>98</sup> See The Commission on Global Governance (1995:304).

understood as one of the anarchical aspects, but it does not necessarily mean that states can do whatever they want, even if states are sovereign in international society.<sup>99</sup> International society itself reflects common values and common norms, and under the character of international society, international law itself is deeply embedded in those norms and values. And, states are also well aware of the fact that their compliance with such rules in international society is closely connected with their own long-term interests and moral ground. Due to these reasons, states are highly likely to comply with international law, and they are reluctant to do what they can do in international society. All in all, we can say that international law is not incompetent to restrain the freedom of sovereign states, even under the circumstance that there is no international police force for states' compliance with the rules. In fact, as English School scholars put it, international law should be acknowledged as a major international institution to preserve the international order and promote the well-being of international society, and so it has been historically recognized as one of the major elements of international society.

When looking into the relations between international law and international society, which can help understand the important contribution of international law to international society, we can notice that the relationship between international law and international society is mutual re-enforcing relationships. The primary function of international law is ultimately to recognize the idea of a society of sovereign states (Fawn and Larkins, 1996: 6). As Martti Koskenniemi puts it, international law is derived from the effect of a common consciousness of the whole international society, which could be recognized as 'civilized consciousness' (Koskenniemi, 2001: 51-

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<sup>99</sup> Ibid.

55).<sup>100</sup> And, international law contributes to common goods such as international order and the well-being of international society, while promoting and consolidating the norms and values of international society.

Mutual re-enforcing relationships can be more clearly grasped in the relationship between domestic society and municipal law. In the relationship between society and law, John Westlake mentions “no human society can have existed a day without its law,” and “the breach of no law can be unaccompanied by the feelings of a wrong and a right” (Westlake, 1914:16). This remark does imply the inevitable positive relationship between society and law. We can expand and apply this logic to the relationship between international law and international society, and we can say that international society cannot exist a single day without international law, even if I have to admit the relatively different level of impacts of domestic law and international law on domestic society and international society. In fact, Westlake declares “when we assert that there is a thing as international law, we assert that there is a society of states: when we recognize that there is a society of states, we recognize that there is international law” (Westlake, 1914:2-3).

Also, Hugo Grotius’s concept of law can advocate such co-relationship and help understand the great contribution of law to international society. In *Prolegomena*, Hugo Grotius mentions:

Just as the laws of each state have in view the advantage of that state, so by mutual consent it has become possible that certain laws should originate as between all states, or a great many states; and it is apparent that the law thus originating had in view the advantage, not of particular states, but of the great society of states. And this is what is called of nations, whenever we distinguish that term from the law of nature

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<sup>100</sup> Customary international law emerges in this way as well.

(Prolegomena, XVII).<sup>101</sup>

At this juncture, we can clearly see that law itself as an institution can promote the well-being of international society as a whole rather than only interests of certain nation states. Indeed, we can comprehend that to comply with international law itself can be recognized as to sustain international order and the society of states, when considering Hugo Grotius' emphasis on the role of domestic law (see below XVIII). Further, we can comprehend in the XVIII that the law can help to reduce the degree of unpredictability in international affairs via maintaining certain patterns of behaviors of states. In *Prolegomena*, Hugo Grotius mentions:

For just as the national who violates the law of his country in order to obtain an immediate advantage break down that by which the advantage of himself and his posterity are for all future time assured, so the state which transgresses the laws of nature and of nations cuts away also the bulwarks which safeguard its own future peace. Even if no advantage were to be contemplated from the keeping of the law, it would be a mark of wisdom, not of folly, to allow ourselves to be drawn toward that to which we feel that our nature leads (Prolegomena, XVIII).<sup>102</sup>

This demonstrates how important international law has been in international society

The significant role of international law has been quite often disregarded as an instrument of the Great Powers or even as the useless rules of laws which powerful states can ignore and violate anytime, and international law might be often simply misunderstood as an instrument for furthering the shared purposes of states or as an outcome of the transactions arising from the pursuit of shared purposes (Nardin, 1983:309). However, more fundamentally, international law should be recognized as

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<sup>101</sup> See Hugo Grotius (1957).

<sup>102</sup> Ibid.

a condition of the pursuit of all purposes and exists only where common procedures for particular transactions are realized (Nardin, 1983:309). All in all, we should not forget the significant role of international law in maintaining the existence of international society itself and further in elevating the wellbeing of international society.<sup>103</sup>

Below, I will investigate the contribution of international law to democratic development across international society, which can bring out the long-term interests for the whole international society. In the process, I will attempt to reveal the close relationship between international law and international society. Further, I will examine the triangle relationship among international law, international society and democracy.

## 2> *International Law and Democracy*

My dissertation is about democratic development as the new wave expansion of international society and the new standard of civilization in the post-Cold War era and 21<sup>st</sup> century. This chapter is about the nature and role of international law, in the connection of its contribution to international society. Also, this section in this chapter is to primarily focus on whether or not international law is closely related with democratic development and how this can have an impact on democratic promotion across international society, if they are intimately related. In addition, I will attempt to demonstrate that international law will reflect more and more democratic norms in international society. Actually, earlier, I already mentioned the co-relationship between international law and international society, but I want to touch on the

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<sup>103</sup> States often face various issues which cannot be contained within their own national boundaries, such as disease and environmental problem. This requests international law in international society.

relationship between international society and international law, further stressing the triangular relationship among international society, international law and democracy.<sup>104</sup>

At the end of WWII, the defeat of fascism led to some opportunity for the international community to make democracy a norm of international law (Rich, 2001:21). However, during the Cold War era, the theme of democracy had been regarded as a tool for a power struggle. As a matter of fact, as Rich points out, during the period of the ideological conflict, democracy itself could be hardly accepted as necessary to secure peace in international society and to turn itself to become an essential norm for the development of international law (Rich, 2001:22). We can say that during the Cold War era, democracy itself had simply political and propagandistic uses for the US and against Soviet Union, which was originally motivated by super-power competition (Rich, 2001:22-25).

However, in the post-Cold War era and the 21<sup>st</sup> century, democracy cannot be derived from power struggle anymore, and it has been more and more willingly accepted as the best means to achieve good governance, which can bring out more peace and security in international society, not to mention the well-being of international society in the end (Rich, 2001:23). We can say that in the post-Cold War era and the 21<sup>st</sup> century, as the predominant force, democracy has obtained more and more attention in international society. We can clearly notice the predominant force of democracy in various areans. As one of evidences, in the post-Cold War era

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<sup>104</sup> I want to stress the co-relationship among civilization, international law and international society. Civilization cannot be thinkable without law and also, only civilized people recognize international law. And international society can hardly exist without international law. See Schwarzenberger (1955:219), and Westlake (1914:2-3). Here, we can think that if democracy becomes the standard of civilization, we can think of close relationship among international law, international society and democracy.

and the 21<sup>st</sup> century, international law has increasingly advocated democracy and international law itself has gradually reflected the predominant force of democracy as well.<sup>105</sup>

However, as Steven Wheatley point out, I admit that in international law, democratic government is still not an official condition of membership in the United Nations (Wheatley, 2005:133). But as mentioned above, we cannot deny the fact that the nature of international law has gradually reflected more and more norms of democracy, not to mention human rights, which conveys the transformed nature of international society, uncovering how international law manifests the nature of international society. Particularly, the democratic nature of international society can help comprehend some democratic proclivity in international law. In turn, the democratic tendency in international law strengthens democratic development across international society, via its impact on national constitution. At this juncture, we can grasp the triangle relationship between democracy, international law and international society.

Thomas Franck could be recognized as one of representative international lawyers to advocate democratic development and get it to become norm of international law. For instance, in 1992, Thomas Franck advocated fabricating the groundwork for the “emerging right of democratic governance” by having national elections observed and endorsed by the international community that could fabricate the international legitimacy to governments (Rich, 2001:26). Especially, Franck claims that in the post-Cold War era, a pro-democracy movement has been strongly felt in international society and that democracy has gradually become an entitlement

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<sup>105</sup> See, for more detail, Thomas Franck (2000).



in international law (Franck, 1995: 84). Franck states:

Democracy is becoming an entitlement in international law and process is due in part to the very recent political reality of a burgeoning pro-democracy movement within the states which constitute the world community (Franck, 1995: 84).

Governments which only a decade ago would have bridled at the idea not accept that the international community not only has the power to respond to occasional invitations to monitor national elections, but has an interest in seeing that free and fair elections are held everywhere at regular intervals (Franck, 1995:109).

As shown, Franck is well aware of such close connections between international law and democracy. Actually, he even asserts that in the future, democratic government might be made a precondition for fiscal, trade and development benefits, and for the protection of UN and regional collective security measure (Mark, 2000: 549). Also, Fernando R. Teson advocated the connection between democracy and international law, even though he is not as strong a supporter as Thomas Franck is. Teson asserts that there are fundamentally similar characteristics between international law and democracy as well. He believes that one of the primary aims of international law is to secure the enduring peace in international society, while supposing that democracies are more peaceful than tyrannies, which could be the shared ground between international law and democracies (Teson, 1996:35).<sup>106</sup> In a similar position, Lassa Oppenheim is well aware of the close relationship between democracy and international law on the basis of the evolution or progress of international law, advocating the norm of democracy in international society as well. Oppenheim states:

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<sup>106</sup> As Teson puts it as well, democracies can be aggressive as much as tyrannies, when it faces non-democracy, but we can say that in general, democracies tend to avoid war if possible, in particular among democracies, which is what democratic peace theory claims.

**the progress of international law is intimately connected with the victory everywhere of constitutional government over autocratic government, or what is the same thing, of democracy over autocracy.** Autocracy government, not being responsible to the nation it dominates, has a tendency to base the external policy of the state, just as much as its internal policy, on brute force and intrigue; whereas constitutional government cannot help basing both its external and its internal policy ultimately on the consent of the governed. And although it is not at all to be taken for granted that democracy will always and everywhere stand for international right and justice, so much is certain, that it excites a policy of personal aggrandizement and insatiable territorial expansion, which in the past has been the cause of the many wars (Kingsbury: 1999:75).

As shown, at this juncture, the close relationship between international law and democracy has been increasingly noticed, and we can see that the nature of international society has been increasingly embedded in the norm of democracy and international law itself has been expected to gradually reflect the nature of international society.

Let us investigate international legal documents to advocate democracy in order to display the wide-ranging co-relationship between democracy and international law. First, we can think of General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV):

Declaration of Principles of International Law in terms of Friendly Relations ‘defines a state conducting itself in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as one’ thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or color.<sup>107</sup>

This resolution indirectly advocates democracy across international society. Indeed, Robert Rosenstock advocates this position, claiming that this resolution reflects the

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<sup>107</sup> GA Res. 2625 (XXV) was adopted on October 25, 1970.

idea of the necessity for governments to represent the governed, which was re-examined in the UN Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action to confirm that “government must represent the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction of any kind” (Rosenstock, 1971:713, 732, Wheatley, 2005:143). At this juncture, Wheatley claims that this government can be characterized with the assumption that the legislative and other measures of the state should not arbitrarily favor, or disfavor, any particular group of persons, and ultimately should carry out the will of people (Wheatley, 2005:143).

The propensity backing of international law toward democracy can be seen in other legal documents, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In particular, Article 1 and Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights strongly indicate the close relationship between international law and democracy. Article 1 said “all people have the rights of self-determination. By virtue of these rights they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development,” and Article 25 said:

- Every citizen shall have the rights and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions and without unreasonable restrictions:
- a. To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representative,
  - b. To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;
  - c. To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.<sup>108</sup>

These articles 1, and 25, clearly reveal the tendency of international law toward

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<sup>108</sup> See “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.” Available at the website: <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm#art13>

democracy. As James Crawford points out, particularly when considering in Article 25 that every citizen has the right to participate in the conduct of public affairs, directly or via freely chosen representatives (Crawford, 2000:93), and when considering that democracy reflects a range of rights to join public life, effective freedom of speech and the opportunity to organize political parties and other groups (Crawford, 2000), this is not the only democratic indication in international society, but also democratic predisposition in international law. In fact, at the universal level, the Human Rights Committee drafts a general comment on Article 25 to guarantee democratic political system in states parties to the Covenant, while stressing the close relationship between Article 1 and 25, and noting that arbitrary deprivation of citizenship for the purpose of avoiding or diminishing the political rights of individuals would violate Article 25 (Crawford, 2000:105).

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights demonstrates that the significance of democracy in international society could not be minimized even during the Cold War era as well. The article 21 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights clearly implies this point.

1. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country directly or thoroughly freely chosen representatives.
2. Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.
3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures. (Article 21)<sup>109</sup>

The Universal Declaration clearly emphasizes ‘basic civil rights’ and ‘political rights,’

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<sup>109</sup> See “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” Available at the website: <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml>

not to mention the right to life, the right not to be held in slavery, not to be tortured, the right to equal protection of law, the right to due process guarantees, ‘freedom of speech, assembly and movement,’ the right to privacy, etc. (Buergethal and Maier, 1990:120). Indeed, the United Nations Human Rights Committee identifies the people of existing states as beneficiaries of self-determination, and equates their rights of self-determination with the existence within the state of a continuing system of democratic government based on public participation (Crawford, 2000:94-95). All of these obviously show the intimate relationship between democracy and international law.

Also, we can recall Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and General Assembly Resolution 47/135, which guarantees the interests of minority as the primary aspect of democracy, when considering that as mentioned in Chapter I, democracy is more than just the rule of majority and that it should reflect harmonious interests and mutual toleration rather than only interests of the majority. Democracy is not only the counting of votes but also the sharing of reasons and the harmony of interests, reflecting popular sovereignty as well as political equality and freedom. The accomplishment of democracy requests the guarantee of minority rights. The absence of minority rights itself can bring out the tyranny of majority, and the will of the majority can’t always determine the will of the people properly, and democracy should be understood by its underlying principles of popular sovereignty, the will of the people, political equality, harmonious interests and mutual toleration rather than simply the rule of majority (Wheatley, 2005). Thus, the protection of minority rights should be recognized as very significant in democracy, and the understanding of democracy in international law has to expand beyond an institutional and procedural one, in order to acknowledge the significance of political

participation for the minority groups, which can facilitate democratic development across international society (Williams, 2000:124, Wheatley, 2005). Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights said:

In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic **minorities exists, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group,** to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language.<sup>110</sup>

Article 1 (1 & 2), 2 (2) and 5 (1) of General Assembly Resolution 47/135 said as well:

Article 1(1&2): 1. States shall protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity of minorities within their respective territories and shall encourage conditions for the promotion of that identity. 2. States shall adopt appropriate legislative and other measures to achieve those ends.....

**Article 2(2). Persons belonging to minorities have the right to participate effectively in cultural, religious, social, economic and public life.....**

**Article 5(1). National policies and programmes shall be planned and implemented with due regard for the legitimate interests of persons belonging to minorities.**<sup>111</sup>

These legal documents support democracy, and they can even rectify the false concept of democracy, such as the rule and interests of majority alone, with emphasis on harmonious interests of citizens. They can also help facilitate the prohibition of unreasonable and discriminative national constitution, for instance, that the president and the prime minister should be a member of a particular group such as male or female; White, Hispanic, Asian, or Black; and Christian, Buddhist or Islamist.<sup>112</sup> We

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<sup>110</sup> Available at the website: <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm>

<sup>111</sup> “Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities” adopted by General Assembly resolution 47/135 of December 18 1992. Available at the website: <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/minorities.htm>

<sup>112</sup> These legal documents clearly advocate democracy, and in fact, this aspect can be seen especially in

can say that the above international legal documents are pretty important, and that the above legal documents for minority rights can be ultimately comprehended to advocate democratic promotion and consolidation.

Democratic features of international law can influence national domain such as national constitutions as well. We can say that international law can have an impact on domestic constitutions and that it can influence internal and external behaviors of states, which can lead to states' alteration of character and identity in the end. For instance, the US Supreme Court wrote:

**International law is part of our law**, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose, where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations (Buergethal and Maier, 1990:209).

This suggests that international law can be adopted as national law, not to mention the impact of international law on national law. Also, when considering that Article 12 and 20 of Iraqi new constitution stress the equal rights regardless of gender, sect, opinion, belief, religion or origin, and that China's constitution on March 14, 2004 modified itself to guarantee private property and human rights that could be recognized as China's progress of democracy, we cannot completely deny that the wide-ranging norms in international society and international law indirectly influence national constitutions. These clearly prove that democratic features in international law can have great impacts on domestic constitution.

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consociational democracy. Steven Wheatley points out this. See, Steven Wheatley (2005:162-164). Also, Arend Lijphart explains well about the concept and role of consociational democracy. See Lijphart (1995).

Also, all democratic features in international law and international society can facilitate even the justification of intervention for democratic redevelopment. In 1999, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan mentioned “gross violations of human rights and denials of democratic fundamentals can no longer be regarded as purely domestic matters.”(Carter, Trimble and Bradley, 2003:1037). In addition, when considering the United Nations’ involvement in promotion of democracy such as the practice of election monitoring, for the promotion of democracy in Haiti (SC/6300), Namibia, Kosovo, Cambodia, East Timor (SC/1410), and recently Afghanistan (SC/1378), we can perceive that democracy itself has progressively become a part of the nature of international society and of international law, even though the use of force for purely democratic promotion is still hardly approved on international legal basis in international society.

So far I have intended to reveal the triangular relationships among democracy, international law and international society via my investigation of the relationship between ‘international society and democracy,’ ‘international society and international law,’ and ‘international law and democracy.’ In the post-Cold War era and 21<sup>st</sup> century, democracy can be more and more easily found across international society. When democracy has become the gradually predominant force in international society and even grown to be an emerging new standard of civilization in the post-Cold War era and the 21<sup>st</sup> century, international law is also expected to evolve itself to match the nature of international society and to reflect increasingly democratic norms and values. When all things are considered, in the post-Cold War era and the 21<sup>st</sup> century, as a significant institution in international society, international law has played a significant role in promotion and consolidation of democracy. To sum up, global democratic phenomenon shows the positive indication to international law in order to



promote and consolidate democracy, and international law can be expected to contribute to democratic development. The below three cases, China, South Korea and Iraq can help comprehend how international law can have an impact on democratic development, not to mention how international law, international society and democracy can influence each other.

### ***3> International law and Case Studies (Democratic Development)***

In the above section, I briefly investigated the triangular relations among international society, international law and democracy, and I stressed that international law has had an impact on democratic development. In this section, three cases, China, South Korea and Iraq, can demonstrate how international law can have an impact on each country's path toward democracy, even if Iraq's case is still hard to advocate the assumption that international law can influence Iraq's democracy. As each case represents the different aspect of international society such as pluralist, solidarist and liberal anti-pluralist facades, we will see how international law can have relatively different impacts on the promotion and consolidation of democracy in three states. They can explicate that international law can lead to some pressure on democratic promotion and consolidation, which will fortify the triangular relationship among democracy, international law and international society.

#### ***A) China***

In this section, I will examine the impact of international law on China's path toward democracy. This will help comprehend why we should deliberate the considerable function of international law in a pluralist international society, and how international law can have an impact on the promotion and consolidation of democracy and further on path toward democracy in a pluralist international

society.<sup>113</sup> In this section, I will take a look at international legal documents concerning ‘human rights’ and ‘religious freedom,’ which can ultimately strengthen democratic development in China.

China was, for the first time, exposed to European-oriented international law around 1860 when China was not even recognized as a nation (Feng, 2001: 224). But, China’s serious relationship with international law can be traced in its compliance with the European-oriented international law in 1943, which helped guarantee life, liberty and property for foreign nationals.<sup>114</sup> However, China had been identified with an aggressive revisionist power until the late 1970s, rejecting any norm and value of international society as the West-oriented biased tool for Western powers’ interests. This made China so reluctant to comply with international law, and this is also why China was struggling for equal status in the international community of states from 1840 (Feng, 2001: 239). As for China, international law itself could be understood as a West-biased mechanism for Western powers’ narrow interests. For instance, the Chinese government was used to rejecting international human rights law, in particular whenever China was criticized for its violation of human rights, such as China’s poor human rights record in Tibet, and pressure on China’s compliance with human rights. The Chinese government claimed that it seemed to reflect the interest of the West, while using cultural relativism like Asian values which former Singapore Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew raised. Also, China was used to defend its position against human rights, claiming that as for the US, the US national law is prior to international law whenever they come to be in conflict

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<sup>113</sup> As mentioned in Chapter I, we can see international society with three divisions such as pluralist, solidarist and liberal anti-pluralist dimensions, which can be seen relatively in China, South Korea and Iraq.

<sup>114</sup> See Gong (1984).

with each other. Pointing out the priority of the decision of US Supreme Court over the decision of the International Criminal Court, China has tended to make its strong claim that whether or not China adopts human rights should be conceived as its own domestic issue in which no state and no international authority, in particular the US can have any right to intervene.

However, China cannot totally avoid the pressure from international law. China yielded to the European oriented international law in 1943 to protect foreign nationals, after its series of shameful experiences such as its defeat of the Opium War. And, importantly, since 1978, Chinese has become interested in international law, due to China's four modernization programs (Chiu, 1988:3). To achieve the goal of modernization, the introduction of Western technology and investment into China is necessary (Chiu, 1988:39). As for the Chinese, international law serves as a valuable tool to assist such intercourse between China and the outside world (Chiu, 1988:39). Indeed, Deng Xiaoping and his successors have been aware of the fact that no country can be in complete isolation from the international system in today's world, and so it is essential for countries to understand and abide by the rules of the international community (Zonglai and Bin, 2010:193). And so, Deng Xiaoping and his successors have attached great importance to the role of international law in the reform and opening-up process (Zonglai and Bin, 2010:194).

Moreover, now that today, China lives in a more favorable legal environment and does not need to challenge the existing legal order by advocating different systems of international law as Chinese scholars did in the mid-1950s, China has a more positive attitude toward international law (Chiu, 1988:39-40). As a matter of fact, Chinese leaders tend to claim that international law plays a profound role in China's peaceful development in three dimensions - i.e. generating a peaceful and safe

outside environment, creating an equal and impartial competition order, and proffering a legal safeguard for international cooperation (Deming, Yuan and Hua, 2006:262). Nonetheless, as a bottom line, they believe that international law is important since it is beneficial for China's national interests, in particular its economic interests and its pursuit of Great Power status.

There are many evidences that China has not rejected international law since 1978. For instance, today, China is a party to more than 300 international treaties, whereas before the reform and opening-up it acceded to just over 30 international treaties (Zonglai and Bin: 2010: 194). Also, China often uses the rhetoric of international law to describe its behavior in the international community, even when that rhetoric is self-serving or hypocritical (Feinerman, 1995:188). This demonstrates China's acceptance of the legitimacy of international law, in particular UN's law (Wan, 2007:740).

International law can have an impact on China, as China complies with international law. For instance, although the Chinese Constitution has no express provision on the relative status of treaties and domestic laws, the general practice in China is to perceive international law (treaties) as superior to domestic law (Keyuan, 2006:238). We can think of Article 142 of the 1986 General Principles of Civil Law:

if any international treaty concluded or acceded to by China contains provision different from those in the civil laws of China, the provisions of the international treaties shall apply, unless the provisions are the ones to which China has announced reservation (Keyuan, 2006:238).

Indeed, also, the international treaties concerning economy and commerce are superior to China's domestic law (Guo, 2009:166). Because of this, the principles of the World Trade Organization (WTO) facilitate China's legal reforms, such as the rule of law, which demonstrates that China's gradual integration into the global trade

system brought about its increasing acceptance of international law (Wan, 2007:739). Moreover, some international rules and treaties are incorporated into Chinese laws (Hsieh, 2010:10). For instance, China's Contract Law is mostly consistent with the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Good (CISG) (Hsieh, 2010: 10, fn 26). And, we can think of Article 18 of the Constitution on foreign investment protection and the Regulations on Diplomatic Privileges and Immunity in 1990 as examples of incorporation of international treaties and rules (Keyuan, 2006:238). Moreover, China makes corresponding revisions and amendments of domestic laws in line with the international treaties which China has ratified or acceded to, like the 1985 Provisional Regulations on Trade Marks after China ratified the Paris Convention on Protection of Industrial Property (Keyuan, 2006:238). All in all, we can say that China is willing to comply with international law and that international law has some impacts on China.

When considering the triangular relationship among international law, international society and certain predominant values like human rights and democracy, international law itself is expected to indirectly and gradually transform China's identity and character even under the principles of equality and non-intervention in a pluralist international society. As mentioned earlier, China has cherished the principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention, which led to Beijing's official criticism of the handling of the Kosovo crisis in 1999 (Feng, 2001: 225). For instance, China's former President, Jiang Zemin expressed his stance against power politics, criticizing the NATO forces' management of the Kosovo case and claiming that the UN Charter was far from outmoded yet (Feng, 2001:2005). However, the principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention do not necessarily mean that

there are no mechanisms to alter the gradual transformation in China's identity and character. Under the principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention, the best mechanism in the alteration of China's identity and character as well as its behavior and language might be the long-term trend of socialization among states, in particular, the interest-based socialization, which can gradually blur or eradicate differences in the political, economic and cultural lives (Feng, 2001:233). This point indicates that non-violent pressure from international law and international society on the basis of certain interests, values and norms can be one of plausible mechanisms to alter and cultivate the identity and character of China.

When considering the close relationship among international law, international society and certain values such as human rights and democracy, which can help understand the alteration in China's identity and character, we can think of several examples. First of all, we can chew on China's membership in the United Nations.<sup>115</sup> China's UN membership means that China should have been bound by norms in the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and Chinese leaders have been well aware of the fact that most states have been subscribed to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as the UN Charter in international society.<sup>116</sup> Also, in terms of its compliance with international human rights, China has been gravely criticized by international human right organizations and non-governmental organizations such as the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Amnesty International. At this juncture, China has been well aware of the interests from its integration into international society. In particular, China has

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<sup>115</sup> China became the member of the United Nations in 1971.

<sup>116</sup> See, for more information, John F. Cooper (1988).

had a great desire to be accepted as a member of the Great Power club whose duty is to maintain general norms and values of international society and to even promote them, which can contribute to the well-being of international society in the long run, in particular via its compliance with international law.<sup>117</sup>

Under the above kinds of pressures, China's gradual engagement in international society and its acceptance of international law have contributed to the alteration in China's identity and character. For instance, in September 1988, at the forty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Chinese foreign Minister described the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as the first international tool for protection of fundamental human rights (Kent, 1993:103). This is one of indications to demonstrate that China has gradually changed itself, accepting international human rights law. In the past, Chinese had skeptical attitude on the international law of human rights, while regarding the law as an attempt by Western countries to interfere in the internal affairs of socialist countries (Chiu, 1988:40). However, due to the Four Modernizations program and open door policy, China cannot afford to ignore the human rights issue at home and abroad (Chiu, 1989: 24). As a matter of fact, China began to join international human rights laws in 1980 (Wan, 2007:739). Human rights law has been a growing part of international law and so China could not completely shun the human rights issue in its foreign relations (Wan, 2007:739). In other words, with the deepening of its economic reform and openness to the outside world, China started paying sincere attention to international human rights law (Keyuan, 2006:243). In particular, now that China is a permanent

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<sup>117</sup> We should keep it in mind that Great Power does not mean just a material superior power, but it is more than that. Also, in terms of the qualification of membership in international society, the compliance with international law itself can be recognized as the full membership precondition in international society. Indeed, Gong uses the compliance with international law as the standard of civilization. See, for more detail, Gong (1984).

member of the United Nation Security Council with big power status, it cannot simply avoid the human rights issue, especially when considering that it has been pursuing Great Power status (Chiu, 1989: 24). This is very meaningful since we can assume that China cannot avoid democracy in the end as well, as democracy becomes the new standard of civilization in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Now, China had signed 21 international human rights treaties (Lee, 2007b: 448). China has ratified six of nine core human rights treaties – i.e. the Convention on Children’s Rights (CRC), the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment (CAT), the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) - and is also considering ratifying the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (Guo, 2009:161). At this juncture, what is important is that an international convention, once ratified by the Chinese legislature, becomes part of the Chinese legal system (Wan, 2007:741). In other words, international human rights laws are lower than the Constitution but equal to domestic law (Wan, 2007:741). Because of this, China hesitates to join some international human rights conventions (Wan, 2007:743).

Moreover, importantly, China launched the 2004 constitutional reform to permit ‘private property’ and to advocate ‘human rights.’ This 2004 constitutional reform can be acknowledged as China’s initial big step toward democracy, not to mention a positive sign that Chinese authority started deliberating on human rights very seriously, which led to China’s further modification of behavior and language toward international society. Nevertheless, now China recognizes the universality of



human rights protection without questioning the legitimacy of international human rights law (Wan, 2007:740) but, China has its own unique view on some aspects of human rights – i.e. the collective and developmental rights of its people rather than individual human rights (Keyuan, 2006:243).

Let us see several international legal documents, especially, those which China has supported, so as to help comprehend how international law can have an effect on China's democratic development. As mentioned earlier, international legal documents such as Articles 1, 25, and 27 of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 1 of International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), Article 21 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights, General Assembly Resolution 47/135, and Paragraph 8 of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action obviously reflect an intimate relationship between international law and democracy. These legal documents can have an effect on China's path toward democracy. For instance, when considering that China has signed ICESCR in 1997 and ratified in March 2001, and it signed ICCPR in 1998 and seriously considers ratifying it, we can assume that these international legal documents have some influence on China's identity and character toward democracy (Kent, 2002:353). Indeed, according to the requirements of the covenant, China submitted its first implementation report to the UN in June 2003, which passed a UN review in 2005,<sup>118</sup> and China also presented its second report on the implementation of ICESCR to the UN on June 30, 2010.<sup>119</sup> Thus, we can say that ICESCR can have an impact on

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<sup>118</sup> See "Let the World Learn of China's Human Rights Progress," *China News and Report 2010*. The website is available at : [http://www.china.org.cn/report/2010-10/08/content\\_21078130.htm](http://www.china.org.cn/report/2010-10/08/content_21078130.htm)

<sup>119</sup> See "China submits second implementation report on international covenant to UN," *Chinese Government's Official Web Portal*. The website is available at [http://www.gov.cn/english/2010-07/07/content\\_1648171.htm](http://www.gov.cn/english/2010-07/07/content_1648171.htm)

China's gradual alteration in its identity and character. Also, the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights goads China to have public consultations to bring about interest and debate on the steps the State Party has carried out in implementing its treaty obligations under the Covenant; goads it to review the Trade Union Act to permit workers to organize independent trade unions; and goads it to get rid of restrictions on freedom of information and expression (Lee, 2007b:451). These examples show that international law can have an impact on China.

Let us investigate more on the impacts of international legal documents such as ICCPR as well as ICESCR on China, in particular in terms of China's democratic development. ICESCR and ICCPR can affect China's democratic development. When considering "Article 1 of ICESCR," and Donnelly's concept of democracy, we can expect that international legal documents can influence China's domestic arenas. For instance, Article 1 of ICESCR states "All peoples have the rights of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural system."<sup>120</sup> Donnelly defines democracy with the following: "democracy allocates sovereign authority to the people to determine their own political, economic, and social and cultural system"(Donnelly, 2003:191). This indicates that those international legal documents can influence China's democratic development. Also, the ICCPR can clearly show its support of democracy, when considering that the ICCPR states fundamentals for democracy – e.g. the right of self-determination (Article 1), prohibition of torture, cruel or degrading punishment (Article 7), democratic elections (Article 25), freedom of

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<sup>120</sup> See "International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights." Available at the website: <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm>

movement, thought, religion and expression (Article 18), the right of assembly (Article 21), and the ability to associate (Article 22). Due to this, someone can argue that if China ratifies the ICCPR, then the fundamentals for democracy will be given the opportunity to develop in China (Lee, 2007b: 473). This clearly can display how international law can influence China's domestic policy, and further its identity and character.

For the last time, let me examine the impact of international law on religious freedom in China, since religious freedom is very important for democratic development. There are many international legal documents to support religious freedom in China. For instance, we can think of Article 2 of ICESCR (Prohibition on Religious Discrimination) and, Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Prohibition on Religious Discrimination); and Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the right to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his/her choice, and to manifest his/her religion or belief); and Article 6 of the Declaration on the Elimination of Religious Intolerance and Discrimination based on Religion or Belief (DRID).<sup>121</sup> These international legal documents can indirectly influence religious freedom in China.

Actually, since the 1980s when Deng Xiaoping softened the control of religions, Chinese civilians have gradually enjoyed religious freedom. For example, Christian church got back to society after 1978. Beatrice Leung made a good summary about the general improved religious freedom in China, saying:

In 1983, there were 300 Catholic churches in China; by 1987 the number had increased to 2,100, by 1992 to

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<sup>121</sup> The United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted the DRID. See, for Article 6 of the Declaration on the Elimination of Religious Intolerance and Discrimination based on Religion or Belief, the website available at: [http://www.religioustolerance.org/un\\_dec.htm](http://www.religioustolerance.org/un_dec.htm)

3,900 and by 1997 to 5,000. The number of Catholic adherents was established to have risen from 3.3 million in 1986 to over 12 million in 1994 (including both the official and underground churches). In 2004, there were reportedly 2,200 priests. This number was up from 1,500 in 1997; three-quarters of the priesthood had been ordained in the previous 12 years. Protestant numbers increased steadily from 5-6 million in 1993 to 10 million in 1997, and to 14 million in 2004. In 2004, it was estimated that there were 16,000 protestant churches and 32, 000 meeting points (70 per cent built within the previous 20 years) (Leung, 2005:905).

Also, in 2006, a poll of 4,600 people by Shanghai University Professors demonstrates more religious freedom in China. BBC news mentioned the poll, by saying:

300 million people nationwide could be religious, compared to the official figure of 100 million...About 200 million believers are Buddhists, Taoists or worshippers of legendary figures such as the Dragon King and God of Fortune.... The survey found that Buddhism, Taoism, Catholicism, Christianity and Islam are the country's five major religions – China considers Catholicism as separate to Christianity, which covers Protestantism.... A significant rise in Christianity – accounting for 12% of all believers, or 40 million, compared with the official figure of 16 million in 2005. Professor Liu Zhongyu, who helped carry out the survey, attributed the rise in religious belief to growing freedoms in the country as well as the upheaval of rapid social and economic change.<sup>122</sup>

Article 36 of the Chinese Constitution advocates this point, by saying:

Citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief. No state organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to believe in, or not believe in any religion; nor may they discriminate against citizens who believe in, or do not believe in, any religion. The state shall protect normal religious activities.<sup>123</sup>

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<sup>122</sup> See "Survey finds 300m Chinese believers." *BBC News*. February 7, 2006.

<sup>123</sup> This Constitution of the People's Republic of China was adopted on December 4, 1982. See the website available at <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html>

The protecting regulation of religious liberty in China can be much more easily found in rural arenas such as Guangdong than in urban arenas like Beijing.<sup>124</sup> For instance, Article 2 and Article 21 of Guangdong Religious Regulations provide broad protection of religious liberty:

Article 2: Citizens have freedom of religious belief. No one is allowed to force others to believe or not believe or not believe in religion. These should not be any discrimination against either citizens who believe or citizens who do not believe in religion.

Article 21: The normal religious activities of approved and opened places of religious activity are under the protection of the law. No unit or individual is allowed to spread atheistic or anti-religious propaganda within places of religious activity.<sup>125</sup>

This demonstrates that citizens in China definitely enjoy more religious freedom than ever.

At this point, we can also obviously see some parallel among international legal documents such as Article 2 of ICESCR, and Article 2 and Article 21 of Guangdong Religious Regulations. Article 2 of ICESCR states:

the States Parties to the present covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.<sup>126</sup>

When considering this tendency, we can deny the idea that international law and domestic law are completely separable, not to mention the assumption that

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<sup>124</sup> See the website available at: <http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/research/ndp/ref/?action=view&doc=chn100387e>

<sup>125</sup> Guangdong Religious Regulations, *supra* note 97, at 60, 62. See Article 4 and 5 of “Regulations on Religious Affairs of the Province of Guangdong.” June 30, 2000. Available at the website: [http://monitorchina.org/en\\_show.php?id=36](http://monitorchina.org/en_show.php?id=36)

<sup>126</sup> See the website available at: <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm>

international society and domestic society are completely separable, as completely different domains, which is similar to the intimate relationship between international society and international law.

However, it is not right to say that China completely allows religious freedom. China still constrains religious organizations, religious activities and places of worship since Beijing leaders believe that uncontrolled religion can lead to a catalyst of social revolt, which could explain why the Chinese government has been so sensitive to Falun Gong, and the Chinese government has even taken the step of choosing Catholic Church bishops, rejecting any authority of the Vatican, even though around 85% of the official Church's bishops are approved by Rome.<sup>127</sup> Also, Article 36 of Chinese Constitution declares that no one is allowed to use the religion to be engaged in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational system of the state. This indicates that the right to religious freedom cannot be exercised in a manner that infringes on the interests of the state, of the society, and of the collective (Evans, 2002: 757-758). Further the 1982 Constitution does not yet allow citizens to appeal to the procurator for the alleged violations of their rights by the bureaucracy (Kolodner, 1994:470).

However, we can't deny the increasing religious liberty in China, even though it has been limited to activities which the government feels don't interfere with state stability and prosperity.<sup>128</sup> Also, we can expect China to continuously increase

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<sup>127</sup> The Vatican has no formal diplomatic contact with China. In other words, Chinese Roman Catholic Churches have no official connection with Vatican. See, for more information referring to China's religious freedom, the website available at: [http://www.cardinalrating.com/cardinal\\_214\\_article\\_4818.htm](http://www.cardinalrating.com/cardinal_214_article_4818.htm). Also, see Beatrice Leung (2005).

<sup>128</sup> Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin had been in pursuit for the accommodation policy between religious liberty and state stability and prosperity. Hu Jintao continues his predecessors' policies. See Beatrice Leung (2005).

religious freedom, since international law, such as Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, will continuously give some pressure to China for its lack of religious freedom.<sup>129</sup> In particular, when considering that China will definitely ratify the ICCPR, we can say that Chinese will enjoy more religious freedom.

Article 18 of the ICCPR is worthwhile to look at. Article 18 states:

1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and it public or in private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, and practice and teaching; 2 No one shall be subject to coercion that would impair his freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of his choice; 3 Freedom to manifest one's religion or belief may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others; 4 the State parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.<sup>130</sup>

China's ratification of the ICCPR implies that Chinese must change itself by carrying out various obligations required by Article 18 of the ICCPR, altering domestic law where it is incompatible with international standard in terms of individual's freedom of religion.

In China, such gradual religious freedom should be recognized as significant for its contribution to democratic development in the long run, especially when considering that religious freedom indicates 'freedom of association,' 'freedom of

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<sup>129</sup> See Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance." Available at the website: <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a18>

<sup>130</sup> See "International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights." Available at the website: <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm>

speech’, freedom of expression’ and ‘freedom of consciousness,’ which are core values of democracy. In other words, we can perceive that the increasing religious freedom itself signifies China’s move toward democracy, even if it is slowly moving. Also, we can see that international law can ultimately have an impact on China’s identity and character.

So far, I have attempted to reveal how international legal documents of human rights and those of religious liberty can indirectly and directly alter domestic regulations, which might contribute to China’s path toward democracy in the long run. As the nature of international society displays more democratic norms in the post-Cold War era and 21<sup>st</sup> century and international law has been expected to embrace the increasingly democratic norms in this context, China has been anticipated to gradually accept democratic norm as well as human rights in the end. As mentioned above, on March 14, 2004, the Chinese Constitution was amended so as to guarantee private property (“legally obtained private property of the citizens shall not be violated”) and human rights (“the state respects and protects human rights”).<sup>131</sup> This can be seen as democratic development in China, not to mention a nice gesture to match the standard of international human rights, even if this might be primarily derived from the newly created rich class’s and the middle class’s desire for the protection of their own property on the basis of Chinese economic radical growth, and further such changes have been dismissed as merely paying lip-service to the idea of freedoms for Chinese people and to quell social unrest.<sup>132</sup> In addition, on October 19, 2005, China White Paper on political democracy shows that China is slowly moving toward democracy.

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<sup>131</sup> See “Constitution of the People’s Republic of China.” *Wikipedia*. Available at the website: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution\\_of\\_the\\_People's\\_Republic\\_of\\_China](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_the_People's_Republic_of_China)

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*



This is very meaningful not only because this document itself is the first time for the Chinese government to issue a white paper on the political democracy, but also because it seems to indicate Chinese government's official admission that it has faced massive pressure from various directions whose one might be derived from international law. China is more anticipated to abide by international law, not to mention just international human rights law itself.

To sum up, international society and international law have increasingly reflected democratic norms as well as human rights, and so we cannot totally deny that China has transformed itself toward democracy since it has faced the increasing pressure to alter its identity and character from authoritarian regime to democracy, as it did transform its identity and character from an aggressive revisionist power to a status quo power since 1978, because China has been well aware of its interests from its integration into international society, and China has a great desire to become a Great Power. Also, China is continuously expected to transform its identity and character to satisfy the standard of international society. In China's case, I emphasized the triangular relationship among international society, international law and democracy, and I stressed that international law can have an impact on democratic development in a pluralist international society.<sup>133</sup>

### ***B) South Korea***

In South Korea, we can observe the contribution of international law to democratic promotion and consolidation, and also the effect of international law on South Korea's path toward democracy. At this juncture, as seen in China's case, the

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<sup>133</sup> Here, I do not stress enough the relationship among economic development, economic liberalization, political freedom and international law. Nonetheless, I implied the close relationship between economic development and international human right law.

triangular relationship between democracy, international law and international society will be discerned as well, and the relationship between democracy and international law in a solidarist international society will be stressed. In the process, I will investigate international human rights law and international labor law to grasp how international law can promote and consolidate democracy in South Korea and how it has had an indirect or direct impact on South Korea's path toward democracy.

When considering the relationship between international law and domestic law in South Korea, we can see that some international law can be recognized as domestic law in South Korea. For instance, South Korea's constitution states:

Treaties duly concluded and promulgated under the constitution and generally recognized rules of international law shall have the same force and effect of law as domestic laws of the Republic of Korea (Article 6, paragraph 1).<sup>134</sup>

In short, if treaties are ratified by South Korea, they have the same effect as domestic law. This demonstrates that international law can be very effective in South Korea, although in South Korea, the constitution is superior to international law.<sup>135</sup> In consideration of Article 6 (1) of South Korea's constitution, let us examine the international human rights law and international labor law.

First of all, let us take a brief look at the role of international human rights law. In South Korea, currently, the promotion and consolidation of human rights and democracy can be recognized as one of primary foreign policies, which has been advocated by a majority of South Korean civilians. However, during military

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<sup>134</sup> See "Constitution of South Korea." *Wikisource*. Available at the website: [http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Constitution\\_of\\_South\\_Korea](http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Constitution_of_South_Korea)

<sup>135</sup> See, for more information, "한국 법체계에서 국제법의 지위" (the status of international law in South Korea's legal system). Available at the website: [http://kin.naver.com/qna/detail.nhn?d1id=11&dirId=1112&docId=66285635&qb=6rWt7KCC67KV6rO8IO2VnOq1rQ=&enc=utf8&section=kin&rank=2&search\\_sort=0&spq=0&pid=gMufddoi5TCssvYQgyRsss--169783&sid=TOCSQRxq4EwAADvfHWg](http://kin.naver.com/qna/detail.nhn?d1id=11&dirId=1112&docId=66285635&qb=6rWt7KCC67KV6rO8IO2VnOq1rQ=&enc=utf8&section=kin&rank=2&search_sort=0&spq=0&pid=gMufddoi5TCssvYQgyRsss--169783&sid=TOCSQRxq4EwAADvfHWg)

authoritarian regimes, human rights and democratic development had been dismissed for economic and social development. For instance, the Park regime thoroughly believed that South Korea should continue its economic and social development prior to human rights and democratic development for its national security. He claimed “Every citizen should feel that he is a soldier. Politicians, journalists, religious people, students, professors, workers, and housewives – all of them should determine that they are warriors to defend nation.”<sup>136</sup> In particular, during his regime, former US President Jimmy Carter’s projected withdrawal of the US troops, under the urgent situation of the military stand-off along the 38 parallel in the Korean Peninsula, led to the uncertain and insecure feeling in the mind of South Korean leadership and the public.<sup>137</sup> With national security reason, human rights and political freedom in South Korea could be easily dismissed, and socio-economic development was seen as one way to facilitate national security and to legitimize the authoritarian system.<sup>138</sup> Also, in South Korea, constitutions such as 1954, 1962, 1972 and 1980 had been anti-democratic, except for 1960, until before 1987, and they were abused as a simple mechanism for sustaining power for the presidents and the ruling parties (Lee, 1993:707).<sup>139</sup> Under these circumstances, the desire and dedication to democratic development as well as human rights could be hardly thinkable. These brought deep concern about human rights encroachment such as ‘illegal arrests and detentions,

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<sup>136</sup> See Richard Halloran (1975), and C.I. Eugene Kim (1978).

<sup>137</sup> See Eugene Kim (1978).

<sup>138</sup> This circumstance can be similar to China’s prior policy of economic development and social stability over political freedom.

<sup>139</sup> Anti-democratic constitutions can be easily found. In particular, the 1962 constitution is for no limit terms for presidency and the 1972 constitution was for Yusin system. See, for more information, the website available at: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution\\_of\\_the\\_Republic\\_of\\_Korea](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_the_Republic_of_Korea)

tortures, imprisonments without fair trials, unexplained disappearance and death from unknown reasons,' from many human rights experts, in particular from international governmental and non-governmental organizations like Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists and the International League for Human Rights (Lee, 1993:707-708).

However, since 1987, South Korea has radically transformed itself into a decent democratic regime. This radical change in identity and character of South Korea was ignited primarily by its civilians' endless effort toward democracy. Particularly, massive protests in the Spring of 1987 attracted a wide range of the South Korean population and brought out government acceptance of the eight-point reform proposals, such as direct presidential elections (Lee, 1993:707, fn. 11). Also, on October 29, 1987, the revised constitution could strengthen democratic principles, augmenting the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms (Lee, 1993:711). The amended constitution was eventually approved in a national referendum (Lee, 1993:707). Chung-in Moon, Youngjae Jin and Wook Kim describe the amended constitution, by saying:

**The Present Constitution, amended on October 29, 1987, was the outcome of the continuous struggle of the Korean people, who were determined to make democracy prosper and to build an advanced modern state.** Accordingly, it guaranteed maximum autonomy and independence to the judiciary as a strong means to promote a law governing principle and to protect the basic rights of the people (pp 8) The 1987 constitution protects various rights. Chapter II, in Article 10 to 39, lists the duties and rights of citizens. **Article 21** pertains to speech and association, subject only to the honor and rights of others who may be entitled to compensation for unbridled speech. **There are separately a freedom to move and rights to work and collective action of unions. Entering into the 90s, all the legal and institutional barriers to the freedoms of speech, association and assembly have**

**been removed.** Basically, people feel free to say what they want to say, and organize a gathering whenever and wherever they want. The number of demonstrates has increased considerably, and the way the police respond to peaceful demonstrations has also changed from repressive to protective (pp 12).....Constitutional **Article 11 on equality stipulates there shall be no discrimination on the basis of religion.** Article 20 guarantees freedom of religion, and keeps state separate South Korea is richly diverse, and has Buddhism, Confucianism, Christianity both Catholic and Protestant, Chondogyo, hundreds of minor religions and the long shaman tradition.<sup>140</sup>

All of these clearly show that democracy as well as human rights were voluntarily accepted in South Korea, which cannot be seen in China and in Iraq, since Korean citizens have been increasingly aware of the significance of human rights and democracy especially after the Kwangju Massacre of May 1980 that claimed around 2000 innocent lives. Currently, a majority of civilians in South Korea feel that they are living in a liberal democratic state in which the rule of law, harmonious interests, mutual toleration, limited government, transparency, individual freedom, human rights, equality can be guaranteed in some sense.<sup>141</sup>

Due to the above reason, I put South Korea into a solidarist international society, which seems to demean the external influence on political freedom in South Korea. However, South Korea's voluntary acceptance of human rights and democracy does not necessarily mean that international law has had no impact on political freedom in South Korea. International law has had some impact on South Korea's alteration of identity and character, and also South Korea's voluntary compliance with international law has been more likely to fortify democratic norms

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<sup>140</sup> See Chung-in Moon, Youngjae-Kim and Wook Kim, *Democracy Report for South Korea*. The website is available at [http://www.idea.int/publications/sod/upload/South\\_Korea.pdf](http://www.idea.int/publications/sod/upload/South_Korea.pdf) pp.13

<sup>141</sup> Suk Tae Lee points out this as well. See Lee (1993: 711-712).

and values across international society, when considering that international society and international law have increasingly reflected human rights and democracy and South Korea's foreign policy has been more and more primarily based on human rights and democracy.

When considering South Korea's ratification of International Human Rights Covenants, we notice that importantly in April 1990, South Korea ratified the international covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural rights (ICESCR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR (Protocol) (Lee, 1993:706). Also, South Korea has ratified many significant human rights conventions; for example, the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). Those Covenants strongly advocate the protection of human rights and basic freedom, which are closely related to democratic development across international society. In particular, South Korea's ratification of ICESCR, ICCPR and the Protocol to the ICCPR indicates that South Korea entered into international human rights legal order (Jung, 2006:49-50). And, South Korea's participation in CRC (December 20, 1991) and CAT (February 8, 1995) can be interpreted as the assumption that South Korea can't justify its violation of human rights in the name of economic growth and national security (Jung, 2006:50).

Also, importantly, at this juncture, South Korea's ratification of international human rights covenants indicates the co-relationship between international law and domestic law rather than the conflicting relationship, which can ultimately grasp the idea that the impact of international law is strong enough to influence the identity and

character of state in some sense. For instance, under Article 6 (1) of the Constitution in South Korea, the ICCPR or the CRC has the same effect as domestic laws do and it can apply to domestic cases (Lee, 1993:712).<sup>142</sup> This refers to the inseparable relationship between international society and domestic society, and also, this demonstrates that international law can have an impact on South Korea, in particular its democratic development.

However, I should admit that there are several conflicting aspects between international law and domestic law in South Korea. As an example, we can think of the National Security Law (NSL) that could lead to the highly possible violation of international human rights law. Under the NSL, South Koreans are not allowed to praise North Korea or disseminate North Korean propaganda.<sup>143</sup> Also, under the NSL, South Koreans are prohibited from meeting with North Koreans or visiting North Korea without state permission.<sup>144</sup> Due to these kinds of prohibitions, South Korea's NSL often tends to violate the right to freedom of expression and association.

However, international human right law has reduced South Korean governments' abuse of NSL that still restricts some basic rights of Korean citizens in some sense.<sup>145</sup> In other words, Human rights activists and human rights organizations use international law to criticize any violation of human rights in South Korea, and to abolish or revise its NSL. For instance, in November 1995, the UN Special Rapporteur made a statement concerning the NSL to promote the right of freedom of opinion and expression in South Korea, emphasizing the Universal Declaration of

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<sup>142</sup> See, for example, Byung-do Park (2007:37).

<sup>143</sup> See Kay Seok (2010).

<sup>144</sup> Ibid.

<sup>145</sup> See, for more information concerning National Security Law, Lee (1993:730, fn. 106).

Human Rights and the ICCPR:

- a) The Government of the Republic of Korea is strongly encouraged to repeal the National Security Law and to consider other means, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to protect its national security.
- c) All prisoners who are held for their exercise of the right to freedom of opinion and expression should be released unconditionally. The cases of prisoners who have been tried under previous governments should be reviewed, due account being taken of obligations arising under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. . .<sup>146</sup>

Also, Human Right Watch often emphasizes the fact that South Korea is a state party to ICCPR, while pointing out Article 19 of ICCPR (the Right to hold opinions without interference).<sup>147</sup> This can give some pressure to the South Korean government to protect freedom of expression, which can make it possible for South Koreans to reveal their opinions on North Korea. Nonetheless, South Korea can justify its use of the NSL on the basis of Article 4 Section 1 of the ICCPR (Kraft, 2001: 644).

As an another example, we can think of the South Korean government's prohibition of persons with HIV and AIDS from their entering into South Korea or its requirement of disclosure of HIV status for entry for short-term stays. South Korea categorically refuses entry of persons living with HIV and AIDS or requires disclosure of HIV status for entry for short-term stay.<sup>148</sup> Human Rights Watch criticizes South Korea's policy for its treatment of people living with HIV and AIDS, emphasizing Article 26 of ICCPR (equal protection of law without discrimination) as well as Article 7 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (equality before

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<sup>146</sup> Available at the website: <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/commission/country52/39-add1.htm>

<sup>147</sup> See Kay Seok (2010).

<sup>148</sup> See Seong-Taek Lee (2009).



the law and equal protection of the law without discrimination).<sup>149</sup> All in all, these examples can be ultimately understood as the process of consolidation of human rights and democracy in South Korea, and we can hardly deny the fact that international law has had some effect on democratic development in South Korea. As mentioned above, South Korea becomes a mature democracy, but this does not necessarily mean that international law is not necessary for South Korea's consolidation of democracy.

When considering international labor law, we can see that international labor law has contributed to democratic development, like the contribution of international human right law to democracy. In South Korea, governments had been severely repressing the labor union, without allowing any freedom of association. As an example, particularly under Park and Chun's military regimes, governments did not hesitate to arbitrarily arrest, imprison and even torture the leaders of labor unions, even if South Korea's rapid and enviable economic growth itself had been predominantly on the basis of its human resources, for instance, its large, literate and extraordinarily hard-working workforce (West, 1987: 477). The 1963 labor law amendments under the Park government imposed harsh constraints on labor autonomy (West, 1987: 491). West made a good summary on the 1963 labor law amendments, by saying:

The 1963 amendments established the corporatist principle of representational monopoly by prohibiting recognition of competing unions deemed to hamper the ordinary operation of an already existing labor unions. State controls over formation and dissolution of unions were established. The amendments also expanded the scope of the essential services section, within which strikes were prohibited, and mandated procedural

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<sup>149</sup> Ibid.

prerequisites including national union approval, for all strikes. At the time of their enactment, the 1963 amendments were criticized as attempts to restrain the labor movement for the sake of economic development, based on their evident purposes of (1) strengthening government intervention, (2) shaping labor administration with an emphasis on the so-called public interests, (3) restricting labor disputes, and (4) providing institutions for the relief of unfair labor practices (West, 1987:491).

This amendment was not only for social stability, but also for economic growth, which could ultimately legitimize labor exploitation for comparative advantage in labor costs, domestication of labor unions and the maintenance of low wage, the ruthless exploitation of teenage girls, various discrimination like wage and promotion against female workers and long-hours working day (West, 1987:492-532). Under Park Chung-Hee's *Yushin* system, since 1972, the record of South Korea in protecting the basic human rights of union members had been so poor (West, 1987:525). During the *Yushin* system period, Unionists had been very often harassed, beaten, arrested, convicted on false indictments and tortured, which could be compared to the patterns of human rights deprivations under the Greek and Chilean military governments in the 1970s (West, 1987:525). This can be one of the façades for the typical lives of labor unionists in South Korea.

However, since 1985, the South Korean government started revealing its intention for the membership in the International Labor Organization in which South Korea would have to conform to the international labor standard. Its shift was derived from the lack of legitimacy of Chun's regime and from the increasing democratic movement in South Korea, especially the 'radical democratic movement' since 1987 (West, 1987: 542). Along with the Kwangju massacre in May 1980 that cost around two thousand civilian lives, Chun's regime rejected the historical flow of

an open political and economic system, which led to the lack of legitimacy of Chun's regime.<sup>150</sup> In South Korea, the request of political freedom from ordinary citizens had been increasingly strong, along with their antipathy against Chun's regime. The middle class's participation in the student-led -protest for democratic institutions brought out democratic reform. Along with this circumstance, the government had been more and more sensitive to the criticism from the public and from abroad, for labor workers' horrible situation and denial of labor workers' rights. As C.I, Eugene Kim points out, on February 12, 1985, via the 12th National Assembly election, people made democratic exercise within the military authoritarian context, even though it did not have anything to do with the transfer of power (Kim, 1986:66-67).<sup>151</sup> Eventually, as a result of the 1987 amended constitution, labor rights started being increasingly protected. It is worthwhile to take a look at the labor law. Korean Labor law declares:

The Constitution grants fundamental labor standards, such as the **right and also the obligation to work (Art. 32 paras. 1 and 2); the workers' right to freedom of association, collective bargaining and collective action (Art. 33), with public officials and employees of important defense industries being excepted unless provided for by law; special protection for working children and working women including prevention of unjustified discrimination** against women (Art. 32 paras. 4 and 5).<sup>152</sup>

Also, South Korea eventually became the full member of the International Labor

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<sup>150</sup> See, for more information, "Changes in Military Rule: The Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan Regimes." Available at the website: [http://epress.anu.edu.au/mdap/mobile\\_devices/ch08s03.html](http://epress.anu.edu.au/mdap/mobile_devices/ch08s03.html)

<sup>151</sup> Since 1985, when New Korean Democratic Party (NKDP) emerged as a major opposition party, the role of political parties in South Korea appeared to be democratic in terms of balancing the governing party. See, for more information, Kim (1986:69).

<sup>152</sup> See "Labor Law." *National Labor Law Profile: Republic of Korea*. Available at the website: [http://blog.daum.net/blog/BlogTypeView.do?blogid=0YZoT&artcleno=75&categoryId=73&regdt=20110607033220#ajax\\_history\\_home](http://blog.daum.net/blog/BlogTypeView.do?blogid=0YZoT&artcleno=75&categoryId=73&regdt=20110607033220#ajax_history_home)

Organization (ILO) in 1991, along with its full membership in the United Nations. This has given further pressure on South Korea to conform to international obligations to protect labor workers. South Korea ratified around 28 International Labor Conventions; for example, Equality of Treatment (Accident Compensation) Convention (3/29/2001), Minimum Wage-Fixing Machinery Convention (12/27/2001), Officers' competency Certificates Convention (11/04/2003), Medical Examination Convention (12/9/1992), Labor Inspection Convention (12/9/1992), Employment Service Convention (12/27/2001), Equal Remuneration Convention (8/12/1997), discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention (4/12/1998), employment Policy Convention (9/12/1992), Minimum Wage Fixing Convention (12/27/2001), Workers' Representatives Convention (12/27/2001), Minimum Age Convention (1/28/1999), Human Resources Development Convention (1/21/1994), Tripartite Consultation (International Labor Standards) Convention (11/15/1999), Labor Administration Convention (8/12/1997), Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention (3/29/2001), Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (Disabled Persons) Convention (11/15/1999), Labor Statistic Convention (12/8/2003), Chemicals Convention (11/4/2003), and Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention (3/29/2001).<sup>153</sup> All of the Conventions have given some level of pressure to South Korea to comply with the standard norms of international society, which can ultimately contribute to human rights and political freedom.

There are many cases that international labor law can have an impact on South Korea. For example, the prohibition of child labor in its domestic law was brought

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<sup>153</sup> See "List of Ratifications of International Labor Conventions: Republic of Korea." Available at the website: <http://webfusion.ilo.org/public/db/standards/normes/appl/appl-byCtry.cfm?hdroff=1&CTYCHOICE=1450&Lang=EN>

about by International Labor Organization Convention No. 138. In other words, as South Korea became the member of the ILO in 1991, certain laws have been put into place to guarantee that the use of child labor is not an issue.<sup>154</sup> According to International Labor Law, minimum age convention:

aims at the abolition of child labor, stipulating that the minimum age for admission to employment shall not be less than the age of completion of compulsory schooling, and in any case not less than 15 years (14 for developing countries) (Convention No. 138).<sup>155</sup>

Due to this, South Korea came to have new labor laws concerning child labor. According to South Korea's labor law, "A person under the age of 15 shall not be employed as a worker. However, this shall not apply to a person with an employment permit issued by the Minister of Labor" (Article 62, paragraph 1 of the Labor Standards Act).<sup>156</sup> Moreover, we can think of the following:

working hours of a person aged between 15 and 18 shall not exceed seven hours per day and forty-two hours per a week; provided, however, that the parties concerned have reached agreement, the working hours may be extended up to an hour per day, or six hours per week (Article 67 of the Labor Standards Act).<sup>157</sup>

When considering the above, we can see some connection between domestic labor law and international labor law, which indicates that international law can have an impact on South Korea. However, labor rights in South Korea still have some room for improvement. For example, we can think of ILO Convention No. 87 that

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<sup>154</sup> See "South Korean Child Labor Law." *International Business Wiki*. Available at the website: [http://internationalbusiness.wikia.com/wiki/South\\_Korean\\_Child\\_Labor\\_Laws](http://internationalbusiness.wikia.com/wiki/South_Korean_Child_Labor_Laws)

<sup>155</sup> See "International labor Law." *International Labor Organization*. Available at the website: <http://actrav.ilo.org/actrav-english/telearn/global/ilo/law/lablaw.htm>

<sup>156</sup> See "Korea, Republic of – Labor Standard Act." Available at the website: <http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/WBTEXT/46401/65062/E97KOR01.htm#a62>

<sup>157</sup> Ibid.

expressively protects the rights of unions and federations to affiliate with international bodies (West, 1987:524).<sup>158</sup> ILO Convention No. 87 states “public authorities shall refrain from any interference which would restrict this right of free association or impede the lawful exercise thereof”<sup>159</sup> and further, the ILO Freedom of Association Committee has repeatedly stressed the right to strike by workers and their organizations are generally recognized as a legitimate means of defending their occupational interests (West, 1987:520). However, laws in South Korea imposed qualitative and status restrictions to bar millions of workers from forming or joining unions (West, 1987:510). In South Korea, the public officials and teachers were prohibited from their joining labor unions. Article 31 of the South Korean Constitution declares “the right to association, collective bargaining and collective action shall not be granted to workers who are public officials, except for those authorized by the provisions of law”(West, 1987:508). However, the ILO conventions have been continuously rejecting a public/private distinction as determinative of associative rights (West, 1987:508). In general, International Labor Convention No. 87 clearly claims:

workers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall have the right to establish and, subject only to the rules of the organization concerned, to join organizations of their own choosing without previous authorization.<sup>160</sup>

Also, International Labor Organization Convention No. 87 provides that “neither workers’ nor employers’ organizations shall be subject to dissolution by

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<sup>158</sup> See ILO Convention. No. 87, art. 5. Available at the website: <http://www.actrav.itcilo.org/actrav-english/telearn/global/ilo/law/con87.htm> Here, I can point out the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) and the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) as examples for national federations.

<sup>159</sup> Ibid, ILO Convention. No. 87, art. 3(2).

<sup>160</sup> Ibid, ILO Convention No. 87, art. 2.

administrative fiat.”<sup>161</sup> The ILO strongly requested South Korea to restore the basic labor rights of public officials and schoolteachers, and termination of government interference in labor union activities (Kim and Moon, 2000:58).

Due to the above international pressure in South Korea, workers have gradually become free to organize and join unions, and the external pressures could be recognized as new catalysts for labor reforms in South Korea (Kim and Moon, 2000:59). From July 1, 1999, teachers eventually got permission to organize and to bargain collectively such as the Korean Teachers’ and Education Workers’ Union and the Korean Union of Teaching and Educational Workers, and additionally from January 1, 1999, other public officials were permitted to organize workplace associations, if they are of grade 6 or higher and do not belong to special services.<sup>162</sup> Furthermore, Article 33 (paragraph 1) of Constitution claims that the workers’ rights to collective action, such as strike, are constitutionally guaranteed.<sup>163</sup> At this juncture, this suggests that international law can directly or indirectly have an impact on domestic law, and further it can be the valuable mechanism to spread and consolidate certain norms and values across international society. Via this logic, we can perceive how democracy can be ultimately promoted and consolidated across international society.

However, South Korea has not yet ratified International Labor Organization Convention No. 87. When South Korea participated in the OECD in 1996, a condition of adherence was a commitment to reform its industrial relations legislation

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<sup>161</sup> Ibid, ILO Convention, No. 87, art. 4.

<sup>162</sup> See the website available at: <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/ifpdial/II/kor.htm>.

<sup>163</sup> Ibid.

in line with ILO standards.<sup>164</sup> However, there has been no reform.<sup>165</sup> In other words, in spite of its 1996 pledge, current and previous governments have not yet ratified ILO Conventions No. 87 (freedom of association).<sup>166</sup> But, as Amnesty International points out, although South Korea has not yet ratified Convention No. 87, as a member state of ILO, it is obligated to comply with ILO Convention No. 87 to protect the right to freedom of association for all workers, without distinction whatsoever, in particular when considering that ILO Convention No. 87 can be seen in the Constitution of the International Labor Organization.<sup>167</sup> This is one way to consolidate South Korea's democracy.

In South Korea, I investigated international laws such as international human rights law and international labor law in order to reveal how international law can have an impact on democratic development across international society. We can see that these international laws can have an impact on domestic law and further human rights and democracy. As a matter of fact, international human rights law and international labor law can have an effect on the promotion and consolidation of democracy in the end, as they have been gradually respected across international society. For instance, the U.N. Human Rights Commission strongly recommended that South Korea amend its labor laws which are in violation of U. N. human rights states (Kim and Moon, 2000:58). As West points out, also the obligations

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<sup>164</sup> See "International Unions Call for Action on Labor Rights Abuses in Korea." Available at the website: <http://cms.iuf.org/?q=node/564>

<sup>165</sup> Ibid

<sup>166</sup> Ibid

<sup>167</sup> "Republic of Korea (South Korea): Government must respect the right to freedom of association of all migrant workers." *Amnesty International*. Available at the website: [http://www.amnesty.org.nz/archived\\_news/Republic-of-Korea-South-Korea-Government-must-respect-the-right-to-freedom-of-association-of-all-migrant-workers](http://www.amnesty.org.nz/archived_news/Republic-of-Korea-South-Korea-Government-must-respect-the-right-to-freedom-of-association-of-all-migrant-workers)



undertaken by ILO members with reference to freedom of association presume the efficient protection of “the interdependent rights of personal security, freedom of thought and expression, and non-discrimination in the administration of justice”(West, 1987:525). This implies a strong penchant for human rights and democracy. In consideration of the above, we can say that international law has not only promoted democracy but also influenced South Korea’s path toward democracy. All in all, in the triangular relationship between international law, international society and democracy, we can recognize that international law facilitates political freedom in South Korea. However, we should not forget the specific circumstances in South Korea in which a majority of civilians are more likely to accept democracy and human rights; internal factors are more influential than external factors in promotion and consolidation of democracy; and solidarist aspects can be strongly felt.

### ***C) Iraq***

In Iraq’s case, we can think of the relationship between international law and its path toward democracy. In this section, I will attempt to show that in the future, international law may permit the use of force for the promotion of democracy, as democracy has slowly become the standard of civilization in the 21st century. Nevertheless current international law tends to prohibit the use of force for promotion of democracy without any resolution of UN Security Council. Unlike previous cases, this case might indirectly suggest the necessity of transformation in international law that can allow more aggressive external intervention in domestic affairs and even regime change, as international society has increasingly reflected democratic norms, especially when considering that international law itself is not inherently fixed but

that it has evolved on the basis of the nature of international society.<sup>168</sup> This will indirectly facilitate the triangular relationship among international society, international law and democracy. However, I have to say that the use of force for promotion of democracy should be applied to outlaw states alone.

I will begin with the question of whether or not international law can plausibly support the US/UK coalition forces' invasion of Iraq, which has been dominant debate since the Second Gulf War in 2003. In general, in the international law community (international lawyers and international law scholars), scholars have rarely advocated the US and UK coalition forces' invasion of Iraq in 2003 as legitimate. Many international lawyers have strongly disapproved of the military intervention for democratic promotion as illegal. Such prohibition of military intervention for democratic development is deeply embedded in Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter.

Article 2 (4) reads:

All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purpose of the United Nations.<sup>169</sup>

Nonetheless, the UN Charter does not completely discard the possibility of resorting to legitimate forms of force. There are two exceptions under the Charter permitting the lawful use of force. Article 51 of the UN Charter allow for inherent rights of individual or collective self-defense (Palmer, 2004:1). Intervention is otherwise possible collectively via the UN as a last resort to maintain international peace and

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<sup>168</sup> This section will be longer than the previous two sections, since it has been one of the most controversial issues in international society since 2003, and this can be the turning point in the character of international society, even if I, in brief, touched on this issue when dealing with liberal anti-pluralism.

<sup>169</sup> See "Charter of the United Nation." Available at the website.: <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml>

security, if the Security Council determines that there is a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Palmer, 2004:1-2). With these two exceptions, there is no legal basis for military interventions, in particular for the restoration or creation of democracy, or for the relief of humanitarian disasters (Palmer, 2004:54). Thus, in consideration of Article 2 (4), we can easily conclude that the US and UK invasion of Iraq for promotion of democracy cannot be legal, since the use of force was not authorized by the UN Security Council. Indeed, former Secretary General of the United Nations Kofi Annan declared the 2003 Iraq War illegal.<sup>170</sup> This connotes that international law seems to be deeply rooted in the principles of equal sovereignty and non-intervention.

However, we cannot totally disregard military intervention for democratic development as well as human right across international society – i.e. in particular a liberal anti-pluralist international society. Due to this, international law needs to be changed in order to adapt itself to the changing world. It is worth looking to the 1999 Kosovo conflict. The Kosovo war in 1999 can be seen as the first war in which states declared war on another state to protect the human rights of subjects of that state (Schwabach, 2003:10). However, in doing so, we can say that the NATO states broke with existing international law, since international law has not yet recognized any right to go to war to protect human rights, or to intervene militarily in the domestic human rights practices of another state (Schwabach, 2003:10). As noted above, the Charter of the UN does not contain any right of humanitarian intervention, and prohibits even the UN from intervening in matters which are essentially within

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<sup>170</sup> See, for more detail, “Lessons of Iraq war underscore the importance of UN Charter-Annan.” *UN News Center*. September 16, 2004. Available at the website: <http://www.un.org/apps/news/storyAr.asp?NewsID=11953&cr=iraq&Cr1=.Accessed%20may%206,2005>

the domestic jurisdiction of any state, absent the authorization of the Security Council (Schwabach, 2003:11). Thus, we can say that the action of NATO countries drastically departs from the Charter system for collective security, which hinges on a rule (collective enforcement action authorized by the Security Council) and an exception (self-defense) (Cassese, 1999: 24).

However, the principal justification of NATO countries for their military action was that the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) (FRY) had performed massacres and other gross breaches of human rights as well as mass expulsions of thousands of their citizens belonging to a particular ethnic group, and that this humanitarian catastrophe would most likely destabilize neighboring countries such as Albania, Bosnia, and Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, thus, forming a threat to the peace and stability of the region (Cassese, 1999: 25). And, the intervention was comprehended by most democratic governments and numerous scholars to be a legitimate humanitarian intervention (Heinze, 2006:29). Also, importantly, today, human rights are no longer of exclusive concern to the particular state where they may be infringed. Human rights are increasingly becoming the major concern of the international society as a whole (Cassese, 1999: 26). There is a widespread sense that they cannot and should not be crushed with impunity in any part of world (Cassese, 1999: 26). Thus, the Kosovo intervention can be perceived as evidence of state practice toward the creation of a customary legal norm that allows for humanitarian intervention without UN approval (Heinze, 2006:29-30). In other words, the 1999 Kosovo intervention may be taken as evidence of an emerging doctrine in international law permitting the use of forcible countermeasures to hinder a state from committing large-scale atrocities and genocides on its own territory, especially in circumstance

where the Security Council is incapable responding adequately to the crisis (Cassese, 1999: 23). We often see that the Security Council cannot take any coercive action to stop massacres or atrocities because of disagreements among the Permanent Members or because one or more of them exercises its veto power, and so it either refrains from any action or only restricts itself to criticizing or denouncing the massacres or atrocities, plus possibly terming the situation a threat to the peace, such as in Rwanda in 1994 and the Bosnian War from 1992 to 1995 (Cassese, 1999: 23). Thanks to this, we need a new legal norm to allow the use of force to stop massacres or atrocities without any authorization of Security Council. The Kosovo conflict shows that we need a legal norm for the use of force without any resolution of the Security Council to stop massacres and atrocities. At this juncture, for me, the vital question concerning the use of force is, as W. Michael Reisman put it, not whether coercion has been applied in the absence of any resolution of Security Council, but whether coercion has been applied in support of or against community order and basic policies, and whether it was applied in ways whose net results embrace increased congruence with community goals and minimum order (Reisman, 1984:645).

Like the Kosovo conflict, the Iraq war in 2003 can be recognized as the wake up call to promote the development of new international law for the use of force to promote and consolidate democracy, absent any authorization of the Security Council. The fact that in the aftermath of the allied victory over Saddam in 2003, no member of the Security Council or General Assembly has thought to propose that his regime should be restored as an expression of Iraqi political will indicates that we need a new legal norm for the use of force for the promotion of democracy even if military intervention is not authorized by the Security Council (Wedgwood, 2003:582). However, I have to claim that the use of force for democratic development should be

constrained to the outlaw states which carry out atrocities and massacres in the domestic arena and pose an existential threat to regions and the whole international society – i.e. Saddam’s Iraq. Let us briefly examine whether or not Saddam’s Iraq was an outlaw state, which can help us to understand why war was needed to topple Saddam’s regime in 2003 and impose democracy in Iraq.

First of all, Saddam Hussein was a ruthless and dangerous tyrant. No one refutes that Saddam Hussein was a brutal dictator who cruelly oppressed the Iraqi people, especially the Kurds and Shias, for more than 20 years, - e.g. the 1988 Anfal genocide, wherein some 100,000 Kurds were killed by the Iraqi government (Winston, 2005:45). Indeed, the fact that Saddam and his government carried out murder, mass murder, torture, political imprisonment, denial of fair trial, silencing of political dissent, and a vast range of other serious human rights violations and abuses had been widely documented by UN and non-governmental organization (NGO) reports many years before the US /UK invasion (Winston, 2005:45). Also, bad enough, before the US/UK invasion, no one doubted that Saddam’s sons Uday and Kusay would continue the brutal reign of terror that their father had begun (Winston, 2005:50). Thus, if the regime was not somehow deposed, there was little hope for any significant improvement in Saddam’s Iraq’s gloomy and dreadful human rights record, in particular when considering that even though there were measures to stop Saddam ‘s brutal repression – i.e. economic sanctions and no-fly zones - Hussein’s flagrant violation of human rights standards persisted (Heinze, 2006:27, Winston, 2005:50). Also, importantly, the prospect of political liberalization under Saddam could not be considered very realistic (Palmer, 2004:10).

Second, Saddam’s Iraq posed an existential threat to the region and further international society. On January 29, 2002, President George W. Bush in his state of

the union address mentioned “the Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax and nerve gas and nuclear weapons for over a decade.....States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world” (Visser, 2007:54). In particular, according to intelligence services, Saddam’s Iraq might be able to make a nuclear bomb within three years (Palmer, 2004:32). Nevertheless, someone might argue that the US-led coalition forces could not find any weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). However, Saddam’s Iraq still had a stockpile of scientists and technology, and actual equipment for producing WMDs (Palmer, 2004:25). In other words, Saddam could rebuild WMDs later, that is, after all sanctions were lifted, since Saddam had been determined to get WMDs. Hence, Saddam’s Iraq posed an existential threat to the region and international society as a whole, in particular when considering that Iraq would use WMDs if it had WMDs, since Saddam’s Iraq had a will and history to use WMDs – e.g. gassing Iranians and Kurds. Also, If Iraq had WMDs, there would be high possibility of future nuclearization of the region, and of the leakage of WMD technology and expertise to terrorist networks (Palmer, 2004:40). Furthermore, Saddam’s Iraq invaded its neighboring states, Iran and Kuwait. These invasions demonstrate that Saddam’s Iraq were great threats to the region and the whole international society, in particular when considering that Saddam attempted to make Iraq a hegemonic power in the region via all necessary means including the use of force, especially WMD.

Third, Saddam’s Iraq had breached all kinds of Security Council resolutions as international legal obligations for more than a decade. For instance, just after the successful conclusion of Operation Dessert Storm, the Security Council adopted two resolutions that set up the terms of a cease-fire agreement between Iraq and Coalition partners (Ho, 2003: 81). Resolution 687 imposed a series of disarmament and

inspection obligations on Iraq, and also required Iraq to abandon international terrorism (Ho, 2003: 81). Resolution 688 banned further Iraqi oppression of its civilian and refugee populations (Ho, 2003: 81). However, Iraq violated the ceasefire requirements of the 1990 Gulf War by denying UN weapons inspections and failing to convince the US and its allies of disarmament (Natarajan, 2007:408). As an example, the Saddam regime still refused to give any credible explanation of the missing Iraqi weapons inventory that included 31,000 chemical warfare munitions, 600 tons of VX nerve gas precursors, and 17 tons of biological growth media, and the Saddam regime even refused to allow the interview of Iraqi weapons scientists outside the country (Wedgwood, 2003:581). Also, the Saddam regime did not stop repressing its civilian population, in particular, Kurds. Thus, Resolution 1441 of November 2002 recalled previous resolutions including Resolution 687 and Resolution 688, criticized Iraq's longstanding failure to cooperate with weapons inspections and to end repression of its civilian population, and gave Iraq a final opportunity to abide by its obligations (Palmer, 2004:34). Nonetheless, nothing had radically changed.

The above primary aspects of outlaw state show why the war in 2003 was necessary in order to transform the outlaw state into a decent democratic state, as according to Kenneth Pollack, practically the only way to remove Saddam from power was to launch 'a full-scale invasion' (Palmer, 2004:32). Indeed, given Saddam's rebuff to give up power even under the threat of military invasion in March 2003, there was more than a realistic chance that other efforts to convince him to give up - either for purposes of relinquishing WMDs or ceasing flagrant human rights violations - would have failed (Heinze, 2006:27). Nonetheless, if Iraqis overthrew Saddam Hussein, and reliably coped with the issue of weapons of mass destruction,



there clearly would have been no war, which was realistically impossible since the citizens of Iraq were powerless against Saddam and his henchmen (Roth, 2006:84).

The war in 2003 was for promotion of democracy, that is, transformation of outlaw state (non-member of international society) into a democratic state (a full member of international society), regardless of whether or not someone argues that there were mixed motivations for the Iraq war in 2003 - .e.g. WMDs, Terrorism, human rights and economic interests – as Nicholas Wheeler clearly claims that we need not consider the motives of the interveners in judging the legitimacy of an intervention, but rather whether or not the intervention achieved a positive humanitarian result (Wheeler, 2000:37-38, Heinze, 2006:23). Along with human rights, democracy is also becoming the predominant norm of international society. Indeed, in the post-Cold War era, a remarkable new international consensus on the importance of political democracy, in its own right as an indispensable precondition to the achievement of many other internationally prescribed human rights, and as the *sine qua non* of international peace – e.g. democratic peace theory - has appeared (Reisman, 1995:801, 804). In this circumstance, the use of force for the promotion of democracy should be legally allowed absent the UN authorization in the failure of the Security Council to take action, even if the target states should be outlaw states since tyrants claim national sovereignty but outlaw states do not have the legitimacy of sovereignty - sovereignty does not belong to tyrants, but to people - as international law should adapt itself to the changing international society. Thus, though today the use of force against Saddam's Iraq in 2003 is technically illegal, the use of force to transform outlaw states to democratic states may be legally accepted in the future, in particular when considering an evolutionary process of customary international law and considering that the 2003 war itself was supported by a broad coalition of liberal

democratic states, including Japan, South Korea, Spain, Poland, Denmark, the Netherlands, and many others (Heinze, 2006:30). In other words, the Iraq war in 2003 can form the basis of a new rule of international law, while now it is arguably illegal. At this juncture, we can say that we should not indiscriminately condemn all military interventions, even if they are not authorized by the UN (Reisman, 1984:643). Also, Great Powers' use of force against outlaw states, for the promotion and consolidation of democracy linked with the welfare of international society, can be gradually added into the nature of international society and international law.

As mentioned above, the use of force for the promotion and consolidation of democracy is not yet fully acceptable in current international society, and today, international law still does not advocate the tendency of 'the use of force' for the promotion of democracy. However, as briefly mentioned above, we should not forget the evolutionary nature of international law based on the nature of international society. According to the evolutionary nature of international law, we might expect that international law itself will be used in a more aggressive way to justify 'the use of force for the promotion and consolidation of democracy' in the future. In terms of the evolutionary nature of international law, for instance, we can think that after World War I, the international legal order transformed itself on the basis of the far-reaching change which was derived from the decline of Britain's world supremacy and the increasing active intervention of the US (Grewe, 1992:253). Also, after 1919, the theory of international law used terminology that no longer implied nations being civilized, but simply spoke of an international community that entails inclusive rather than exclusive propensity (Grewe, 1992:256). And, since WWII, international law has been more likely to emphasize the principles of cooperation and solidarity such as

the 1948 declaration of human rights (Grewe, 1992:273).<sup>171</sup> On account of the evolutionary nature of international law, in the post-Cold War and 21<sup>st</sup> century, we can't totally disregard the assumption that the use of force for the promotion of democracy can be legitimized and legalized in the end.

As noted above, democracy has been a more and more predominant norm in international society. As Susan Mark put it (2000:532), we can say that the end of the Cold War has strongly facilitated the assumption that democracy is the foundation of political legitimacy, whereas the repressive regime has been gradually recognized by its lack of legitimacy in international society. It means that the nature of international society has been increasingly transformed to reflect the norms and values concerning 'democracy and human rights,' and so international law is increasingly expected to embrace them, at least advocating pro-democratic regimes in international society. In this context, we can say that international law can indirectly and directly influence non-democratic states to accept those norms and values in the end. Therefore, democracy itself cannot only be anticipated to gradually become an internationally recognized legitimate form of government, but also it can be stimulated by international law in the long run (Mark, 2000: 546). When considering this point, we can expect that the promotion of democracy might be enough of a legal excuse for the use of force in the future. With this optimistic view, the use of force for the promotion of democracy can be in the end legitimized and legalized. This might indicate the positive sign that the US and UK's attempt to

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<sup>171</sup> Nonetheless, international environment cannot be limited to only one of three facets, international system, international society and world society.

promote democracy in Iraq can be justified.<sup>172</sup> As a matter of fact, if Iraq's democracy can be successfully materialized in the end, international law might highly advocate the use of force for democracy in the long run, even if I have to say that the target state must be an outlaw state.

For the last time, I will examine the applicability of 'the law of occupation' to the US-led coalition forces' occupation in Iraq, while considering that democracy becomes a predominant norm of international society. In the process, we can notice that the law of occupation should be adapted to the changing international society, as democracy can be regarded as the new standard of civilization in the post-Cold War era and the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Let us briefly look at the law of occupation. International law governing occupation and regulating the powers of the occupying power is enshrined primarily in arts 42-56 of the Hague Regulations, and the Fourth Geneva Convention, in particular arts 27-34 and 47-78 (Wolfrum, 2005:4). In other words, the formal obligations on an occupying power as responsibility and constraints are outlined in complex provisions in the Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention (Chesterman, 2004: 53). The Hague Regulations of 1899 and later 1907, in particular Article 43 that outlined the occupants general goals and authority, envisioned peaceful coexistence between the local population and the enemy's army, with minimal interaction and tension (Benvenisti, 2003:21). The Hague Regulations

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<sup>172</sup> Of course, I admit that the US and UK invaded Iraq in the name of pre-emptive attack which was lead by their deep concern with Iraqi potential possession of weapons of mass destruction and with the linkage between Saddam's regime and terrorist groups. However, we should not disregard the fact that the US and UK's foreign policy are deeply engaged in the promotion of democracy. For instance, President Clinton declared in his 1994 State of the Union address, "the best strategy to insure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere." *The New York Times*. January 26, 1994. As a matter fact, G.W. Bush clearly mentioned the promotion of democracy as one of mechanisms to fight against Terrorism. Even before Iraq war, as Fukuyama mentioned in his work, Bush mentioned the democratic development. See Fukuyama (2006).

(Article 43) state that an occupier must “take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.”<sup>173</sup> A literal interpretation of article 43 of the Hague Regulations is to ban any change to the laws in force unless absolutely prevented from doing so (Fox, 2005:240). Also, the occupying power’s prohibition of politically restructuring the occupied state is reflected in Article 43 of Hague Regulations (Wolfrum, 2005:13). The Fourth Geneva Convention (Article 64) incorporates the spirit of Article 43 of the Hague Regulations (Charlesworth, 2007:3). According to the Fourth Geneva Convention, in restoring and maintaining peace and security the laws in force of the occupied state shall be respected at all times (Wolfrum, 2005:13). Nonetheless, it adds that an occupier is able to change laws and institutions that constitute a threat to the security of the occupying power or an obstacle to the application of the present Convention (Charlesworth, 2007:3). Thus, when considering the Hague regulation and the Geneva Convention, we can notice that most of the Coalition Provisional Authority’s reforms in Iraq would be invalid (Benvenisti, 2003:32 and Fox, 2005:240).

As we can see above, the law of occupation impedes the active transformation and the remodeling of the power and other values processes of the occupied country (Fox, 2005:276). According to the law of occupation, precisely speaking, the occupant is not allowed to change the existing form of government, to upset the constitution and domestic law of the occupied territory, or to set aside the rights of the inhabitants (Fox, 2005:237). Here, what is important is that the law of

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<sup>173</sup> See “Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907.” *International Humanitarian Law – Treaties & Documents*. Available at the website : <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebART/195-200053?OpenDocument>

occupation explicitly prohibits state-building or regime-change (Charlesworth, 2007:9). Moreover, the law of occupation does not allow democracy-building ventures. Thus, according to the occupation law, the US and the UK –the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) - should have interfered as little as possible in the Iraqi political system during the period of its occupation, in particular when considering that the UN Security Council Resolution 1483 (2003) explicitly recognized that the US and the UK – CPA – were occupying powers in Iraq, and called on them to comply with their obligations under the Geneva Conventions and the Hague Regulations (Chesterman, 2004: 61 and Wolfrum, 2005:8).

However, we can say that when the goal of occupying state is to remake the political and legal institutions of the occupied state so as to promote human rights and democracy, to comply with Hague regulation and Geneva Convention seems to be anachronism. The case of Iraq in 2003 is frequently invoked as proof of the irrelevance of the traditional principle of occupation (Charlesworth, 2007:1). Regime change and democracy-building were an explicit current in public statements by the US before its invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Charlesworth, 2007:4). The Iraq war in 2003 was for the transformation of Iraq from an outlaw state to a democratic state. To put it differently, the primary aim of the US-led coalition forces' invasion of Iraq in 2003 was 'regime change' (Chesterman, 2004: 63). Thus, in this circumstance, it is almost impossible to fully comply with the law of occupation, that is, 'Hague regulation' and 'Geneva Convention.' Where wars are fought to achieve a change of a particular, political regime, the military occupant cannot be under an obligation to sustain the regime fought against (Wolfrum, 2005:13). Indeed, neither the Hague nor Geneva laws should protect laws and institutions of an outlaw state that fall below minimally acceptable standards of humanity, especially when considering that the

laws and political institutions of the Iraqi Ba'ath party were broadly criticized for horrific human rights abuses (Fox, 2005:199, 270-271) and when considering that the change of the political regime – i.e. the Saddam's regime - was the only effective means to secure peace in international society in the long run (Wolfrum, 2005:14). Hence, the law of occupation should be updated, since the Iraq war made the case that the international law of occupation should be treated as anachronism, particularly when considering that democracy becomes the predominant norm of international society (Fox, 2005:199). All in all, the law of occupation needs an overhaul to enable an occupant to change the political and economic institutions, along with legal reform, although the target state must be an outlaw state.

Indeed, in Iraq, the rigours of the law of occupation were considerably lessened by the United Nations Security Council's adoption of Resolution 1483 on May 22, 2003 (Charlesworth, 2007:6). Resolution 1483 gave the Coalition the mandate to administer Iraq and to work towards its political and economic reorganization (Wolfrum, 2005:16). This mandate went beyond the powers assigned to an occupant under the law of occupation, which can make it possible for Iraq to adopt democracy and a capitalist market economy. In short, Resolution 1483 legalized the efforts of the Coalition to restructure Iraq politically and economically, let alone legal and judicial reform (Wolfrum, 2005:19). To sum up, the law of occupation should be adapted to the changing international society, in particular when considering that along with human rights, democracy becomes predominant in international society.

## **Conclusion**

In Chapter II, I emphasized the role of international law as a significant institution, in order to maintain international order and promote the well-being of

international society, while revealing how international law can have a major effect on democratic development across international society. But, in general, international law has been misunderstood as a simple mechanism to facilitate the narrow interests for Great Powers, or as a useless and powerless rule of law that can be easily ignored and violated, whenever necessary. In particular, for realists, international law itself merely reflects power relationship, which is derived from their perception on international environment such as anarchy, self-help systems, and power-struggles.

However, the international environment is not a Hobbesian concept of anarchy, but rather international society. International society can be defined with common values and norms, and international law itself displays such a character of international society as well, reinforcing the character of international society. When considering this point, international law itself is not too weak to be totally disregarded. In fact, international law is a necessary fixture of the 21<sup>st</sup> century and it cannot be ignored today. We should not forget the fact that international law has some level of autonomy in international society. Also, the nature of international law is deeply embedded in the co-existence of power and morality, and the ratio of power vs. morality can be altered in each historical period, reflecting the nature of international society. This can be understood as the evolutionary nature of international law.

In the evolutionary nature of international law, as democracy has been more and more predominant norm and value in international society in the post-Cold War era and 21<sup>st</sup> century, international law has become embedded in democratic values, and it is increasingly anticipated to reflect more democratic values and norms. At this juncture, we can perceive triangular relationship among international society, international law and democracy. In consideration of the triangular relationship that international society, international law and democracy share, in this chapter, I



disclosed relatively different roles of international law on the basis of three different features of international society (pluralist, solidarist, and liberal anti-pluralist principles). Each pluralist, solidarist and liberal anti-pluralist facet of international society can indirectly determine how international law has an impact on democratic promotion and consolidation across international society. China, South Korea and Iraq relatively represent pluralist, solidarist and liberal anti-pluralist features of international society as whole, and they can help understand how international law can have comparably different effect on paths toward the promotion and consolidation of democracy. All in all, as an important institution, international law can greatly contribute to the promotion of democracy and the consolidation of democracy across international society, which can ultimately lead to the well-being beyond the maintenance of order and security in international society.

## Chapter III. Diplomacy and Democracy

### Introduction

In general, diplomacy can be misunderstood as only a simple tool to materialize the goals of foreign policy. In fact, even some conventional international relations scholars such as Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz rarely pay attention to the role of diplomacy in international society. Besides, as Hedley Bull put it, the Cold War had served to weaken the effect of diplomacy, in large part since during the Cold War era “both western and communist diplomats abused their privileges for the purposes of espionage, and had been subject to the threat and periodic reality of expulsion as a consequence,” let alone proxy wars like that in Afghanistan and even hot wars like the Korean War (1950-53) (Bull, 2002:171, Hall, 2006:144).

However, the narrow definition of diplomacy as the tool for achieving the goals of foreign policy is not enough to properly explain the nature and role of diplomacy in international society. Many English School scholars (including Martin Wight, Adam Watson, Herbert Butterfield, Hedley Bull, David Armstrong, John Vincent, Andrew Hurrell, and Geoffrey Wiseman) are well aware of the importance of diplomacy in international society; diplomacy is absolutely necessary to the existence of as well as the well-being of international society.<sup>174</sup> Diplomacy is more than a

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<sup>174</sup> As for English School scholars, diplomacy plays a key role in international politics as a historically emerging and social phenomenon. See Neumann (2003:341). More importantly, many English School scholars put great emphasis on the role of diplomacy as an institution in international society. Nevertheless, they do not agree on the level of importance of diplomacy as an institution, compared with other institutions, such as Great Power, balance of power and international law. For instance, for

simple tool for the goals of foreign policy. Indeed, it is a considerable institution which, in large part governs international society. Though its importance has fluctuated on the basis of historical period and circumstance, diplomacy is absolutely necessary to the existence of international society.

In this chapter, I will attempt to demonstrate how diplomacy plays a significant role in managing international society. Also, I will attempt to demonstrate how diplomacy can have an impact on the promotion and consolidation of democracy as the post-Cold War and 21<sup>st</sup> century standard of civilization and the new wave expansion of international society. In the first section, I will examine the origin and various definitions of diplomacy. And, I will investigate the nature of diplomacy, which is embedded in three traditions, Machiavellian, Grotian and Kantian. Also, I will demonstrate why and how diplomacy is closely related to international society, greatly contributing to international society, as diplomacy can change a state's identity and interests, and change the context of international society, while we can say as well that in turn, diplomacy reflects the fabric of international society. In the second section, I will show various diplomacies which have contributed to the promotion and consolidation of democracy. In this section, my intention is to reveal that the more predominant democracy has gradually become as the post-Cold War and 21<sup>st</sup> century standard of civilization and the new wave expansion of international society, the more various diplomacies we can see to promote and consolidate democracy across international society. In the final section, via three cases, China, South Korea and Iraq, I will show how relatively different diplomacies, such as interest-oriented

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Martin Wight, Hedley Bull, and Herbert Butterfield, diplomacy is put into a lower place than the balance of power, international law and Great Power. In particular, to Hedley Bull balance of power is the most important institution in international society, and in this sense, without the balance of power, other institutions such as international law and diplomacy cannot flourish and even exist. Andrew Hurrell points out this. See Andrew Hurrell (2002: 8).

diplomacy (Economic Diplomacy), legitimacy-oriented diplomacy (Niche Diplomacy) and force-oriented diplomacy (Coercive Diplomacy) can be adopted to promote and consolidate democracy across international society, on the basis of different circumstances such as a pluralist international society, a solidarist international society and a liberal anti-pluralist international society, which can help us understand different paths toward democracy. All in all, in this chapter, I will demonstrate that as a significant institution, diplomacy has had a great impact on democratization across international society so as to improve the well-being of international society as a whole.

### *1> Diplomacy*

First of all, I will look into the origin of diplomacy, and I will also define diplomacy. But, in the process, I will reveal that diplomacy is not simply a tool for the aim of foreign policy, but also one of the key institutions to govern international society. I will start with the origin of diplomacy. Etymologically, the word diplomacy is originally derived from the Greek word *diploun* (diploma), a folded document (Sharp, 2004: 211, Neumann, 2003:365). The Greek *diploun* is closely linked to the study of official handwriting and the idea of credentials confirming the claims of the bearer, and it was carried by heralds and negotiators, certifying and empowering them as what we would now refer to as diplomats (Sharp, 2004: 211, Neumann, 2003:365). When looking into ancient Greek diplomacy as the possible origin of diplomacy, we can find that in the absence of resident embassies, the envoys were sent to other Greek cities, which influenced modern diplomacy (Young, 1964:141). Also, we can find that ancient Greek diplomacy regulated relations between a small state or group of states and their immediate neighbors via the art of persuasion and political *savor-faire*, which can be found in the function of

contemporary diplomacy (Adcock and Mosley, 1975:121-128). But, we have to notice that in ancient Greek diplomacy, in contrast to the modern diplomacy, the envoy was an amateur who was selected from among the prominent members of the polis for a particular mission (Wolpert, 2001:75).

The formal diplomatic relationship via permanent and residential embassies started in the Middle Ages rather than in the Greek city-states (Schwarzenberger, 1964:153). Accurately speaking, resident embassies were first introduced in the mid-fourteenth century in northern Italy (Sofer, 1988:195, Russell, 2005:233). The introduction of resident embassies marked the movement from sporadic to continuous exchanges, which greatly contributed to the full development of modern diplomacy (Keens-Soper, 1999:29). Also, as another distinguishing aspect of Italian diplomacy, diplomacy, when diplomacy rests in the hands of a resident, degenerated into news-gathering and espionage (Mallett, 2001:62). Nonetheless, the introduction of resident ambassadors emerged due to the growing need not only to send messages but also to gather information about neighbors among Italian city-states (Jonsson and Hall, 2005:73). In fifteenth-century Italy, ambassadors were good sources of information, and they often even presented news to host governments (Mallett, 2001:66). This feature can be obviously seen in modern diplomats, and in truth the information-gathering role has been one of the most important modern diplomatic functions (Jonsson and Hall, 2005:74). As a stunning example, we can easily notice the US intelligence's failure on Saddam's Iraq. The US intelligence's failure to gather accurate information on Saddam's Iraq – e.g. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) – was primarily derived from the fact that there had not been any American diplomat in

Iraq, let alone the absence of US embassy, before the war in 2003.<sup>175</sup> This clearly demonstrates how important the information-gathering role, as one of primary diplomatic functions, has been.<sup>176</sup>

Most importantly, above I mentioned the origin of diplomacy, but I have to say that the origin of diplomacy as ‘an international institution’ is the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. In other words, the Peace of Westphalia is very meaningful in diplomacy. It marked the beginning of the European nation-states system initially composed of twelve well-defined sovereign states and codified the rules of conduct among sovereign and equal states.<sup>177</sup> The rise of the nation-state ultimately indicates the change in the pattern of diplomacy, in particular when considering that political ideologies and conflicting religious faiths had replaced the Christian Europe, and so Peace of Westphalia must be regarded as a milestone for modern diplomacy (Thompson, 1984:384). As a matter of fact, even today there is still considerable vitality in the Westphalian order of nation-states and state-centered diplomacy.<sup>178</sup> All in all, owing to such Westphalian order, diplomacy can be recognized as the mechanism by which nation-states alone, via authorized agents, maintain mutual relations, communicate with each other, and carry out political, economic and legal transactions.<sup>179</sup> Hence, as many scholars have claimed, diplomacy could not be recognized as an institution until the seventeenth century in which there was the

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<sup>175</sup> See, for more information, Kenneth Pollack (2004) and Geoffrey Wiseman (2005).

<sup>176</sup> In the below (the contribution of diplomacy to international society), I will demonstrate how important the information-gathering as one of primary functions of diplomacy has been.

<sup>177</sup> See, for more detail, James P. Muldoon Jr. (2007).

<sup>178</sup> See, for more information, Thompson (1984).

<sup>179</sup> See James P. Muldoon Jr. (2007).

formation of permanent embassies and the emergence of a state system, along with the formulation of a set of ideas about diplomacy and the appearance of diplomatic texts (Jonsson and Hall, 2005:40).

When looking into the definition of diplomacy, it is worth looking at various scholars' definitions of diplomacy. First of all, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, diplomacy is the main argument of international relations by negotiation, the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys; the business or art of the diplomatist; and skill or address in the conduct of international intercourse and negotiations.<sup>180</sup> As a British scholar and diplomat to Japan, Ernest Satow (1843-1929) defined diplomacy as “the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states” (Satow, 2004:25). Satow also distinguished the line between foreign policy and diplomacy. Satow states:

Although the word (diplomacy) has been in the English language for no more than two centuries, it has suffered from misuse and confusion. It has sometimes been made to appear, for instance, as the equivalent of foreign policy. But **foreign policy is formulated by government, not by diplomatists.** In order to carry out its policy, a government will need to manage and adjust its international relations by applying different forms of pressure. **How successful these pressures prove will greatly depend on the real power behind them. The power must be real,** but rather than exercise it explicitly, the government may prefer to keep it in reserve with the implication that in certain circumstances it could be used. Nevertheless, **in normal circumstances it will conduct its international intercourse by negotiation. This is**

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<sup>180</sup> Here, I have to mention that diplomacy can be described as a sort of negotiation, but that negotiation itself is not necessarily diplomacy at all. In other words, we should remember that diplomacy is more than negotiation alone. See Paul W. Meerts (1999:79-80). In fact, Ikle's definition of negotiation is worthwhile. Ikle says, “negotiation is a process in which explicit proposals are put forward ostensibly for the purpose of reaching agreement on an exchange or on the realization of a common interests where conflicting interest are present. It is the confrontation of explicit proposal that distinguishes negotiation from tacit bargaining and other forms of conflict behavior.” See R.P. Barston (1988:76-77).

**diplomacy** (Satow, 2009:3-4).

Harold Nicholson adopted the Oxford English Dictionary's definition of diplomacy which can be categorized as a broad conception of diplomacy (Sharp, 2004:211).

Nicolson defined it by saying:

**Diplomacy is the management of international relations by negotiation;** the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys; the business or art of the diplomatist..... Diplomacy is not the art of conversation, it is the art of negotiating agreements in precise and rectifiable form (Nicolson, 1988: 4-5, 52).

As for Nicholson, the core element of diplomacy is negotiation within an organized and ordered framework on the basis of the element of representation to serve the sovereign authority of a state, in order to manage international relations (Otte, 2001:157). At this juncture, we can assume that for Nicolson, diplomacy can be understood as the mechanism that maintains the order and well-being of changing international society. Jan Melissen defines diplomacy, distinguishing it from foreign policy, by saying:

Diplomacy is in the first place about the framework in which international relations take place, the medium that is both a necessary condition, and the lubricant, of international politics. Foreign policy deals with the content as well as the aims and objectives of a state's relations with other states and international actors, and is therefore mainly about the message (Melissen, 1999:xvii).

We can assume that diplomacy refers to the practical implementation of a state's grand strategy, and it was usually carried out by a professional diplomat, while foreign policy refers to the formulation of a state's grand strategy (Wiseman, 2005: 410). Precisely speaking, foreign policy tends to be about theory, for example substance, strategy, and ends, whereas diplomacy tends to be about practice such as procedures, tactics and means (Wiseman, 2005:410). Thus, we can say that diplomacy is one of



mechanisms to attain the primary goals of foreign policy.<sup>181</sup> To put it differently, diplomacy constitutes only one element of foreign policy, and it implements foreign policy via negotiation, making policy understood and, if possible, accepted by other nations (Sofer, 1988:196). Nonetheless, we should keep it in mind that the dividing lines between diplomacy and foreign policy are not always easily drawn (Sofer, 1988:196).

When considering the above definitions of diplomacy, in particular diplomacy as only a simple tool for the aims of foreign policy, we need some correction. In other words, diplomacy is more than a simple tool to materialize the aims of foreign policy. Usually, English School scholars clearly reveal this point. Unlike many conventional international relations scholars, English School scholars have a deep theoretical approach to diplomacy, emphasizing their notion that diplomacy is one of the most considerable institutions to help govern international society. As for them, diplomacy - as the institution via which relations between sovereign states are carried out by 'discussion' and 'agreement' - is at its core a highly developed system of communication, aimed at identifying and accommodating different and often conflicting interests (Otte, 2001:135). For instance, Martin Wight offers a number of different lists of which institutions international relations were made of, and he emphasized diplomacy as "the master institution of international relations," calling it "the system of the art of communication between powers" (Wight, 1995:113, Neumann, 2003:348). Also, along with the balance of power, international law, war and Great Power, Hedley Bull regarded diplomacy as one of institutions to govern

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<sup>181</sup> Adam Watson attempts to distinguish diplomacy from foreign policy, describing foreign policy as "the substance of a state's relations" and as "diplomacy as the process of dialogue and negotiation." See, Adam Watson (1983:11).

international society (Bull, 1977). To Adam Watson, diplomacy as an institution is to enable other institutions; for example, “the balance of power, international law and periodic congresses”<sup>182</sup> Adam Watson claimed “the central task of diplomacy is not just the management of order, but the management of change, and the maintenance by continued persuasion of order in the midst of change”(Watson, 1983: 223).

To sum up, when considering the above English School scholars’ definition of diplomacy, we can say that diplomacy is not only a simple tool to materialize the aims of foreign policy, but also a significant institution to help govern international society, in particular when considering that diplomacy can be understood as a set institution and a process by which states represent themselves and their interests to one another in international society.<sup>183</sup> If necessary as a socializing mechanism, diplomacy can construct, maintain and transform the identities and interests of states and it can even maintain or change the nature of international society, let alone its contribution to the existence of international society and to the well-being of international society.<sup>184</sup> All in all, the concept of diplomacy should be more or less inclusive rather than exclusive, as diplomacy is one of the significant branches for the study of international relations, beyond a simple tool for the aims of foreign policy, particularly when considering that according to the narrow conception of diplomacy, diplomats have nothing to do with policy choices and simply advise and execute (Sharp, 2004:208-210).<sup>185</sup> Thanks to

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<sup>182</sup> See Geoffrey Wiseman (2002).

<sup>183</sup> See Paul Sharp (2008).

<sup>184</sup> Below, I will touch on the close and positive relation between diplomacy and an international society.

<sup>185</sup> Paul Sharp compared a narrow concept of diplomacy with a broad concept of diplomacy, even if Paul Sharp contended that there were many problems with the conventional distinction between broad and narrow conceptions of diplomacy.

this, we can also postulate that diplomats' roles should be recognized as pivotal for governing international society. Nevertheless, of course, diplomats' primary concern appears to be the promotion of the national interest of their own homeland, especially when considering that diplomats at a foreign capital, stand as its leading protagonist, protector and promoter in their country (Kennan, 1997:207). However, we can also see that, overall, diplomatic activity can nurture regional and trans-regional relationships, which can ultimately facilitate stability and order in international society (Talbot, 1997:75). For instance, multilateral diplomacy via international organizations such as NATO, NAFTA, the Chemical Weapon Convention, the Partnership for Peace and the United Nations, obviously demonstrates that diplomacy does not only bring about each country's national interests alone as the result of an execution of foreign policy, but also the existence and the well-being of whole international society (Talbot, 1997.82).

Let us turn to the nature of diplomacy, which can help us understand why we have three kinds of international society: a pluralist international society, a solidarist international society and a liberal anti-pluralist international society, even if all of three relatively reinforce comparatively different diplomatic relationships among states as well. As in other chapters, at this juncture, we need Martin Wight's three traditions: Machiavellian/realism, Grotian/rationalism and Kantian/revolutionism in order to properly understand the nature of diplomacy. Martin Wight displays these three traditions as the primary characters of international relations and uses them as the essences of diplomacy.<sup>186</sup> In other words, we can properly understand the nature of diplomacy with the combination of three traditions rather than with only one of

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<sup>186</sup> See Martin Wight (1992).

them. Ultimately, I will attempt to demonstrate that three traditions are quite essential for properly understanding diplomacy.

First of all, in terms of power in diplomacy, we can easily find many evidences and examples to support the significance of power as one of the predominant characteristics of diplomacy, in particular when considering that diplomacy is often construed as a continuation of war by other means, which can be seen as the *realpolitik* case (Derian, 1987:92). As historical evidence, for instance in classical Greece, alliances and leagues indicate that diplomacy went hand in hand with hegemony, in particular when considering that Athens could impose a variety of restrictions and demands on the members of the Delian League due to its naval power (Wolpert, 2001:77). More outstandingly, in the Melian dialogue (Book V), “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must” demonstrates the significance of power in diplomacy.<sup>187</sup> Further evidence is found in the Roman World (500 BC- AD235). The Romans believed that overwhelming military power and their superiority in war could be an instrument in preserving peaceful conditions, while cherishing their superior military power (Campbell, 2001:2, 18). Thus, the Romans could often use offensive diplomacy in which the threat of their powerful army enabled them to get what they wanted without fighting (Campbell, 2001:1).

There are many scholars and diplomats who emphasize power as one of the most important aspects of diplomacy. Niccolò Machiavelli exhibited the typical realist inclination to treat diplomacy as a symptom of the struggle for power among co-sovereign entities to seek to maintain orderly and peaceful relations among themselves (Russell, 2005:246). Indeed, the Machiavellian diplomacy can be

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<sup>187</sup> Thucydides (1972).

understood with the following four characteristics: flux or change, fear and greed, negotiation from strength, and the technique of bargaining (Jackson, 2002;13). And, Ernest Mason Satow (1843-1929) even argued that the application of military pressure was a legitimate tool of Great Power diplomacy, which he dubbed ‘gunboat diplomacy’:

(the gun boat diplomacy) was used to designate a habit that consuls had got into of calling in the aid of a gunboat whenever they had a dispute with the local officials. It was effective, but liable to abuse. Questions were settled promptly that, without the application of pressure on the spot, have a tendency to drag on for months and years. Properly applied, with the sanction of H.M Government, it would often be useful in these days (Otte, 2001:142).<sup>188</sup>

Harold Nicolson was also aware of the role of power in diplomacy, considering that the major decisions are usually taken by those who possess power and are prepared to exercise it (Nicolson, 1961:48).<sup>189</sup> Kenneth W. Thompson states, “diplomacy most of the time proceeds without any worldwide moral consensus and few generally accepted principles of law” and “diplomacy must rest on power”(Thompson, 1981:430, 432). As for Thompson, power can be seen as one of the most significant aspects in diplomacy, especially when considering that power expresses itself in peace settlement or agreement (Thompson, 1981:412). According to Martin Wight, “diplomacy is the system and art of communication between powers.”<sup>190</sup> Adam Watson is well aware of the close relationship between diplomacy and power. Adam Watson emphasizes power as a significant ingredient in diplomacy and relates diplomatic efficacy to a state’s material capability and its willingness to use it, by saying:

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<sup>188</sup> I quoted this from T.G. Otte (2001).

<sup>189</sup> In context, power can be understood as the ability of the individual or the group to impose its will on other. See Kenneth W. Thompson (1981: 410).

<sup>190</sup> See Martin Wight (1978:113) or Alan James (1980:946).

The extent to which one state can persuade another to act or refrain from acting in a certain way depends on the power which each of them commands, including the will to use it, and the extent to which other states support them – that is, lend their power to one side or the other (Watson, 1983:52).

It is the larger powers that determine the effectiveness of diplomacy. This mechanical fact goes far to explain why in many systems of states special responsibilities for the functioning of international relations, the management of order and the leadership of the diplomatic dialogue have been entrusted by a general consensus to great power (Watson 1983:198).

As Adam Watson put it, we have to admit that the effectiveness of diplomacy can be determined by the level of power, as Great Power's diplomatic influence is mostly greater than Middle Power's or Small Power's diplomatic influence, though, as Watson put it as well, we cannot completely ignore Small Powers' diplomatic roles in international society, let alone Middle Powers' diplomatic roles, which can be explained in South Korea's case below (Neumann, 2003:354, 359).

So far, I have attempted to emphasize the significance of power as one of the primary characteristics of diplomacy, albeit below I will prove that power alone cannot be sufficient to explain the nature of diplomacy (Derian, 1987:92). Owing to this characteristic of diplomacy, today we can see that in the relations of Great Powers and non-civilized/or outlaw (and often considerably less powerful) states, diplomacy becomes the art of persuasion not only by oratorical means and but also occasionally by military means (Otte, 2001:143). Actually, in the importance of power in diplomacy, we can see coercive diplomacy, which can be often seen in international society, particularly a liberal anti-pluralist international society in which outlaw states, such as Gaddafi's Libya, Saddam's Iraq, Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il's North Korea, military junta's Myanmar, and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's Iran have received punishment via coercive diplomacy. In particular, Libya's decision to turn away from

weapons of mass destruction was only possible due to both display of the US physical power and the US persuasive power.<sup>191</sup> As Colin Powell puts it, this clearly demonstrates that diplomacy without power is just naked pleading.<sup>192</sup> All in all, we can clearly perceive that without physical power, diplomacy cannot play a significant role in managing international society, let alone the promotion and consolidation of norms and values of international society. This clearly demonstrates the significance of power in diplomacy.

The other aspect of the primary characteristics of diplomacy we have to consider is the moral aspect in diplomacy. As briefly noted above, we cannot fully explain the nature of diplomacy with the concept of power alone, even though power can explain more issues than any other aspect of diplomacy in international society. We should consider the moral dimension in diplomacy as well. The moral-oriented diplomacy can be understood as Kantian diplomacy which serves all humankind regardless of nationality on the basis of moral doctrine as cosmopolitan, with its attempt to reach a permanent end to war (Jackson, 2002:15).

Diplomacy is, in some sense, embedded in moral elements, such as the moral duty of honesty in reporting and in exchanging information among ambassadors.<sup>193</sup> For instance, above I mentioned that the Romans cherished power and used it when they practiced diplomacy, but we should not forget that even in the Roman World, honor and good faith were recognized as crucial to the successive operation of diplomacy (Campbell, 2001:3, 18). In other words, Romans did not completely ignore morality in diplomacy. Also, as noted above, Satow emphasized the effect of

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<sup>191</sup> See, for more detail, Colin Powell (2004).

<sup>192</sup> Ibid.

<sup>193</sup> See Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne (1995:29).

power on diplomacy, but Satow argued as well that diplomacy has an ethical dimension – e.g. honesty is the best policy as well as the only sound policy (Otte, 2001:134). And, although he was aware of the importance of power in diplomacy, Harold Nicholson emphasized morality as another aspect of diplomacy. Nicholson clearly mentioned that the art of negotiation should depend on reliability and confidence, let alone truth, as eternal principles (Nicholson, 1961:45).<sup>194</sup> More importantly, Martin Wight emphasizes the following ethical elements for classical diplomacy: honesty (or truthfulness), moderation and restraint, courtesy/agreement, and respect for the other side (Jackson, 2002:10). At this juncture, the ethics of classical diplomacy stress the importance of maintaining the minimum of human decency and reciprocity while keeping up international peace and security (Jackson, 2002:10). To Wight, therefore, diplomats should not only defend and promote the interests or concerns of their own government but also attempt to come to terms with those of the other governments, while strengthening the common good of international society by upholding international society, its practices, institutions and values (Jackson, 2002:10). For the last time, Herbert Butterfield believes that effective diplomacy should be based on moral principles, such as self-restraint, empathy and charity.<sup>195</sup> According to Butterfield, good diplomats should conduct themselves with restraint and urge a similar restraint upon those who send them (Sharp, 2003:868).

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<sup>194</sup> Nicholson even claimed that the twentieth century diplomat should have the following qualification: “a man of experience, integrity and intelligence, a man, above all who is not swayed by emotion or prejudice, who is profoundly modest in all his dealings, who is guided only by a sense of public duty, and who understands the perils of cleverness and the virtues of reason, moderation, discretion and tact.” Also, see Kenneth W. Thompson (1984).

<sup>195</sup> See, for more detail, Paul Sharp, “The English School, Herbert Butterfield and Diplomacy,” *Discussion Papers in Diplomacy*, Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael.’ The website is available at: [http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2002/20021100\\_cli\\_paper\\_dip\\_issue83.pdf](http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2002/20021100_cli_paper_dip_issue83.pdf), pp. 17.



Also, for him, in recognition of the equal moral worth of others, good diplomats ought to realize in a spirit of charity that they should conduct themselves with generosity as well as urge a similar generosity on the part of those who send them, in their judgments of the actions and arguments of those who receive them (Sharp, 2003:868). All in all, we should keep in mind the fact that moral principles cannot be excluded in diplomacy. Nonetheless, I do not argue that morality alone can explain diplomacy well without regard to power.

As one of stunning examples for moral diplomacy, we can think of Wilson's open diplomacy which reflects former US President Woodrow Wilson's cherished Kantian ideal of an international community in which permanent cooperation on the basis of ethics and rights rather than persistent rivalry between states would prevail (Jackson, 2002:15-17). Wilson's open diplomacy was elaborated in Point One of his Fourteen Points – "there shall be no private or secret international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view" (Wiseman, 2002:12). Recently, as another example, we can look to former South African President Nelson Mandela's use of strategic moral diplomacy in order to solve the stalemate between Libya, the US and the UK, which demonstrates how essential moral concerns in diplomacy are.<sup>196</sup> The Lockerbie negotiations explicate how choices between morally salient duties are embedded in political philosophies and personal psychologies (Boyd-Judson, 2005:77). This example can be a model for why morality should be included throughout the diplomatic process, which can ultimately lead to a positive outcome in the long run. Nonetheless, as noted above, we cannot reduce diplomacy into morality alone.

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<sup>196</sup> See Lyn Boyd-Judson (2005).

All in all, we can say that diplomacy's primary characteristics are morality and power. Nevertheless, the proportionality of characters of diplomacy can be altered by relatively different circumstances in international society, like a pluralist international society (pluralist principles), a solidarist international society (solidarist principles) or a liberal anti-pluralist international society (liberal anti-pluralist principles), even if in turn the relative different proportion of characteristics of diplomacy reinforce relatively different international societies. In this part, my intention is primarily to emphasize the dynamic relations within characteristics of diplomacy, which can better explain diplomacy as a whole, rather than one single aspect of diplomacy. In particular when considering both power and morality as characteristics of diplomacy, we might conclude that, on the one hand, diplomacy can be recognized as old hat, but on the other hand, diplomacy can be seen as bad hat (Sharp, 2004:218).<sup>197</sup> In other words, we might conclude that the characteristics of diplomacy are similar to Callieres's concept of diplomacy as the union of 'power politics' and 'civilized behaviors' (Keens-Soper, 2001:122). In fact, Nicholson helps us comprehend the dynamic logic of diplomacy with his description of a good British diplomat:

The good British diplomatist is tolerant and fair; he acquires **a fine balance between imagination and reason, between idealism and realism**; he is reliable and scrupulously precise; he possesses dignity without self-importance, demeanour without mannerism, poise without stolidity; he can display resolution as well as flexibility, and can combine gentleness with courage; he never boasts; he knows that impatience is as dangerous as ill-temper and that intellectual brilliance is not a diplomatic quality; he knows above all that it is his duty to interpret the policy of his government with loyalty and common sense and that the foundation of good diplomacy is the same as the foundation of good business – namely credit, confidence, and consideration and compromise (Nicholson, 1988:77).

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<sup>197</sup> Bad hat indicates that diplomacy serves a system of power relations, whereas old hat implies that diplomacy is not completely morally bankrupt. See Sharp (2004:218-219).

Also, Harold Nicolson contended that the development of diplomatic theory has been dependent upon both idealism and realism rather than one of them alone (Nicolson, 2004:60). In other words, diplomatic development is possible in the dynamic existence of realism and idealism. Due to this specific condition, we can see relatively different diplomatic relationships among states, which facilitate each different international society (pluralist, solidarist and liberal anti-pluralist), even if each international society, in turn reinforces such different diplomatic relationships among states.

For the last time, I will examine the contribution of diplomacy to international society. Many scholars assume that the discussion of diplomacy is marginal in international relations, and they tend to disregard the importance of diplomacy in international society (Sofer, 1988:196). In particular, major conventional IR theorists see diplomacy at most as a secondary phenomenon or even disregard diplomacy totally (Jonsson and Hall, 2005:12-23). Some of them even argue that though diplomacy might exist within international theory, it is still rarely analyzed or extensively explored (Sofer, 1988:196). For instance, diplomacy does not appear among Morgenthau's six principles of realism; it is merely a technique, along with war (Jonsson and Hall, 2005:16).<sup>198</sup> Morgenthau also claims that along with the decline of diplomacy set with the end of the First World War, since the end of the Second World War, diplomacy has lost its vitality, and its functions have gradually withered away (Morgenthau and Thompson, 1985: 563-569).<sup>199</sup> Moreover, Kenneth Waltz does not

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<sup>198</sup> Raymond Aron regards war and diplomacy as complementary modality. See Aron (1966:40).

<sup>199</sup> Morgenthau reveals that there have been several reasons why the vitality and function of diplomacy have faded away. As for Morgenthau, the decline of the significance of diplomacy might be deeply imbedded in the development of speedy and regular communications in the form of the satellite, the airplane, the radio, the telegraph, the teletype, the long-distance telephone. Also, he claimed that

even conceive of any socializing agent beyond the state (Jonsson and Hall, 2005:17). For Waltz, there is no processional relationship, but units (states) simply act properly on the basis of the environment they find, or they do not survive (Jonsson and Hall, 2005:17).

However, I have to say that although there has been some fluctuation of the roles of diplomacy in international society,<sup>200</sup> the important role of diplomacy as an institution cannot be completely diminished. More accurately, it would be illusory to presume that we can completely repudiate the importance of diplomacy (Sofer, 1988:207). For instance, North Korea has greatly emphasized self-reliance and autarky, which put North Korea into international isolation and economic meltdown, but even North Korea has cherished diplomatic relations with some countries, like China.

In fact, some scholars such as English School scholars and diplomats have emphasized the importance of diplomacy in international society. For instance, the members of the British Committee claimed that at the heart of what happens and what might happen in international relations lies diplomacy, and that at the heart of any worthwhile theory of international relations must lie a theory of diplomacy (Sharp, 2003:856). Diplomacy was the heart of the research project of the original members of the English School.<sup>201</sup> And so, we can say that almost, all of the English School

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secret diplomacy behind the door led to the depreciation of diplomacy, which reveals his negative view on diplomacy. See Morgenthau and Thompson (1985: 570-571).

<sup>200</sup> As David Armstrong pointed out, until the end of the Cold War, it was hard to expect decent diplomatic relationship between Western and communist states, which was quite different from the decent solid diplomatic relationship among Western states. However, in the post-cold war era and 21<sup>st</sup> century, once again, diplomacy appears to become an important institution in international society, since as the result of the end to the hostility between two blocs, diplomacy can be more preferable than ever. See David Armstrong (1999:56).

<sup>201</sup> See Andrew Hurrell (2006:3).

scholars are well aware of the importance of diplomacy, particularly to international society. Indeed, many English School scholars, like Martin Wight, Hedley Bull, John Vincent, Alan James, Adam Watson, David Armstrong, Barry Buzan, Andrew Hurrell, and Geoffrey Wiseman have recognized diplomacy as a significant institution to help to govern international society, on the basis of their adoption of the historical sociology of international relations.<sup>202</sup> For them, therefore, as an important institution of international society, diplomacy is perceived as significant and necessary to international society and so, for them, the relationships between diplomacy and international society can be inseparable, particularly when considering that due to diplomacy, governance without government becomes possible, and due to diplomacy, international society exists and is developed (Lose, 2001:188).

Let us take a look at several functions of diplomacy, in order to reveal how diplomacy has contributed to international society. First, we can easily notice that diplomacy has close relationships with sovereign states and international society membership, especially when considering that, once, diplomacy could be regarded as the standard of civilization. Usually, sovereign states most idealistically practice diplomacy, and diplomacy most idealistically works within international society as well. In other words, if a state joins a diplomatic system in international society, let alone it is diplomatically recognized, it means that the state is an independent and autonomous sovereign state as a highly possible civilized member of international society, especially as the self-determination/decolonization was once a criterion for membership in international society (Keens-Soper, 1999:34). To put it differently, if

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<sup>202</sup> Barry Buzan regards diplomacy as one of primary institutions about communication, negotiation and the sanctity of agreements. Barry Buzan explained well about the primary institutions of international society well. See Barry Buzan (2002). Also see Barry Buzan (2006:82).

the non-member states of international society practice diplomatic relations with the member-states of international society on the basis of diplomatic norms and rules, it can greatly determine whether or not the non-member states can become members of the international society. In the past, on and off, we could see that diplomatic recognition determined whether or not polities were civilized (or whether or not they were the full members of international society). For instance, during the age of imperialism, diplomatic recognition was denied to uncivilized polities (Jonsson and Hall, 2005:127). Also, the Congress of Vienna in 1815 established the rule that polities would not be seen as sovereign if not diplomatically recognized by other powers, particularly Great Powers (Jonsson and Hall, 2005:127). As non-European polities/states gradually had diplomatic relations with European countries on the basis of diplomatic rules and norms, they were accepted as the full members of international society, which expands international society. All of these evidently indicate that diplomatic recognition can be viewed as a criterion to judge whether or not polities are the full members of international society. And so, diplomatic recognition implies a willingness to deal with a new state as a member of international society, and diplomatic recognition of non-member states of international society can be a parallel to the expansion of international society (Jonsson and Hall, 2005:126). All in all, diplomacy can be used as a criterion for some level of membership in international society, especially when considering that diplomatic relations themselves imply the legitimacy of governments. This demonstrates the absolute necessity of diplomacy for the existence and expansion of international society. At this juncture, we can certainly see the close co-relationship between diplomacy and international society.

Second, diplomacy is understood as a peaceful means rather than aggressive means to resolve some conflicting interests among states, and so we can assume that

diplomacy civilizes international relations. In other words, diplomacy itself can be recognized as the civilized pursuit of the national interest in the relations among states, while softening the naked aggressiveness of power politics or even replacing the use of force, the primeval manner of conducting international politics, with persuasion, which can be often seen in international arenas (Otte, 2001:134, 141). Due to this aspect, we can assume that diplomacy civilizes international affairs, while constantly searching for mutually acceptable terms and conditions (Otte, 2001:134). Adam Watson revealed that diplomacy has facilitated the civilizing and civilized process in international society, while making a good summary of the relationship between diplomacy and international society. Adam Watson stated:

**Diplomacy** is an organized pattern of **communication and negotiation**, nowadays continuous, which enables each independent government to learn what other governments want and what they object to. **In a developed international society it becomes more than an instrument of communication and bargaining.** It also affects its practitioners. It is an activity which even if often abused has a bias towards the resolution of conflicts. **It is a function of the diplomatic dialogue to mitigate and civilize the differences between states**, and if possible reconcile them, without suppressing or ignoring them. Conflicts of interests are a major subject of diplomacy, which can function effectively only when the necessary level of understanding exists between the parties to the dialogue about the maintenance of the system as a whole and about the rules for the promotion of their separate interests within the system. **The diplomatic dialogue is thus the instrument of international society: a civilized process based on awareness and respect for other people's points of view; and a civilizing also, because the continuous exchange of ideas, and the attempts to find mutually acceptable solutions to conflicts of interest, increase that awareness and respect.** The civilizing tendency visibly goes not prevent diplomacy from being perverted and misused – its methods lend themselves to duplicity. But the bias towards understanding other points of view and other needs, toward a search for common ground and a resolution of differences, is unmistakably there (Watson, 1983:20-21).

All in all, at this juncture, as Adam Watson put it, diplomacy is the instrument of

international society for the civilization process, which leads to the continuous exchange of ideas and the acceptable solutions to conflicts of interest. At this juncture, we can see that diplomacy is pretty much inclusive rather than exclusive, rejecting Huntington's obsession with conflict-soaked cultures,<sup>203</sup> especially when considering that diplomacy has been used as an institution to push many different cultural or regional states to work together and find peaceful solutions, which helps to ultimately sustain international society and to promote the well-being of international society. Thus, diplomacy might be one of the best institutions to modify states' language and behavior, which helps to sustain the existence of international society, in particular in the nuclear age in which any nuclear war itself can severely damage or destroy international society.

Third, we can think that diplomacy spreads the standard of civilization across the international arena, as diplomacy promotes and consolidates certain values and norms as universal, such as human rights and democracy, across international society. Diplomacy can encourage states to accept certain norms and values of international society as the standards of civilization, so as to make the states become full members of international society, which most clearly demonstrates the inseparable relationship between diplomacy and international society. In the process, diplomacy can transform states' identities and interests, which can help to consolidate international society or to alter the fabric of international society. In other words, the world has increasingly become a more civilized place and international society has been expanded, as via diplomacy, more states adopt norms and values of international

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<sup>203</sup> Samuel P. Huntington (1996).



society as the standard of civilization.<sup>204</sup> In short, diplomacy has transformed barbarian and savage states into civilized states, as diplomacy has encouraged or forced non-member states of international society to comply with predominant norms and values of the international society, such as human rights or democracy, as the standard of civilization, and in the end, it has made them become full members of international society. Therefore, diplomatic relations themselves can be ultimately responsible for spreading the standard of civilization, and also they can sustain, expand or transform international society. At this juncture, we can see the contribution of diplomacy to the existence of international society, the expansion of international society and the well-being of international society. In addition, we can say that diplomacy clearly plays a significant role in managing international society.

Fourth, when considering that relations between sovereign states bound by no common authority have been traditionally regarded as having a tense and potentially violent character, diplomacy has addressed and managed such relations as its prior.<sup>205</sup> In other words, as one of the primary functions of diplomacy, although diplomacy cannot completely prevent war nor completely guarantee peace and security in international society, diplomacy facilitates order and stability in international society, such as “the minimization of the effects of friction in international relations” (Bull, 1977:165).<sup>206</sup> In fact, we can even say that diplomacy can be seen as a task to sustain

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<sup>204</sup> See Maurice Keens-Soper (1975).

<sup>205</sup> See Paul Sharp (2008).

<sup>206</sup> Hedley Bull mentioned several functions of diplomacy in relation to order within the modern state system, such as communication, negotiation, the gathering of intelligence, minimization of the effects of friction, and symbolizing the existence of the society of states. But, in my dissertation, I want to stress diplomatic functions for the existence of common goods of an international society, including order and stability, even if Bull’s all functions are closely related with order and I admit that I used some of them, such as the minimization of friction as examples for diplomatic functions for order and stability. At this juncture, as for Bull, what constitute order are the primary goals of states – security,

the order and stability in which progress towards civilization (more civilized states and more developed international society) can be obtained.<sup>207</sup> Because of this, diplomacy should not be recognized as a mechanism to pursue states' own national interests alone at the expense of the existence of international society or the well-being of international society, since via diplomacy, it is very hard to accomplish states' own interests in the absence of order and stability in international society.

As mentioned above, we should notice that diplomacy contributes to order and stability in international society, preventing the prevalence of the rule of the jungle in international society, in particular when considering that as power management, diplomatic alliance can be used to counter the imbalance of power so as to keep stability and order.<sup>208</sup> In fact, in some sense, diplomacy and diplomats can be defined with the concept of 'the balance of power,' as the tendency for states to counter anyone that was becoming strong enough to threaten the independence of all the others, which demonstrates how diplomacy manages the balance of power to maintain order and stability in international society.<sup>209</sup> This indicates that order and stability in

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the sanctity of agreements (*pacta sunt servanda*) and territorial property rights. See Bull (1977:163-166).

<sup>207</sup> See Paul Sharp, "The English School, Herbert Butterfield and Diplomacy," *Discussion Papers in Diplomacy*, Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael.' The website is available at: [http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2002/20021100\\_cli\\_paper\\_dip\\_issue83.pdf](http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2002/20021100_cli_paper_dip_issue83.pdf) pp. 20.

<sup>208</sup> At this juncture, we can see a close connection between diplomacy and balance of power. We might even think that loyalty to the principle of the balance of power and attention to its operation might be regarded as the responsibilities of diplomacy and diplomats. See Paul Sharp (2003:861).

<sup>209</sup> Unlike Hedley Bull (1977), in my dissertation, I do not mention balance of power and war as primary institutions to manage an international society. As for me, today, the balance of power and war seem outdated. To me, integration seems more effective than balance of power to manage international society, which can be seen in Germany's integration with the European Union as the solution to Germany problem after WWII. In fact, today integration seems to be a more effective mechanism than balance of power to deal with China. Also, today, war has become so costly, so destructive and so dangerous. In particular, nuclear war itself cannot be regarded as an institution of an international society, since its destructive power can kill not only states but also even an international society. Nevertheless, I am not completely opposed to the war as an institution, as I tend

international society are not things bestowed by nature, but are a matter of refined thought, careful contrivance, and elaborate artifice (Sharp, 2003:861). Owing to this, we can say that diplomats themselves are skillful and good managers governing international society so as to sustain international society and even to promote the well-being of international society (Sofer, 1988:207). To sum up, as a significant institution, diplomacy contributes to upholding order and stability in international society.

Fifth, let us turn to information-gathering as one of the primary functions of diplomacy. Via diplomatic intelligence based on the accurate gathering and relaying of relevant information, we can constantly reassess events and developments with a view to our interests, let alone our understanding the identity and interest of other states, and the context of international society as a whole (Otte, 2001:133). As a function of diplomacy, to put it differently, the flows of information can help one state to achieve a detailed picture of another, which can provide opportunities and motives that may induce its government to stay or change course (Keens-Soper, 1999:45). This can eventually help to keep or change the identity and interests of states and the context of international society in the long run. In other words, as we can acknowledge the identity and interest of other states on the basis of accurate information via diplomacy, we can find the most effective way to keep or change states, which can be seen in my three different and effective ways – i.e. power, interest and legitimacy - to promote and consolidate democracy across international society. As a matter of fact, Hedley Bull was well aware of the importance of the gathering of intelligence or information about foreign countries as one of primary functions of

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to support the war to cope with outlaw states in a liberal anti-pluralist international society. See Paul Sharp (2008).

diplomacy (Bull, 1977:164). According to Bull, diplomats are uniquely skilled in gathering a particular kind of information which is essential to the conduct of international relations (Bull, 1977:181). To him, information via diplomacy is primarily about the view and policies of a country's political leadership, now and in the near future (Bull, 1977:181). For Bull, information is knowledge of the current situation and how it is likely to develop rather than the pattern of past regularities (Bull, 1977:181). More importantly, to him, the information can be derived from day-to-day personal dealings with the leading political class in the country to which a diplomat is accredited (Bull, 1977: 181). When considering all of these, diplomacy has had decisive impacts on states' incentives, interests and behavior, which eventually shapes the nature of international society in the long run. As briefly noted before, the US intelligence failure in 2003 regarding Saddam's Iraq is an outstanding example to prove how important the information-gathering as a key role of diplomacy has been. Geoffrey Wiseman supported the crucial diplomatic role of collection of information, by pointing out the fact that there was no US diplomatic presence in Iraq leading up to the 2003 invasion, which led to the intelligence failure about Saddam's Iraq (Wiseman, 2005:423).<sup>210</sup>

When considering the above, information-gathering as a function of diplomacy should be recognized as significant to govern international society. As a matter of

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<sup>210</sup> Wiseman mentioned: "The United States' historical rejection of this 'talk-to-the-enemy' norm is evident in the US-Iraq relationship. **Iraq suspended diplomatic relations in 1967 after the Middle East War** and only reestablished them under a 1984 agreement, at which point the U.S. embassy in Baghdad was reopened, **only to be closed again in January 1991 during the First Gulf War. In other words, beginning in 1967, there was no American embassy in Baghdad for 29 of 36 years, including from 1991 to 2003.....the important point is that there was no US diplomatic presence in Iraq leading up to the 2003 invasion, which allowed the pro-war faction in Washington to present its case knowing that there was no embassy – nor the media, intelligence, business, and humanitarian presences.....to contradict it.**" See Wiseman (2005:423). Also, Kenneth Pollack pointed out an embassy's pivotal role of collection of information, saying that US intelligence failures in Iraq came largely from the absence of a US embassy in Iraq. See Kenneth Pollack (2004).

fact, if the information-gathering can ultimately facilitate diplomatic recognition, the diplomatic function of information-gathering should be seen as essential to manage international society. In particular, we realize that diplomatic recognition is a prerequisite for reciprocal exchange in international relations, and that diplomatic recognition determines the relations among states. And so, we can even say that diplomatic recognition is the key element to shape an environment of international society or a certain type of international society, which means that information-gathering as a primary function of diplomacy has greatly contributed to international society.

Sixth, as mentioned above, information-gathering as a primary function of diplomacy has been very important to international society. However, we have to realize that it is extremely hard to get accurate information without any communicative action, that is, socialization, which can be felt in the absence of the US embassy in Saddam's Iraq before the war in 2003. In fact, many scholars, especially English School scholars, are well aware of the significance of communicative action as a primary function of diplomacy. For instance, Martin Wight seemed to stress the important role of communicative action as a primary function of diplomacy, as Martin Wight called diplomacy "the system of the art of communication between powers" (Wight, 1995:113). Alan James also contends that diplomacy is, at bottom, the communication system of international society (James, 2004:201). Hedley Bull claims that diplomacy facilitates communication between the political leaders of states and other entities in world politics, and that without communication, there could be neither international society, nor any international system at all (Bull, 1977:163-164). More importantly, according to David Armstrong, diplomacy itself is originally the dialogue that takes place among sovereign states as the members of international

society (Armstrong, 1993:245). All in all, when considering above English School scholars' perception on communicative action as one of significant diplomatic functions, we can notice the significant role of communicative function in international society.

In general, when considering common rules, values, norms and interests via a system of communicative action or a system of negotiation as a definition of diplomacy, we can see the co-related relationships between diplomacy and international society, in particular when considering that international society is defined with common norms, rules, and interests.<sup>211</sup> In short, international society cannot exist without diplomacy, and diplomacy cannot exist without international society, especially when considering that, as Adam Watson put it, diplomacy can be properly comprehended in the context of international society, in which states are engaged with each other, and diplomacy itself reflects a particular façade of international society (Watson, 1983:13).

As communicative action, diplomacy can be used to even persuade or convince other states that they should keep or change their views of the world, their normative beliefs, and their preferences. In other words, via communicative action, socialization constructs, maintains, or transforms the identities and interests of states, which can eventually influence the fabric of international society, the expansion of international society, and even the promotion of the well-being of international society (Sharp, 2004:227). At this juncture, we can understand that diplomacy has played a crucial role in shaping particular international societies (Jonsson and Hall, 2005:121). For example, the Treaty of Westphalia established the foundation for the gradual

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<sup>211</sup> See Bull (1977:13).

emergence of the territorial, sovereign state, and this led to state-centered international society (Jonsson and Hall, 2005:125). As another example, the fact that US and German leaders had been continuously engaged in the process of friendly persuasion via communication with Shevardnadze and Gorbachev, could eventually lead to German unification in 1989, since persuasion, via communication, on the basis of a normative claim of self-determination could alter the Soviet leadership's preference over policies and outcomes in the course of the diplomatic relations, although the Soviet leaders had been strongly opposed to German unification prior to 1989 and at that time even the Soviet Union could have provoked an international crisis and confrontation with Bonn and Washington by fully insisting on its legal rights over Germany as an allied power (Risse, 2000:24-25). Furthermore, this could ultimately not only strengthen the idea of self-determination, but also facilitate the ripple of democracy across international society in the late 20<sup>th</sup> century and the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Diplomatic communication among states is one of the core characteristics of diplomacy to modify the languages and behaviors of states, even influencing domestic economic and political structure, ultimately states' identities and interests, which can change the context of international society in the long run (Jonsson and Hall, 2005:37). In other words, as David Armstrong pointed out, diplomacy as a socializing function can make possible the gradual modification and transformation of states, which is a change in states' identities and interests.<sup>212</sup> This can help to sustain or alter the fabric of international society, contributing to the well-being of international society as well as the expansion of international society. All in all, because of this socializing function of diplomacy, diplomacy has contributed to the process of producing,

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<sup>212</sup> See David Armstrong (1999).

reproducing or transforming particular international society, and so we can certainly say that diplomacy constitutes, re-produces or transforms international society, although, in turn, diplomacy reflects the fabric of international society as well (Jonsson and Hall, 2005:37).

Thanks to communicative action, we can say that diplomacy might be one of the best institutions to promote and consolidate a certain norm and value across an international society, particularly when considering that diplomacy can be seen as a process of learning (Lose, 2001:191), and that communicative action over time has brought about the development of similarity, which can be interpreted as the expansion of international society or the expansion of civilization. As Adam Watson put it, this indicates that the development of international society has been closely related to the diplomatic process of interaction, as norms and values are endlessly amended by negotiations to meet pressures of change, and the better norms and better rules as the requisites of international society are continuously established by diplomatic communication such as negotiations or persuasion, among states (Watson, 1983:213).

To sum up, via functions of diplomacy, we can say that as one of the primary institutions of international society, diplomacy contributes not only to the existence of international society, but also to the character of international society, as diplomacy can construct, maintain or transform the identities and interests of states, along with its contribution to both national well-being and the well-being of international society, let alone the expansion of international society. Indeed, without diplomacy, we cannot even imagine international relations, nor the existence or development of international society, and so, we cannot disregard the role of diplomacy in an inseparable and inevitable relationship with international society (Langhorne, 2008:58). In short, all functions of diplomacy clearly imply the close relationship between international



society and diplomacy, and these help us understand that as a primary institution, diplomacy plays a significant role in managing international society.

Let us turn to the evolution of diplomacy on the basis of the evolution of international society, even if in turn, the evolution of diplomacy strengthens the evolution of international society as well. First of all, we should be aware of the fact that diplomatic culture and the nature of international society are closely related, and we should also acknowledge that the type of diplomacy reflects the context of international society. In short, diplomacy reflects the context of international society. At this juncture, I have to say that diplomacy has not been fixed, but has evolved on the basis of the evolution of the fabric of international society. Many English School scholars are well aware of this point. As for Martin Wight, diplomacy is a sphere of human relations with its own distinctive norms which reflect the complexities, uncertainty, and anxieties of different members of international society (Jackson, 2002:4). More importantly, Hedley Bull made a good point about diplomatic culture, by saying:

In considering the role of such common cultures in relation to international society, it is worth distinguishing between the **diplomatic culture....---the common stock of ideas and values possessed by the official representatives of states ---** and the international political culture by which we mean the intellectual and moral culture that determines the attitudes toward the state system of the societies that compose it. It is clear that **the European international society of the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> century was founded upon a diplomatic** and an international political culture that do **not now underpin the world international society of today** (Hurrell, 2002:6-7).

In fact, Bull ultimately defines a diplomatic culture as the common stock of ideas and values possessed by the official representatives of states, which is part of a wider international political culture as a necessary precondition for the emergence of international society (Neumann, 2003:349). Also, Christian Reus-Smit claims that a

different social condition brings about a different type of diplomacy, while answering the question of why different societies of sovereign states, such as the ‘ancient Greek polises,’ ‘Renaissance city-states,’ ‘absolutist Europe’ and ‘modern world,’ create relatively different kinds of diplomacy, such as ‘third party arbitration,’ ‘oratorical diplomacy,’ ‘old diplomacy’ and ‘multilateralism’ (Reus-Smit 1999). All in all, when considering the above, we can see that diplomacy has not been fixed, but has been historically evolved on the basis of the fabric of international society.

There are many examples to demonstrate that diplomacy reflects the context of international society. At this juncture, I will briefly touch on old diplomacy, multilateral diplomacy, and poly-lateral diplomacy in order to demonstrate that diplomacy reflects the context of international society. First of all, we must consider the international environment in which the old diplomacy emerged. The international environment for the old diplomacy is the absolutes of the Westphalian system, such as territorial fixed states where everything of values lies within some state’s borders, a single, secular authority governing each territory and representing it outside its borders, and no authority above states.<sup>213</sup> The Peace of Westphalia brought about a new diplomatic arrangement such as an order created by states, and for states, while replacing most of the legal vestiges of hierarchy, at the pinnacle of which were the Pope and the Holy Roman Emperor, in particular when considering that the Peace of Westphalia is generally seen as the death knell for a Christian society of polities (Jonsson and Hall, 2005:36). This ultimately indicates that a new international environment requests the emergence of a new different kind of diplomacy; that is a state-centered diplomacy called old diplomacy as a primary type of diplomacy in the

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<sup>213</sup> See James P. Muldoon Jr. (2007).

seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth century, which can also be referred to as bilateral diplomacy or secretive diplomacy (Jonsson and Hall, 2005:41). Thus, we can see that a new type of diplomacy usually emerges because of the change of the context of international society.

Because the practice of diplomacy reflects the context of international society, open/new/multilateral diplomacy cannot be exceptional. The new diplomacy emerged in the nineteenth century and reached the zenith in the twentieth century (Sofer, 1988:197). As a symptom of the new diplomacy, there was a crisis in the system of the European balance of power (Sofer, 1988:197). Also, since the nineteenth century, the strong reaction against the aristocratic international club of diplomatists and particularly against what was called old or secret diplomacy, in which sovereignty was given to few, had gradually emerged (Otte, 2001:157). Moreover, since the nineteenth century, there had been the gradual acknowledgement of the importance of the public opinion (Nicolson, 1950:74). And, old/bilateral/secretive diplomacy could not sufficiently address the new emerging regional and global problems – e.g. terrorism, narcotics trafficking, intra-state conflict, free trade and investment, economic development, self-determination, democratic development, growing inequalities and disparities in the globalizing world economy, global financial and economic crisis, climate change and other pressing global environmental issues, infectious diseases (HIV/AIDS, Bird Flu and drug-resistant tuberculosis), disarmament, arms control, failed states, gross violation of human rights and increasing humanitarian crisis.<sup>214</sup> All of these contributed to the transformation from the old/bilateral/secretive diplomacy toward the new/open/multilateral diplomacy.

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<sup>214</sup> See James P. Muldoon Jr. (2007), Paul Sharp (2008) and Sassen Sofer (1988:195).

In the post-Cold War era, we need a new type of diplomacy due to the new kind of fabric of our current international society. In the post-Cold War era, as a new phenomenon, NGOs and other non-states actors, like Greenpeace, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and others, have rapidly increased in number, and they are expected to continuously increase.<sup>215</sup> Today, more than 20,000 transnational NGO networks are already active across international society (Leonard, 2002:54). This indicates that as a new kind of international environment, we can see that boundaries are becoming increasingly porous rather than being fixed and permanent (Hocking, 2004:151). In other words, recently, the rigid state-centered diplomacy is often rejected due to the involvement of non-state actors. The representatives of increasingly important and successful non-states actors have emerged as new diplomats, and so, this environment requests a new kind of diplomacy such as polyilateral diplomacy which can be marked as the 21st century diplomacy (Sharp, 2003:876). In general, diplomacy has been known to be limited to only a relationship among states, rather than between states and non-state actors, but today we cannot ignore the relations between states and non-state actors as non-diplomatic relationship any more, such as Greenpeace's vigorous campaign against French nuclear testing in the South Pacific and its anti-whaling efforts against Japan (Cooper and Hocking, 2000:363-364).

Up to now, I have demonstrated the close relationship between diplomacy and international society, showing how diplomacy can change the nature of international society and how the evolution of diplomacy has been greatly influenced by the

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<sup>215</sup> See Jan Melissen, "Summit Diplomacy Coming of Age." *Discussion Papers in Diplomacy*. Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael.' The website is available at: [http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2003/20030500\\_cli\\_paper\\_dip\\_issue86.pdf](http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2003/20030500_cli_paper_dip_issue86.pdf)

evolution of the context of international society. However, at this juncture, most importantly, one thing has never been changed or evolved. It is diplomacy as a considerable institution that has played a significant role in the governance of international society, no matter what kind of diplomacy – old diplomacy, new diplomacy or polylateral diplomacy. In the next section, I will demonstrate how various kinds of diplomacy have helped to govern international society, while promoting and consolidating democracy across international society.

## ***2> Diplomacy and Democracy***

In general, adherence to common norms and principles of state behavior in international society has rendered independent states a part of a society of civilized nations (Otte, 2002:234). And so, compliance with human rights and democracy as universal can render independent states full members of international society, especially in the post-Cold War era and 21<sup>st</sup> century in which there has been much lower tolerance for undemocratic states in international society than in the Cold War era, and in which even liberal democracy has been slowly but steadily conceived as a principle all states are expected to move towards (Jordaan, 2003:171). At this juncture, we can guess that there have been various mechanisms to promote democracy across international society, as they have goaded non-democratic states to accept democracy as well as human rights. As one of mechanisms, diplomacy has played a significant role in promoting and consolidating democracy across international society. In particular as diplomacy contributes to the recognition and reproduction of similar polities, while delegitimizing other types of political formations, we can expect that diplomacy can have a great impact on democratic promotion and consolidation across international society (Jonsson and Hall, 2005:136). In fact, once Martin Wight insisted that diplomacy played a significant role in

diffusing the ideas and practices of the European system of states to every new part of the globe (Neumann, 2003:349). As Wight put it, we should recognize that today, diplomacy has been playing a crucial role in promoting human rights and democracy across international society, which has led to the expansion of international society as more states have become increasingly democratic as civilized states.

Nevertheless, the fact that diplomacy has played a very significant role in promoting and consolidating democracy across international society is not new at all.<sup>216</sup> For instance, after the First World War, democratic constitutions and guarantees for minority rights were added to the diplomatic recognition criteria adopted by the victorious states, along with former US President Woodrow Wilson's plea to "make the world safe for democracy" (Jonsson and Hall, 2005:128). Also, in the aftermath of World War II, through diplomacy, the US helped to transform devastated countries, Germany and Japan, into prosperous peace-loving democratic states.<sup>217</sup>

However, we can hardly deny the fact that in the post-Cold War era and 21<sup>st</sup> century, diplomacy has been more often adopted for the robust democratization across international society, supporting democratic ideas and institution and alleviating poverty, than ever, especially when considering that the US has often used its various diplomatic policies to change the repressive regimes in international society, such as the US adoption of conditional economic and security aids and its adoption of political investment to push non-democratic states to accept human rights and democracy in particular currently in African and Arab countries as well as Latin American

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<sup>216</sup> See Condoleezza Rice (2006).

<sup>217</sup> Ibid.

countries.<sup>218</sup> In this section, therefore, I will primarily attempt to examine how diplomacy can promote and consolidate democracy across international society.

In general, we can often see that via diplomacy as a socializing institution, many states are socialized into international norms, like human rights and democracy. Through diplomatic processes such as argumentation, persuasion or communication, many states are exposed to international norms, and they have been gradually engaged in them. In particular, the communications between norm-violating governments, norm-complying governments, transnational advocacy networks and domestic opposition groups can ultimately get the norm-violation states to conform to international norms, which can be seen in Condoleezza Rice's transformational diplomacy, albeit norms-violating governments initially reject the validity of international norms and are not interested in engaging in a serious dialogue with their critics (Risse, 2000:29).

When norm-violating governments experience increased diplomatic pressures via the communicative behavior/ socializing function as one of the diplomatic functions with norm-complying governments, along with their transnational and domestic critics, they usually feel that they must make some concessions in order to increase their international legitimacy or simply to regain foreign aid, and so they eventually no longer deny the validity of the international norms, which is often seen in China's case (Risse, 2000:29). Also, as already noted before, at this juncture, as diplomatic relations can be understood as a learning-socializing process, norm-

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<sup>218</sup> In the past, we could see as well the US diplomatic pressure for democratic development in autocratic countries such as Chile and the Philippines. See, for more information, David Adesnik and Michael McFaul (2006). Also, see, for the information concerning the US current diplomatic conditional aid, Thomas Lum, Christopher M. Blanchard, Nicolas Cook, Kerry Dumbaugh, Susan B. Epstein, Shirley A. Kan, Michael F. Martin, Wayne M. Morrison, Dick K. Nanto, Jim Nichol, Jeremy M. Sharp, Mark P. Sullivan, and Bruce Vaughn, Thomas Coipuram, Jr, (2008).

violating states can gradually change their interests as well as their identities, via their gradual acceptance of international norms, like human rights and democracy. This indicates how norm-violating governments might reach the consensus that international norms like human rights and democracy obtain authentically international validity beyond tactical concession, which can be seen in South Korea's case (Risse, 2000:31). We can confirm that states' identities and interests are not inherently fixed but are subjected to change, and such change in states' identity and interests can be possible via diplomacy. As a matter of fact, in terms of change in state's identity and interests, we can think of diplomacy based on a hierarchical relationship and limited use of force, which is known as coercive diplomacy, as well. This type of diplomacy was evident in Iraq's case, although only partially successful. In other words, via coercive diplomacy, even outlaw states might become a better state, in particular when considering that after more than 13 years of U.S. sanctions and 7 years of UN sanctions, plus the US's air strikes on Libya in 1986, Libya which was once a terror sponsoring outlaw state, had taken important steps on the road to normalizing its relations with the international community, beginning with its renunciation of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, in order to ultimately become a better state.<sup>219</sup> When considering this change in states' identities and interests via diplomacy let alone states' acceptance of human rights and democracy, we can say that diplomacy is a good institution to promote and consolidate democracy. All in all, we can see how throughout diplomacy, non-democratic states can become

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<sup>219</sup> For certain, Gaddafi's Libya's change is one of good examples as success of coercive diplomacy. See "1986: US launches air strikes on Libya." *BBC News*. April 15, 1986. Also, see "Bush Speaks with Gaddafi in Historic Phone Call." *The Washington Post*. November 18, 2008. And see "Carrots or Sticks? Libya and U.S. Efforts to Influence Rouge States." *Center for Contemporary Conflict*. The website is available at: [http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nps/ccc\\_calabrese\\_nov04.pdf](http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nps/ccc_calabrese_nov04.pdf)



democratic states in the end, and we can see that they can become full members of international society, or good citizens of international society.

There are many kinds of diplomacy that have been adopted to promote and consolidate democracy across international society, such as summit, public diplomacy, and transformational diplomacy, with which I will briefly deal in this section. First of all, I will start with the role of summit for democratization. According to Jan Melissen, summit can be understood as a masterpiece in the art of compromise.<sup>220</sup> The term ‘summit’ is accurately applied to meetings between incumbent heads of government and heads of state, or political leaders, and the highest representatives of an international organization.<sup>221</sup> Also, as an international meeting, summit has more than one purpose, and requires the time and location of a meeting, such as the European Union (EU) and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).<sup>222</sup> The summit is the expression of the direct political ties between the leader and his people, since the leader’s policy is greatly influenced by the media and his/her people’s preference, and the political leader is perceived as the elected diplomat-in-chief.<sup>223</sup> There are two kinds of summits: “ad hoc summits that are called as the occasion seems to demand, such as the Camp David summit on the Middle East in September 1978” and “serial summits which usually have their origin in ad hoc summits but then become part of a regular series,” such as European Union (Berridge and James, 2003:255-256). Some summits have contributed to democratization across

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<sup>220</sup> See Jan Melissen, “Summit Diplomacy Coming of Age.” *Discussion Papers in Diplomacy*, Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael.’ The website is available at: [http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2003/20030500\\_cli\\_paper\\_dip\\_issue86.pdf](http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2003/20030500_cli_paper_dip_issue86.pdf)

<sup>221</sup> Ibid.

<sup>222</sup> Ibid.

<sup>223</sup> Ibid.

international society. For instance, known as the effective center of global governance, the Group of Eight (G-8) industrialized democracies (Grieco and Ikenberry, 2003:305),<sup>224</sup> albeit Russia is not a rich democracy, has been known to advance the universal values of human dignity, democracy, economic opportunity, and social justice, in particular for the countries of the Middle East and North Africa (BMFNA).<sup>225</sup> In particular, there are several cases for the promotion and consolidation of democracy via such a summit. For example, whenever former US President George W. Bush and former Russian President Vladimir Putin met, Bush raised his concern about Russia's poor democratic record such as no free media, undemocratic fashioned rule of law, and severe human rights violation, not to mention Putin's Russia crossing back across the line from Partly Free to Not Free in 2004.<sup>226</sup> Also, Russia's membership in G-8 itself has directly or indirectly given some pressure to Russia toward human rights and democracy. Moreover, the G-8 made its commitment to train 20,000 peacekeeping troops for good governance and democracy in Africa at the 31<sup>st</sup> G8 Summit from July 6 to July 8, 2005.<sup>227</sup> And the G-8 has provided conditional aid on the respect for democracy and good governance in the

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<sup>224</sup> At the 1998 summit meeting in the United Kingdom, the summit process officially expanded to embrace Russia as a full member, turning the G-7 into the G-8. See Joseph M. Grieco and G. John Ikenberry (2003:307-308). Also, the G-8 refers to the annual summit meeting of the G8 heads of government : France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, the US, Canada (since 1976) and Russia (since 1998). See "Profile:G8," *BBC News*, September 17, 2008.

<sup>225</sup> See, for more information, Paula J. Dobriansky, "Promoting Democracy Through Diplomacy." *US Department of State*. Available at the website: <http://www.state.gov/g/rls/rm/2005/46358.htm>

<sup>226</sup> See "Promoting Democracy Through Diplomacy." *Hearing Before the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress*. Series No. 109-82. May 5, 2005. Available at the website: <http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/archives/109/21022.pdf>

<sup>227</sup> See "31<sup>st</sup> G8 Summit." *Wikipedia*. Available at the website: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/31st\\_G8\\_summit](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/31st_G8_summit)

recipient countries.<sup>228</sup> All in all, the G-8 has contributed to the promotion of democracy across international society, and it has worked as a primary diplomatic mechanism for democratic development across international society. Nonetheless, in the mid-1970s, the G-8 was originally set up as a forum for economic and trade matters.<sup>229</sup>

As another example, I can think of the ministerial meeting of the Community of Democracies, even though, accurately speaking, I cannot call it a summit but rather multilateral diplomacy. The ministerial meeting of the Community of Democracies (CD) demonstrates how diplomacy can enhance the solidarity of democracies, let alone the promotion of democracy across international society. As a unique global forum, the ministerial meeting of the CD has brought together those nations committed to promotion and consolidation of democracy across international society.<sup>230</sup> More accurately, this meeting has contributed to the strengthening of a civil society; to the reduction of poverty, development and democracy; to development of democracy caucuses at the UN and other regional organizations; and to regional and inter-regional cooperation for democracy.<sup>231</sup> Currently, more than 120 nations have come together: first in Warsaw, Poland in 2000; second in Seoul, South Korea in 2002; third in Santiago, Chile in 2005; and fourth in Bamako, Mali in 2007.<sup>232</sup> Through these meetings, they have had a chance to confirm their commitment to consolidate

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<sup>228</sup> See "Profile:G8." *BBC News*, September 17, 2008.

<sup>229</sup> Ibid. The first meeting was held in Rambouillet France in 1975, and was attended by the leaders of France, the US, the UK, Germany, Japan and Italy. See Joseph M. Grieco and G. John Ikenberry (2003: 305).

<sup>230</sup> "The Community of Democracies." *U.S. Department of State*. Available at the website: <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/c10790.htm>

<sup>231</sup> Ibid. These were the theme of the Bamako Ministerial meeting.

<sup>232</sup> Ibid

their own democratic institutions and work with other countries regionally and globally to assist them on their transition toward democracy.<sup>233</sup> The basic principles of the group can be seen in the Warsaw Declaration.<sup>234</sup> More importantly, the 2005 Santiago Commitment improved the Community's agenda by facilitating regional and inter-regional cooperation for democracy promotion, as well as global efforts, via support for the UN Democracy Fund and the UN Democracy Caucus.<sup>235</sup> Overall, diplomacy such as ministerial meetings as well as summits can be used to facilitate and consolidate a community of democracies, as democratic states together promote, protect and consolidate their shared democratic principles, practices and values, and their political, social and economic freedom across international society.

Let us turn to public diplomacy for democratization across international society. The term 'public diplomacy' was first used in 1965 by Edmund Gullion, who was once a diplomat and dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, contributing to establishment at the Fletcher School of the Edward R. Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy (Wolf and Rosen, 2004:3). At that time (1965), the Murrow Center revealed the definition of Public Diplomacy, by saying:

public diplomacy...deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy....[including] the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with those of another...(and) the transnational flow of

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<sup>233</sup> Ibid

<sup>234</sup> Warsaw Declaration is to respect and upholding the democratic principles and practices. See, for more information concerning the Warsaw Declaration, "Final Warsaw Declaration: Toward a Community of Democracies." Warsaw, Poland. June 27, 2000. *U.S. Department of State*. Available at the website: <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/26811.htm>

<sup>235</sup> "The Community of Democracies." *U.S. Department of State*. Available at the website: <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/c10790.htm>

information.<sup>236</sup>

In short, public diplomacy is “the process by which direct relations with people in a country are pursued to advance the interests and extend the values of those being represented”, which, as Melissen put it, is the most succinct definition of public diplomacy by Paul Sharp (Melissen, 2007:11, Sharp, 2007). However, more importantly, as an integral component of transformational diplomacy which I will explain below, public diplomacy can be understood to:

foster a sense of common interests and values with the people of other countries; to isolate, marginalize, and discredit violence extremists; and to foster a positive vision of hope and opportunity that is based on universal values like a belief in freedom, equality, the dignity and worth of every human being.<sup>237</sup>

In other words, public diplomacy has contributed across international society to the promotion and consolidation of human rights and democracy as norms and values of international society, especially when considering that democratic change can be almost impossible without citizens’ access to accurate information and that tyrannical regimes are secured when they tightly control knowledge.<sup>238</sup> In fact, we can easily find some examples for the contribution of public diplomacy to democratic development across international society. For instance, the US has used public diplomacy to promote democracy across international society, while advocating broadcasts, print media, and other outlets, such as Voice of America, Radio Free Asia,

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<sup>236</sup> I quoted this from Charles Wolf Jr. and Brian Rosen (2004:3). But the original source is “What is Public Diplomacy?” *United States Information Agency Alumni Association*, updated September 1, 2002. The website is available at: <http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/1.htm> (as of August 6, 2004).

<sup>237</sup> See Kennon H. Nakamura and Susan B. Epstein, “Diplomacy for the 21<sup>st</sup> century: Transformational Diplomacy,” *CRS Report for Congress*. The website is available at: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34141.pdf>, pp.10.

<sup>238</sup> See “Promoting Democracy Through Diplomacy,” *Hearing Before the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress*. Series No. 109-82. May 5, 2005. The website is available at: <http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/archives/109/21022.pdf>

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Sawa, Alhurra, and Radio and TV Marti, in order to equip people in closed nations with open truth.<sup>239</sup> In particular, during the time of the Soviet Union, Radio Liberty was one of the only ways for the people to hear accurate news and information about their own society and the world.<sup>240</sup> Also, when considering that the two primary things which brought down totalitarian regimes in the Eastern bloc, were ‘the Helsinki Accord in 1975’ and ‘Radio Free Europe,’<sup>241</sup> we can hardly deny how effective public diplomacy has been in promoting and consolidating democracy across international society.<sup>242</sup>

Most importantly, let us examine transformational diplomacy. During the Cold War era, Russians - with their uniform policy of destroying the influence of capitalism everywhere and by any means - could afford to send agents into every Laotian village to persuade the headmen of the philanthropy of the Soviet creed, and it might be that by the ‘cell’ method they could create disturbance, organize riots and demonstrations, and even topple governments (Nicolson, 1961:42). This kind of cell method can be compared to transformational diplomacy in the post-Cold War era in order to promote and consolidate democracy across international society. As a primary diplomacy for freedom for all people in international society, Condoleezza Rice’s transformational diplomacy is to elevate democracy-promotion activities inside

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<sup>239</sup> See Paula J. Dobriansky, “Promoting Democracy Through Diplomacy.” *US Department of State*. Available at the website: <http://www.state.gov/g/rls/rm/2005/46358.htm>

<sup>240</sup> Ibid

<sup>241</sup> “Promoting Democracy Through Diplomacy.” *Hearing Before the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress*. Series No. 109-82. May 5, 2005. The website is available at: <http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/archives/109/21022.pdf>

<sup>242</sup> There are many different kinds of mechanisms for public diplomacy – e.g. US educational and cultural cooperation via student, scholar and professional exchange programs. See, for more examples, Thomas Lum, Christopher M. Blanchard, Nicolas Cook, Kerry Dumbaugh, Susan B. Epstein, Shirley A. Kan, Michael F. Martin, Wayne M. Morrison, Dick K. Nanto, Jim Nichol, Jeremy M. Sharp, Mark P. Sullivan, and Bruce Vaughn, Thomas Coipuram, Jr (2008).

countries, with the following objectives: “to work with our many partners around the world to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.”<sup>243</sup> As one of the outstanding aspects of transformational diplomacy, at this juncture, transformational diplomacy is deeply rooted in partnership rather than in paternalism. In other words, transformational diplomacy implies that via diplomacy, we are working, “not for people, but with people” in order to “help foreign citizens better their own lives and to build their own nations and to transform their own future.”<sup>244</sup> Thus, we can say that transformational diplomacy is about closely working with, sharing experiences with, and collaborating with local people on democratic change.<sup>245</sup> Also, as transformational diplomacy can be understood as partnership with a local population to build their own democratic societies, we can say that transformational diplomacy indicates partners’ ownership of change toward democracy.<sup>246</sup> Due to this aspect, transformational diplomacy is different from traditional diplomacy which is based on the relationship between diplomats as the representatives of states.<sup>247</sup> All in all, we can obviously see that various diplomacies have been used to promote and consolidate democracy across international society, as

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<sup>243</sup> See Condoleezza Rice (2006).

<sup>244</sup> Ibid

<sup>245</sup> See “Promoting Democracy Through Diplomacy.” *Hearing Before the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress*. Series No. 109-82. May 5, 2005. The website is available at: <http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/archives/109/21022.pdf>

<sup>246</sup> See, for more information, Ambassador Robert P. Finn, “Transformational Diplomacy,” presented at Princeton University Celebration for the Seventy-Fifth Anniversary of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton, June 3, 2006. The website is available at: [http://www.princeton.edu/~lisd/events/talks/finn\\_trans.pdf](http://www.princeton.edu/~lisd/events/talks/finn_trans.pdf)

<sup>247</sup> See “Promoting Democracy Through Diplomacy.” *Hearing Before the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress*. Series No. 109-82. May 5, 2005. The website is available at: <http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/archives/109/21022.pdf>

diplomacy has become a considerable institution to push or civilize non-democratic states to accept human rights and democracy as norms and values of international society.

In consideration of diplomatic role in democratization across international society, let us take a look at how diplomats have contributed to the promotion and consolidation of democracy across international society. Many diplomats have made great efforts to promote and consolidate democracy across international society, especially in their host countries. Nonetheless, someone might argue that diplomats do not even define democratization as part of their job description even in the rare moment when they are engaged in promotion of democracy (Adesnik and Mcfaul, 2006:8). However, certainly we can observe that many diplomats are deeply engaged in promotion and consolidation of democracy, albeit often quietly behind the scenes (Adesnik and Mcfaul, 2006:8). In fact, former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had directed Ambassadors to give priority to democracy promotion, to make it central to mission strategies and their daily diplomatic activities.<sup>248</sup> Like this, in general, US diplomats such as ambassadors and consulate staff have been instructed to meet regularly with local political and religious leaders, dissidents, journalists, activists, and other voices for democratic values across international society, while making it clear that the US will stand with them if democracy activists peacefully speak out or stand up for freedom,<sup>249</sup> which is a good example to implement transformational diplomacy. Because of this, U.S. diplomats have played a special role in democratization in countries ruled by dictatorships, while helping to build up or

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<sup>248</sup> Ibid

<sup>249</sup> Ibid



strengthen the democratic opposition and to weaken or divide the autocrats in power, especially when they adopt transformational diplomacy to challenge autocratic regimes (Adesnik and McFaul, 2006:7-8). For instance, in despotic regimes, diplomats can provide legitimacy to democratic challengers by meeting with them, appearing in public with them, inviting them to diplomats' countries, and affirming their importance (Adesnik and McFaul, 2006:23). Also, diplomats can warn of their intent to withdraw support from autocratic incumbents, while serving as intermediaries or channels of communication between the autocratic regimes and the democratic oppositions, in particular during moments of transition (Adesnik and McFaul, 2006:23). Diplomats' engagement with social and political opposition leaders against the autocrat can help protect them from harassment and imprisonment, and diplomats can even help to get democratic leaders released from prison in authoritarian regimes, if authoritarian regimes have friendly relations with diplomats' countries (Adesnik and McFaul, 2006:23). All in all, we notice that as diplomats from democratic countries, like the US, reach out to opposition party leaders, democratic leaders and societal leaders in authoritarian regimes, they can ultimately help democracy take root in authoritarian regimes.<sup>250</sup>

There are many successful examples for how diplomats have contributed to the promotion and consolidation of democracy across international society. In particular, many ambassadors have greatly contributed to the promotion and consolidation of democracy across international society. First, Mark Palmer the American Ambassador to Hungary, during Hungary's swift transition from 1986 to 1989, greatly

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<sup>250</sup> David Adesnik and Michael McFaul point out this. See Adesnik and McFaul (2006:23).

contributed to Hungary's democratization.<sup>251</sup> Known for his advocacy of democracy and human freedom, Mark Palmer often marched with the dissidents and the people who were working for democracy, rather than with the oppressive government.<sup>252</sup> Palmer also has been frequently approached by young Iranians, Libyans, Belarussians, Chinese and others asking who they can approach in the U.S. government for advice and support concerning democratic change.<sup>253</sup> And in Moscow in the late 1960s, Palmer was responsible for dealing with dissidents, Jews, actors, writers and others the Communist Party oppressed, while smuggling out dissident literature.<sup>254</sup> When considering all of the above, Palmer is one of the diplomats who have practiced transformational diplomacy.

Second, from 1986 to 1988, the Reagan administration endorsed five UN resolutions critical of Pinochet's record on human rights, and at that time, the US Ambassador to Chile, Harry Barnes continuously encouraged Chile's economic reforms, while promoting free and fair elections in Chile (Adesnik and McFaul, 2006:18). In fact, Ambassador Barnes in Chile was, in a large part, contributing to bringing down Pinochet, while respecting Chilean civil society, meeting publically with representatives of opposition political parties like Christian Democrat leader Gabriel Valdes and civil society figures, and even warning the Pinochet regime not to

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<sup>251</sup> Currently, Mark Palmer is the Vice Chairman of Freedom House and the Council for a Community of Democracies. See "Mark Palmer." *Wikipedia*. Available at the website: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark\\_Palmer](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_Palmer). Also see "Promoting Democracy Through Diplomacy." *Hearing Before the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress*. Series No. 109-82, May 5, 2005. The website is available at: <http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/archives/109/21022.pdf>

<sup>252</sup> See "Promoting Democracy Through Diplomacy." *Hearing Before the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress*. Series No. 109-82. May 5, 2005. The website is available at: <http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/archives/109/21022.pdf>

<sup>253</sup> Ibid

<sup>254</sup> Ibid

interfere with the 1988 plebiscite, which could ultimately get Chileans to restore their democracy.<sup>255</sup> At that time, Valdes even said “the embassy has changed completely for us.”<sup>256</sup>

Third, the US Ambassador Smith Hempstone (to Kenya, 1989-93) made a great effort to almost succeed in uniting Kenyans to replace Daniel arap Moi who was the corrupt and undemocratic Kenyan President, while campaigning for multi-party elections and an end to persecution of dissidents.<sup>257</sup> Hempstone’s (and Washington’s) pressure eventually prevailed in Kenya, along with the international tide of democracy across international society, and so, in 1992, Kenya held its first genuine multi-party election.<sup>258</sup> At that time, the Kenyan opposition, Ndolo Ayah called Hempstone the “second hero of the liberation.”<sup>259</sup>

Fourth, US Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan, Stephen Young greatly supported the desire of the Kyrgyz to live in a free society.<sup>260</sup> Throughout his time in Kyrgyzstan, Ambassador Young very often met with civic activists around the country, speaking with journalists, students, businessmen and political party leaders to enunciate US

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<sup>255</sup> See “The Fall and Rise of Chilean Democracy: 1973-1989.” Available at the website: [http://www.diplomatshandbook.org/pdf/Handbook\\_Chile.pdf](http://www.diplomatshandbook.org/pdf/Handbook_Chile.pdf)

<sup>256</sup> Ibid

<sup>257</sup> See “Promoting Democracy Through Diplomacy.” *Hearing Before the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress*. Series No. 109-82, May 5, 2005, the website is available at: <http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/archives/109/21022.pdf>; Also, see, for more information, “Smith Hempstone: Rogue ambassador to Kenya,” *The Independent*. December 4, 2006.

<sup>258</sup> See “Smith Hempstone: Rogue ambassador to Kenya,” *The Independent*. December 4, 2006.

<sup>259</sup> Ibid

<sup>260</sup> See “Promoting Democracy Through Diplomacy.” *Hearing Before the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress*. Series No. 109-82. May 5, 2005. The website is available at: <http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/archives/109/21022.pdf>

support for democratic development, while urging President Akayev publically to respect the international commitment of Kyrgyzstan to democratic reforms.<sup>261</sup>

Fifth, along with many other US officials, Michael Armacost, the US Ambassador to the Philippines helped to democratize the Philippines under autocrat Marcos's rule (Adesnik and McFaul, 2006:12). Armacost worked with the opposition against the autocratic regime, while standing with the Pilipino people rather than Marcos. For example, Armacost attended Aquino's funeral in September 1983, even though Marcos instructed him not to go (Adesnik and McFaul, 2006:22).

When considering the examples above, we can see how diplomats can have a great impact on democratization in non-democratic states, and we may even think that embassies can be recognized as 'islands of freedom,' which could be seen in Budapest, Moscow and Bucharest in 1985 when many dissidents were accustomed to ardently going to the embassy because they knew that the ambassador would stand with them.<sup>262</sup> Also, more importantly, we can clearly see the role of diplomats as "a delicate kind of engagement to promote democracy" especially in countries ruled by dictatorship (Adesnik and Mcfaul, 2006:8). Overall, we can easily observe that diplomacy has greatly contributed to democratic development across international society. Due to, in large part, diplomatic efforts for democracy, today we see an increased number of democratic states in ever-growing international society, especially when considering that the last decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and the first decades of the

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<sup>261</sup> Ibid

<sup>262</sup> See "Promoting Democracy Through Diplomacy." *Hearing Before the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress*. Series No. 109-82. May 5, 2005. The website is available at: <http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/archives/109/21022.pdf>

21<sup>st</sup> century can be called an era of liberty.<sup>263</sup> This has not only brought about certain countries' national interests, but also the common good of international society in the long run, as democratic peace theory emphasizes. Therefore, as Condoleezza Rice implied, the promotion and consolidation of democracy via diplomacy across international society might be very difficult and might take a very long period of time, but we should not forget that what is certain is "democracy is always worth it."<sup>264</sup> To sum up, diplomacy has greatly contributed to the promotion and consolidation of democracy across international society and so democracy has slowly but steadily become the post-Cold war and 21<sup>st</sup> century new standard of civilization and the new wave expansion of international society. Nonetheless, in turn, the more democratization across international society has occurred, the more different kinds of diplomacy have been adopted to promote and consolidate democracy across international society. In other words, initially, few states like the US started using diplomacy for promoting and consolidating democracy across international society as their aims of foreign policy, but as democracy has been gradually predominant in international society in the post-Cold War era and the 21<sup>st</sup> century, many kinds of diplomacy have been used for democratization across international society, which has boosted up the long-terms common interests or the well-being of international society as a whole. In short, the more democratic states have appeared in international society, the more different kinds of diplomacy have been adopted to promote and consolidate democracy across international society, as in this chapter I try to show as many kinds of diplomacy as possible for democratization across international society.

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<sup>263</sup> See "Rice tells senators 'the time for diplomacy is now,'" *International TV*, January, 19, 2005. The website is available at: <http://www.internationaltv.com/ansub/Daily/Day/050119/2005011901.html>

<sup>264</sup> Condoleezza Rice (2006).

Below, through three cases, China, South Korea and Iraq, I will demonstrate how relatively different kinds of diplomacy have variously promoted and consolidated democracy on the base of relatively different kinds of circumstances: a pluralist international society, a solidarist international society and a liberal anti-pluralist international society.

### ***3> Case Studies for Diplomacy and Democracy***

#### **a> Diplomacy and China's Democratic Development**

China had been one of late-comers to the world of international diplomacy, and its eventual adoption of established diplomatic procedures had been slow and often difficult process, sometimes at great personal danger, in particular when considering that Mao rejected the rules of the international system and even sought to overthrow it, in pursuit of change via revolution, along with his harsh rhetoric against Great Powers - especially the US - while choosing relative isolation and economic autarky (Otte, 2001:129).<sup>265</sup>

However, Chinese diplomacy has been rapidly changed since the late 1970s. In 1978, Deng Xiaoping's four modernization policies could push China to lean toward the West, and he initiated China's first major diplomatic transformation by launching the reform and opening movement, while promoting China's engagement with international society via its increasing participation in intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, in particular financial ones.<sup>266</sup> Its current numerous diplomatic relations across international society are hard to miss. In fact, the number

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<sup>265</sup> Also See Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel (2003).

<sup>266</sup> Nevertheless, Deng's diplomatic transformation was still only partial, in particular considering that Deng feared multilateral institutions which, as for Deng, could be used to constrain and even punish China. See Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel (2003).

of countries establishing diplomatic ties with China has steadily increased, for example, from around 60 countries in 1971 to more than 160 countries currently.<sup>267</sup>

Also, China shares borders with 14 countries: Russia, North Korea, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam. Among them, around ten countries used to or still have territorial disputes with China.<sup>268</sup> And, China is very close to the latent hot spots in international society such as the Korean Peninsula and it has had a strategic competitor, 'Japan' which has been supported by the US – e.g. the US-Japan joint development of theater missile defense systems (TMD).<sup>269</sup> Due to these, for China, diplomacy has been a significant mechanism to guarantee its security and sovereignty, let alone its own economic development and even its responsibility as a potential Great Power, as China's pivotal aims of policy.<sup>270</sup>

In terms of China's character of diplomacy, we come to see pluralistic principles in its practice of diplomacy.<sup>271</sup> China has cherished pluralistic principles,

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<sup>267</sup> See "China's diplomacy enters golden age," *China Daily*, September 11, 2005. The website is available at: [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-09/11/content\\_476769.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-09/11/content_476769.htm)

<sup>268</sup> See Wang Yizhou, "China's Diplomacy for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Balance among three demands," The website is available at: [http://old.iwep.org.cn/chinese/gerenzhuoye/wangyizhou/wenzhang/china\\_deplomacy\\_in\\_21st\\_century.pdf](http://old.iwep.org.cn/chinese/gerenzhuoye/wangyizhou/wenzhang/china_deplomacy_in_21st_century.pdf)

<sup>269</sup> Ibid

<sup>270</sup> There are three demands for China's diplomacy: the demand for economic development; the demand for sovereignty and security; and the demand for responsibility, that is, playing a constructive role in regional and global affairs. See Ingrid d'Hooghe (2007:7). Also see Wang Yizhou, "China's diplomacy for the 21<sup>st</sup> century: Balance among three demands." The website is available at: [http://old.iwep.org.cn/chinese/gerenzhuoye/wangyizhou/wenzhang/china\\_deplomacy\\_in\\_21st\\_century.pdf](http://old.iwep.org.cn/chinese/gerenzhuoye/wangyizhou/wenzhang/china_deplomacy_in_21st_century.pdf). Moreover, see Official Foreign policy statement by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Website is available at: <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt>

<sup>271</sup> Though, as Ingrid d'Hooghe and Allen Carlson mentioned, since the early nineties, Beijing has continuously adjusted and loosened its principles of sovereignty and non-intervention such as Beijing's vote for Resolution 1441 on weapon inspections in Iraq in November 2002, we cannot deny the fact that China's fundamental pluralistic principles do not seem to be altered in the near future. China's diplomacy is still in a large part, based on the guarantee of the rigid concept of sovereignty. See Ingrid d'Hooghe (2007), Allen Carlson (2006), and Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel (2003).

because they best support China's interests, in particular when considering the Opium War and its past unfair treatment by the West. As noted several times in previous chapters, China belongs to a pluralist international society in which the rigid concept of sovereignty, sovereign equality, and the principle of non-intervention in other's internal affairs have been deeply embedded. Due to this position, we see some limits of diplomacy in changing China's identity and character. For example, whenever facing some diplomatic pressure about its poor domestic record of human rights, some Chinese leaders have often said that state sovereignty cannot be undermined under the pretext of international human rights protection (Kent, 1999:153). In short, human rights are principally a matter of state sovereignty (Kent, 1999:154). Also, they often raise Asian values, contending that we should accept different understanding, explanation and purposes of a state human rights, as each state has differences in politics, economy, culture, society, history and religion (Kent, 1999:154). Below is a summary that can help understand why China has cherished even anti-hegemony and principles of a pluralist international society for its justification of rejection of human rights and democracy.

**The diversity of civilization is a basic characteristic of human society.** There are naturally differences among countries or nations in social systems, values, development routes, tradition, religious beliefs and culture. To create a colorful world with different civilizations, all countries must respect each other, exist harmoniously, seek common points while reserving differences and seek common progress. Different histories, cultures, and economic and social systems should be a driving force of mutual supplementation and progress, rather than a source of mutual isolation, hostility and conflicts. Different civilizations can co-exists for and pursue common development by learning from each other. The thinking of not accepting and respecting the diversity of the world and attempting to force its own social system, development methods or values on others are actions of



hegemonism and go opposite to the laws of history. Of the nearly 200 countries in the world that combine to have a population of more than 6 billion, they all have their historical traditions and development patterns. **A uniform framework is impossible to pull them together, erasing their own characteristics.** Undeniably, there may be disputes or even conflicts among different civilizations due to their different values. Such circumstances are not rare, happening in the past and the present, but these could have been prevented. Today, mankind has entered a time where **different civilizations should learn how to coexist in peace, not only to prevent misunderstandings, tension and conflict, but also to seek common prosperity in harmony.** Otherwise, it could only bring about tragedy.<sup>272</sup>

Furthermore, on June 28, 2004, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao said for the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence:

China will firmly safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity, tolerating no one to interfere in its internal affairs. At the same time, the country will respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of others.<sup>273</sup>

In fact, when considering China's diplomatic relations with the third world countries including many repressive regimes like North Korea, Myanmar and Zimbabwe, we can obviously see that China has rarely cared about their form of government and their record of human rights, insisting that its diplomacy has been based on the pluralist principles, which has been mostly welcome to many poor and repressive countries in Africa and in the Middle East, let alone North Korea, Myanmar and Zimbabwe.<sup>274</sup>

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<sup>272</sup> See Pei Yuanying (2004).

<sup>273</sup> See "China will never seek hegemony, said Chinese premier." *People's Daily*. June 28, 2004.

<sup>274</sup> Even someone argues that North Korea, Sudan and Zimbabwe are China's friends and China won't dump its friends, pointing out the fact that they had helped China not only in economic and political arenas. For example, they argue that Burma was one of countries that supported China's cracking down democratic movement in 1989; that Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe was a hero who greatly contributed to the end of British colonial rule; and that there had not been any genocide in Sudan. Nevertheless, their arguments does not sound reasonable and acceptable, in particular considering that China's support for repressive regimes might bring about its short-term interests rather than its long-term interests like a responsible Great Power which maintains the existence of an international society and promotes the well-being of an international society. Also, Myanmar, Iran, North Korea, and Sudan, and Zimbabwe have received small arms and dual-use and conventional weapons technologies from

Chinese themselves have strongly believed that China has shown an absolute respect for sovereignty and independence of other states, irrespective of their size and status in the international system (Kim, 1977:740), and they might even claim that people of each nation should have the right to choose their own state system and way of life without interference from other nations (Shao, 1986:497). All in all, it's clear that China's practice of diplomacy has been deeply embedded in pluralistic principles, such as non-interference in others' internal affairs, with its emphasis on the rigid concept of state sovereignty, which appears to make it hard to influence China's behavior and its perception. Nevertheless, there were some controversial cases to reject Chinese claims, like China's occupation and colonization of Tibet in 1950, China and North Korea's invasion of South Korea in 1950, and China's invasion of Vietnam in 1979.<sup>275</sup>

However, China's obsession with pluralistic principles does not necessarily mean that diplomacy cannot be effective enough to alter not only the behavior of states but also the identity and character of states in a pluralist international society. In other words, it would be wrong to say that diplomacy cannot have any impact on China's identity, character and behavior, like China's democratization in international society, simply because China has been embedded in the principles of a pluralist international society. In fact, as an institution for socialization among states, diplomacy can encourage China to gradually accept human rights and democracy as

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economic and military actors in China, and in particular, China has been the largest arms supplier to Sudan since 2004. Jonathan Fenby, Professor Athar Hussain, Martin Jacques and professor Chen Jian had a debate on "China After the Olympics," in The London School of Economics in December 2008. The website is available at: <http://www.lse.ac.uk/resources/podcasts/publicLecturesAndEvents.htm>. Also see Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Andrew Small (2008).

<sup>275</sup> China's intervention in the Korean War in 1950 is clearly a violation of the sovereign right of Korea, in particular, when considering that the Korean War was a kind of civil war. I do not bother to mention Tibet to demonstrate how hypocritical China's self-claim for its absolute respect of sovereign rights of other countries has been.

universal, as long as the interest- oriented diplomacy can be applied to China, in particular when considering that economic development has been the most cherished goal in China's policy as the source for the legitimization of the rule of Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In this section, thus, I will demonstrate how diplomacy can push China toward human rights and democracy, while revealing how economic diplomacy has had an impact on China's path toward democracy. Nevertheless, at the end, I will briefly touch on political interests such as China's desperate desire for its good membership in international society and for its status as a responsible Great Power, which could influence China's attitude toward human rights and democracy. Overall, in the process, I will emphasize the assumption that interest-oriented diplomacy can directly or indirectly facilitate China's democratic development, as I show that China's behavior, identity and characteristic have been swayed by China's national interest, which can strengthen China's economic development and its status as a potential responsible Great Power in international society.

Economic diplomacy can be defined as "diplomacy which employs economic resources, either as rewards or sanctions, in pursuit of a particular foreign policy objective," even if once again I have to say that diplomacy is more than a simple tool for achieving the goals of foreign policy (Berridge and James, 2003: 91). This economic diplomacy is most likely adopted not only to integrate China into international society, but also to get it to gradually accept human rights and democracy as universal norms and values of international society, albeit economic diplomacy should continuously bring about China's national interest. As for China, economic development is the key to China's success and the basis for the growth of China's comprehensive national power (Soeya, Wang and Welch, 2003:196). Thanks to this, in its diplomacy, China has given great weight to economic consideration (Soeya,

Wang and Welch, 2003:188). Also, now that regional and global stability and peace are the preconditions for China's economic and political interests, China has been more willing than ever to compromise, coordinate and cooperate with other states, especially capitalist democratic states like the US and Japan, and China has become increasingly sensitive to human rights and democracy, as a result of pressure from many democratic countries, in particular the US and Japan (Soeya, Wang and Welch, 2003:201, Kent, 2001 and Fleay, 2008). Moreover, as China has been increasingly financially and politically engaged in international society, and so its economic and political stake has increased, China has been gradually forced to act as a responsible stakeholder, with its contribution to stability and peace in international society, while clearly rejecting its past revisionist position against international society, since Chinese authorities understand well that the continued rise in China's economic clout relies on an atmosphere of cooperation rather than confrontation (Soeya, Wang and Welch, 2003:188). Overall, when considering the above, we can see a bright future for China's democratization, as economic diplomacy can have an impact on China's democratization.

Let us take a look at some examples for economic diplomacy that has influenced China's behavior and its identity and characteristics. First of all, as one of outstanding examples of the impact of economic diplomacy on China, we can see the strong reaction of democratic states against China's crackdown on the democratic movement in 1989. In general, the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 and its aftermath raised a negative image of China across international society, like an international pariah. Democratic states imposed unilateral and bi-lateral sanctions on China after the Tiananmen Square massacre as punishment for the massacre (Kent, 2001:592, Fleay, 2008:237). Also, as the most prominent expression of concern over

human rights abuse, democratic states supported the draft resolutions critical of the Chinese government's human rights practices at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) (Fleay, 2008:238). Among democratic states, as an ardent critic of China's brutal crackdown on democratic movement, the US has used economic sticks and carrots to change China to gradually accept human rights and democracy.<sup>276</sup> The US imposed economic sanctions on China due to China's brutal crackdown on the democratic movement in Tiananmen Square in 1989, along with its support of UN resolutions, and the US was even opposed to China's full membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)(Kent, 2001:592). Beside China's suppression of the democracy movement in 1989, thanks to its missile exports

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<sup>276</sup> When we look at the history of diplomatic relationship between China and the US, we can find that in the past, successive US administrations refused to recognize the communist government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the legitimate government of China, while supporting the claim of the nationalist government of Taiwan to represent all China, which was one of reasons why the PRC could not take its seat in the UN Security Council until 1971. See Jonsson and Hall (2005). In particular under the Eisenhower administration, the US refused its recognition of the PRC and further was in opposition to China's membership of the UN, and even under the Kennedy administration the US had very dark view of China's nuclear development, in the consideration of the joint nuclear attack on China with the Soviet Union in order to destroy China's atomic capacity. See Hsu (2000:720). However, such hostile relationship has been gradually altered since on July 15, 1971, President Richard Nixon declared the dramatic change in Sino-American relations. Under the tutelage of Henry Kissinger, former Harvard professor and expert on diplomacy of the nineteenth century Austrian statesman Clemens von Metternich, who specialized in the balance of power among states and the limited security, President Richard Nixon terminated the policy of containment in pursuit of the establishment of equilibrium between China, the Soviet Union and the US. See Hsu (2000:722). In February 28, 1972, China's Premier, Zhou Enlai's and the US Secretary of States, Henry Kissinger signed the Shanghai Communiqué, which was the milestone for normalizing relations between two countries. This opened to China the great opportunity for the US recognition of PRC, purchase of the US airplanes and scientific instruments and the deterrence against the Soviet possible attack. See Hsu (2000:724). On December 15, 1978, eventually, the US and China established diplomatic relations, while ending around three decades of official estrangement. The official diplomatic relations between the US and China started on January 1, 1979. And, in February, 1979, Deng's visit to the US helped to fabricate the positive Sino-US relations and his observation to the US democracy and modern economy could help shape China's future. See Hsu (2000:795). Since 1979, the diplomatic relationship between two countries has been gradually intensified, and such diplomatic relations between the US and China could gradually transform their identities and characters from enemy to rivalry. Further, China's diplomacy has been outstandingly active, in particular since its outbreak of its post-Tiananmen isolation, because China's leaders came to acknowledge that China could and should play a role in working toward a stable international environment, which can bring out China's national interests in the end. See Ingrid d'Hooghe (2007:7). Also, see Kent (2001). Moreover, See "Thirty Years Later: Normalization of U.S. -China Relations," *Brookings*, December 6, 2008. The website is available at: [http://www.brookings.edu/events/2008/1210\\_China\\_normalization.aspx?p=1](http://www.brookings.edu/events/2008/1210_China_normalization.aspx?p=1)

to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, the US imposed special restrictions on supercomputer and satellite technology exports to China (Wang, 1993a:639).

Eventually, China had to face the diplomatic isolation imposed by democratic states, especially the West, let alone economic loss due to sanctions, following the bloody suppression of the Tiananmen demonstrations in the spring of 1989 (Gill, 2007:3). In terms of China's economic loss, after the Tiananmen Massacre, Chinese government's tight control did not facilitate, but rather hindered economic growth (Cooper and Lee, 1992:37). Also, due to Chinese government's dreadful crackdown on the 1989 Tiananmen Square democratic movement, Chinese people had to suffer from deep reduction or nearly stop in foreign aid and investment in China, let alone a rapid reduction of Western tourists (Cooper and Lee, 1992). As a matter of fact, for China, 1989 had been the worst year in terms of economic growth since the Maoist era, at four percent, and the inflation rate for the same year was 17.8 percent (Cooper and Lee, 1992:42). During 1990, China had to severely suffer economically, due to foreign countries' withdrawal or limited aid and investment and other economic shrinks (Cooper and Lee, 1992: 43). Even owing to the slip in Western tourists' visit in China, in April, 1990, many hotels fell into bankruptcy, let alone considerable layoffs (Cooper and Lee, 1992:45).

Because of this economic meltdown in 1990, the Chinese government made great efforts to repair China's badly tarnished image and diplomatic isolation coming from the Tiananmen Massacre, by adopting lenient policies, like lifting martial law in Beijing and releasing 573 people imprisoned for their participation in the democratic movement in 1989 (Cooper and Lee, 1992:48). Via this difficulty, also, Chinese leaders thoroughly realized that China's cooperative, coordinative and compromising diplomatic relations with other states along with its contribution to peace and stability

in international society were the best way to protect and promote Chinese economic interests and enhance their security.<sup>277</sup>

Eventually, some countries started resuming their economic relations with China during 1990, due to their expectation that China would eventually improve human rights and democracy (Cooper and Lee, 1992:44). Beijing hoped that the lifting of martial law could result in the end of economic sanctions imposed on China (Cooper and Lee, 1992:50). And, in January, 1990, when the Chinese government lifted martial law in Beijing, the US announced that it would start backing China's applications to the World Bank for loans that satisfy basic human needs (Cooper and Lee, 1992:44). On December 4, 1990, the World Bank also lifted some restrictions on loans to China in order to help human needs, and approved a U.S. \$114.3 million loan for technological improvements in rural industry (Cooper and Lee, 1992:46). Nonetheless, the US's gesture did not necessarily mean that the US government forgave and forgot China's misbehaviors. For example, on January 30, 1990, the U.S. Senate voted 98 to 0 on legislation for trade sanctions against China, which should be regarded as a warning and an expression of disapproval of China's human rights record (Cooper and Lee, 1992:44). Also, in September 1991, the US Customs Service announced that the US government blocked imports of spanners, socket wrenches, steel pipes, and other things which were made by Chinese prisoners, probably Chinese political dissidents like students at Tiananmen Square, in labor camps and prisons (Wang, 1993b:451-452). However, surprisingly enough, on August 8, 1992, China even agreed that U.S. inspectors may visit convict-labor facilities in China when evidence is presented regarding the export to the US of

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<sup>277</sup> See Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel (2003).

products made in the prison-labor facilities, which could indirectly contribute to China's improvement of human rights (Wang, 1993b:453). More importantly, even Western human rights delegations were allowed to visit China in July 1991 and in November 1992, and they had informal discussions with Chinese diplomats in Beijing for their relations, which could ultimately lead to some level of improvement in human rights in Chinese perspectives through a process of their mutual education and learning (Kent, 1999:160). All in all, we can say that economic diplomacy has slowly changed China's attitude toward human rights and democracy.

As an impact of economic diplomacy on China's democratization, we cannot dismiss Japan's economic diplomacy on China's democratization. Economic relations between Japan and China involve trade, investment and economic cooperation, though mainly Official Development Assistance/Aid (ODA) (Okano-Heijmans, 2007:29). Japan's development aid to China began in 1979, just after the signing of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and China in 1978 (Okano-Heijmans, 2007:36). Also, in the late 1980s, Japanese investment in China began rapidly increasing. For example, Japanese investments in China totaled \$1.226 billion in 1987, more than five times the amount in 1986 and the number of investment cases increased to 171 in 1988 from 101 in 1987 (Wang, 1993a:630). However, Japan has increasingly used its aid to China, as a diplomatic weapon to counter the aggressive and disruptive behaviors by the Chinese government, even though, due to this, the Chinese government has openly criticized Japan for its using ODA as a tool of economic diplomacy (Okano-Heijmans, 2007:37-38). For instance, Japan condemned China's brutal crackdown of a democratic movement and suspended its aid to China, which was following the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre (Okano-Heijmans, 2007:20, 38). Also, huge Japanese investments in China were dampened



by the Tiananmen Square massacre, such as the suspension of a Japanese loan package valued at ¥ 810 billion (Wang, 1993a:634). And there were many other examples:

the unilateral suspension of grant ODA to China in protest against nuclear tests (August 1995- March 1997); brief postponement of a special loan package by the Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) Foreign Affairs Committee to protest against the increasing number of Chinese naval incursions in Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone (August-October 2000); and delay of the disbursement of the fourth yen loan package following China's military intimidation of Taiwan (March-December 1996).<sup>278</sup>

Moreover, in April 1991, Japan set forth the "Four Principles for ODA" which would determine whether or not a target state could get ODA: "the ratio of military expenditure as percentage of the economy; the procurement of destructive weapons; arms export policy; and the pace of democratization and economic liberalization" (Wang, 1993a:635). Nevertheless, I do not think that these principles were effective enough to push China to accept human rights and democracy, and in fact, we observed that Japan was condemned for its pursuit of selfish economic interests at the expense of high moral principles such as human rights, when in 1990, Japan resumed ODA to China (Wang, 1993a:639). However, in January 1990, Japan's Cabinet Secretary Masumi Moriyama said that the lifting of martial law would be a significant factor in Japan's decision whether or not to start resuming economic assistance to China (Cooper and Lee, 1992:44). And on July 9, 1990, Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu announced that Japan would gradually resume its economic assistance to China, including a loan package which was stopped due to the Tiananmen Massacre, revealing his motivation by saying "China's human rights record is insufficient by our standard, but the loan would encourage political and economic reform." (Cooper and

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<sup>278</sup> See Maaike Okano-Heijmans (2007).

Lee, 1992:45). In early November 1990, due to the same reason, Japan announced approval of \$280 million as economic aid to China (Cooper and Lee, 1992:45). In addition, Japan has used the East Asia Summit (EAS) to contain China and to downplay historical issues, while emphasizing democratic values (Okano-Heijmans, 2007:44). All in all, we cannot deny the fact that Japan's economic diplomacy to China has indirectly or directly pushed China toward human rights and democracy, though in general Japan's adoption of economic diplomacy mostly has not had a big impact on China's behaviors because the amount of most grant aids has been limited and so it was more likely symbolic and political (Okano-Heijmans, 2007:39).

The most-favored nation (MFN) provides another stunning example of the impact of economic diplomacy on China. The MFN trade status for China was one of the key issues in US-China diplomatic relations (Wang, 1993b:441).<sup>279</sup> Via this issue, we can see that economic diplomacy successfully pressed China to gradually accept the norms and values of human rights and democracy as universal (Wang, 1993b:442). Originally in 1979, just after establishing diplomatic relations, the US signed its first trade agreement with the People's Republic of China (PRC), and most importantly, they had the mutual granting of MFN trading status (Wang, 1993b:442). Owing to this MFN, China could enjoy exporting goods to the US at the lowest tariff rates applied to US imports (Wang, 1993b:442). This economic interest was the primary reason why China has desperately sought for its MFN status. Nevertheless, China's MFN status was subject to a list of requirements listed by the U.S. Trade Act of 1974 and to annual renewal by the president in accordance with the Jackson-Vanik

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<sup>279</sup> The Most-Favored Nation (MFN) is reciprocal and is one of the fundamental principles of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In a MFN agreement, participating states guarantee to each other tariff treatment as low as that accorded to any their country. See, for more information, Yangmin Wang (1993b).

Amendment (Wang, 1993b:442). Most importantly, China's MFN has been often used to push China to accept human rights and democracy. Just after the Chinese government's crackdown on June 4, 1989, a number of U.S. legislators proposed that the US administration consider China's human rights record before it issued the required certification for renewing MFN status (Wang, 1993b:442). For instance, as economic diplomacy, on October 18, 1990, the US Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi of California even offered an amendment tying the issue, "the renewing of the MFN trade status for China" to the harassment of Chinese students in the US by agents of the Chinese government (Cooper and Lee, 1992:59). And, US Congressman Solarz mentioned in mid-1991:

The issue of MFN and China involves a particularly complex set of questions. How can the US best promote human rights and democratization in China, as well as a range of strategic and political interests? Where specifically does MFN fit into that calculus? Do we have a better chance of promoting our multiple interests by revoking MFN, by renewing it, or by imposing some sort of conditionality.<sup>280</sup>

Interestingly, former US President George H. W. Bush also mentioned in a commencement address at Yale University, "The most compelling reason to renew MFN and remain engaged in China is not economic, it's not strategic, but moral. It is right to export the ideals of freedom and democracy to China."<sup>281</sup> The Clinton administration also deeply considered China's low record of human rights whenever dealing with China's most-favored-nation (MFN) trade status.<sup>282</sup> In fact, the Clinton administration considered even the withdrawal of China's MFN or nondiscriminatory status in the trade with the US, and in mid-1993, Clinton set additional human rights

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<sup>280</sup> I quoted this from Yangmin Wang (1993b:443).

<sup>281</sup> Ibid. Also, see "President Bush Elaborates on China Policy." *The New York Times*. May 28, 1991.

<sup>282</sup> See Thomas L. Friedman (1994).

conditions for the renewal of China's MFN status in mid-1994.<sup>283</sup> But, the impact of such a move on financial markets had to gnaw at it, and eventually the administration came to support China's MFN trade status, even delinking the MFN renewal from human rights and other conditions.<sup>284</sup> However, the Clinton administration's support of China's MFN could be rooted in the idea that China's deep economic engagement in international society and its rapid economic growth via its engagement could help change China's language and behavior, which would lead to China's gradual acceptance of human rights and democracy as universal norms in the end. All in all, we can see that MFN status could be used to directly and indirectly goad China's gradual acceptance of human rights and democracy.

What is more, between 1990 and 1991, China attempted to influence the debate in the USA about whether to grant MFN trade status to China (Wachman, 2001:272). Nonetheless, China has recognized well that it has not had many cards to move the US, and so China has used the release of prisoners as a political card. Due to the MFN status, as economic diplomacy, on May 10, 1990, the Chinese government released 211 people, mostly intellectuals and students arrested for their connection with the Tiananmen demonstration, but this release was announced only weeks before US President George H. W. Bush's decision to renew the MFN trade status for China (Cooper and Lee, 1992:57). In fact, China released many individuals associated with the demonstrations in Tiananmen Square; martial law was lifted in Beijing; Fang Lizhi – a senior activist in the US embassy as a refugee - was permitted to leave the PRC; Han Dongfang – a labor activist dying in prison – was released; and China offered the

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<sup>283</sup> See Vladimir N. Pregelj (1996).

<sup>284</sup> Ibid. Also see Thomas L. Friedman (1994).

U.S. assurances that it would not prohibit individuals from going abroad for political reason (Wachman, 2001:272). Also, many prisoners were released on the eve of President Clinton's decision about whether to grant MFN status to China in 1993, albeit some of them were jailed again (Wachman, 2001:272). This demonstrates how economic diplomacy can change China's behavior and possibly get China to accept human rights and democracy as universal, though diplomacy should bring about China's economic or political interests. As Ann Kent pointed out, China has become more and more compliant, even if its compliance does not result from internalized, learned behavior, but instead from its adaptation at offering gestures of compliance in exchange for its national interest (Kent, 1999:247; Wachman, 2001:258). This reminds me of Dale C. Copeland's argument that the expectation of future economic gains between nations helps to reduce political tensions and puts off the onset of hostilities (Copeland, 2000). In other words, as long as there are economic benefits and future economic gains via its engagement in international society, China has been most likely to adjust itself to the standards of international society, like human rights and democracy. Therefore, we can say that the more China has become engaged in international society, the more China has adjusted itself to the norms, values and rules of international society, such as, possibly, human rights and democracy, even though its engagement generally originates in its pursuit of political and economic national interests.

However, we should also consider the international order in which China cannot benefit any longer in the future. In this case, most likely, China will attempt to undermine the international economic, political and legal order, with its rapid growing political, economic and military influence, which the US has dominated so

far.<sup>285</sup> Also, as a matter of fact, in 30 or 50 years, let alone in 100 years, if China maintains the speed of the last 20 years in its development and concentrates its efforts on economic construction, China is expected to reach the level of a middle-developed country in per capita average and secure a place among the top three in the world in total aggregates, along with its grasp of the status of Great Power.<sup>286</sup> By then, China might try to build up the new international political and economic order in international society, which might be greatly profitable to China's national interest.<sup>287</sup> Nevertheless, now, China still remains a developing country,<sup>288</sup> not to mention its shortage of smart power (hard power and soft power) to become a Great Power. In fact, on November 2, 2008, China's President Hu Jintao urged world leaders to learn from the global financial crisis and work towards the establishment of a new international financial order that is fair, just, inclusive and orderly.<sup>289</sup> Also, Hu said at the APEC summit in Peru, on November 2, 2008 that Asia Pacific was now an important driving force for global economic growth and would exert increasing influence in the world economy.<sup>290</sup> This clearly indicates that China will challenge the current structure and will build up a new structure which will be more likely to bring

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<sup>285</sup> See Thomas J. Christensen (2008).

<sup>286</sup> See Wang Yizhou, "China's Diplomacy for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Balance among three demands," The website is available at:  
[http://old.iwep.org.cn/chinese/gerenzhuye/wangyizhou/wenzhang/china\\_deplomacy\\_in\\_21st\\_century.pdf](http://old.iwep.org.cn/chinese/gerenzhuye/wangyizhou/wenzhang/china_deplomacy_in_21st_century.pdf)

<sup>287</sup> Ibid

<sup>288</sup> Ibid

<sup>289</sup> See Naomi Mapstone (2008).

<sup>290</sup> Ibid

about China's national interests.<sup>291</sup> This reminds me of Deng Xiaoping's maxim: "*tao guang yang hui*" ("hide one's capabilities and bide one's time") that clearly demonstrates China's desire not only to become a Great Power, but also to change the order of international society (Soeya, Wang and Welch, 2003: 197).

However, China is continuously expected to adjust itself to current international society, while ultimately accepting norms of international society, as long as it can get its substantial national interests in the current international order, and more importantly, as long as China's adaptation to norms of international society brings about more national interest than its rejection against them.<sup>292</sup> Nonetheless, this can help us understand why China will undoubtedly have close diplomatic relationships even with outlaw states, if such diplomatic relationship brings about China's national interests. For instance, China's diplomatic relationships with Sudan and Iran demonstrate China's unconditional and narrow self-interest oriented diplomacy, in particular when considering that in 1996, unlike Western oil companies that pulled out of Sudan due to Sudan's status as a sponsor of terrorism, Chinese companies purchased a 40 percent majority share in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company and since then, they have increased their stakes in Sudan's oil

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<sup>291</sup> This can be confirmed by National Intelligence Council's report "Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World." The website is available at: [http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC\\_2025\\_project.html](http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_2025_project.html), November 2008.

<sup>292</sup> China's interest-oriented diplomacy has been very often observed. For instance, in Sudan, China's stock was approaching \$500 million of which most investment has been for the oil and gas industry, whereas the US's foreign direct investment in Sudan has virtually disappeared. The China National Petroleum Corporation has had active partnership with the Sudanese government's Sudapet, and other multinational oil companies have developed Sudan's oil industry, funding the building of upstream resources, constructing industry infrastructure like the export pipeline and downstream facilities. See Thomas Lum, Christopher M. Blanchard, Nicolas Cook, Kerry Dumbaugh, Susan B. Epstein, Shirley A. Kan, Michael F. Martin, Wayne M. Morrison, Dick K. Nanto, Jim Nichol, Jeremy M. Sharp, Mark P. Sullivan, Bruce Vaughn and Thomas Coipuram (2008:68).

sector.<sup>293</sup> Also, in 2004, Iran was already one of China's primary suppliers of crude oil and even agreed to sell to a Chinese corporation \$20 billion worth of natural gas per year for 25 years.<sup>294</sup> In June, 2009, China National Petroleum signed a \$5 billion deal to develop the South Pars natural gas field in Iran, and in July 2009, Iran invited Chinese companies to participate in a \$ 42.8 billion project to construct seven oil refineries and a 1,019-mile trans-Iran pipeline.<sup>295</sup> Moreover, in August 2009, Tehran and Beijing struck another deal for \$3 billion, that would pave the way for China to help Iran expand two more refineries.<sup>296</sup> All in all, China's economic links to Tehran are growing rapidly, and Iran has built China into one of its largest trading partners, especially when considering that China is estimated to have \$120 billion committed to Iranian gas and oil projects and China has been Iran's biggest oil export market for the past five years, and that in return, Iran has loaded up on imported Chinese machine tools, factory equipment, locomotives and other heavy goods.<sup>297</sup> These examples certainly demonstrate that China's nice gesture like the release of political prisoners is primarily for instrumental interests, like economic and political interests, especially its evasion or at least reduction of international isolation (Risse and Sikkink, 1999: 25). Furthermore, they demonstrate that China tends to put its priority to its national interest over the common good of international society. All in all, we can say that China's diplomacy is primarily driven by well-calculated assessment of self-interests.

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<sup>293</sup> We should also notice that by 2007, China had become the largest trading partner of Iran, North Korea and Sudan and the second-largest of Myanmar and Zimbabwe. See, for more information, Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Andrew Small (2008).

<sup>294</sup> Ibid

<sup>295</sup> See Michael Wines (2009).

<sup>296</sup> Ibid

<sup>297</sup> Ibid



Nonetheless, in calculation of self-interests, China has gradually adopted human rights and democracy, since, overall, its accretion of norms of international society can help China gain long-term national interests, such as its pursuit of Great Power status. Owing to this, as Thomas J. Christensen put it, we can change China's identity and characteristics via diplomacy as a mechanism to shape its choices, in particular by altering its rational calculation on its national interest.<sup>298</sup> In other words, we can say that diplomacy can ultimately contribute to China's gradual acceptance of human rights and democracy as norms and values of international society.

Above, I mentioned that, on and off, China even has a close relationship with outlaw states on the basis of its national interests, especially economic interests. However, we can see as well that due to national interests such as political interest, China often tries to distance itself from outlaw states, particularly when considering its pursuit of status of a responsible Great Power. For example, China has urged North Korea to sit at the negotiating table of the six-party talks and it has persuaded North Korea to completely abandon its nuclear weapons programs, while supporting strong measures in the United Nations.<sup>299</sup> Also, in another nuclear issue, China joined the UN in condemning Iran's nuclear activities by voting for UN Security Council Resolution 1696 in July 2006, declaring that Iran should not obtain nuclear weapons capability, and in December 2006, China even joined the UNSC's unanimous vote in favor of UNSCR 1737, which imposed sanctions under Article 41, Chapter VII on Iran's nuclear program.<sup>300</sup> More importantly, China has condemned a brutal government crackdown on peaceful demonstrators in Myanmar, supporting the

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<sup>298</sup> See Thomas J. Christensen (2008).

<sup>299</sup> Ibid

<sup>300</sup> Ibid

statement from the UN Security Council deploring the junta's use of force against peaceful civilian protestors, and pushing the junta to grant the UN special envoy Ibrahim Gambari access to the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi as well as senior generals.<sup>301</sup> In January 2007, China even called on the regime to listen to the call of its own people and speed up the process of dialogue and reforms, encouraging the junta to use less confrontational language and attitude to international organizations such as the UN, and even Chinese officials made their efforts to reach out to the democratic opposition by hosting its representatives for a meeting in China.<sup>302</sup> Most importantly, the Chinese government has issued public calls for stability, democracy and development in Myanmar.<sup>303</sup> This is not everything. There are many other examples for China's contribution to the existence of international society and well-being of international society, just like China's active participation in the UN peacekeeping operations in many countries: Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Mozambique, Liberia, Sierra Leon, Sudan and West Sahara in Africa<sup>304</sup>; Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo in Europe; Timor-Leste and Afghanistan in Asia; Haiti in the Americas; and Lebanon in the Middle East.<sup>305</sup>

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<sup>301</sup> See Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Andrew Small (2008).

<sup>302</sup> Ibid.

<sup>303</sup> This seems to indicate some change in China's principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of nations, which are usually friendly to China, itself. However, China is still insisting the non-interference as one of primary principles for its foreign policy. See Thomas J. Christensen (2008).

<sup>304</sup> In September 2006, in an interview with the official Xinhua News Agency, Major General Zhang Qinsheng, the Deputy Chief of General Staff for China's People Liberation Army described China's participation in the UN peacekeeping operations, saying "China is a peace-loving country. In addressing grave issues involving international peace and security, we are a responsible country. Peacekeeping is our mission and it is also our fundamental principle.....Chinese peacekeeping activities demonstrate our country's image as a responsible superpower. The quality of our troops is highly praised by international organizations and other countries, (and) in the course of our peacekeeping activities under the UN charter, China sets a glorious example." See Bonny Ling (2007:47-49).

<sup>305</sup> Ibid.

And, as of January 2007, China was contributing 1,861 peacekeepers to twelve UN operations, and today, China ranks twelfth in the total number of troop contributions by country to UN missions.<sup>306</sup> Nevertheless, China has more peacekeepers operating under the UN flag than any other permanent member of the Security Council (Kurlantzick, 2007:230). This can bring about a positive image of China, like a good citizen of international society and a potential responsible Great Power that advocates peace and security in international society, and more importantly, this can alleviate the fears of other countries about China's rapid rise in an international arena, while demonstrating Chinese people's love of peace and Chinese army's importance in safeguarding world peace.<sup>307</sup> Recently, many Chinese politicians and strategists began to openly speak of China as a *fuzeren de daguo* (responsible Great Power), while rejecting the persistent emphasis on China's 150 years of shame and humiliation as the primary lens via which Chinese view their place in modern international affairs (Gill, 2007:6).<sup>308</sup> In fact, due to its economic success, today China has the second largest economy in the world, and it is not any more the victimized developing nation of the Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping eras, but instead it is a slowly emerging potential

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<sup>306</sup> Ibid.

<sup>307</sup> We call this "win-win diplomacy." China's "win-win diplomacy is not only to reduce any fear from China's rapid rise, but also to facilitate China's pursuit of Great Power. A "win-win diplomacy is based on the assumption that China is growing into a Great Power, without any threat to other nations, and advocates a world in which nations do not interfere in other nations' affairs and all countries can benefit China's rise. See Kurlantzick (2007:224-226) and Ling (2007:47-49).

<sup>308</sup> The term *fuzeren de daguo* (responsible great power) emerged in association with Beijing's decision not to devalue its currency during the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, a decision that received widespread praise and appreciation from the region and around the world. See Bates Gill (2007:6). In fact, the US has also given some diplomatic pressure to China to become an open, transparent and responsible power, with its respect of human rights and democracy. For instance, on September 2005, Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick called for China to become a responsible stakeholder in an international society, warning that China's diplomatic relationship with outlaw states would damage its national interests in the long run. See Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Andrew Small (2008).

Great Power, in particular when considering that the successful 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing did not only push China closer to the world,<sup>309</sup> but also, via the Games, China was given a good opportunity to convince the world that China can become a responsible Great Power in the long run, let alone a good citizen of international society, which can satisfy China's great desire for its good membership in international society and for a status of Great power.<sup>310</sup> Among Chinese, today a Great Power mentality has replaced China's victim mentality derived from its loss of the Opium Wars (1839 to 1842 and 1856 to 1860) and the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), and often unfair treatments in international society. As for Chinese, a responsible Great Power indicates the following meanings: "less victimized, less aggrieved, and less alienated," and more actively supporting and operating within international norms and multilateral institutions like the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the ASEAN Regional Forum, etc.(Gill, 2007:6). Due to the above reasons, China becomes more active, more cooperative and more pragmatic than ever before in international society, while Chinese abandon their long-held and reactive "victimhood" complex, put their historical legacy of shame aside, and identify their view with a Great Power mentality befitting China's larger and more secure position in international society (Gill, 2007:7). All in all, China has gradually constrained China's unconditional and narrow self-interest oriented diplomacy, pursuing common goods of international society beyond its own immediate and narrow interests, while it has slowly accepted human rights and democracy as norms of international society. In other words, China's interest-oriented diplomacy can ultimately get China to slowly

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<sup>309</sup> See Li Datong, "The Beijing Olympics: the last award," *Open Democracy: Free thinking for the world*, The website is available at: <http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/the-beijing-olympics-post-match-analysis>

<sup>310</sup> See Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel (2003).

but gradually accept human rights and democracy as norms of international society. Ironically, the more national interests China pursues, the deeper China has to get involved in international society, and the deeper China is engaged in international society for its national interests, the more China has to accept norms of international society, such as human rights and democracy, albeit China has been reluctant to accept those norms.

#### **b) Diplomacy and South Korea's Democratic Development**

South Korea's diplomatic relations with democratic countries, in particular the US and Japan have greatly contributed to South Korea's democratization. There were many examples of democratic states like the US assisting South Korea's democratic development. The Rhee Syngman regime would have never been overthrown without the withdrawal of U.S. support in 1960, and Washington intervened to save the life of Kim Dae Jung, a prominent democracy activist, from the murderous Korean Central Intelligence Agency in the mid-1970s (Kim and Lim, 2007:74). Also, the US helped South Korea's pro-democracy movement during the 1970s through various civil society assistance programs for religious organizations and human rights groups (Kim and Lim, 2007:74). More importantly, when former US President Carter visited South Korea in June 1979, he advised the late South Korea President Park Jung Hee to respect human rights and to return to democracy, and he even pressured Park by tying the withdrawal of the US troops to the improvement of human rights situation in South Korea (Im, 2006:168).<sup>311</sup> Most importantly, the US played a pivotal role in promoting South Korea's 1987 democratization. James Lilly, former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea sought to enhance the statue of the two

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<sup>311</sup> This can be coercive diplomacy in some sense.

opposition leaders, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, and their allies by making it known that they were friends of the embassy (Adesnik and McFaul, 2006:16). With Shultz's active support, Gaston Signur, former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia pushed Chun Doo Hwan to allow the direct election of his successor (Adesnik and McFaul, 2006:16). When South Korea reached the highest point of the riots and Chun considered mobilizing the armed forces to crush dissent, which could have killed hundreds, US President Ronald Reagan called for Chun's restraint to use the armed force and Chun pulled back at the last moment (Adesnik and McFaul, 2006:17). Also, when Gaston Sigur, Assistant Secretary of the State for Asia-Pacific Affairs made a speech before the US Korea Society in New York on February 6, 1987, Sigur sent a cautionary warning to Chun that the US-Korea relations depends on the Chun government's creating a more open and legitimate political system, along with his emphasis on civilizing the government and his urge on the Korean military to concentrate on its primary mission of national defense (Sigur, 1987; Im, 2006:171). Furthermore, Senator Edward Kennedy and others introduced legislation for economic sanctions against South Korea until free and fair elections took place (Im, 2006:172). All of above show how in the past, diplomacy could influence South Korea's democratic development. Since 1987, South Korea has gradually become a stable, prosperous and democratic state with its respect of human rights, and so, South Korea has become a full member of a solidarist international society.

However, South Korea does not stop there, simply enjoying the self-satisfaction with its status as a full member of a solidarist international society. Like many Middle Powers, such as Canada, Norway and Australia, South Korea started diplomatically contributing to the existence and well-being of international society. More specifically, as a Middle Power, South Korea has slowly but increasingly

contributed to the promotion and consolidation of democracy across international society, via its diplomacy which is recognized as Niche diplomacy or Middle Power's diplomacy, as to ultimately help to maintain order and security in international society and promote prosperity in international society. In this section, I will demonstrate that South Korea belongs to the club of the Middle Powers in international society, and will examine how South Korea can facilitate the promotion and consolidation of democracy across international society via its distinguishing diplomacy. Nevertheless, before that, I will define the Middle power and Niche diplomacy, while showing how a Middle Power has used its Niche diplomacy to help to maintain international society and promote the well-being of international society, albeit any Middle Power cannot be comparable to a Great Power as an institution which governs whole international society.<sup>312</sup> In this section, we will ultimately examine how as an institution, Niche diplomacy can help to govern international society, with its contribution to the existence of international society and to the promotion of well-being of international society, let alone the promotion and consolidation of democracy across international society.

First of all, I will start with the definition of the Middle Power (traditional concept) and that of Niche diplomacy. First, though it is very difficult to satisfactorily define Middle Power, we can simply define Middle Power as a power that is neither great nor small, but fits somewhere between the two on the basis of some criteria such as physical capability (land mass, geographic position, natural resources, etc.), military capability (armed forces, technology, leadership, national character, etc.), and economic capability (gross national product, labor, education, etc.)

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<sup>312</sup> In this chapter, I do not touch on the roles of Great Powers, but in Chapter IV, I fully focus on the roles of Great Powers as an institution to govern international society. Please see Chapter IV.

(Holbraad, 1984:2, Robertson, 2007:152). In short, Middle Powers can be understood as states that are neither great nor small in terms of international power, capacity and influence.

Second, Middle Powers are more likely to support Great Powers' order, norms and values than to challenge them as revisionists, since they are interested in the top-down dissemination of hegemonic values and practices, and they are interested in how their conformity with the international standards of hegemonic order provides domestic legitimacy (Jordaan, 2003:174). In other words, in general, Middle Powers accept and support the norms and practices of the hegemon and the world order it seeks to impose by a strategy, and so it is ok to even say that Middle Powers are generally royal followers of Great Powers, particularly in security urgent cases (Jordaan, 2003:173-174). Gerry Simpson points out this hierarchical relationship, by saying, "the Great Powers made the law and the middle powers signed the resulting treaty. The smaller powers, meanwhile were erased from consideration"(Simpson, 2004:112). Due to this, currently, in international society in which democracy has been gradually accepted as a universal principle, we can understand why traditional Middle Powers are stable democracies and why they tend to promote liberal democracy across international society (Jordaan, 2003:171). We can also understand that the state cannot be seen as a Middle Power, if any state deviates from hegemonic orthodoxy such as democratic norms as well as human rights, although it has enough hard power to be called a Middle Power (Jordaan, 2003:167). In other words, if states are not democratic, rejecting human rights and democracy in the current international society, albeit they are between Great Powers and Small Powers in terms of hard power, we should not think of them as Middle Powers. For example, when considering this characteristic of the Middle Power, Iran, let alone North Korea,



Myanmar, or Zimbabwe, cannot be recognized as a Middle Power, even if Iran has been recognized as a regional power in the Middle East since in the region, except for Israel, no state can match Iran in terms of hard power. All in all, in lieu of revisionist powers, as ardent followers to Great Powers, Middle Powers play a supporting role in a hegemonic order, as they advocate the norms, values, rules, and practices of Great Powers, and so eventually such hegemonic order appears as a universal national order (Cox, 1989:825-826). Nonetheless, I have to say that on and off, Middle Powers adopt their own independent and different policies from Great Powers' policies, which is one of characteristics of Middle Powers as well.<sup>313</sup> In general, Middle Powers tend to support Great Powers' general management in affairs in international society, and in particular during periods of heightened security tension, Middle Powers tend to align themselves to Great Powers' policies, but during periods of lower security tension, the Middle Powers are highly likely to pursue independent policies that can be different from Great Powers' policies.<sup>314</sup> For example, throughout the Cold War era, most Middle Powers had been ardent followers to Great Powers, such as the US, since they had faced great threats from communist countries, like the Soviet Union, but during the post-Cold War era, Middle Powers are more likely to adopt their independent policies, even often challenging Great Powers' policies than ever, since there is no immediate and major threat to them any more.<sup>315</sup>

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<sup>313</sup> Many scholars like Kenneth Waltz in international relations tend to disregard the role of the Middle Powers in international society, but we cannot completely disregard the importance of the Middle Powers in an international society in order to grasp the whole international society more accurately, in particular when considering that the Middle Powers are not simple followers all the time and on and off they play independent roles in an international society. For example, the Middle Powers might be good mediators, since they can be regarded as virtuous and trustworthy - at least, they do not seek for political and military dominance. See Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal (1993).

<sup>314</sup> See Jeffrey Robertson (2008).

<sup>315</sup> Ibid.

Third, Middle Powers generally bring about not only their national interests, but also the common good in international society via their distinguishing diplomacy (Hamill and Lee, 2001:34). As a matter of fact, Middle Powers think of themselves as even “a helpful fixer, honest broker or peacemaker” (Henrikson, 1997: 49). And, we can often see that Middle Powers such as Australia and Canada have contributed to the welling-being of international society via foreign aid and peacekeeping operations, while helping to promote cohesion, stability and prosperity in international society (Robertson, 2007:152, Jordaan, 2003:165). In fact, Middle Powers’ self-interest can be located at a deeper and more dispersed level than a Small Power, and so we can often see that the Middle Power tends to interfere in global issues beyond their immediate interests, though Middle Powers interfere far less than Great Powers (Jordaan, 2003:166-167). Because of this, Middle Powers have a good reputation, such as a good international citizen.<sup>316</sup> Also, because Middle Powers can afford to take morally superior positions in the absence of any desire for a world hegemonic position, they have stronger credibility among other Middle Power states and Small Power states, than Great Powers, without any hypocritical, threatening or unduly self-interested behavior, and so Middle Powers may even have better diplomatic footwork than Great Powers.<sup>317</sup>

Fourth, as indicated above, like middle-range material capability, despite Middle Powers’ contribution to stability and prosperity in international society, I have to say that Middle Powers have obvious limitations in their management of conflicts in international society because of their lack of smart power. Middle Powers do not

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<sup>316</sup> See, for more information concerning the Middle Power, Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal (1993) and Robert W. Cox (1989).

<sup>317</sup> See Tim Dunk and John Mckay (1997).

have enough resources to unilaterally and single-handedly shape global outcomes in any direct manner. Due to this, Middle Powers are most likely to focus on certain issues rather than broad issues, and they are most likely to utilize and assert themselves through international organizations for multilateral cooperation, so as to help to manage affairs and promote prosperity in international society (Jordaan, 2003:169). In particular, when comparing Middle Powers with Great Powers, we notice that Middle Powers benefit from a more focused, narrower international agenda, and correspondingly less responsibility in international security as well as greater freedom to pursue core national interests than Great Powers.<sup>318</sup> Also, international organizations can be seen as the vehicles for diplomacy via which Middle Power can contribute to peace, security and prosperity in international society (Cox, 1989:835-837). Owing to this, we can even say that Middle Powers act as good multilateralists.

All in all, when considering the aforementioned characteristics of a Middle Power, we can possibly say that the Middle Power thesis is regarded as an amendment to a realist perspective on world politics, in particular when considering Kenneth Waltz's view on world politics as politics of great powers and his complete disregard of middle powers and small powers in an international system (Cox, 1989:827). Nonetheless, maybe, Waltz might defend his view on world politics, by saying "Denmark doesn't matter... Sure people in Luxembourg have good ideas, but who gives a damn. Luxembourg ain't hegemonic" (Higgott, 1997:35).<sup>319</sup> Also, I have to say that in comparison with Great Powers' management of international society,

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<sup>318</sup> See Jeffrey Robertson (2008).

<sup>319</sup> Kenneth Waltz was so obsessed with the roles of great powers in international management, and so, he came to completely exclude the roles of Middle Powers in international management. See, for more information, Kenneth Waltz (1979), Richard Higgott (1991) and (1997), and Alan K. Henrikson (1997:49).

Middle Powers' can be nothing, even if Middle Powers' roles in management of international society are noticeable enough in international society.

Let us turn to the definition of Niche diplomacy. Niche diplomacy was given its name by Gareth John Evans, Australian politician who served as Attorney-General and Foreign Minister of Australia during the Hawke and Keating Labor governments (Henrikson, 2005a: 67).<sup>320</sup> Due to the above distinguishing aspects of Middle Powers, they have practiced their own distinguishing diplomacy. Such Middle Powers' diplomacy has been called Niche diplomacy. As Alan K. Henrikson put it, Niche diplomacy has usually been fully developed by countries with sufficient size and capacity so as to play notable roles in international society, even if they are not strong enough to impose their positions or solutions (Henrikson, 2005a:67). In general, as Middle Power's diplomacy, Niche diplomacy can be understood as an instrument to concentrate Middle Powers' own limited resources in specific areas best able to generate returns worth having, rather than trying to cover the field (Evans and Grant, 1995:323; Cooper, 1997:5). In other words, as implied above, now that Middle Powers do not have enough material capabilities to cover as many issues as Great Powers, they tend to select some issues and focus on them with their own limited capabilities. However, as we can extrapolate positive aspects of Niche diplomacy from the characteristics of Middle Powers, Niche diplomacy has been known as an international good citizens' tool, since it has been adopted to boost up common goods in international society, via various ways, such as 'mediation,' 'peacekeeping operation,' 'humanitarian aid,' or 'promotion and consolidation of human rights and democracy.' In short, we can conclude that, as Middle Powers' diplomacy, Niche

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<sup>320</sup> See "Gareth Evans." *Wikipedia*. The website is available at: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gareth\\_Evans\\_\(politician\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gareth_Evans_(politician))

diplomacy has been used to contribute to the well-being of international society beyond Middle Powers' own national interests.<sup>321</sup>

From now on, in consideration of the characteristics of Middle Powers and those of Niche diplomacy, I will demonstrate that as a Middle Power, South Korea has contributed to the order and prosperity of international society, while promoting human rights and democracy in international society, via its Niche diplomacy. When considering characteristics of traditional Middle Powers, we can say that South Korea can be put into the category of traditional Middle Powers. South Korea's population is 48,754,657 as the 26<sup>th</sup> rank in the world (July 2011 est.),<sup>322</sup> and its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is \$ 787.627 billion (2005 est.) (Robertson, 2007:155). South Korea is a member of the economic club of developed nations, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and around a \$ 20,000 per capita income country (2004 est.), let alone the thirteenth largest economy in the world and the fourth largest economy in Asia.<sup>323</sup> South Korea is a member of the G-20, which brings together finance ministers and central bank governors of systemically important countries within the Bretton Woods System,<sup>324</sup> and more surprisingly it took over the

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<sup>321</sup> We can find some examples for Middle Powers' contribution to the well-being of international society, like Norway's contribution to the Middle East - the Oslo process. We can name several Middle Powers which have boosted up common goods in international society, such as Canada, Australia, Norway, South Africa and so on. See, for more information, Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgot and Kim Richard Nossal (1993), Evan H. Potter (1996/1997), Alan K. Henrikson (2005a), and James Hamill and Donna Lee (2001).

<sup>322</sup> See "East & Southeast Asia: Korea, South." *Central Intelligence Agency: the World Factbook*. The website is available at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ks.html>

<sup>323</sup> In 1996, South Korea became a member of OECD, which means that South Korea reached the status of developed countries; Victor Cha made his speech on "South Korea's Democracy and Diplomacy" at the Brookings Institution: Center For Northeast Asian Policy Studies on March 23, 2004.

<sup>324</sup> See Jeffrey Robertson (2008).

presidency of the G20 in 2010.<sup>325</sup> South Korea's military expenditure is \$16.4 billion, ranking eleventh in the world (2005 est.) (Robertson, 2007:155), and its military is recognized as the tenth strongest military power in the world military rank, with its fifth rank in terms of the world ground force and with its tenth rank in terms of the world air force.<sup>326</sup> Thus, when considering its physical, economic and military capability, South Korea is strong enough to be classified as a Middle Power, and in fact it even outranks many Middle Powers (Robertson, 2007:156).

However, I often notice that there are some arguments that South Korea's behavior is not enough to satisfy the criteria for the status as a Middle Power (Robertson, 2007:153-155). However, I can demonstrate that South Korea is no longer an emerging Middle Power, but a traditional Middle Power (Robertson, 2007:154-155).<sup>327</sup> For instance, in 2007, South Korea's official development assistance (ODA), for the construction of roads, ports and vital social service infrastructure in poor countries, amounted to US\$ 672 million, as the 19<sup>th</sup> rank in terms of international assistance among the 30 OECD members states, excluding

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<sup>325</sup> See "South Korea To Help Forge Global G20 Improvement Plan." The website is available at: <http://www.zibb.com/article/4389554/SOUTH+KOREA+TO+HELP+FORGE+GLOBAL+G20+IMPROVEMENT+PLAN>

<sup>326</sup> See "World Military Rankings – Strongest Armies." *Canadian University Forum*. The website is available at: <http://www.univforum.com/canadian-universities/viewtopic.php?p=51857>

<sup>327</sup> Robertson defines emerging middle powers, saying "emerging middle powers are less stable democracies, having emerging from authoritarian, or one party rule, with the end of the Cold War. They have greater levels of social inequality and less established socio-political values. Emerging middle powers are not as integrated into the world economy and can be on its periphery. With the combination of social inequality and less integration into the world economy, emerging middle powers have relatively less interest in the maintenance of the status quo." Because in the above, I already described the characters of the traditional middle power, I won't say them in detail here. Nonetheless, I can make a summary on the traditional middle power, with the following: stable social democracy; a high level of social equality (in particular under Rho Moo Hyun's regime); established socio-political values; the core of the world economy with the majority of citizens highly integrated into the world economy; and a vast interest in the maintenance of the status quo. See Jeffrey Robertson (2007).

Mexico and Turkey, and as 27<sup>th</sup> in terms of the ODA ratio of gross national income.<sup>328</sup> And, South Korea has actively participated in the UN peacekeeping operations in various countries like East Timor, Lebanon, Somalia, Angola and Western Sahara, not to mention the India-Pakistan border and Georgia as military observing missions.<sup>329</sup> Indeed, it plans to even expand its troop participation in the United Nations peacekeeping operations to over one thousand from the current 400.<sup>330</sup>

Moreover, in August 2004, South Korea dispatched 3,400 troops (Zaytun Division and Daiman Unit) to Iraq in a peace-keeping operation, and in 2002, it sent 60 medics from the Dongui Medical Unit and 150 engineers from the Dasan Engineering Unit to Afghanistan to aid in the reconstruction effort.<sup>331</sup> And, the South Korean government approved a plan to provide 56 billion won as part of its measure to expand reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, such as building a hospital, a job training facility and a taekwondo instruction center, while sending 100 ambulances and 300 police patrol motorcycles to Afghanistan by July 2009.<sup>332</sup> Also, on October 30th 2009, South Korea announced a plan to send out hundreds of troops and police to

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<sup>328</sup> See “S. Korea’s aid to underdeveloped countries jumps in 2007.” *Yon-Yonhap News Agency of Korea*. April 8, 2008. The website is available at: [http://www.accessmylibrary.com/comsite5/bin/aml\\_landing\\_tt.pl?purchase\\_type=ITM&item\\_id=0286-34276635&action=print&page=aml\\_article\\_print](http://www.accessmylibrary.com/comsite5/bin/aml_landing_tt.pl?purchase_type=ITM&item_id=0286-34276635&action=print&page=aml_article_print)

<sup>329</sup> See “Military of South Korea: UN peacekeeping operations.” *Wikipedia*. The website is available at: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military\\_of\\_South\\_Korea](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_of_South_Korea)

<sup>330</sup> See “Government to Expand Peacekeeping Efforts.” *KBS Global*. December 31, 2009. The website is available at [http://english.kbs.co.kr/News/News/News\\_view.html?No=69283&id=Po](http://english.kbs.co.kr/News/News/News_view.html?No=69283&id=Po)

<sup>331</sup> See “Military of South Korea: Peace-keeping operations in Iraq, and Reconstruction in Afghanistan.” The website is available at: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military\\_of\\_South\\_Korea](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_of_South_Korea)

<sup>332</sup> See “Gov’t Approves 56 Bln Won for Afghan Reconstruction.” *KBS Global*. May 5, 2009. The website is available at: [http://english.kbs.co.kr/News/News/News\\_print.html?No=63292&id=Po&prn=Y](http://english.kbs.co.kr/News/News/News_print.html?No=63292&id=Po&prn=Y)

Afghanistan with the mission of the protection of its civilian aid workers there.<sup>333</sup> More importantly, President Lee Myung-bak revealed a “New Asia Initiative” in Jakarta, Indonesia, on March 8, 2009, which indicates that South Korea will play a critical role in representing the interest of Asian nations in the international arena.<sup>334</sup> This does not only indicate that South Korea deeply cares about the entire Asian region beyond Northeast Asia, but also that the scope of cooperation will be extended from economy to security, culture, energy and other sectors (Zhu, 2009). Under such initiative, the key point is that, as a good model for less developed Asian nations in economic development and democratization, South Korea has a goal to speak for Asian nations in the international arena, while playing a leading role in resolving transnational problems like the financial crisis and climate change, which can greatly contribute to peace and prosperity throughout Asia (Zhu, 2009). All in all, the above clearly shows how South Korea has contributed to peace, security and prosperity in international society as the precondition for promotion of democracy across international society.

South Korea has been actively engaged in international organizations in its pursuit of multilateral solutions to problems in international society, which demonstrates that as a Middle Power, South Korea has enough diplomatic energy, creativity and agility to even outmaneuver some major powers (Robertson, 2007:172). For example, during the late 1990s, the Kim Dae Jung administration made the significant efforts to effectively position South Korea as a key diplomatic instigator of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Plus Three processes (Robertson,

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<sup>333</sup> See “S. Korea to Send Troops to Afghanistan to Protect Aid Workers.” *The Seoul Times*. November 2, 2009.

<sup>334</sup> See “President announces New Asia Initiative.” *Korea.net Gateway to Korea*. The website is available at: [http://www.korea.net/news/issues/issueDetailView.asp?board\\_no=20334](http://www.korea.net/news/issues/issueDetailView.asp?board_no=20334)



2007:172). Also, South Korea has had a special relation with ASEAN via S.Korea-ASEAN Special Summit.<sup>335</sup> For instance, at the South Korea-ASEAN Special Summit in 2009, South Korea and ASEAN agreed to expand bilateral trade volume to \$150 billion, and more importantly South Korea agreed to increase its official development assistance (ODA) for ASEAN countries by \$400 million.<sup>336</sup> Also, at the summit, President Lee Myung-bak said that South Korea would provide \$200 million in assistance to ASEAN countries via the East Asia Climate Partnership Agency to help them address climate change.<sup>337</sup> This clearly helped South Korea to solidify its status as a Middle Power. And, when looking at the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), we can notice that South Korea has gradually gained a leadership role in inter-regional organizations (Park, 2000: 78). For instance, from October 19 to 21, 2000, Seoul hosted the third ASEM, which demonstrated South Korea's leadership role in inter-regional cooperation.<sup>338</sup> At the ASEM summit on October 24, 2008, President Lee vigorously called for concerted global efforts to combat the financial crisis, while endorsing the free market economy but opposing protectionist trade policies.<sup>339</sup> Also, at the ASEM summit in Beijing on October 25, 2008, South Korean President Lee

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<sup>335</sup> ASEAN consists of Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Brunei, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam and Cambodia.

<sup>336</sup> See "S. Korea-ASEAN Special Summit ends." *KBS Global*. June 2, 2009. The Website is available at: [http://english.kbs.co.kr/News/News/News\\_view.html?No=63959&id=Po](http://english.kbs.co.kr/News/News/News_view.html?No=63959&id=Po)

<sup>337</sup> Ibid

<sup>338</sup> See, for more information, "The Third Asia-Europe Meeting in Seoul (October 19-21,2000)," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*. The website is available at: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/asem/asem3/index.html>

<sup>339</sup> See "Widens role in fighting crisis through ASEM diplomacy," *Asia Pulse Data Source via COMTEX*. The website is available at: <http://www.zibb.com/article/4240185/ROUNDUP+Lee+widens+role+in+fighting+crisis+through+ASEM+diplomacy>

Myung-bak asked Asian and European leaders to actively endorse his policy bid to denuclearize North Korea via the stimulation of various inter-Korean economic cooperation projects.<sup>340</sup> In addition, by 1997, South Korea had played an instrumental role in the development of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, and as a member of APEC, South Korea has contributed to international economic cooperation.<sup>341</sup> At the 16<sup>th</sup> APEC summit in Lima, Peru on November 23, 2008, President Lee Myung-bak emphasized the need to boost domestic consumption via increased government spending and reduced taxes, in opposition to trade protectionism, in order to overcome the wide spreading financial crisis.<sup>342</sup> More importantly, South Korea has been very actively engaged in six-party talks, simultaneously using international organizations, like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations Security Council, in pursuit of a multilateral solution to North Korea's nuclear weapons program, while North Korea's nuclear program has clearly posed a serious existential threat not only to South Korea, but also to East Asia and to entire international society.<sup>343</sup> On November 21, 2008, South

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<sup>340</sup> See "Lee Asks for ASEM Support for NK Denuclearization," *The Korea Times*, October 25, 2008.

<sup>341</sup> See Jeffrey Robertson (2008).

<sup>342</sup> See "Pres. Lee Suggests New Ways to Fight Crisis," *KBS Global*, Sunday, November 23, 2008.

<sup>343</sup> Six participating states are China, South Korea, North Korea, the US, Russia and Japan. These talks started due to North Korea's withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003. Often, I personally feel that South Korea should not exclude military action, if necessary, to remove North Korea's nuclear capabilities – under the condition that North Korea does not have nuclear weapons yet and that the cost is not too expensive. North Korea's identity and character have not been changed at all for more than a half century, and I do not expect any change in North Korea via peaceful measures in the future. In fact, North Korea has resisted any kind of change. North Korea launched a long-range missile (April 2009), even if North Korea claimed that it did for a communications satellite, and most problematically, North Korea conducted a second underground nuclear test (May 25, 2009), which clearly demonstrates that North Korea does not have any intention to change its identity and character, as an outlaw state that poses a great existential threat not only to the Korean Peninsula but also to the whole international society. I firmly believe that North Korea is a barbarian and dangerous outlaw state, and so we should treat it differently from other civilized full members of an international society. The use of force should not be excluded in dealing with North Korea, if North Korea does not yet have nuclear weapons but it does not give up nuclear program, and

Korea supported a U.N. committee's resolution to urge North Korea to improve its human rights conditions, which reveals South Korea's unprecedented strong voice for human rights.<sup>344</sup> And on December 19, 2008, South Korea voted for the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly which condemned and called for an immediate end to North Korea's systemic and serious human rights abuses.<sup>345</sup> These examples demonstrate that South Korea seeks multilateral solutions, with its deep engagement in international organizations as a vehicle for diplomacy. Nevertheless, South Korea's pursuit of multilateral solutions does not necessarily mean that South Korea has completely rejected bilateral solutions, such as the 2000 inter-Korean summit between Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Il, which could be seen as one of the positive outcomes of the Sunshine Policy of reconciliation with North Korea (tendency towards compromise).<sup>346</sup>

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if the cost of military action is not too expensive. Civilizing methods, such as gentle and soft talks cannot work for the barbarian criminal. If necessary, we should even kill the criminal for the whole international society (I am not talking about regime change, but about the removal of North Korea on the world map, in particular when considering that North Korea is a part of South Korea). Nevertheless, first of all, we should use coercive diplomacy to deal with North Korea, rather than any other kind of diplomacy – e.g. at least the six party talks with coercive mechanisms – especially when considering that Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine policy and Rho Moo Hyun's Peace and Prosperity policy (gentle and soft talks) only resulted in North Korea's possible possession of nuclear weapons if Robert Gates' remark is correct – North Korea has built several nuclear bombs. See Robert M Gates (2009). Also see Dr. Han Sung-Joo former Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Korea made statement in Singapore, July 26-28, 1993, The Website is available at: <http://www.aseansec.org/4809.htm>

<sup>344</sup>In the past, South Korea was concerned about North Korea's reaction against its criticism on North Korea's human rights violations, such as what if North Korea would reject the Six Party Talks. Thanks to this, South Korea adopted a quiet diplomacy on North Korea's human rights violation. See, for more information, Sook-Jong Lee made a speech on "U.S. Policy toward Japan and Korea in the Second Bush Administration," at the Brooking Institution: Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, January 27, 2005. Also see "UN Committee Passes Resolution on NK Human Rights," *KBS Global*. November 22, 2008.

<sup>345</sup> See "UN Adopts Resolution Condemning NK Human Rights." *KBS Global*. December 19, 2008.

<sup>346</sup> **Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine policy revealed South Korea's independence from the US's North Korea policy**, particularly during George W. Bush's first term in office, which can be explained enough with Bush's remark of "an axis of evil" for North Korea in his State of the Union Address on January 29, 2002. The George W. Bush administration (first term) had taken a decidedly harsh line against North Korea, even revealing its intention to use pre-emptive military force against North Korea, whereas the Kim Dae Jung administration and the Roh Moo Hyun administration had preferred to use a

Most importantly, in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, South Korea has clearly been a stable, prosperous and democratic state as a full member of international society, in particular a solidarist international society, and it has tried to promote human rights and democracy across international society, which does not only facilitate norms and values of Great Powers but also expands the community of democracies in international society. For example, former President Kim Dae Jung had been an ardent supporter for human rights and democracy as universal values, like his support of Aung San Suu Kyi's fight for human rights and democracy in Myanmar and his appeal to the Korean people for peacekeeping operation in East Timor in order to protect human rights (Park, 2000:85). Also, in Warsaw on June 26-28, 2000, with democracy and preservation of human rights as the main policy objectives, seven countries – i.e. South Korea, the U.S., Poland, the Czech Republic, Chile, India and

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peaceful diplomatic method (not even coercive diplomacy) which could be understood as only carrot without stick. At that time, the pivotal point of the disagreement between South Korea and the US in dealing with North Korea was that some of the U.S. options were unthinkable to South Korea mainly because of its geographical proximity to North Korea and also because of some South Koreans' optimistic and sympathetic views of North Korea as a poor brother country. Also, as Robertson put it, the possible cost of re-unification might be still too high for South Korea to bear, ranging from \$ 260 billion to 3.2 trillion, if peaceful reunification is possible, and the cost might make the 1997 financial crisis seem insignificant (2007:159). As the worst case, the military option such as the US –South Korea's pre-emptive strike on North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear facility might escalate into a full scale war whose cost would be extremely high to both North Korea and South Korea like more than 2 million casualties, massive refugee flood, and economic meltdown, even if the US and South Korea would ultimately win the war. Nevertheless, Kim Dae Jung's and Roh Moo Hyun's North Korea policies completely failed, when considering that as Robert Gate put it, North Korea has had several nuclear weapons, let alone North Korea's tests of nuclear devices and missiles in 2006, North Korea's purchase of weapons with money given as financial aid by South Korea, and an incident of a South Korean tourist shot dead by a North Korean soldier in the North's Mt. Kungang on July 11, 2008. By the way, **at this juncture, the important thing is South Korea's independent policy as one of the characteristics of a Middle Power. In other words, South Korea's independent policy on some issues from the US policy should not be misunderstood as anti-American, but as a signal of South Korea's achievement of traditional middle power status. Thus, as Kim and Lim put it, the US should feel proud of its past economic and political contribution to today South Korea's status as a grown-up traditional Middle Power, rather than the US is concerned about South Korea's independent policy (2007:80). The US should be glad to see South Korea's achievement of a traditional middle power and to have South Korea as a grown-up royal follower to the US. All in all, Sunshine policy can be seen as a chance for South Korea to demonstrate its Middle-Power diplomacy.** See, for more information, Jeffrey Robertson (2007) and (2008). Also, see Robert Gate (2009), and Sunhyuk Kim and Wonhyuk Lim (2007). Moreover, see "Korea Rebuilds: from crisis to opportunity." *Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade*. The website is available at: [http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/korea\\_rebuilds/economicpolicies.html](http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/korea_rebuilds/economicpolicies.html)

Mali - came together for the preparation of the first International Conference of the Community of Democracies (Park, 2000:79). And, in 2002, Seoul hosted the second International Conference of the Community of Democracies under the auspices of the Korean NGO network, the Sejong institute and the International Planning Committee composed of an NGO from each of the ten Convening Group Countries.<sup>347</sup> Two hundred fifty NGOs, trade unions, business representatives, political leaders and other practitioners of democracy from 60 countries attended the conference.<sup>348</sup> Its theme was “Democracy: Investing for Peace and Prosperity”, and the attending countries endorsed the Seoul Plan of Action for the continuous development of democracy domestically and the promotion of democracy regionally and globally.<sup>349</sup> Furthermore, the US and South Korea have shared a strong mutual support of democratic promotion and consolidation via diplomacy. For instance, former US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice and former South Korea Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon (current UN Secretary-General) set a dynamic agenda for future discussions within the framework of the strategic consultations, with their emphasis on creative initiatives. The initiatives are documented as follows:

Cooperation and coordination of efforts **to promote freedom, democratic institutions and human rights worldwide**, demonstrated by their successful shared effort in Iraq and Afghanistan; Strengthened cooperation on fighting terrorism, and exerting common efforts for the observance and implementation of international security cooperation regimes

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<sup>347</sup> We should not forget that conference should be recognized as an effective type of diplomacy, even if it cannot be a traditional type of diplomacy. See “Seoul Conference,” *Council for a Community of Democracies*, the website is available at: <http://www.ccd21.org/seoul.htm>

<sup>348</sup> Ibid

<sup>349</sup> See “2002 Seoul Ministerial.” *U.S. Department of State*. The website is available at: <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/c10711.htm>. Also, see “Seoul Plan of Action – Democracy: Investing for Peace and Prosperity.” *U.S. Department of State*. The website is available at <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/15259.htm>

for the prevention of proliferation of weapons of Mass Destruction and Their delivery means; coordination and combination of efforts to develop comprehensive international strategies to fight transnational strategies to fight transnational pandemic disease; **maintaining a strong U.S.-ROK alliance to contribute to peace and stability in Northeast Asia**, leading possibly to an eventual regional multinational mechanism for security cooperation; Developing common approaches to reinforcing peace and stability through multilateral peacekeeping and improved collaboration on crisis responses and disaster management.<sup>350</sup>

Also, via former US President Bill Clinton and former S. Korean President Kim Dae Jung's remarks, we feel the consolidation of the community of democracies.<sup>351</sup> Bill Clinton said, "Your work matters. You help transform nations and end tyranny. You save lives."<sup>352</sup> And Kim Dae Jung said, "Today, the triumph of democracy in Korea is also a victory for the democracy-loving people of America."<sup>353</sup> Further, Clinton mentioned, "there are still people who say that democracy is a luxury people can afford only when times are good. But Korea is proving that democracy can provide the necessary support for action when times are difficult."<sup>354</sup> These remarks demonstrate the consolidation of democracy in South Korea as well as democratic solidarity between South Korea and the US.

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<sup>350</sup> See "U.S.-South Korea Relationship Enters New Era, State says." *U.S. Department of State*. The website is available: <http://tokyo.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-20060123-15.html>

<sup>351</sup> See, for example, "White House, Office of the Press Secretary: Remarks by President Clinton and President Kim Dae Jung of South Korea at Arrival Ceremony," June 9, 1998. The website is available at: <http://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/New/html/19980609-3059.html>. However, I have to say that during the cold war era, as for the US, the protection of S. Korea from the aggression of the North Korea was prior to the promotion of democracy, whenever they collided. See Hyug Baeg Im (2006:162).

<sup>352</sup> See "White House, Office of the Press Secretary: Remarks by President Clinton and President Kim Dae Jung of South Korea at Arrival Ceremony," June 9, 1998. The website is available at: <http://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/New/html/19980609-3059.html>

<sup>353</sup> Ibid.

<sup>354</sup> See "White House, Office of the Press Secretary: Remarks by President Clinton and President Kim Dae-Jung in Exchange of Toasts, Blue House, Seoul, Republic of Korea." November 21, 1998. The website is available at: <http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/Pacific/19981121-25757.html>

All of the above clearly demonstrate how, as a Middle Power, South Korea has played a leading role in proliferating democracy across international society and consolidating a community of democracies. South Korea's promotion and consolidation of democracy across international society have obviously advocated Great Power (the US)'s norms and values as universal values across international society, let alone the expansion of a community of democracies as well as the consolidation of a community of democracies. Also, when considering South Korea's overall achievement as a Middle Power, particularly in development, human rights, democracy, and its contribution to order and prosperity in international society, let alone its promotion and consolidation of human rights and democracy, we can say that South Korea is a good citizen as a full member of international society. Owing to this, South Korea can be regarded as a model country that should be emulated by developing countries, and it can give some hope for the same success to the developing countries (Park, 2000:78).

**c) Diplomacy and Iraq's democratic development**

Saddam's Iraq had belonged to a liberal anti-pluralist international society in which a hierarchical relationship among states can be very clearly seen and even the use of force can be justified, in particular when a target state is an 'outlaw state.' In this environment, coercive diplomacy is the best option to deal with an outlaw state, bearing in mind that the total use of force or war is a last resort against the target state. When considering Saddam's Iraq, we can obviously see how coercive diplomacy was applied to Saddam's Iraq in order to alter its identity and character, let alone its behavior. Nonetheless, overall, such coercive diplomacy failed, as, in March 2003, war as a last resort was adopted to topple Saddam's regime and impose democracy in Iraq.

In this section, I will start by examining coercive diplomacy which reflects a hierarchical power relationship among states. And I will reveal how coercive diplomacy attempted to manage Saddam's Iraq as an outlaw state, so as to examine whether or not coercive diplomacy could have been successful in changing Iraq's behavior, and its identities and character from an outlaw state to a prosperous democratic state. All in all, in this section, I will explore whether or not coercive diplomacy modified Iraq's aggressive behavior, with its attempt to alter Saddam's regime. However, at this juncture, most importantly, we should recognize that coercive diplomacy can be regarded as an institution to maintain international society and promote the well-being of international society. Furthermore, we should conceive diplomacy as one of essential institutions for international society. Nonetheless, as noted above, in Iraq's case, the war was eventually adopted to deal with Saddam's regime, which means that coercive diplomacy was not successful enough to radically alter Saddam's Iraq.

According to Alexander George, coercive diplomacy can be defined as a strategy to "back one's demand on an adversary with a threat of punishment for noncompliance that he will consider credible and potent enough to persuade him to comply with the demand" (George, 1992:4). Coercive diplomacy involves four basic variables: "the demand, the means used for creating a sense of urgency, the threatened punishment for noncompliance, and the possible use of incentives."<sup>355</sup> There are also five types of coercive diplomacy on the basis of differences in basic variables: "the ultimatum, the tacit ultimatum, the try-and-see approach, the gradual turning of the

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<sup>355</sup> See Tanya Glaser, "Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War by Alexander George," *Conflict Research Consortium Book Summary*. The website is available at: <http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/example/geor2638.htm>



screw, and the carrot and stick approach.”<sup>356</sup> The goals of coercive diplomacy, as George put it, are:

to use the threat of force or limited force to persuade an adversary to stop short of the goal of an action currently under way; to persuade the adversary to undo an action already carried out; and to achieve a cessation of the opponent’s hostile behavior through a demand for change in the composition of the adversary’s government or in the nature of the regime (George, 1994:8-9).

In general, when considering coercive diplomacy, we can grasp power relationships or asymmetrical relationships in diplomacy. Due to this, coercive diplomacy can be very often adopted by Great Powers to deal with outlaw states in a liberal anti-pluralist international society, although this does not necessarily mean that every coercive diplomacy is successful.<sup>357</sup> Thus, coercive diplomacy can be seen as a punitive military action against those who violate the norms and values of international society, including the concept of deterrence. In some sense, nonetheless, due to such asymmetrical and coercive aspects, coercive diplomacy can be simply

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<sup>356</sup> The ultimatum is a specific demand, a time limit for compliance, and a credible threat of punishment in the event of non-compliance; a tacit ultimatum is the ultimatum without a specific time limit or threat of punishment, and it relies on the ambiguity to instill fear in its adversary in the hope that the tension of uncertainty will provoke a positive response; the try and see approach is a specific demand without a time limit and a state threat; a gradual turning of the screw is that the coercing state sets forth specific demands but does not define a time limit for compliance. But if its demands are not met, it will step up pressure incrementally until they are; and the carrot and stick approach is to use reward and punishment. See Tanya Glaser, “Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War by Alexander George,” *Conflict Research Consortium Book Summary*. The website is available at: <http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/example/geor2638.htm>. Also, see “The Failure of Coercive Diplomacy.” The website is available at: [ase.tufts.edu/hemispheres/2005/Carlson.doc](http://ase.tufts.edu/hemispheres/2005/Carlson.doc)

<sup>357</sup> There are several examples of coercive diplomacy: for example, in July 1941, the US threatened Japan with an oil embargo unless Japan withdraw from China; in 1961, the US president Kennedy successfully adopted coercive diplomacy for the limited objective of defending the royalist forces in Laos; in the early 1980s, the US applied coercive diplomacy in Nicaragua to limit the influence of Marxist revolutionaries; president Reagan applied coercive diplomacy against Libya in an attempt to end Libyan support of terrorism; and under the Clinton’s administration and Bush’s administration, along with the UK’s and others’ help, coercive diplomacy successfully ended Libya’s WMD programs and terrorism. See, for more information, Bruce Jentleson (2006). Also see Tanya Glaser, “Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War by Alexander George,” *Conflict Research Consortium Book Summary*. The website is available at: <http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/example/geor2638.htm>

understood as “a euphemism for the threat or use of force against an opponent to foster a more cooperative case of mind” (Berridge and James, 2003:40). In other words, coercive diplomacy is aimed at influencing behavior by manipulating the costs and benefits of the policies available to the target not by influencing its capability to carry out certain courses of action.<sup>358</sup> And, as part of the strategy of coercive diplomacy, force is often used to raise the costs of non-compliance.<sup>359</sup> At this juncture, force can be used to achieve either an offensive (aggressive) or defensive (status quo) agenda.<sup>360</sup> At this point, coercive diplomacy is usually defensive in nature, and is an effort to persuade an opponent to stop and/or undo an action it has already embarked upon, whereas blackmail strategies are offensive in nature (George, 1992:5).

However, as one of the important aspects of coercive diplomacy, we should keep it in mind that coercive diplomacy is still diplomacy that embraces ‘negotiation’ and ‘persuasion’ as essential,<sup>361</sup> even if asymmetrical and coercive aspects might appear as dominant aspects of coercive diplomacy, and even coercive diplomacy itself affirms the significance of ‘power’ as an essential element in international society. In other words, we should not reduce coercive diplomacy to the concept of ‘pure power’, like the naked threat of force, and coercive diplomacy still should include the possibility of negotiation, compromise, and accommodation as parts of coercive diplomacy.<sup>362</sup> Nevertheless, we cannot realistically deny the fact that the ultimate

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<sup>358</sup> See Susan B. Martin (2004).

<sup>359</sup> Ibid.

<sup>360</sup> See William S. Captain Langenheim, “First, try coercive diplomacy – Give Peace a Chance,” *Naval War College Review*, available at the website: [http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_m0JIW/is\\_4\\_55/ai\\_95259475/prin...2008-08-27](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JIW/is_4_55/ai_95259475/prin...2008-08-27)

<sup>361</sup> See “The Failure of Coercive Diplomacy.” The website is available at: [ase.tufts.edu/hemispheres/2005/Carlson.doc](http://ase.tufts.edu/hemispheres/2005/Carlson.doc)

<sup>362</sup> See Susan B. Martin (2004).

source of coercive diplomacy is ‘the threat of force.’<sup>363</sup> Also, we should keep it in mind that coercive diplomacy adopts the use of ‘selective and limited force’ rather than ‘unlimited and full-scale use of force’, since any large-scale use of force is a clear failure of coercive diplomacy.<sup>364</sup> Nonetheless, as coercive diplomacy is the threat of use of force to coerce an opponent to undertake an action they do not wish to, coercive diplomacy covers a wide range of instruments from diplomacy to military, including the use of strategic bombing, the use of aerial warfare to strike at targets in an enemy state, and sanctions, in order to convince the enemy state to change its policies (Lang, 2006: 394, Art and Cronin, 2003). However, at this juncture, ‘the unlimited and full-scale use of force’ or ‘war’ indicates the failure of coercive diplomacy, in particular when considering that coercive diplomacy itself is alternative to war.<sup>365</sup>

In consideration of the characteristics of coercive diplomacy, let us take a look at how coercive diplomacy could be applied to Saddam’s Iraq, examining whether coercive diplomacy succeeded or failed. As a prologue to the war, coercive diplomacy was one of the most plausible means to deal with Saddam’s Iraq, with hopes for regime change, since Saddam’s Iraq was a source of regional instability and a danger to the region and international society as a whole, as long as Saddam or his designated heirs remained in power without any radical change, such as their authentic acceptance of human rights and democracy as universal values, which was nearly impossible. Coercive diplomacy seemed to be the most plausible one of diplomacies, especially when considering the potential of a nuclear-armed Saddam Hussein via

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<sup>363</sup> See “The Failure of Coercive Diplomacy.” The website is available at: [ase.tufts.edu/hemispheres/2005/Carlson.doc](http://ase.tufts.edu/hemispheres/2005/Carlson.doc)

<sup>364</sup> Ibid

<sup>365</sup> See Susan B. Martin (2004).

Iraq's continuous pursuit of nuclear weapons; Iraqi link to terrorism including an assassination attempt on former US President George H.W. Bush; Saddam's regime's direct threat to the US citizens as one aspect of Iraq's belligerence toward the US; and the high cost allocated to maintaining the policy of containing Saddam's Iraq, like over eighty billion dollars annually for protecting the southern Gulf states.<sup>366</sup>

However, the Iraq wars (1990-1991 and 2003) seemed to demonstrate how coercive diplomacy failed to stop Saddam's aggressive ambition, let alone its failure to transform the characteristics of the regime as an outlaw state into a decent democratic state. First of all, let us take a look at several reasons for the failure of coercive diplomacy to Saddam's Iraq before the first gulf war. As Iraq's military buildup against Kuwait grew throughout the last two weeks of July in 1990, the Bush administration warned Saddam Hussein about the possibility of US intervention (Schultz, 2001:54). On July 24, 1990, a State Department spokesperson warned Iraq against using coercion and affirmed that the US had a commitment to the individual and collective-defense of our friend in the Gulf with whom we had deep and longstanding ties (Freedman and Karsh, 1993:51-52, Schultz, 2001:54).

However, Iraq's response was to rebuff such a warning. In fact, on July 25, 1990, Saddam called the US Ambassador to his office and told her that he was not scared by the US threats, saying "yours is a society which cannot accept 10,000 dead in one battle" (Schultz, 2001:54). To Saddam, the US operated under constraints against the use of force, which made him more willing to ignore the warning from the US (Schultz, 2001:54). Saddam thoroughly believed that the US could not stomach a

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<sup>366</sup> See William S. Captain Langenheim, "First, try coercive diplomacy – Give Peace a Chance," *Naval War College Review*, available at the website: [http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_m0JIW/is\\_4\\_55/ai\\_95259475/prin...2008-08-27](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JIW/is_4_55/ai_95259475/prin...2008-08-27)

long and costly war, such as the possible casualties of thousands of American soldiers and the supposedly irresolute American public, in order to restore Kuwait's independence, which ultimately shaped much of Saddam's strategy in this crisis and the consequent war (Schultz, 2001:54). Thus, Saddam regarded the US threat as a simple bluff. This is one of primary reasons why coercive diplomacy failed. And, as Alexander George put it, this confirms the idea that the success or failure of a coercive diplomacy is, in large part, determined by the adversary's perception of the coercing power's motivation and commitment, and the adversary's assessment of the credibility and potency of its threat.<sup>367</sup> Also, Saddam was even convinced that he had to stand up to the US and that Iraqi victory was by no means impossible.<sup>368</sup> Saddam might have believed in the assumption that in the Arab world, having the courage to fight a superior foe can bring political victory, despite a military defeat.<sup>369</sup> This is another primary reason for the failure of coercive diplomacy. Furthermore, because Saddam was intoxicated by the elixir of power and the acclaim of the Palestinians and the radical Arab masses, Saddam might have been on a euphoric high and optimistically overestimated his chances to win the war.<sup>370</sup> Due to these, Saddam might not change his confrontation against the US, even though in retrospect, his judgement was completely wrong. This ultimately led to the failure of coercive diplomacy.

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<sup>367</sup> See Tanya Glaser, "Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War by Alexander George." *Conflict Research Consortium Book Summary*. Available at the website: <http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/example/geor2638.htm>

<sup>368</sup> See William S. Captain Langenheim, "First, try coercive diplomacy – Give Peace a Chance." *Naval War College Review*. Available at the website: [http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_m0JIW/is\\_4\\_55/ai\\_95259475/prin...2008-08-27](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JIW/is_4_55/ai_95259475/prin...2008-08-27)

<sup>369</sup> Ibid

<sup>370</sup> Ibid

Shortly after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the US had attempted to induce Saddam to stop or undo one form of undesirable behavior.<sup>371</sup> US President George H.W. Bush started deploying US army, navy, marine corps, air force and coast guard units to Saudi Arabia, while building the US-led coalition forces.<sup>372</sup> The international community requested Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait; on 2 August, 1990, SCR 660 demanded Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal; four days later SCR 661 froze Iraqi assets and put in place comprehensive economic sanctions until Iraq withdrew; and finally, SCR 678 of 29 November issued an ultimatum, demanding that Iraq withdraw no later than 15 January 1991 and authorizing after that date 'all means necessary' to compel compliance.<sup>373</sup> President Bush stood before Congress in January 1991, declaring "the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait will not stand" (Schultz, 2001:43). On January 9, 1991, Secretary of State James A. Baker III met Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, and attempted to deliver a letter of warning from George H.W. Bush to Saddam Hussein (Alterman, 2003:281). The letter said "what is at issue here is not the future of Kuwait-it will be free, its government will be restored – but rather the future of Iraq....Iraq cannot and will not be able to hold on to Kuwait or exact a price for leaving" (Alterman, 2003:281). Also, former Secretary of State James A. Baker III explicitly mentioned in his memoirs that the U.S. government's actions in August 1990 were intended to deter an Iraqi move into Saudi Arabia and to undo Iraq's invasion of Kuwait by the pursuit of a

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<sup>371</sup> Ibid

<sup>372</sup> See "Gulf War." *From Wikipedia*, available at the website: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gulf\\_War](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gulf_War)

<sup>373</sup> We can see several variations of coercive diplomacy, such as the try-and-see method, the gradual turning of the screw and an ultimatum, notwithstanding the carrot-and-stick approach was not seen because no reward for aggression could work. See William S. Captain Langenheim, "First, try coercive diplomacy – Give Peace a Chance." *Naval War College Review*. The website is available at: [http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_m0JIW/is\\_4\\_55/ai\\_95259475/prin...2008-08-27](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JIW/is_4_55/ai_95259475/prin...2008-08-27)

policy of coercive diplomacy against Saddam Hussein, while increasing economic pressure and later military pressure such as gradually increasing American troop strength in the Gulf.<sup>374</sup> Also, on January 12, 1991, the US Congress authorized the use of military force to drive Iraq out of Kuwait, with 52-47 votes in the Senate and 250-183 votes in the House of Representatives.<sup>375</sup> At that time, many leaders, particularly American leaders in a coalition of states expected that war was the most likely and necessary option to drive Iraqi forces out of Kuwait.<sup>376</sup> All in all, as application of coercive diplomacy to Iraq, the demands to Iraq were clear, and the threat was direct, credible and potent (Alterman, 2003:281).

However, even just before the first gulf war, Saddam did not make any move to withdraw his troops from Kuwait, while raising pan-Arab and pan-Islamic symbols and preparing Iraq for war, not to mention his dealing with Fahd and Mubarak by calling for their violent overthrow (Herrmann, 1994:252). Saddam's Iraq did not take the ultimatum seriously, regarding it as a simple bluff. Thus, even at that time, Saddam might not have properly judged the motivation of the US-led coalition.<sup>377</sup> Also, Saddam seemed to believe that Iraq's best chance for political success would come via war, with his huge miscalculation that Arab countries would eventually side with him and war would expand to include Israel (Herrmann, 1994:256). Furthermore, when considering Saddam's character, Saddam's interest in his own survival had trumped the well-being of his country to an overwhelming extent, which

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<sup>374</sup> See Jon B. Alterman (2003:284), and James Addison Baker and Thomas M. DeFrank (1995:277).

<sup>375</sup> See "Gulf War." *From Wikipedia*, available at the website: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gulf\\_War](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gulf_War)

<sup>376</sup> See "The Failure of Coercive Diplomacy," available at the website: [ase.tufts.edu/hemispheres/2005/Carlson.doc](http://ase.tufts.edu/hemispheres/2005/Carlson.doc)

<sup>377</sup> Ibid

was one of the reasons why coercive diplomacy could not work properly (Alterman, 2003:296). Also, in some sense, Saddam might reject the ultimatum since he regarded acceptance of it as humiliating, as incompatible with honor, and as too damaging politically (George and Simons, 1994:276). In other words, to Saddam, any withdrawal from Kuwait might have created a perception of weakness, which he could not afford in his tense, ethnically divided nation.<sup>378</sup> Maybe, from the beginning, Saddam might have believed that the American goal was to remove him from power, which could be, in large part, rooted in his paranoid orientation, although in 1991 former US President George H.W. Bush was clearly opposed to regime change via occupying Iraq, rejecting any policy to divide Iraq into several parts. Nevertheless, I admit that former President George W. Bush had obviously pursued the Iraqi regime change, in particular since the September 11 terrorist attacks. Due to all of these, coercive diplomacy could not properly work for Saddam's withdrawal of his troops from Kuwait. We can say that coercive diplomacy through the use of sanctions might not only completely fail, but also through threatening war, failed to eject Iraq from Kuwait (Herrmann, 1994:257). All in all, as for coercive diplomacy and Saddam's Iraq, we might even easily reach the conclusion that the application of the coercive diplomacy to Saddam's Iraq was the most grievous failure, when considering the ultimate full-scale war between the US-led coalition forces and Saddam's Iraqi forces.

However, I have to say that coercive diplomacy was not a complete failure. There are several reasons why coercive diplomacy had to be adopted at first and it worked in some sense. For example, there were 'legitimacy,' 'a prelude to war (war should be the last resort),' 'prevention of Iraqi further aggression beyond Kuwait as

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<sup>378</sup> Ibid



well as Iran,' 'Iraq's inability to possess nuclear bombs,' and 'Saddam's refrainment from the use of the chemical and biological weapons due to his fear for the US's possible response by using nuclear weapons.'<sup>379</sup> All of these partially demonstrate that coercive diplomacy did not completely fail.

Coercive diplomacy was applied again to Saddam's Iraq after the 1991 Persian Gulf War, in order to change Iraq's identity and characteristics, let alone Saddam's giving up WMD. Operation Vigilant Warrior (1994) could be recognized as a successful application of coercive diplomacy, since it was primarily intended to preempt future Iraqi action, even though it seemed to lie between coercive diplomacy and deterrence (Alterman, 2003:286). In particular, the fact that the US action took place in a relatively confined time frame, the demands were specific, and the threat of force was real (Alterman, 2003:286), helped facilitate successful coercive diplomacy. Let us take a brief look at Operation Vigilant Warrior as a successful example of coercive diplomacy:

On October 5, 1994, US intelligence analysts noted the massing of two Iraqi Republican Guard armored divisions near the Kuwaiti border, numbering some fifty thousand soldiers....The move became public on October 7. In response to the Iraqi troop movement, the US swiftly deployed thousands of troops to the area and began moving tens of thousands more. The UK and France also sent token naval assets to the Gulf. The administration made its move public by leaking it to CNN correspondent Wolf Blitzer on the morning of October 9. The next day Iraq announced that the troops were being withdrawn from the border area.....What is clearer was that the US took the threat seriously and acted to move forces with extreme speed. Because of the forward deployment of so much materiel in the region, a US threat to meet an Iraqi invasion forcefully was credible (Alterman, 2003:286).

As another example of coercive diplomacy, let us take a look at "Operation Desert

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<sup>379</sup> Ibid

Fox” (1998). In general, it was regarded as not completely successful, and it was also widely misunderstood in the West as a pointless exercise, which is rooted in the failure of intelligence in the West.<sup>380</sup> However, via Operation Desert Fox as a good example for coercive diplomacy, we can see that the threat or the limited use of force could compel a state to reverse an action already taken (Lang, 2006:396).

As Iraq suspended its cooperation with UNSCOM in August 1998 and then announced unilaterally in October that all UNSCOM work in Iraq should cease. The inspectors left Iraq on November 9-12. After US warplanes were in the air to bomb Iraq on November 14, Iraq announced that inspectors could return and that the Iraqis would cooperate fully. Inspections resumed on November 18, with a warning that the US and its allies would strike if, in fact, full Iraqi cooperation was not forthcoming. In his report to the Security Council on December 15, UNSCOM chairman Richard Butler noted several instances (out of several hundred inspections) in which the Iraqi did not fully comply with UNSCOM demands. US-British air strikes began shortly after midnight on December 17 and lasted four days, ending just before the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. In all, something like hundred sorties and four hundred missiles strikes were carried out against one hundred or so targets in Iraq (Alterman 2003:289).

There were the six primary targets of Operation Desert Fox:

(1) Iraq’s air defense system; (2) the command and control system that Saddam Hussein uses to direct his military and repress his people; (3) the security forces and facilities to protect and hide his efforts to develop or maintain the deadly chemical and biological weapons; (4) the industrial base that Saddam Hussein uses to sustain and deliver his deadly weapons; (5) the military infrastructure, including the elite Republican Guard forces that pose the biggest threat to his neighbors and protect his weapons of mass destruction program; and (6) airfields and the refineries that produce oil products that Iraq smuggles in violation of economic sanctions (Lang, 2006:397).

As previously mentioned, as a punitive purpose, the US and UK’s military strike against Iraq in December 1998 was a strategic bombing as part of a campaign of

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<sup>380</sup> See Chris Brown (2007:18).

coercive diplomacy (Lang, 2006:395-396).<sup>381</sup> More precisely, on December 17, 1998, Operation Desert Fox was launched by the US and UK's military strike against Iraq, while bombing the sites identified with Iraqi attempts to produce weapons of mass destruction, in order to force Iraqi compliance with specific UN resolutions that banned Iraq's development and possession of WMDs (Lang, 2006:396). In questioning whether or not Operation Desert Fox was successful, we can conclude that the coercive diplomacy was successful. In particular when considering that Saddam had complied with UNSCOM's demands in some cases under specific military threat, we can say that coercive diplomacy was successful (Alterman, 2003:290). Also, in retrospect, as Thomas Ricks put it, Iraqis abandoned their WMD programmes, due to the success of Operation Desert Fox in 1998, when the US and British warplanes bombed the sites where WMDs were being developed, which obviously demonstrates the success of their coercive diplomacy.<sup>382</sup>

Most importantly, in terms of Operation Desert Fox, we can assume some indirect relationship between diplomacy and democracy. When considering that the above primary targets in Operation Desert Fox were not limited to military assets, importantly we can notice that as a punitive military action, the operation was against Iraq's violation of the norms and values of international society, such as 'human rights,' 'democracy,' 'non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,' and 'no

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<sup>381</sup> In fact, there was no explicit Security Council authorization for the use of force. However, these cases can be a showcase for the use of force in international society, in particular when considering the evolutionary nature of international society. Also, at least, someone might argue that President George W. Bush went to the United Nations on September 12, 2002, and Resolution 1441 was passed in November 2002, by a 15-0 vote, which could furnish sufficient justification for the use of force in light of Iraq's clear failure to comply with all of demands. Security Council Resolution 1441 was adopted by the Security Council on November 8, 2002. See S/RES/1441 (2002), available at the website: <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/682/26/PDF/N0268226.pdf?OpenElement>. Also See Colin L. Powell (2004).

<sup>382</sup> See Chris Brown (2007).

aggression,' -Saddam's Iraq violated the human rights of Iraqis, obtaining WMDs and waging wars against its neighboring states, beyond Iraqi in compliance with the UN resolutions (Lang, 2006:397). In fact, this punitive military action could be in part recognized so as to overthrow the regime in the long run (Lang, 2006:397). In particular, when considering "the Iraq Liberation Act of October 1998," just before Operation Desert Fox, which was "the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime," we cannot totally deny that coercive diplomacy could be used as a tool to promote human rights and democracy, even though as coercive diplomacy, the primary purpose of Operation Desert Fox was primarily to degrade Saddam's weapons of mass destruction program (Lang, 2006:396-397).<sup>383</sup> In other words, though coercive diplomacy was not able to directly push Saddam's Iraq toward democracy, it could be seen as a prelude to goad Saddam's Iraq toward democracy, in particular when considering that the US primary aim had been to remove the threat of Iraqi aggression from the region, which eventually resulted in eradicating Saddam as the source of the problem.<sup>384</sup> In short, coercive diplomacy, in the end, was part of a long journey to alter Iraq's regime toward democracy. In fact, after December 1998, the US policy on Iraq demonstrates this point. After December 1998, the US policy was not to coerce the regime in Baghdad but rather to simply get rid of it (Alterman, 2003:276-277). Alterman mentions:

After December 1998, U.S. policy was not to coerce the regime

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<sup>383</sup> The Iraq Liberation Act in October 1998 called for around US\$2 million to support a Radio Free Iraq and US\$97 billion for military aid to opposition groups. See Anthony F. Lang, Jr (2006).

<sup>384</sup> See Captain William S. Langenheim (2002).

in Baghdad but rather to remove it. That month, high-ranking U.S. officials announced that a primary goal of U.S. policy was to achieve regime change in Iraq. Given the repressiveness of the regime at home and its isolation abroad, regime change would seem to represent a death sentence for Baghdad's brutal leaders (Alterman, 2003:276-277).

However, in some sense, I admit that in the Iraq case, diplomacy could not be credited for the promotion and consolidation of democracy, since instead of diplomacy, war turned out to be the primary mechanism to initiate democracy in Iraq.

On March 17, 2003, US President George W. Bush warned "Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours. Their refusal to do so would result in military conflict."<sup>385</sup> This clearly indicated that the US goal was more than Saddam's Iraq's giving up its WMD. However, as for Saddam, even in 2003, the US threat did not seem to be credible, since the US's decision to topple Saddam's regime via its use of force would likely jeopardize relations with its allies including even Kuwait and other strategic partners, which indicated that the US's adoption of the use of force would be too expensive for the US to bear.<sup>386</sup> In fact, Arab states were reluctant to advocate the deposing of Saddam, even disdaining the US strategy to isolate Iraq until the regime collapsed, in particular when considering Iraqi populace's suffering.<sup>387</sup> Owing to these, Saddam might miscalculate that the US threat against his regime could be another simple bluff rather than a credited threat. All in all, coercive diplomacy appeared to fail, and there was no plausible option left to change Saddam's Iraq. As US President George W. Bush put it on May 1, 2003, the US used all the

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<sup>385</sup> See George W. Bush, "President Says Saddam Hussein Must Leave Iraq Within 48 Hours," *The White House*, March 17, 2003, available at the website: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html>

<sup>386</sup> See Captain William S. Langenheim (2002).

<sup>387</sup> Ibid

tools of diplomacy, and as the last resort, only a full- scale war for regime change was left.<sup>388</sup> In other words, we can think that the 2003 Iraq war was destined to happen due to the failure of coercive diplomacy.

However, in retrospect, we cannot say that coercive diplomacy completely failed, but instead we can say that coercive diplomacy was partially successful, particularly when considering that coercive diplomacy can be understood as an effort to ‘persuade an opponent to undo an action’<sup>389</sup> and no one has found any WMDs in Iraq since the US-led coalition forces’ invasion of Iraq in 2003. In other words, Iraq may not have developed WMDs, as an international community requested Iraq to destroy WMDs and to abandon the program of WMD in Iraq, like Security Council Resolution 1441 on November 8, 2002 which was the final opportunity for Iraq to comply with its disarmament obligation.<sup>390</sup> In short, there were ‘no substantial gains’ in its nuclear, biological and chemical weapon programs (Alterman, 2003:275). Also, as one of the effects of coercive diplomacy on Iraq for more than twelve years, there had been no serious attack by Iraq on its neighbors (Alterman, 2003:275).

Nevertheless, it is difficult to recognize a partial success of coercive diplomacy. There are some plausible reasons why we could not recognize it. First, as noted earlier, there was lack of information on Saddam’s Iraq, since there had not been any American diplomat, not to mention a U.S. Embassy in Saddam’s Iraq, which led to various false assumptions on Saddam’s Iraq. As mentioned before, this clearly

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<sup>388</sup> See Colin L. Powell (2004).

<sup>389</sup> See Susan B. Martin (2004).

<sup>390</sup> See, for more information, Robert O. Keohane, “Multilateral Coercive Diplomacy: Not Myths of Empire,” available at the website: [http://www.ciaonet.org/special\\_section/iraq/papers/ker02/ker02.html](http://www.ciaonet.org/special_section/iraq/papers/ker02/ker02.html). Also, see, for more information, Security Council Resolution 1441. Available at the website: <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/682/26/PDF/N0268226.pdf?OpenElement>

demonstrates how important the role of diplomacy is in terms of information-gathering. Second, Saddam's Iraq regarded the chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and missile programs as vital to its national security.<sup>391</sup> In particular, Iraq's chemical and ballistic missiles were seen as key to Iraq's survival in the Iraq-Iran war.<sup>392</sup> Also, now that Saddam's Iraq had pursued the regional hegemon, it was continuously expected to keep developing nuclear weapons, at least to counter the Israeli nuclear capability. In short, Saddam's Iraq clearly had many reasons to keep pursuing WMDs, and in reality, once it had some of WMDs and missiles. Due to this, no one expected that Saddam's Iraq would give up WMDs and missiles easily. Third, Iraq had posed an existential threat not only to its neighboring states, but also to international society as a whole, especially when considering Saddam's Iraq's habitual invasion of its neighboring states, such as its invasion of Iran and Kuwait, and when imagining Saddam's Iraq's possible possession of nuclear weapons. Fourth, the willingness of Iraq to challenge the UN seemed to have increased over time, culminating in 1998 with an Iraqi refusal to continue with UNSCOM inspections, let alone no 100 percent verification for Saddam's Iraq's compliance with the UN resolutions.<sup>393</sup> All of these were primary reasons why many people jumped to the conclusion that coercive diplomacy completely failed, supporting the war against Saddam's Iraq in 2003.<sup>394</sup> Due to these kinds of reasons, also, the goal of 'regime change' moved to center stage after Operation Desert Fox in 1998, and it became increasingly predominant after the

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<sup>391</sup> See Susan B. Martin (2004).

<sup>392</sup> Ibid

<sup>393</sup> Ibid

<sup>394</sup> A majority of Americans (over 60 percent) supported the war against Saddam's Iraq, even though their support came to plunge when they came to see the fact that there was no WMD in Saddam's Iraq.

September 11, 2001 attacks.<sup>395</sup> Nevertheless, in retrospect, most of Iraq's weapons appeared to be destroyed in 1991; for the most part the nuclear program seemed to be already stopped; and the biological weapons program was revealed in 1995,<sup>396</sup> even if there was always a possibility that Saddam's Iraq might try to rebuild WMDs again, and even if its identity and character as a brutal despotic regime could not be altered as long as Saddam held power in Iraq, which means that WMDs were only one of many reasons for the use of force against Saddam's Iraq. All in all, in terms of WMDs, coercive diplomacy was successful, but it had never been influential enough to change Saddam's Iraq's identity and character as a brutal despotic outlaw state which, at any time, could pose an existential threat, particularly to its neighboring states and possibly to the whole international society, as long as Saddam firmly held power in Iraq.

However, as mentioned above, some scholars like Jon B. Alterman argued that coercive diplomacy did not work since regime change in Iraq was the ultimate goal of the US policy (Alterman, 2003:290). Also, other scholars like Geoffrey Wiseman criticized the Bush administration for its use of force against Saddam's Iraq rather than its adoption of diplomacy, by saying "the first transgression of diplomatic cultures was the United States' eagerness to use force rather than to exhaust diplomatic negotiation" (Wiseman, 2005:419). But such arguments do not seem to be rational. There was no possibility that Saddam's Iraq would stop and change its unconstrained aggressive behaviors, without the external use of force, as its past behaviors demonstrated, in particular when considering that even coercive diplomacy failed to make Iraq withdraw itself from Kuwait. In other words, coercive diplomacy did not work for

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<sup>395</sup> See Susan B. Martin (2004).

<sup>396</sup> Ibid.



some issues, not because the goal of the US policy on Saddam's Iraq was regime change, but because nothing could change Saddam's Iraq except for a full-scale war. That was why the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 came to be a necessary and plausible option, since coercive diplomacy was not enough to alter Saddam's Iraq to become a full member of international society. In terms of war as the last resort, the Bush administration's use of force is not quite wrong, when considering 'the UN's continuous sanctions leading to the loss of more than one and a half million Iraqis lives for more than a decade,' 'Saddam's Iraq as a despotic outlaw state with no future for Iraqi change toward democracy,' and 'the failure of coercive diplomacy.' Furthermore, as Mr. Malone, a Canadian diplomat, put it, overall, patience with Saddam's regime had pretty much run out.<sup>397</sup> Thus, there was no carrot for Saddam's regime any longer, since the carrot itself might result in Saddam's nuclear-armed Iraq, especially when considering that 'carrot', like Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine policy and Rho Moo Hyun's Peace and Prosperity policy on North Korea, resulted in Kim Jong Il's nuclear armed North Korea. Due to the failure of coercive diplomacy, war in 2003 became the last resort, even if, as noted above, coercive diplomacy was not a complete failure.<sup>398</sup> In fact, we can see that the appliance of coercive diplomacy to Iraq facilitated the legitimacy of the full-scale use of force in the end, since after coercive diplomacy did not work, the public became more likely to perceive that all other options were exhausted before the war began. In other words, the failure of coercive diplomacy against Saddam's Iraq helped to justify the US-led coalition forces to wage war against Saddam's Iraq, while indicating that the Iraqi regime's belligerent

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<sup>397</sup> See, for more information, Barbara Crossette (2002).

<sup>398</sup> See, for more information, Captain William S. Langenheim (2002).

and intransigent attitude, not US warmongering, was the primary cause of the war.<sup>399</sup>

The limit of coercive diplomacy ultimately necessitated the US-led coalition forces' invasion of Iraq in 2003 so as to overthrow Saddam's regime and build up a new, prosperous and democratic Iraq.<sup>400</sup>

## **Conclusion**

In general, diplomacy is easily misunderstood as only a simple tool to materialize the goals of foreign policy. However, as many English School scholars put it, diplomacy should be recognized as a considerable institution which plays an important role in managing international society as a whole. As an institution, diplomacy is absolutely necessary to the existence and the well-being of international society. We can certainly understand it if we simply consider the definition of international society in Hedley Bull's term. Also, as democracy has slowly become the standard of civilization in the 21<sup>st</sup> century as well as the post-Cold War era and diplomacy has greatly contributed to the promotion and consolidation of democracy across international arena, we can see how diplomacy ultimately helps to promote the standard of the civilization and expand international society.

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<sup>399</sup> Ibid

<sup>400</sup> At this juncture, the unlimited use of force or war in 2003 can be understood as punishment for violations of international norms, such as human rights and democracy (Lang, 2006:394). Thus, war in 2003 can be regarded as an institution to maintain the existence of international society and to promote well-being of international society, while maintaining and promoting norms and values of international society like promotion of human rights and democracy across international society. However, as noted before, as for me, in general, 'war' and 'balance of power' have been increasingly negatively recognized and they seem even outdated in a current international society. Instead of balance of power, today integration seems efficient to manage international society, when considering that China's deep integration with international society is a more proper solution than the balance against rising China, which could be seen in Germany's and Japan's deep integration with an international society after WWII. Also, any war in the nuclear age should be recognized as very dangerous to even the existence of an international society. As mentioned before, because of this reason, I am cautious with using war along with balance of power as an institution in my dissertation. Nonetheless, in my dissertation, I tend to support some wars to cope with outlaw states, like Saddam's Iraq, which pose the existential threat to a whole international society, in a liberal anti-pluralist international society.

Diplomacy has various functions to help to govern international society. As a socializing mechanism, such as communicative action, diplomacy can produce, reproduce, or transform states' identities and interests, which is closely related to the production, reproduction or transformation of the fabric of international society, as via diplomatic socialization states increasingly come to sustain or change their behavior and language, and to keep or accept norms and values such as human rights or democracy as the standard of civilization. However, at this juncture, we can see as well that diplomacy is influenced by the fabric of international society. This indicates the inevitable relationship between diplomacy and international society. Furthermore, owing to this, we can say that the more predominant democracy has gradually become as the post-Cold War and 21<sup>st</sup> century standard of civilization and the new wave expansion of an international society, the more various diplomacies have been adopted to promote and consolidate democracy across international society. Thanks to this, in section 2, I attempted to show as many diplomacies as possible for democratic development.

As I examine the nature of diplomacy with three traditions, in terms of diplomacy's contribution to democratization, I intend to show how three different diplomacies (power-oriented, interest-oriented and legitimacy-oriented), can promote and consolidate democracy. And so, I have shown three paths toward democracy via three cases, China, South Korea and Iraq. I hope that these three cases can help to explain how different diplomacies, 'Economic Diplomacy'(interest-oriented), 'Niche Diplomacy' (legitimacy oriented) and 'Coercive Diplomacy' (power-oriented) can contribute to democratization in relatively different international societies, 'a pluralist international society,' 'a solidarist international society' and 'a liberal anti-pluralist international society.' All in all, as a primary institution, diplomacy has had a great

impact on the promotion and consolidation of democracy as the post-Cold War and 21<sup>st</sup> century standard of civilization and the new wave expansion of international society.

## Chapter IV. Great Powers and Democracy

### Introduction

In Chapter IV, I will define the concept of Great Power, and examine the role of Great Power as a significant institution in international society, even if in Chapter I, I briefly dealt with 'Great Power' as one of English School's distinguished features.<sup>401</sup> Also, I will examine the intimate relationships between Great Powers' values and the nature of international society, but I will largely focus on Great Power's contribution to democratic development across international society, which can help demonstrate that democracy can become the emerging new standard of civilization and the new wave expansion of international society in the post-Cold War era and 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Great Power has historically contributed to the limited progress as the evolutionary nature of international society, such as the end of the slave trade, decolonization, human rights and currently possibly democratic development in international society.<sup>402</sup> This indicates Great Power's contribution to the well-being of international society as well as the maintenance of international society, beyond its

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<sup>401</sup> Like Gerry Simpson (2004), I distinguish "G"reat "P"ower (capital letters) from small, "g"reat "p"ower (small letters). I use Great Power in a positive sense, whereas I use great power in a negative sense.

<sup>402</sup> In fact, US President George W, Bush claimed in November 2003 'liberty is both the plan of heaven for humanity, and the best hope for progress here on Earth... **It is no accident that the rise of so many democracies took place in a time when the world's most influential nation was itself a democracy.**' **The above is one of evidences that predominant norms are, in large part, determined by Great Powers.** Bush made the above statement at the 20<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, United States Chamber of Commerce, Washington DC, 6 November, 2003. The website is available at: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html>

pursuit of narrow interests alone. In this chapter, I will attempt to stress Great Powers as a significant institution that maintains international order and security, and furthers the welfare in international society, by their contribution to democratic development across international society.

In Great Power's contribution to democratic development, we should examine how Great Powers can have relatively different effects on democratic promotion and consolidation under three different façades of international society, 'pluralist', 'solidarist' and 'liberal anti-pluralist' and under its different relationships with lesser powers such as 'hegemony,' 'primacy' and 'dominance.' Great Powers tends to choose its relatively different apparatuses for democratic promotion and consolidation under each different feature of international society and under its relationships with lesser powers, like 'interest-based socialization,' 'value-oriented socialization' and 'use of force.' In this chapter, three cases, China, South Korea and Iraq are chosen to demonstrate how Great Power adopts comparatively different mechanisms to promote and consolidate democracy in international society, since these cases reflect their own distinctive characteristics.

### ***1> Great Power***

In this section, first of all, I will define the concept of Great Power, comparing various scholars' definitions of Great Power.<sup>403</sup> For instance, I will compare conventional IR scholars' definition of great power with English School scholars' notion of Great Power. In my dissertation, nonetheless, I will advocate Bull's concept of Great Power in a broad sense, while rejecting Buzan's categories of Great Power. In general, as for conventional IR theorists, great power can be defined as a

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<sup>403</sup> In Chapter I, I already touched on definition of Great Power, but here, I will primarily focus on material capability, mutual recognition and soft power as the criteria for Great Powers.

state that has 'enough material powers' such as economic, political and military power, to dominate its relationship with other states and influence the behavior of states. We can see that material capability is a necessary condition for great power. For instance, in his work, "The Great Powers," Ranke claims that a country can be defined as great power when it can sustain itself against all others, when they are united against it, classifying the military status of great power in terms of self-sufficiency or independence of allies (Ranke, 1950: 203, Bull 1977:195). Also, Kenneth Waltz states as well:

The economic, military, and other capabilities of nations cannot be sectored and separately weighted. States are not placed in the top rank because they excel in one way or another. Their rank depends on how they score on all of the following items: size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capabilities, military strength, political stability and competence....Ranking states, however, does not require predicting their success in war or in other endeavors. We need only rank them roughly by capability (Waltz, 1979:131).

A Great Power that is one among many learns how to manipulate allies as well as adversaries. Great Powers have to accommodate some of their number in order to gain strength vis-à-vis others. In dealing with near equals, they design their policies to influence the actions of others (Waltz, 1986:333 ).

As for Kenneth Waltz, by and large, great power is defined as power with substantial industrial and military potentials, along with its domination of relationship with other states and its impact on behavior of other states. At this juncture, as his concept of international structures, such as 'anarchical organizing principles,' 'no functional different units,' and 'distribution of different capabilities' demonstrate, we can see that his notion of great power is deeply embedded in material resources.<sup>404</sup> In particular,

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<sup>404</sup> See, for more information, Waltz (1979).

when considering Waltz's remark on the bipolar systems and multi-polar systems that can be recognized as international political structure determined by the distribution of capabilities among states, we can perceive material resources as significant for the criterion of great power.<sup>405</sup> Fareed Zakaria also emphasizes material powers as fundamental sources for great power, by saying:

with greater wealth, a country could build a military and diplomatic apparatus capable of fulfilling its aims abroad; but its very aims, its perception of its needs and goals, all tend to expand with rising resources (Zakaria, 1998:5).

Moreover, John J. Mearsheimer clarifies the definition of great power in a similar way, stating:

Great powers are determined largely on the basis of their relative military capability. To qualify as a great power, a state must have sufficient military assets to put up a serious fight in an all-out conventional war against the most powerful state in the world. The candidate need not have the capability to defeat the leading state, but it must have some reasonable prospect of turning the conflict into a war of attrition that leaves the dominant state seriously weakened, even if that dominant state ultimately wins the war. In the nuclear age great powers must have a nuclear deterrent that can survive a nuclear strike against it, as well as formidable conventional forces (Mearsheimer, 2001:5).

Specially, I argue that power is based on the particular material capabilities that a state possesses.....States have two kinds of power: latent power and military power. Latent power refers to the socio-economic ingredients that go into building military power....Great Powers need money, technology, and personnel to build military forces and to fight wars, and a state's latent power refers to the raw potential it can draw on when competing with rival states (Mearsheimer, 2001:55).

The above clearly indicates that the concept of great powers especially in American IR, is overall obsessed with material capability, and it is determined by material

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<sup>405</sup> Ibid



superiority, while disregarding any character of states. We can simply say that in American IR, the status of great powers can be determined by how many more guns they have. When considering Zakaria's remark, "from the Peloponnesian War over two thousand years ago to the rise of Germany in this century, almost every new addition to the ranks of great powers has resulted in global instability and war", we can see that at this juncture, the concept of great power does not include character of states, stressing material capability (Zakaria, 1998:3). In other words, according to the above concept of great power, German expansionism from 1933 to 1945 put Germany into the rank of great power, even though Nazi ideology itself determines identity and character of state, which led to total destruction of civilization in the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Zakaria 1998:17). Edward Keene points out this disregard of character of great power, by saying that Nazis can be regarded as the new barbarianism, being guilty of genocide, but also of the crime of aggressive militarism (Keene, 2002:139). During WWII, unlike Great Britain, Nazi Germany did not protect and promote civilization, but destroy it. When considering this aspect, material capability alone cannot be enough to explicate Great Power properly. Nevertheless, I do not demean significant weight of material capability to determine Great Power, especially when considering the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.

However, my point is that military capability alone cannot correctly explain any international affair in international society. Jack Donnelly points out this, by saying "aggressiveness of great powers cannot be explained by the distribution of capabilities independent of substantive motivational assumptions"(Donnelly, 2000:114), and "polarity simply does not determine whether a great power is a status quo or a revolutionary (imperialist) power"(Donnelly, 2000:116). Great Power does not mean simply a power with substantial material capability, since substantial

material capability alone can be nothing in some sense. This clearly confirms that material capability alone cannot illustrate international affairs properly in international society.

English School scholars, such as Hedley Bull, rectify the above concept of great power. They claim that other factors should be added to the criteria for Great Power, such as 'social relationship,' and 'soft power.' For instance, Martin Wight argues that Great Powers are defined more by their relationship to the states-system as a whole than by the quantity or the ingredients of power (Wight, 1978: 50).<sup>406</sup> Also, Hedley Bull defines Great Powers as those states to "assert the right and are accorded the right, to determine the rights that influence the peace and security of the international system as a whole" (Bull, 1977: 201, Simpson, 2004:223). Hedley Bull states in a similar way to Martin Wight's concept of Great Power:

Great Powers are Power recognized by others to have, and conceived by their own leaders and peoples to have, certain special rights and duties. Great Powers, for example, assert the rights, and are accorded the rights, to play a part in determining issues that affect the peace and security of the international system as a whole.. They accept the duty, and are thought by others to have the duty of modifying their policies in the light of the managerial responsibilities they bear (Bull, 1977:196).

Bull continues to argue:

It may be noted that **it is a mistake to define great powers or super powers in terms of possession of strategic nuclear weapons.** Although military nuclear capability is today a necessary condition of super-powerhood or great powerhood it is not a sufficient condition, as is shown by the cases of Britain and France. Moreover, the United States and the Soviet Union were recognizable as super powers before their strategic nuclear arms were fully developed, and in the case of the latter before it had acquired them at all (Bull, 1977:197).

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<sup>406</sup> Jack Donnelly points out this as well. See Donnelly (2000:97).

Also, as Donnelly points out (2006:153), Barry Buzan states in note of Superpower:

Superpowers must possess first-class military-political capabilities (as measured by the standards of the day) and the economies to support such capabilities. They must be capable of, and also exercise, global military and political reach. They need to see themselves, and be accepted by others in rhetoric and behavior, as having this rank (Buzan, 2004b:69).

This clearly demonstrates that mutual recognition as social factor should be considered as one of criteria for Great Power, along with material resources. Like Hedley Bull, Barry Buzan is well aware of social features as a necessary condition for Great Power, saying that the definition of Great Power needs material capabilities and social roles (Buzan, 2004b:59). In other words, a mutually recognized identity of state should be seriously considered to be a necessary condition for Great Power. For instance, the US and the UK have been recognized as Great Powers by other members of international society. By contrast, Nazi Germany was acknowledged as an outlaw state rather than a Great Power by other states, and North Korea won't be recognized as Great Power by others in international society unless it alters its identity and character via its social role, even if North Korea may have strategic nuclear weapons in the near future, along with its 1.2 million troops as the fourth largest military in the world.<sup>407</sup> At this juncture, we can see that the mutual recognition as a social feature is one of criteria for Great Power as well. Also, we can comprehend that a mutually recognized identity among states brings out their reciprocally realized duties and rights in international society. In other words, the interplay of self-perception and perception by others determines Great Power, Middle Power and

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<sup>407</sup> See the website available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr1997/n04251997\\_9704251.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr1997/n04251997_9704251.html)

Small Power's duties and rights.<sup>408</sup> We can confirm the assumption that Great Powers have a material benchmark, but they are more concerned about socially constructed roles in the international system (Buzan, 2004b: 60). All in all, we can clearly perceive a sociological aspect to define Great Power, and we can easily notice the significance of mutually recognized special rights and duties of Great Powers, which is fundamentally different from conventional IR's concept of great power.

Soft power should be deliberated as one of criteria for Great Power as well. Besides hard power which I mentioned in the above, soft power cannot be excluded as a necessary condition for Great Power. Soft power is the ability to promote cultural values and ideology via non-violent means such as debate and dialogue, to influence others' belief and behavior.<sup>409</sup> Joseph Nye points out the significant role of soft power.

Nye mentions:

**What is soft power? It is the ability to get what you through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies (Nye, 2004:X).**

I first developed the concept of "soft power" in *Bound to Lead*, a book I published in 1990 that disputed the then-prevalent view that America was in decline. I pointed out that the United States was the strongest nation not only in military and economic power, but also in a third dimension that I called soft power (Nye, 2004:XI).

The indirect way to get what you want has sometimes been called 'the second face of power.' A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries – admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness – want to follow it. In this sense, it is also important to set the agenda and attract others in world politics, and not only to force them to change by threatening military force or

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<sup>408</sup> I will touch on this in the below again, when I deal with the role of Great Power.

<sup>409</sup> See the website available at [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Power\\_\(international\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Power_(international))

economic sanctions. This soft power – getting others to want the outcomes that you want – co-opts people rather than coerces them. Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others. At the personal level, we are all familiar with the power of attraction and seduction (Nye, 2004:5).

This indicates that soft power should be considered as a necessary condition for Great Power. For instance, when considering China's history, we can find one interesting case that Mongols conquered the Han people via the use of force but that weirdly enough, Mongolians themselves were, by contrast, absorbed into the Han culture.<sup>410</sup> This clearly demonstrates that material power is not omnipotent, and soft power should be deeply considered as one of criteria of Great Power. Currently, in international society, human rights and democracy that the US and UK have promoted in the post-Cold War era and 21<sup>st</sup> century, have been gradually predominant and even universal,<sup>411</sup> and this obviously implies that soft power can greatly help facilitate the legitimacy of the role of Great Powers in international society. All in all, the significance of soft power should be deeply considered along with material capability for the criteria for Great Power. I will explain this point in the below again, when facing the question about “how do Great Powers promote and consolidate democracy in international society?”

In consideration of the above definition of Great Power, let us take a brief look at classification of Great Powers that Barry Buzan revealed in his work, “The United States and the Great Powers: World Politics in the Twenty-First Century.”

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<sup>410</sup> Zhao also makes a similar point. See, for more information, Zhao (2004:228).

<sup>411</sup> I have to admit that it might be too early to say that democracy itself can be one of universal norms and values in international society. But as for me, in the post-cold war era and the 21<sup>st</sup> century, we cannot deny the global phenomenon that democracy is increasingly becoming one of predominant values and norms in international society.

Barry Buzan uses Bull's notion of Great Powers with different name tags, such as hyper-power, super-power, great power and regional power. Buzan states:

A hyper-power is simply a sole superpower viewed in critical perspective.....**super-power posses first-class military political capabilities and the economies to advocate such capabilities....Superpowers will also be fountainheads of universal values of the type necessary to underpin international society.** Their legitimacy as superpowers will depend substantially on their success in establishing the legitimacy of such values....**Great Powers need not necessarily have big capabilities in all sectors, and they need not be actively present in the securitization or economic processes of all areas of the international system. Great Power status rests mainly on a single key: What distinguishes great powers from merely regional ones is that they are responded to by others on the basis of system-level calculations, as well as regional ones, about the present and near future distribution of power.....Regional Powers define the polarity of any given regional security complex.....The capabilities of regional powers loom large in their regions, but do not register much in a broad spectrum way at the global level (Buzan, 2004b. 69-72).**

In some sense, I do agree to Buzan's division of Great Powers into hyper-power, super-power, great power and regional power. In particular, when considering that the US share of Global GDP is around 31.2%, of Global Defense Spending around 36.3%, of Global Spending on research and development around 40.6 % and of Global movies box office revenues around 83. 1%, not to mention that the US military spending of more than \$600 billion is as much as the next twenty top-spending countries combined, we obviously need to call the US more than a Great Power, which is obviously a hyper-power.<sup>412</sup> Such categorization of Bull's broad concept of Great Power can be recognized as a great contribution to the development of the concept of Great Power.

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<sup>412</sup> This is reported in *Newsweek* (July 21, 2003).

However, in my dissertation, I prefer to use Bull's broad concept of 'Great Power,' rather than hyper-power for the US, and 'Great Power' for the UK, rejecting Buzan's classification. The reasons are following. First, Barry Buzan mentions that the promotion and consolidation of certain values and norms in international society are constrained to the role of hyper-power or super-powers alone. However, we can clearly notice that the UK is ranked as Buzan's narrow definition of great power, but that its role to promote and consolidate certain predominant values and norms like human rights and democracy in international society cannot be discounted at all. In particular, in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the UK's active role can be easily observed in its aggressive promotion and consolidation of democracy in international society. Second, in terms of the measure of duties and rights, the UK should be ranked above Buzan's rank of great power into which Germany, Japan, China and Russia are fitted, since the role of the UK is clearly far greater than any state Buzan puts into the category of great power. Third, in my dissertation, I adopt democracy as the new standard of civilization and the new wave expansion of international society, that is, the criterion of full membership in international society. When considering this one, it is hard to expect any contribution yet from Russia and China to promote and consolidate democracy as well as human rights across international society. Nevertheless, two states have been in transition toward democracy, gradually accepting human rights as a universal norm in international society. In other words, they are still within a barbarian circle rather than a civilized circle in a pluralist international society, so we need to distinguish the UK from China and Russia. Japan and Germany emerged from a barbarian circle into a civilized circle in a liberal anti-pluralist international society, but their contribution to international society is far less than the UK's. Overall, in my dissertation, I adopt Bull's broad concept of Great

Power in order to demonstrate the close relationship between the role of Great Powers and the promotion of democracy in international society. Below, I will uncover the close relationship between international society and Great Power, and scrutinize how Great Powers can affect the maintenance of order and security in international society and the well-being of international society. This will help us understand how Great Powers can have an impact on democratic development with their various mechanisms.

Great Power's role has been historically considered as significant, since it can largely determine the nature and structure of international society. The role of Great Power has been massively stressed by many IR scholars such as realists, neo-conservatives and English School scholars. As for realists, IR theories are about theories of great power politics rather than general theories of international politics in some sense (Donnelly, 2000: 100). Nevertheless, realists seem to be too much obsessed with and exaggerate the role of great powers in international system. For instance, Kenneth Waltz's "Theory of International Politics" (1979) and Robert Gilpin's "War and Change in World Politics"(1981) clearly demonstrate how significant great powers have been in the international arena. Also, English School scholars' works, Hedley Bull's "Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics"(1977) and Barry Buzan's "The United States and the Great Powers"(2004b) regard Great Power as an important institution to maintain order and security across international society and to promote well-being of international society as a whole. Nevertheless, realists and English school scholars have quite different perspectives on Great Powers' role, as they have different views on international environment. For instance, realism is overwhelmingly obsessed with pure anarchical environment, such as self-help system and power struggle, whereas the English School notices societal



aspects along with anarchical feature as international environment, which displays certain common values and norms in international society. Like this, the English School emphasizes social aspects in Great Powers' role, whereas realism stresses anti-social elements of great powers. In my dissertation, I will embrace the English School's notion of the role of Great Powers.

According to English School scholars, Great Powers' primary responsibility is to maintain international society and to promote the well-being of international society. They assume that international society reflects Great Powers' primary values and norm. At this juncture, we can say that their co-relationships have been known as inevitable. In deliberation of co-relationship between international society and Great Power, Hedley Bull claims:

the idea of a great power, in other words, presupposes and implies the idea of an international society as opposed to an international system, a body of independent political communities linked by common rules and institutions as well as by contact and interaction (Bull,1977:196).

This clearly indicates the co-relationship between international society and Great Powers, in particular when considering that one of Great Power' roles is for preservation of international society and for the wellbeing of international society.<sup>413</sup> Also, as above, Great Powers can shape and form certain nature and character of international society, as a large portion of nature and character of international society have historically reflected Great Powers' values and norms, like 'the end of the slave trade and slavery,' 'compliance with international law beyond Western states,' 'self-

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<sup>413</sup> As mentioned in Chapter I, Hedley Bull revealed the roles of Great Powers such as "preservation of the general balance; seeking to avoid or control crises in their relations with one another; seeking to limit or contain wars among one another; exploiting their local preponderance; agreeing to respect one another's spheres of influence; and joint action" See Bull (1977:200).

determination' and 'human rights.'<sup>414</sup> This can be understood as Great Powers' role to spread the standard of civilization at each historical period. In the early nineteenth century, the end of the slave trade and that of slavery system could be regarded as the outcome of the roles of Great Powers, in particular, the UK's role, after the slave trade was abolished in the British Empire in 1807 and slaves were emancipated via the British Parliament in 1833, even if the slave trade itself had led to enormous economic interests.<sup>415</sup> In the late nineteenth century, compliance with international law itself could not be possible without the roles of Great Powers. In the 1960s, the self-determination and decolonization were derived from the effect of the role of Great Powers, even if as the primary normative ideas, they emerged in some sense that Great Powers, that is, Western colonial powers lost their confidence in their normative right to rule (Zacher, 2001:240, Russett 1993:35, and Jackson, 1993).<sup>416</sup> As Jackson puts it, also we can easily perceive that if the leading colonial powers had been authoritarian states and not democracies, the world would look far different from the world we have now, not to mention the possibility that colonialism might still be widespread (Jackson, 1993:137). In the late 20<sup>th</sup> century, human rights has been one of primary US foreign policies for decades; it has been increasingly accepted as universal norm across international society; and human rights is one of primary features of a solidarist international society. In the post-Cold War era and the 21<sup>st</sup> century, democracy has become the norm and value which Great Powers such as the

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<sup>414</sup> In Chapter I, I already mentioned some of them, when I dealt with the standard of civilization and wave expansions of international society.

<sup>415</sup> See the brief history concerning the end of slavery and of the slave trade, available at the website: <http://demo.lutherproductions.com/historytutor/basic/modern/genknow/end-slavery.htm>

<sup>416</sup> In fact, material reasons should be considered to explain why the western powers gave up their colonies, such as the increasing resistance against the colonial powers, and the high cost to maintain their colonies via using military forces. See, for more detail, Jackson (1993).

US and the UK have chosen and promoted across international society. As Larry Diamond points out, as mentioned in Chapter I, when considering that in the 1970s, less than 30 nation-states were democracies, but currently, more than 120 nation-states are democracy, democracy is continuously expected to become a primary dimension of international society in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. At this juncture, we should not diminish the role of Great Powers in the transformation of the nature of international society.<sup>417</sup> This clearly illustrates co-relationship between Great Power and international society.

Also, when we think of Great Power's primary contribution to international society, as implied above, we can think that the role and function of Great Powers are mainly to manage the affairs of international society as a whole, and to provide certain direction in international society. Bull states:

The steps the great powers take to manage their relations with one another lead directly to the attempt to provide central direction or management of the affairs of international society as a whole; the steps they take to exploit their preponderance in relation to the rest of international society presupposed some effective management of their relations with one another (Bull, 1977:201).

For instance, in 1815, Great Powers sought to manage and order European affairs, even formulating international law whenever necessarily, and forging a concert system, which reflects a legalized hierarchical aspect in international society (Simpson, 2004: 91-92). At this juncture, it is worthwhile to take a look at Bull's points concerning role of Great Powers in more details, even if briefly mentioned in Chapter I. I will examine Bull's notion of the roles of Great Powers:

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<sup>417</sup> Larry Diamond spoke on "can the whole world become democratic?" at New York Democracy Forum. The Video concerning his speech is available at the website: <http://www.ned.org/>

preservation of the general balance; seeking to avoid or control crises in their relations with one another; seeking to limit or contain wars among one another; exploiting their local preponderance; agreeing to respect one another's spheres of influence; and joint action (Bull, 1977: 200).

First, 'preservation of the general balance' can be obviously recognized as Great Powers' cardinal contribution to international society, via their management of relations among states (Bull, 1977:201). This role is primarily to preserve the existence of international society, and this leads Great Powers to have special rights and duties. Bull states:

They perform in relation to international order that is most widely recognized in international society at large, and which provides the basis of the willingness of other states to accept the notion of the **special rights and duties of great powers** (Bull, 1977:201).

This is quite different from realist perception, especially offensive realist perception on the role of great powers that great powers are focusing on maximizing relative power in pure anarchical environment (Mearsheimer, 2001:22).<sup>418</sup> At this juncture, we can see that as for the English School, Great Powers' interests are more than simply their narrow self-interests like maximization of their own interests alone, to sustain international society as a whole. In turn, Great Powers can be given legitimate special rights to decide important issues by Middle Powers and Small Powers. As mentioned several times, Gerry Simpson advocates this, explaining a legalized hierarchical relationships among Great Powers, the Middle Powers and Small Powers well. He claims "All three facets of legislative equality were heavily compromised at Vienna. The Great Powers made the law and the middle powers

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<sup>418</sup> In terms of the preservation of balance, we might think that English School and defensive realism seem to have similar positions for great powers to sustain international order. However, it might be dangerous guess, since as for English School, Great Powers are not only concerned with their own national interests, but also with broad interests of international society as whole, whereas as for defensive realism, great powers are deeply concerned about their own interests alone.

signed the resulting Treaty. The small powers, meanwhile, were erased from consideration”(Simpson, 2004: 112). Jack Donnelly added:

At San Francisco, though the lesser powers had a more active role, the basic structure was decided by the US, the UK and the USSR. The Great Powers have also been formally predominant in peace and security organizations such as the Concert of Europe and the Security Council (Donnelly, 2006:153).

We can evidently perceive that Great Powers are primarily engaged even in the law-making process, which is parallel with the role of the members of the Security Council in producing resolutions as a binding international law. Also, we can see that via such legal process, the hegemony of Great Powers has become increasingly legitimized in international society, which can be called even legalized hegemony.

However, we can perceive that the existence and role of Great Powers itself in international society can be interpreted as the tension between two principles, sovereign equality and hegemony. But, what is important is historically that we can't deny such a hierarchical relationship in international society. As Lassa Oppenheim points out, states should be, in principle, treated as equal before law, but it is hard to deny the reality that in politics, Great Powers have louder voice than Small Powers in international society.<sup>419</sup> Oppenheim states:

Legal equality must not be confounded with political equality. The enormous differences between states as regards their strength are the result of a natural inequality which, apart rank and titles, finds its expression in the province of policy (Oppenheim,1920:198).

Gerry Simpson went further, blurring a clear distinguishing line between the legal arena and the political arena. Simpson states:

The powers represented a legislative elite and the law was

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<sup>419</sup> See, for more information, Lassa Oppenheim (1920).

obligated to recognize this fact. Political inequality rendered a strong form of sovereign equality null or fictitious or purely theoretical. The reality of international law was that states were unequal and had unequal rights. Sovereign equality was an ideal but one that could never be realized (Simpson, 2004:121-122).

As shown above, we can see the hierarchical relationship among states in international society. At this juncture, we can perceive the distinguishing roles of Great Powers via the inevitable hierarchical relationship between Great Powers and Small Powers, and further via the radial hierarchical relationship between Great Powers and outlaw states. All in all, in international society, via such hierarchical relations, we can see the inevitable correlations between the role of Great Powers and the management of international society.

Second, Bull mentioned 'Avoidance and Control of Crisis' as the role of Great Powers' in order to underscore the necessary actions for the interests of international order, while pointing out several crisis management events, such as the 1967 Middle East Crisis. Bull regarded 'the avoidance and control of crisis' as a central element in the management of Great Power relations as well. This aspect seems similar to Waltz's concept of great powers that I mentioned in the above (1986:333), in particular when considering his emphasis on accommodation among great powers. However, we have to notice that his motivation of emphasis on accommodation among great powers started from great powers' self-interests alone on the basis of realist logic, whereas Bull's stress on 'avoidance and control of crisis' is derived from not only Great Powers' concern with their own self-interests, but also their concern with general interests of international society as a whole. In particular, Waltz's remarks that great powers' accommodation is basically to gain strength *via-a-vis* others and that in dealing with near equals, their policies are ultimately to influence

the action of others, advocate the fundamental difference between Bull's role of Great Powers and Waltz's role of great power (Waltz, 1986:333). Currently, the US engagement in the North Korea nuclear issue, along with other states, cannot be only rooted in the US concern with its own national interests, but also in its deep concern with general interests of international society as whole, such as the US foreign policies against nuclear proliferation, terrorism and human rights violations.

Third, Bull underscored 'Limitation of War' as the role of Great Powers, so as to avoid war, in particular nuclear war, or limit war if it occurs, via possibly unilateral policies such as the enunciation of strategic doctrines and the development of weapons systems (Bull, 1977:207). As Bull points out, this is directly related to Great powers' management of the affairs of international society as a whole (Bull, 1977:206). Nevertheless, as for Bull, war itself can be recognized as one of significant institutions in some sense. However, when considering international affairs in current international society, Bull's argument seems obsolete. Gerry Simpson made a good argument for Great Power's interventionism. He said that current international society can be described as the progenitor of the new order, with his emphasis on the Kantian belief in the link between internal conditions of states and their external behavior (Simpson, 2004: 203). In particular, in the post-Cold War era and 21<sup>st</sup> century, the international environment has transformed itself to reflect more democratic norms, and interventionism has been more likely justified. Nevertheless, I do not mean that Great Powers do not care about the limitation of random violence anymore. For instance, the US has so far chosen a diplomatic solution rather than a military solution to deal with Iran and North Korea's nuclear issues. Iran has become a rising regional hegemonic power as OPEC's second largest oil producer and as the most powerful military state in that region, while

directly confronting the US influence in the Middle East since Saddam's regime collapse. North Korea has the fourth largest army in the world, and on Oct 9, 2006, it had nuclear test, which has caused a large amount of tension with its neighboring states. The US has been very careful to constrain wars with Iran and North Korea, while preventing nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and East Asia regions which are recognized, along with Europe, as economic and political hubs in international society.

Fourth, Bull put stress on 'the Unilateral Exercise of Local Preponderance' as Great Powers' role. The preponderance of Great Power can be understood as habitual and uninhibited military intervention in internal affairs and external relations of the local states, including prolonged military occupation, and in failure to pay more than lip service to notions of the sovereignty, equality, and independence of these states (Bull, 1977:207). As mentioned above, we can observe a hierarchical relationship under official horizontal principles in international society. Bull introduced three types of unilateral exploitation of preponderance, 'dominance,' 'primacy' and 'hegemony' (Bull, 1977:207). Bull states:

**dominance is a relationship in which a great power, while stopping short of the establishment of imperial sovereignty over the areas in question, treats the small states or quasi-states within its hinterland as second-class members of international society. Dominance is characterized by the habitual use of force by a great power against the lesser states comprising its hinterland, and by habitual disregard of the universal norms of interstate behavior that confer rights of sovereignty, equality, and independence upon these states;** At the opposite extreme to dominance there exists what may be called **primacy**. A great power's preponderance in relation to a group of lesser states take the form of primacy **when it is achieved without any resort to force or the threat of force, and with no more than the ordinary degree of disregard for norms of sovereignty, equality and independence.** The position of **primacy or**



**leadership which the great power enjoys is freely conceded by the lesser states within the group concerned, and often expresses the recognition by the latter of the disproportionately large contribution which the great power is able to make to the achievement of common purposes; where a great power exercises hegemony over the lesser powers in a particular area or constellation, there is resort to force and the threat of force, but this is not habitual and uninhibited but occasional and reluctant (Bull, 1977:208-209).**

In fact, in a similar way, Watson uses hegemony, suzerainty, dominion, and empire.

Watson states:

**By a hegemony I mean that some power or authority in a system is able to lay down the law about the operation of the system, that is to determine to some extent the external relations between member states, while leaving them domestically independent; In international law, it (Suzerainty) usually means that one state exercises political control over another. In many historical contexts, it means a shadowy overlordship that amounts to very little in practice; dominion covers situations where an imperial authority to some extent determines the internal government of other communities, but they nevertheless retain their identity as separate states and some control over their own affairs; and there is empire, no more absolute in practice than independence, meaning direct administration of different communities from an imperial centre (Watson, 1992:15-16).**

Jack Donnelly made distinctions among empire, hegemony and dominion as well.

**Empires control both the internal and the external policy of the subordinated policy; the imperial center rules over peripheral units. Hegemons control only external policy, allowing internal autonomy to their hegemonized followers, within the limits, as the ancient Greeks put it, of having the same friends and the same enemies. Hegemony, being defined by the interest of the dominant power rather than ideological solidarity, is more like protection or guarantee than common security.....Between Hegemony and empire lies what Adam Watson calls dominion – an imperial authority to some extent determines the internal government of other communities, but they nevertheless retain their identity as separate states and some control over their own affairs (1992:15-16) (Donnelly, 2006:156).**

In consideration of the above, we can notice that the role of Great Powers in current international society might be described with ‘dominance,’ ‘primacy’ and ‘hegemony’ in Bull’s terms; hegemony and dominion in Watson; and hegemony and dominion in Donnelly’s terms. At this juncture, I will examine hegemony, primacy and dominance for current international society, which might help explain democratic development for a pluralist international society, a solidarist international society and a liberal anti-pluralist international society. Dominance can be seen in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. This generates the strong image of ‘the standard of civilization’ when considering that it had been often used for the relationship between European states (Christian civilization) and non-European States (Bull, 1977:208). The use of force in dominance can be far more easily justified than in hegemony or primacy. Dominance itself can be pretty often seen in a liberal anti-pluralist international society. Hegemony can be seen in the US adoption of economic pressure and diplomatic pressures on other states like China, with US recognition of the principles of non-intervention and equal sovereignty.<sup>420</sup> Hegemony can be seen in a pluralist international society, when its primary aspect is “there is resort to force and the threat of force, but this is not habitual and uninhibited but occasional and reluctant” (Bull, 1977:209). We can see this kind of Great Powers’ exercise of preponderance in a large portion of international society. Primacy can be seen in capitalist democratic security community (a solidarist international society) in Buzan

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<sup>420</sup> Unlike Bush administration, I do not put Iran into the category of ‘axis of evil’ or ‘outlaw state.’ Nonetheless, Iranian regime cannot be called liberal democratic regime. Besides, realistically, the US adoption of the use of force against Iran has been hardly persuasive and expected, and it cannot be tolerated in international community, in particular, when considering that Iran did not invade its neighboring countries, even if it has been supporting Hezbollah that has been transformed into a political party. As for me, current Hezbollah in Lebanon should be recognized as a strong nationalist party rather than a simple terrorist group.

term, like between the US and South Korea. Here, it is worthwhile to look at Huntington's concept of primacy. Huntington defined international primacy as a government to exercise more influence on the behavior of more actors with respect to more issues than any other government (Huntington, 1993a:68). Also, he claimed that primacy is an alternative to war, since primacy is to achieve the state's goal without recourse to war (Huntington, 1993a:68-70). This is similar to Bull's concept of primacy. As mentioned above, Bull claimed that a Great Power can command powerful bargaining levers in disputes with lesser states without any coercion under the confines of a normal degree of acceptance of basic norms of international behavior, since the position of primacy or leadership is conceded and recognized by the lesser states for the achievement of common purposes (Bull, 1977:208). This aspect can be seen in a solidarist international society. So far, I have briefly illustrated three different types of Great Power's exercise of preponderance, and below, I will apply them to three cases, China, South Korea and Iraq.

Fifth, Bull highlighted 'spheres of influence, interest or responsibility' as Great Powers' role. Bull claimed that Great Power tends to establish the sphere of influence, interests or responsibility on the basis of agreement among Great Powers (Bull, 1977:212). The spheres of influence can be simply understood as the recognition of special rights, such as the Monroe Doctrine (Donnelly, 2006: 153). It could be easily recognized during the Cold War era, as the US and the USSR had been reluctant to intervene in each other's sphere of influences for their co-existence such as the Johnson and Brezhnev doctrines (Bull, 1977: 217, Donnelly, 2006:153). However, in the post-Cold War era and 21<sup>st</sup> century, it is little bit harder to recognize the spheres of influence, since the US influence has been felt across international

society, even at the corner of global world, such as North Korea, Iran and Sudan.<sup>421</sup> But, I do not totally disregard regional powers' effects in some levels, such as China's influence in Asia (on North Korea's issue) and Iran's influence in the Middle East (on Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Iraq's issues). Nevertheless, we should not forget the US deep engagement in all of these issues, in particular, North Korea's issue, regardless of whether China can have a great impact on North Korea. The role of the US has been increasingly and widely felt across international society.

Sixth, Bull underlined 'Concert' or 'Condominium' as a role of Great Powers. Bull claimed that Great Powers tend to join forces in promotion of common policies via the international system, saying "Concert is the principal historical model of joint management by the Great Powers, the Concert of Europe"(Bull, 1977:218). Bruce Cronin , Gerry Simpson and Jack Donnelly briefly mentioned the concert system, and their argument can advocate Bull's role of Great power. Cronin mentioned that in a concert system, the mutually recognized Great Powers get together to collectively manage security affairs within a given region (Cronin, 1999:10). In a concert system, consultation and joint action are the patterns of behavior, and congress and summits are primary institutions (Cronin, 1999: 13). Also, Simpson mentioned that at the Congress of Vienna, Great Powers were successful in forming a Concert system in which they had played a predominant role, and argued that this could be, in some sense, acknowledged with the competition between Great Power's dominance and sovereign equality (Simpson, 2004: 92-93). Jack Donnelly claimed that concert involves collective, internationally recognized

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<sup>421</sup> Over the last decade, USAID has provided over \$1 billion in humanitarian assistance to Sudan. See the website available at <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/20053.pdf>.

Great Power management, such as post-Vienna Europe, the Security Council (if ‘increased permanent membership’) and the Group of 8 (Donnelly, 2006:155).

From now on, I want to examine the Security Council and the Group of 8 as Great Powers’ collective management institution for current international society. As Donnelly puts it, when considering current international society, the Security Council’s permanent membership might be recognized as Great Powers’ collective crisis management mechanism and their formal concert system, which reflect the legalized hierarchy under the principle of equal sovereignty. However, it has its own problems. For instance, Security Council permanent members can hardly reach the consensus, whenever any issue is related with their own interests, like their inability to reach a common position on Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo (Penttila, 2003:34-35). Besides, I do not put China (South and East Asia), Russia (Europe and Central Asia), France (Africa and Europe) into the category of Great Powers but to the category of regional powers, since as mentioned above, Great Powers should have hard power (material capacity), soft power (Human Rights and Democracy) and recognition (recognized hierarchical relations). Furthermore, when considering that there are ten non-permanent members of the Security Council – e.g. Argentina, Congo, Denmark, Ghana, Greece, Japan, Peru, Qatar, Slovakia, United Republic of Tanzania in 2006,- and they can influence decision-making process of Security Council Resolutions in some level, we cannot say that the Security Council (increased permanent members if possible) can be called a condominium of Great Powers to collectively deal with international affairs.

As a matter of fact, the Group of 8 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States and Russia) might be much closer to Great Powers’ autonomous collective management institution than the Security Council

(permanent members), in particular because the Group had been recognized as the largest industrialized and richest democratic group (65% of the world economy) to deal with major political and economic issues.<sup>422</sup> Especially in the 1990s, in the most significant innovation in the G-7/G-8 process, the summit leaders have acted to set up an array of task forces and working groups to tackle specific international problems such as drug-related money laundering and financial crime (Grieco and Ikenberry, 2003:309). Also, the G7/G8 has anchored Russia in the West, and via the G8, the Western powers and Russia have been given a chance to have common voice to deal with various issues, such as trade in small arms and light weapons, illicit dealing in diamonds, a UN-certified international civilian police force, terrorism, democracy and AIDS (Penttila, 2003:5-6).

Its security role since its founding at Rambouillet, France, on 15-17, November, 1975 has been noticeable with its formidable economic, political and military resources (Penttila, 2003:7-9). For instance, the 1983 Williamsburg Summit demonstrated that Group of 8 has been deeply concerned with international order and peace. The joint 'Declaration on security' states:

1. We shall maintain sufficient military strength to deter any attack, to counter any threat and to ensure peace.
2. We wish to achieved lower levels of arms through serious arms-control negotiations.
3. Arms control must be based on equality and must be verifiable.
4. Attempts to divide the West will fail (referring to Soviet attempts to make separate deals with France and the UK on intermediate-range nuclear forces).
5. Should there be no agreement on such forces, the countries concerned will proceed with the planned deployment of the US systems in Europe beginning at the end of 1983.

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<sup>422</sup> See, for a brief information, the website available at <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G8>

6. Our countries are united. Attempts to avoid serious negotiations by seeking to influence public opinion in our countries will fail.
7. We are committed to removing the threat of war.  
(Penttila, 2003:40).

Also, in June 2006, the G-8 Strelna Summit dealt with the following agendas:

international energy security, terrorism, non-proliferation, crisis management, Middle East (Iraq and Palestine) and Military Proposals (NATO to use Russian military transport aviation), not to mention health, education, migration, demography, aid and development, trade and environment.<sup>423</sup>

The above indicates that G8 has become the de facto centre of global governance as a concert system, in particular when considering the G8's peace-building role in Kosovo (Penttila, 2003:34-35).

However, it cannot be a proper way to say that the G8 can be compatible with Bull's concept of a concert system, due to its lack of ability and recognition as a sort of concert system, in order to deal with international affairs. For instance, the G8 did not yet even include China that is a vital regional power and potential Great Power, even if in my dissertation, I regard the US and UK as Great Powers, and place others such as Russia and China into the category of regional powers. Also, the G8 is still marginalized and has been dismissed by the US, for a loose coalition of the able and willing (Penttila, 2003:47). But I cannot deny the high possibility that the Security Council and the Group of 8 may be Great Powers' collective internationally recognized management as a concert system in the future, in particular when considering "the preservation of Kuwait's sovereignty could be attributed to the special privileges and powers of the Security Council"(Simpson, 2004:171).

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<sup>423</sup> See the website available at:  
<http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/evaluations/2006stpetersburg/2006agenda.html#prep>

So far, I have briefly explored the roles of Great Powers. On the whole, the significant roles of Great Powers have been historically recognized, and the post-Cold War era and 21<sup>st</sup> century cannot be exceptional. We can notice the historical fact that Great Powers have had a great impact on the evolutionary natures of international society. This can reveal a close relationship between Great Power's norms and values and the natures of international society. Also, Great Powers have played a significant role in the maintenance of international order in international society and furthermore in the promotion of the well-being of international society via their various mechanisms. In the post-Cold War era and 21<sup>st</sup> century, as democratization of international society has elevated the public good in international society as a whole, the promotion and consolidation of democracy across international society have become one of Great Powers' roles. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the US and the UK are actively promoting and consolidating their own norms and values, 'democracy' and 'human rights,' across international society from the Middle East to Africa, for both their own interests and general interests of international society as a whole. Below, I will look into Great Powers' specific role in democratic development.

## **2> Great Power's Role in Democratic Development across International Society**

In this section, I will primarily focus on the relationships between the role of Great Powers and the promotion and consolidation of democracy that can become the emerging new standard of civilization and the new wave expansion of international society in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Also, I will investigate the assumption on whether or not Great Powers' promotion and consolidation of democracy can be justified in international society. This will help understand Great Power's impact on China, South Korea and Iraq's paths toward democracy, which I will examine in the next section.



In general, for realists, Great Powers' promotion and consolidation of democracy is not worthwhile for their own interests unless it can be a tool to maximize their own interests. For instance, John Mearsheimer obviously rejects the significant role of democracy. Mearsheimer mentions:

When one looks at how the decision not to fight was reached in each case, the fact that both sides were democracies appears to have mattered little. There certainly is no evidence that the rival democracies had benign intentions toward each other. In fact, the outcome each time was largely determined by balance of power considerations..... No democracy can be sure that another democracy will not someday become an authoritarian state, in which case the remaining democracy would no longer be safe and secure. Prudence dictates that democracies prepare for that eventuality, which means striving to have as much power as possible just in case a friendly neighbor turns into the neighborhood bully (Mearsheimer, 2001: 368).

However, unlike realists, the promotion and consolidation of democracy itself should not be used as a simple instrumental excuse to achieve national goals and interests. In fact, as I mentioned in Chapter I, unlike Mearsheimer's argument, the effect of democracy can be strongly felt across international society, which can advocate democratic peace theory. We know that if the Soviet Union was a liberal democracy, even the Cold War itself might not have emerged at all. Also, during the past 150 years, democracies have not fought against each other, with very few exceptional cases. Bruce Russett claims "the more democracies there are in the world, the fewer potential adversaries we and other democracies will have and the wider the zone of peace" (Russett, 1993:4). Currently, we can point out various peaceful zones in international society such as Scandinavia and EU members. And, we can expect that as the circle of the democratic core members has widened, the security of international society has in the long run become more guaranteed. At this juncture,

Great Powers' role in the promotion and consolidation of democracy can be understood as a great contribution to international security and the welfare of international society as a whole in the long run.

When considering Great Powers' mechanisms to promote and consolidate democracy, we can imagine multiple ways, such as 'interest-based socialization' like change in price, 'value –oriented socialization' and 'the use of force,' which can be mentioned relatively in 'pluralist,' 'solidarist' and 'liberal anti-pluralist' international societies. They can be in a large part determined by the relatively different relationship between Great Powers and the lesser powers, like 'hegemony,' 'primacy' and 'dominance.' In this consideration of Great Powers' mechanisms for democratic development, below I will look into Great Power's role in democratic development in international society. In the post-Cold War era and 21<sup>st</sup> century, the increasing numbers of states have become democratic, but this cannot be expected without Great Powers' role in the promotion and consolidation of democracy. At present, we can observe that Great Powers' effort to promote and consolidate democracy has made democracy the emerging new standard civilization in the post-Cold War era and the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In particular, the US has been playing a greater role than any other state in the promotion and consolidation of democracy.

However, the US great role for democratic development is not new at all, but it can be traced into the US 28th President, Woodrow Wilson's idealism, "democracy must someday be the universal rule of political life" (Link, 1974:13-14, Ikenberry, 2000a:105-6). His thought has greatly influenced his successors like Ronald Reagan, George, H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. The 40<sup>th</sup> US President Reagan, speaking before the British parliament on June 8, 1982, proclaimed that governments founded on a respect for individual liberty exercise restraint and

peaceful intentions in their foreign policy, announcing a crusade for freedom and a campaign for democratic development.<sup>424</sup> Also, he announced that the day of the dictatorship is over and the people's right to democracy must not be denied.<sup>425</sup> The 41<sup>st</sup> President Bush, on October 1, 1990, in an address before the United Nations General Assembly, declared "the Call for democracy and human rights are being reborn everywhere" (Ikenberry, 2000a:22). The 42<sup>nd</sup> US President Bill Clinton had greatly emphasized democratic development across international society. Clinton's 1994 State of the Union Address clearly demonstrates that the US foreign policy is primarily based on the promotion and consolidation of democracy, with his remark that "ultimately, the best strategy of our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere", which clearly shows that democracy-building worldwide became a key plank of the Clinton years (Rich and Newman, 2004:7). And, the 43<sup>rd</sup> US President, George W. Bush's foreign policy had been more deeply embedded in the promotion of democracy across international society than ever. Even the nature of his decision to invade Iraq gradually transformed to advocate the promotion and consolidation of democracy, with his emphasis on the close connection between the promotion of democracy and the war against terrorism. Also, as mentioned before, on July 10, 2006, Bush approved an \$80 million fund toward boosting democracy in Cuba, even if Cuban and US ties have been very strained for nearly 50 years.<sup>426</sup>

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<sup>424</sup> See President Regan's speech. Available at the website: <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/60882a.htm>. Also see Michael Doyle (2000:21).

<sup>425</sup> See Michael Doyle (2000:21, fn2).

<sup>426</sup> See "US in \$80m 'Cuba democracy' plan." *BBC News*. July 11, 2006.

All of the above Presidents believe that the promotion of democracy across international society can encourage our hopes for a more stable, more peaceful, more prosperous world, not to mention the US interests, which clearly prove that the US can be put into the category of Great Powers. Also, many policy-makers claim that democracy can be the best option to bring out peace and security for the US and for the whole international society as well. For instance, former National Security Council Director Anthony Lake in 1995 claimed:

We led the struggle for democracy because the larger the pool of democracies, the greater our own security and prosperity. Democracies, we know are less likely to make war us or on other nations. They tend not to abuse the rights of their people. They make for more reliable trading partners. And each new democracy is a potential ally in the struggle against the challenges of our time – containing ethnic and religious conflict; reducing the nuclear threat; combating terrorism and organized crime; overcoming environmental degradation.<sup>427</sup>

Former Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott mentioned as well:

Our answer to the skeptics, the critics and the self-styled realists is straightforward: look at history, and look at the world around us. Democracy contributes to safety and prosperity, both in national life and in international life – it's that simple. The ability of a people to hold their leaders accountable at the bail box is good not just for a citizenry so enfranchised – it is also good for that country's neighbors, and therefore for the community of states.<sup>428</sup>

However, I should assert that the US foreign policy has never been naïve enough to literally accept Wilson's idealism. As Cox, Ikenberry and Inoguchi point out, many US policy makers have tended to advocate democracy, but we cannot deny

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<sup>427</sup> See Anthony Lake's remarks on the Occasion of the 10<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the Center for Democracy, in Washington, D.C. on September 26, 1995. Available at the website: <http://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/speeches/tlcfid.html>

<sup>428</sup> See Strobe Talbott's remarks on Democracy and the International Interests, in Denver on October 11, 1997. Available at the website: <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/talbott.htm>

the fact that many like Acheson and Kissinger have preferred order to freedom and stability to choice as well (Cox, Ikenberry and Inoguchi, 2000:4).<sup>429</sup> Especially, the Nixon and Kissinger period can be marked as the period of *Real-Politik* foreign policy. Michael Cox even claimed that Bill Clinton could not be regarded as “a liberal Rambo,” but instead, that Bill Clinton’s emphasis on promotion of democracy was pretty pragmatic and kept to assuage domestic constituencies, and further it should be recognized as a policy instrument to advance the US power rather than a pure moral duty (Cox, 2000:221).

However, in general, we can neither deny liberal aspects in the US foreign policy, such as the promotion of liberal democracy and human rights, nor the US immense role in the promotion and consolidation of democracy. Also, as John Ikenberry puts it, we should think that the US democratic development derived from its pragmatic, evolving, and sophisticated understanding of how to create and maintain a stable international order and sound security environment in which the US is better able to obtain its interests by reducing the security threat.<sup>430</sup> This is not only just for narrow national interests, but also ultimately for general interests of whole international society. So to speak, we should not forget that Great Powers, in the end, bring out common interests for a whole international society beyond their narrow concept of national interests. The US has been spending a massive amount of resources and time on the promotion and consolidation of democracy, such as its devotion of \$720 million to democracy assistance in 1998 especially in the fields of

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<sup>429</sup> Dean Acheson did not care about the form of government, in making friends. For instance, Acheson did not disapprove the Portuguese dictator, Salazar in the early 1950. See, for more information, Michael Cox, John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi (2000:4, fn. 23). I do not bother to mention that Henry Kissinger has been recognized as the master-mind of real-politik

<sup>430</sup> See John Ikenberry (2000a).

elections, legislatures, rule of law, civil-military relations and civil society (Carothers, 1999:54). On the average, the US government spends more than \$500 million annually, in over 50 countries, on democratic development, and a number of government agencies ranging from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to the Department of Defense have sponsored democracy assistance (Carothers, 2000:181-182).<sup>431</sup> It also claims that the US foreign economic aid should match the condition for democratic development (Carothers, 2000:181-182). This is clearly related with the US long-terms interests and further general interests for international society as a whole.

Carothers describes the role of the US in the promotion and consolidation of democracy across international society. Carothers mentions:

In the 1990s, democracy assistance mushroomed, driven by a confluence of trends including the fall of communism in eastern Europe, the demise of the Soviet Union, the surprisingly widespread trend of political openings in sub-Saharan Africa, further democratic transition in Asia, and a mild but recognizable liberalization trend in parts of the Middle East. For the most part, where democracy seemed to be emerging, the United States attempted to be supportive, both diplomatically, economically, and with democracy aid.....American democracy aid explained most rapidly in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union as an integral part of the Bush and then the Clinton administration's policy of supporting the transition away from communism. Under the Support of Eastern European Democracy Act of 1989, the US government has provided significant amounts of democracy aid to eastern Europe since 1989. Similarly, under the Freedom Support Act of

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<sup>431</sup> Carother explains well about how the US governmental agencies have had great impact on democratic development. For instance, the State Department, the Department of Defense, and Department of Justice have been relatively greatly influencing democratic development across international society. The State Department's Bureau for democracy, human rights, and labor has responsibility for democratic development. The Department of Defense has foreign military training programs to advocate democratic development. The Department of Justice has judicial and police programs such as the overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training (OPDAT) programme that trains foreign prosecutors. All of these have contributed to democratic development across international society. See Thomas Carothers (2000).

1991, large amounts of democracy aid have gone to the former Soviet Union since 1991. Russia and Ukraine have been by far the largest recipients of such aid in the former Soviet Union, with major programmes on elections, parties, rule of law and civil society.....Although US aid officials were initially skeptical at the beginning of the 1990s about the idea of democracy-related aid to sub-Saharan Africa, they were brought around to it by both policy-makers and Africans themselves who sought help from Western donors for their attempted democratic transitions.....In Latin America, the United States continued to be heavily involved with democracy assistance. The initial focus on elections assistance in Latin America faded as elections became more regularized. The additional strong emphasis on programmes of judicial and legal reform largely continued.....A major elections programme established by USAID aided almost every transitional election in Africa in the first half of the 1990s.....Democracy assistance increased to Asia, at least to those countries attempting democratic transitions, such as Cambodia, Mongolia, and Nepal (Carothers, 2000:184-185).

This clearly shows that as a Great Power, the US has made a great effort on democratic development across international society. Most outstandingly, during the George W. Bush administration, we could observe its enormous effort on global democratization across international society more than ever. This can help us understand how democracy might possibly become the 21<sup>st</sup> century-emerging new standard of civilization in the end. At this juncture, we can even assume that Great Powers have contributed to the cultivation of good citizenship in international society, via the promotion and consolidation of democracy across international society, in particular when considering that democracy is the litmus test for good citizenship in international society.<sup>432</sup>

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<sup>432</sup> Linklater and Suganami revealed several conditions for a good citizenship of international society. The promotion and consolidation of democracy can clearly contribute to the cultivation of a good citizenship of international society as whole, in particular, when, as mentioned earlier, considering that liberal democracy has been more concerned with human rights than any other type of government. See, for more detail, Linklater and Suganami (2006).

However, we might face one question on whether or not the US promotion of democracy and consolidation can be justifiable, even good enough to use force. From now on, let us investigate whether or not Great Powers' promotion and consolidation across international society can be justifiable, looking into some potential obstacles to Great Powers' effort to the promotion and consolidation of democracy. First, many scholars in departments of political science and departments of international relations, like Benjamin Barber, Michael Walzer and Joseph Nye claim that democracy should not emerge via external force or external influence, since democracy itself reflects freedom of choice and so no external force should impose a certain form of government on other states. Benjamin Barber states:

A people corrupted by tribalism and numbered by McWorld is no more ready to receive a prefabricated democratic constitution than a people emerging from a long history of despotism and tyranny. Nor can democracy be someone's gift to the powerless. It must be seized by them because they refuse to live without liberty and they insist on justice for all (Barber, 1996:279).

This is similar to Michael Walzer's argument. Walzer claims that regime change should not happen via any external intervention, but via internal voluntary and natural movement.<sup>433</sup> Using John Stuart Mill's notion of self-determination, Walzer mentions self-determination as "the right of a people to become free by their own efforts" (Walzer, 1977: 88). As for Walzer, therefore, there is no rights to be defended against the outcomes of domestic failure, even against a bloody repression (Walzer, 1977:88). Along with this logic, we can assume that Walzer would be very reluctant to advocate external influence, in particular military intervention for the promotion and consolidation of democracy. Also, Joseph Nye claims that democracy should be

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<sup>433</sup> See, for more information, Michael Walzer (1977).



gradually accomplished without any external military intervention. He states:

Democracy cannot be imposed by force. The key to success will lie in policies that open regional economies, reduce bureaucratic controls, speed economic growth, improve educational systems, and encourage the types of gradual political changes that are taking place in small countries like Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait and Morocco (Nye, 2004:120).

Nye clearly rejects any possibility to use the force in promotion and consolidation of democracy. All of three share common ground to reject external influence and intervention for democratic development.

However, what if its cost is too high to domestically and internationally disregard the illiberal, indecent and criminal state, and what if democracy cannot emerge by itself without any strong stimulus such as a military intervention? In particular, what if powerless citizens have been tortured and killed under brutal dictatorship as a systemic way? If we follow Barber's logic, do we have to ignore them because democracy should not be imposed by external forces? At this juncture, I will make several points why Great Powers should promote and consolidate democracy via even their use of force, attempting to answer the above questions. First, there are many states like Iraq (Saddam) and North Korea where democracy is hardly expected to take root due to their entrenched social, economic, and political structures. In this case, the external influence and even external military intervention can't be completely disregarded, especially if the regime itself can be listed on the category of an indecent, illiberal and criminal state, that is, 'outlaw state.' It might be unethical and immoral to keep ignoring such regimes. Nevertheless, the price for the use of force and the price for its outcome and responsibility for international society should be prudently and simultaneously considered before Great Powers' adoption of the use of force. Besides, as the nature of international society has become more and

more liberal and even democracy has become the emerging standard of civilization to distinguish legitimate governments from non-legitimate governments such as outlaw states, we can think of the potential justification of the use of force in democratization across international society.

Second, as Bull and Simpson claim, Great Powers “assert the right, and are given the right, to play a part in determining issues that have an effect on the peace and security of the international system as a whole”(Bull, 1977:202, Simpson, 2004:223). Great Powers’ police action including military action against outlaw states like Serbia, Iraq (Saddam), North Korea and Afghanistan (Taliban) can be more and more justified (Sellers, 2005: 950-952). In international society, the US claims itself a liberal democratic hegemon, and it has been recognized as democratic hegemon by others in international society, which has improved democracy at home and indoctrinated democracy abroad.<sup>434</sup> In particular, following the end of the Cold War, the promotion of democracy has become a cornerstone of US foreign policy, which has been greatly helpful to promote the well-being of international society in the long run. This suggests that the promotion and consolidation of democracy across international society can be seen as Great Powers’ privilege and responsibility.

Third, when comparing historical data for the number of conflicts in democratic zones with the data of the number of conflicts of non-democratic zones, we can observe how Great Powers’ contribution to democratic development can bring out the well-being of international society, beyond stability and order. In international society, among 50 interstate wars between 1816 and 1965, except for two marginal cases, democracies had no wars between them (Small and Singer, 1976, Rummel,

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<sup>434</sup> See, more information, “The Liberal Power.” *The New Republic*, Vol. 228, Issue 8. March 3, 2003. pp.7 and pp.1.

1983: 42). Further, in the late 1970s, none of the 22 democracies was engaged in war (Weede, 1984:659). This advocates Rummel's 'joint-freedom proposition,' "Libertarian systems mutually preclude violence (violence will occur between states only if at least one is non-libertarian) and *Freedom Proposition*: Freedom inhibits violence (the more libertarian a state, the less it tends to be involved in violence)" (Rummel, 1983: 29). However, this does not necessarily mean that democracy itself guarantees peace. In other words, I do not totally dismiss some level of danger from democratization. As Mansfield and Snyder put it, democratization might increase the probability of war, which is saying:

though mature democratic states have virtually never fought wars against each other, promoting democracy may not promote peace because states are especially war-prone during the transition toward democracy (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995:94).

Besides, Erich Weede's remark appears to reveal incoherent relationship between democracy and peace. Weede states:

Findings for the entire 1960-1980 period as well as for the 1960-1974 period replicate Rummel's (1968) earlier conclusion that regime type and war involvement are unrelated. By and large, the findings for the 1975-1980 period replicate Rummel's (1983) more recent conclusion that democracies successfully stayed out of war in the late 1970s (Weede, 1984: 659-660).

This appears to show that the regime type is not closely related with the causation of war. However, at this juncture, we should consider that there were around less than 25% democratic states in international society before 1980, and currently, more than 65 % of states in international society can be called democracy. In consideration of this fact, we can think of a more peaceful international society on the basis of democratic peace theory, in particular, if more democratic states have become mature. For instance, Europe had been known as conflict zone due to the two world wars, but

now, in Europe, there is a lack of opportunities for war, since the level of democracy in Europe is higher than ever before and higher than any other zone (Gleditsch and Hegre, 1997:306). This indicates that we should not deny the co-relationship between peace and mature democracy, even if a transitional period itself might cause instability and even war, no matter which direction like transition from authoritarian regime to democratic regime, or from democratic regime to authoritarian regime. As a matter of fact, as Rousseau puts it, even democratic transitions should be welcomed rather than feared, since promoting democratization will eventually contribute to a decline in the amount of violence in an international system in the long run (Rousseau, 2005:15). Also, we should not forget that democratic institutions can often prevent the emergence of a crisis, regardless of the regime type of the opposing state, because of domestic political opposition, especially on waging war and because of their tendency to wage the war when they can only win (Rousseau, 2005:129). All in all, democratic promotion and consolidation across international society is worthwhile in the long run, even if it might be expensive in some cases. However, in consideration of the merits of democracy, we should be aware of the high possibility that democracy might wage wars with non-democratic regimes, primarily outlaw states, which might be one of Great Powers' tasks, along with their military intervention and their other various assistances for democratic development, such as democratic transitions in Haiti, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

Fourth, as mentioned several times in previous chapters and an appendix, democracy is not limited to the West alone. This assumption was already countered earlier, but once again, as Nye points out, we should keep in mind the fact that cultural differences did not prevent democracy from taking root in any state beyond boundaries and cultural differences, like Japan or South Korea (Nye, 2004:120).

Also, we should keep in mind the fact that within the same culture, very different ideological objectives can be found, like Fascism, Democracy and Communism as Western thoughts, and that the shared beliefs can be easily found from different cultures as well. This indicates two primary points. First, there cannot be problem with Great Powers' promotion and consolidation of democracy beyond cultural differences and national boundaries, for the general interests of international society. Second, some prejudices such as against Great Powers' enormous effort for democratic development from particularly non-Western states can be melted down. Let us investigate these two points. For instance, as for Islamic fundamentalists, liberal democracy is used to being understood as an invention of the infidel West in no connection with Islam, which is parallel with corruption, sex, violence, and American films and television (Nye, 2004:120, Charfi, 2005: 33). This is one of reasons why Islamic fundamentalists have been opposed to liberal democracy, while claiming that the only legitimate form of government is the caliphate (Charfi, 2005:33). Nevertheless, we can observe the increasing positive secular elements in the Islamic community, such as the protection of woman rights, in particular when secularism can be interpreted as mutual toleration along with material progress. At this juncture, it is worthwhile to take a brief look at Hass's remark "the greater the ideological differences dividing decision makers across states, the higher the perceived level of threat" and "the greater the ideological similarities uniting leaders, the lower the perceived threat" (Hass, 2005:4). In other words, we can think of the following:

the greater the ideological differences among leaders, the greater the hardship they will have in communicating effectively with one another, and the more likely these individuals will interpret one another's actions and proclamations in the worst possible light (Hass, 2005:17).

This can explain Islamic fundamentalists' view on Great Powers' role for promotion

of democracy in the Middle East. Islamic fundamentalists fear democratic development across international society which can be compared to American leaders' concern and obsession with the domino theory of communism during the Cold War era, especially the Vietnam War era (Hass, 2005:7).

However, we cannot say that the entire Islamic community hates the West. As Nye puts it, many Arabs have feared, misunderstood and been opposed to American policies, but nonetheless have admired some aspects of American culture, and they shared many values such as family, religious belief, and desire for democracy (Nye, 2004:121). For instance, in the BBC interview with former Iranian President, Mohammad Khatami, he revealed his opposition to Western style of democracy.<sup>435</sup> But, in fact, he has never been opposed to democracy itself, saying "We have no other choice but to establish democracy in our country,"<sup>436</sup> and implying that each state has its own distinguishing ways toward democracy, such as an Islamic type of democracy, which could be ultimately parallel with Condoleezza Rice's remark, "I do not mean to imply that there is only one model of liberal democracy."<sup>437</sup> Also, in the past, the US military interventions to save Muslim lives in Bosnia and Kosovo and its assistance to Muslim countries to advocate development and combat AIDS, can help properly understand the US incentive to promote and consolidate democracy (Nye, 2004:122). This can lessen a big gap of misunderstanding between both sides, and also, this can prove that Great Powers' role for democratic development should not be discouraged, due to cultural and geographical differences, in particular when considering Indonesia,

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<sup>435</sup> See "Khatami labels US policy 'a joke.'" *BBC News*. November 2, 2006.

<sup>436</sup> See "Khatami: Iran must have democracy." *BBC News*. March 11, 2001.

<sup>437</sup> Former US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice made speech at Ewood Park, Blackburn, United Kingdom on March 31, 2006.

Turkey, Malaysia, Egypt, Tunisia and Libya's democratic transitions, and when considering massive civilian deaths in Syria in the absence of Great Powers' intervention in 2012.

So far, I have made several points to advocate Great Power's promotion and consolidation of democracy. Torture under repressive regimes, Great Powers' rights and responsibility, democratic peace and unconstrained democratic development can help justify Great Power's role in the democratic development across international society. Below, China, South Korea and Iraq will help us understand the significant role of Great Powers in the democratic promotion and consolidation. Each country conveys relatively different characteristics, such as pluralist, solidarist and liberal anti-pluralist façades within international society as a whole.<sup>438</sup> According to different features of international society, Great Powers also adopt their different ways to promote and consolidate democracy, such as socialization in change of price, socialization in legitimacy, and the use of force, which can be relatively understood with hegemony, primacy and dominance. This can confirm Great Powers' contribution to the welfare of international society via Great Powers' role in the promotion and consolidation of democracy in the long run.

### ***3> Case Studies: China, South Korea and Iraq (Great Power and Democratic Development)***

In the above section, I briefly mentioned the role of Great Powers in the democratic development. In this section, I will examine how Great Powers can have an impact on democratic promotion and consolidation in three states, China, South Korea and Iraq. Because each state represents a comparably different facade of

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<sup>438</sup> We should keep in mind the fact that unit's identity cannot be ultimately separated from the character of structure. In fact, Wendt's three cultures of anarchy can explicit this aspect. See Wendt (1999).

international society and each of them has relatively different relationships with Great Powers, Great Powers have adopted relatively different mechanisms to promote and consolidate democracy for three countries, like hegemony (interest-based socialization), primacy (value-oriented socialization) and dominance (use of force) as well. In China's democratic development (pluralist international society), we can expect Great Power, the US - its reluctance of military confrontation - to pursue interest-based socialization on the basis of the US hegemonic relationship with China. In South Korea's democratic development (solidarist international society), we can observe Great Power, the US tremendous support of material support toward South Korea and its value-oriented socialization with South Korea on the basis of the US primacy over South Korea. In Iraq's democratic development (liberal anti-pluralist international society), we can see the US use of force on the basis of its dominant relationship with Iraq. In Great Power's role in Iraq's democratic development, we can expect a more flexible use of force for alteration in identity and characteristics in post-Cold War era and the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

At this juncture, as Great Power has had direct and indirect impacts on the promotion of democracy in other states, it can greatly contribute to regional security and further international security in the long run, when considering that Japan, Germany and South Korea's democratic successes have elevated the well-being of international society. As for Great Powers, democratization of international society might be the best option for the maintenance of peace and security and for the long-term welfare of international society. Also, Great Powers' promotion and consolidation of democracy can be the process for the emerging standard of civilization in the post-Cold War era and 21<sup>st</sup> century. Below, I will explore these, dealing with three states, China, South Korea and Iraq.



### ***3. A) Great Power's role in Democratic Development in China***

In this section, I will show how Great Power can have an impact on China's democratic development. But, before starting Great Power's role in democratic development in China, we should ask ourselves about whether or not China can be put into the category of Great Powers. On one hand, we might think that China can be categorized into Great Power status, but on the other hand, China can be recognized as a simple regional power. Below, I will investigate this issue. In the end, I will demonstrate that China is a rising potential Great Power, as well as a regional power, but I will claim that China is not a Great Power yet.

#### ***a. Is China a Great Power ?***

In international society, China has been known as a regional power and sometimes as even a great power.<sup>439</sup> As Buzan put it, China might be ranked as a great power in various ways, when considering its material capability and recognition by others in some sense, and also, I cannot completely deny the fact that it has gradually transformed itself to become a Great Power. But, in my dissertation, I prefer to say that China has been a regional power rather than a Great Power.

Since the beginning of the Cold War era, China has been recognized as a regional power in Asia, and even the leader of the third world in some sense, for example, in its influence on African states.<sup>440</sup> There are several reasons why I put China into the category of regional powers. At the beginning of this chapter, I rejected Buzan's category of Great Powers, and instead, I intended to adopt Bull's concept of Great Powers, while emphasizing 'material capability/hard power,' 'mutual

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<sup>439</sup> See Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver (2003:28).

<sup>440</sup> In fact, Buzan and Weaver tend to describe China as a great power rather than a regional power. See Buzan and Weaver (2003:60).

recognition' and 'soft power' as essential elements for Great Power in a broad sense. When considering the above those elements, 'material capability/hard power,' 'mutual recognition' and 'soft power' for Great Power, China cannot be fully recognized as a Great Power yet. The reasons are following. The first is 'material capability/hard power.' China is obviously a rising potential Great Power, when considering its material capacity such as the second largest world economy in international society and its potential economic supremacy over the US by 2025.<sup>441</sup> Former President Jiang Zemin and President Hu Jintao's remarks can support China's status as a potential Great Power. In his political report to the sixteenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in November 2002, former President Jiang Zemin said that China's per capita share of GDP should jump from US \$800 to approximately US\$3,000 in 2020, and President Hu Jintao said at the 2005 Fortune Global Forum in Beijing that China would quadruple its GDP to around US\$4 trillion by 2020 (Zhu, 2006:89). Also, in terms of military power, China has the largest military in the world, with around 2.3 million active forces and with about 10 million organized militia members across China.<sup>442</sup> According to the 2004 US Department of Defense assessment, China had around 20 inter-continental ballistic missiles that can target the US, and China has around 400 to 430 nuclear warheads.<sup>443</sup> China's defense expenditure in 2012 is \$110 billion.<sup>444</sup> When considering these aspects, that is, China's material capabilities, China might be called a great power.

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<sup>441</sup> See, for more information, Oded Shenkar (2004).

<sup>442</sup> See "Annual Report to Congress, The Military Power of the People's Republic of China." *Department of Defense of the United States of America* (2005). Available at the website: <http://www.defense.gov/news/Jul2005/d20050719china.pdf>

<sup>443</sup> See the website available at: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People's\\_Republic\\_of\\_China\\_and\\_weapons\\_of\\_mass\\_destruction](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People's_Republic_of_China_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction)

<sup>444</sup> See "China boosts defense budget 11 percent after U.S. pivot." *Reuters*. March 4, 2012.

However, China is still a developing country. As a developing country, China has still too many problems to be called a Great Power, like chronic poverty, population growth, environmental deterioration, ethnic separatism, increasing unemployment, and neglect of the rule of law (Zhu, 2006:101). Despite China's economic rapid growth, only 44 % of China's population had sustainable access to improved sanitation in 2002, and around 23% of the population in 2002 still did not have sustainable access to improved water sources (Gill and Huang, 2006: 28). In the medical system, health insurance cannot cover almost 80% of rural residents and approximately 55% of urban residents (Gill and Huang, 2006:28). In fact, as one of the most serious problems, the widening income gap has brought out instability and corruption in China. 20 percent of China's population is at the poverty level, accounting for only 4.7 percent of the total income or consumption, and 20 percent of China's population is at the affluence level, accounting for 50 percent of the total income or consumption.<sup>445</sup> By 1995, the richest 10 percent of the urban population have been garnering 60 % of privately owned housing assets (Khan and Riskin, 1998:245). In particular, between 1988 and 1995 income inequality increased sharply in China, which gets China to become one of the most unequal of Asian developing countries (Khan and Riskin, 1998:245). State Press wrote that "in the first quarter of the 2005, China income gap widened with 10 percent of the nation's richest people enjoying 45 % of the country's wealth," and the Xinhua news agency reported as well that "China's poorest 10 percent had only 1.4 percent of the nation's

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<sup>445</sup> See "Income gap in China reaches alert level." *China Daily*. September. 20, 2005.

wealth.”<sup>446</sup> Further, Fan Gang, a leading economist at the Nationalist Economic Research Institute of China stated “the income gap issue will not become smaller in the next 10 years, but probably will increasingly widen.”<sup>447</sup>

As another serious problem, the urban and rural unequal development can shake social and political stability and the great urban-rural gap is still the predominant contributor to overall inequality (Khan and Riskin, 1998:245). In modern China, the greatest unfairness can be the rural-urban divide and urban based policy. For instance, Chinese peasants are continuously expected to suffer from absolute poverty, under-funded education, poor social welfare and security, and backward human development conditions (Xia, 2006:205). In spite of the increase in urban poverty, most poor population in China – almost 90% in 1995 – are living in rural areas (Khan and Riskin, 2001: 148). The ratio of urban-rural per capita income has increased from 1.86 in 1985, 3.11 in 1990, 2.47 in 1997, 3.11 in 2002, to 3.22 in 2005.<sup>448</sup> Tony Saich states:

In urban areas real income was also consistently higher, with Shanghai enjoying real income approximately twice that of the northwest and 60 percent higher than that in the southwest. Per capita net annual income for rural households in Shanghai was 5407 yuan, for Beijing 3952 yuan, Jiangsu 3377 yuan, Sichuan was 1789 yuan, Xinjiang was 1600 yuan, Gansu 1425 yuan, Guizhou 1335 yuan, and Tibet 1232 yuan (Saich, 2001:150).

All of these, on and off, cause China’s instability, as 58,000 riots have been breaking

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<sup>446</sup> See the website available at: <http://pundita.blogspot.com/2005/06/riots-in-todays-china-peasants-fight.html>

<sup>447</sup> Ibid

<sup>448</sup> See the website available at [http://www.undp.org.in/MEDIA/2006/Jan/Raising\\_HBL\\_3Jan.pdf](http://www.undp.org.in/MEDIA/2006/Jan/Raising_HBL_3Jan.pdf). Also, see “Party Plenum to Focus on Social Harmony.” *China Daily*. October 9, 2006.

out across China from 2003 to 2005.<sup>449</sup> This indicates that China cannot be acknowledged as a Great Power yet, in particular, when considering that there were 26 million people living in poverty in the countryside in 2005(Zhu, 2006:101); tens of million of workers are unemployed in the cities, while from 60 to 100 million surplus rural workers are drifting between the village and cities, living on part-time low-paying jobs (Zhu, 2006:102); and China will have to attain at least an urbanization rate of 50 % in order to build up its modern well-off society, and it is expected to obtain it by 2020. In fact, on January 29, 2007, Chinese News Paper, People's Daily said "in 2015, China will have modernized to the level of developed nations in 1960s."<sup>450</sup> John Mearseimer shares this point, saying that China cannot achieve great power status, since it is not as wealthy as Great Powers, like the US and the UK (Mearsheimer, 2001:62). All in all, China can be recognized as a potential Great Power in terms of the criterion of material capability, but we cannot say that it obtains a Great Power status.

The second is 'recognition'(social role). As Hedley Bull points out (1977), the state should greatly contribute to the maintenance of international society and the promotion of well-being of international society, in order to be recognized as a Great Power by other members of international society. In consideration of this assumption, we can assert that China can be possibly recognized as a potential Great Power in some sense by other states in international society, since it has greatly contributed to international society in various ways. For instance, since the late 1990s, China has become more active in UN peacekeeping missions, along with

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<sup>449</sup> See the website:<http://pundita.blogspot.com/2005/06/riots-in-todays-china-peasants-fight.html>. We can think of Shenyou's riot (the northern village) on June 16, 2005. See, for more information, "Bloody China riot caught on film." *BBC News*. June 16, 2005.

<sup>450</sup> See "Report: China to Complete first Stage of Modernization by 2015." *People's Daily*. January, 29, 2007.

China's increasing membership in international organizations. In fact, China has been engaged in 15 UN peace-keeping operations since 1990, sending out 6,000 troops or policemen to global hotspots such as Congo and Liberia.<sup>451</sup> In August, 2005, China sent 4,999 soldiers and police to join 14 UN peacekeeping operations, and in 2005, China was ranked as the fifteenth largest contributor of peacekeeping personnel to the UN (Gill and Huang, 2006:22). Recently, 125 Chinese peacekeepers were dispatched in Haiti.<sup>452</sup> Also, Beijing announced that it would increase its troops in Lebanon to 1,000 on a United Nations peace mission, while advocating the implantation of UN Resolution 1701.<sup>453</sup> And China is expected to train 15, 000 African professionals, setting up a development fund for schools and hospitals (Gill and Huang, 2006:23). Financially, in 2002, Beijing pledged \$150 million to assist Afghanistan for its reconstruction, and in 2005, offered \$83 million to the countries hit by the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami (Gill and Huang, 2006:23). Even Beijing offered \$5.1 million in aid to the US when it suffered from Hurricane Katrina's disaster (Gill and Huang, 2006:23). Furthermore, on November 4, 2006, Chinese President Hu Jintao announced that Beijing would proffer US\$3bn in loans and US\$2bn in export credits over the next three years, as he opened a summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in Beijing attended by around 50 African leaders of state and ministers.<sup>454</sup> And China has made increasingly serious effort to follow

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<sup>451</sup> Cambodia and Namibia were the first two destinations for Chinese peacekeepers. 800 Chinese military engineers and 47 military observers were dispatched in Cambodia to rebuild highways and 47 bridges. See "China's peacekeeping role deemed important." *China Daily*. November 3, 2006.

<sup>452</sup> Ibid

<sup>453</sup> Ibid. Also, see "Chinese president says wide-ranging consensus reached during Beijing Summit." *People's Daily*. November 6, 2006.

<sup>454</sup> See "China to double its aid to Africa." *BBC News* November 4, 2006.

many international norms such as free trade, nuclear non-proliferation, and furthermore, even environmental protection (Gill and Huang, 2006:23).

All of these show that as a potential Great Power, China has been gradually concerned with international society. Xiong Guangkai, author of the article "Firm Adherence to Peaceful Development and Appropriate Response to Diversified Security Threats," advocates this assumption.<sup>455</sup> He said that China has attempted to create a peaceful international environment for the benefit of its own growth, while trying to make its due contribution to world peace, stability and prosperity.<sup>456</sup> Also, Xiong emphasized China's major role in multilateral frameworks, including the APEC, the ASEAN plus China (10+1), and the ASEAN plus China, Japan and the Republic of Korea (10+3).<sup>457</sup> At this juncture, we can see that Beijing has sought a policy of a peaceful rise or peaceful development rather than the competitive inducing policies of Weimar Germany, Imperial Japan and the former Soviet Union (Gill and Huang, 2006: 23). All of these contributions can help bring out special rights for China's Great Power status. All in all, we can say that China's role in international society can facilitate the escalation of China's rank as a Great Power and get other states to recognize China as a potential Great Power in international society in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

However, its contribution to international society is still short, when being compared with Great Powers such as the US and UK's contribution to international society. Also, the record of China's compliance with human rights is still problematic, like Falun-Gong, and China's level of political freedom can hardly

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<sup>455</sup> See "Chinese president says wide-ranging consensus reached during Beijing Summit." *People's Daily*. November 6, 2006.

<sup>456</sup> Ibid

<sup>457</sup> Ibid.

match the US and UK's, like the Tiananmen square massacre and the Tibet issue. For instance, in September 1989, because six Tibetan Buddhist nuns shouted the slogan, "independence for Tibet," they were arrested and five of them were sentenced to three years of hard labor (Saich, 2001:127). Also, even in the post-Cold War era, Beijing has been reluctant to cut political and economic deals with corrupt and brutal dictators, such as its lavishing honors on Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, while claiming "business is business"(Gill and Huang, 2006:28), and China has been a very close ally to North Korea that has been recognized as an outlaw state to pose various threat against international society. This indirectly advocates anti-democratic environment as well as anti-human right in international society. What is more dangerous is that China has transferred nuclear technology to Iran, North Korea, Pakistan and Algeria, not to mention the sales of 11 M-9 missiles to Syria, which has damaged international security and international well-being. All of these have made China difficult to become a Great Power. As a matter of fact, according to a Pew Global Attitudes Survey in 2005, more than 12 % people in Western European countries see the US as "the major power to come to the aid of people under threat of genocide," whereas only "3% said that they would turn to China"(Gill and Huang, 2006:29). Also, as Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel put it, China's political system is still opaque and can threaten the economies and livelihoods of its neighbors, in particular as Chinese leaders focused on internal stability and ignored the SARs epidemic crisis, facilitating its spread by withholding information – China's foreign policy still serves the domestic goals of its leaders like supporting, reforming, and securing the survival of a Leninist political system.<sup>458</sup> Nevertheless, China's past

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<sup>458</sup> See Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel (2003).



victim mentality has been gradually transformed into a Great Power's mentality.<sup>459</sup> This indirectly implies that China is a highly potential Great Power, but it needs further transformation and development in various ways, to obtain the status of a Great Power from international society.

The third is soft power. China does not have enough soft power to be called Great Power. As mentioned above, Nye claims that soft power is derived from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political idea, and policies (Nye, 2004:X). Thompson states that soft power can include the followings:

a country's culture, political values, foreign policy, and economic attraction as essential components of national strength, providing the capacity to persuade other nations to willingly adopt the same goals (Thompson, 2005:1).

As Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang put it, soft power can be obtained only when many other states respect and emulate aspects of a certain state's civilization (Gill and Huang, 2006:17). In the post-Cold War era and 21<sup>st</sup> century, unlike the US democratic development across international society as its grand strategy, China has made no such effort, nor does it seem to have any intention to export its ideas, not to mention its inability to replace the former Soviet Union as a global threat to US interests and to the security of regions across international society (Zhu, 2006:91). The US and the UK's norms and values, human rights and democracy have been gradually accepted across international society. By contrast, China's norms and values like Confucianism can't be easily spread across international society, and they cannot compete with the US and UK's norms and values. However, I have to admit that from the Tang Dynasty (618-906 AD) through mid-Qing (1855 AD), Chinese

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<sup>459</sup> Ibid. As Medeiros and Fravel put it, we can observe the transformation from China's past victim mentality to its Great Power's mentality since 1990s. For instance, President Hu Jintao became the first Chinese leader to attend a meeting of G8 in June 2003, even though he was a dialogue member.

civilization could be voluntarily accepted by its neighboring states such as Korea, Japan and Vietnam, and during the Cold War era, China had been recognized as the leader of the have-not states of the Third World, competing with the USSR for the leadership of spreading communism across international society, in its struggle against superpower hegemonism (Bull, 1977:198, Gill and Huang, 2006:17-18). Furthermore, China's soft power in the Middle East and Africa can be still felt in some sense, such as the 1960s and 1970s liberation movements in several African states, which is derived from China's pluralist principles, 'equal sovereignty' and 'territorial integrity'(Gill and Huang, 2006:24). As mentioned above, however, we can say that China's soft power is not strong enough to call China a Great Power, in particular when compared with the US and UK's soft power.

As a matter of fact, although democracy has gradually become the accepted norm and value of international society and even the emerging criterion for membership in international society in the post-Cold War and the 21<sup>st</sup> century, China has been reluctant to allow political freedom. This indicates that China is only partially fitted into the category of full membership in international society, without the full satisfaction of the qualification of Great Power.<sup>460</sup> All in all, I attempted to demonstrate that China can be put into the category of regional powers rather than Great Powers, even if China can be, for certainty, recognized as a highly potential Great Power in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. When Great Powers' criteria, 'material capability/hard power,' 'mutual recognition,' and 'soft power' are applied to China, China cannot fully satisfy all three criteria. Nevertheless, China's material and soft

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<sup>460</sup> As implied in Chapter I, in terms of the standard of civilization, China is far better than Nazi Germany. However, it is not good enough to be recognized as a full member of international society, since China has not fully accepted general norms and values of international society, such as human rights. For this reason, China cannot be called a Great Power.

powers cannot be completely disregarded at all, not to mention the recognition of China by others as a regional power. The above unique condition makes us consider China's distinguishing path toward democracy. Below, I will demonstrate how as a Great Power, the US can have an impact on democratic development in China under its distinguishing status in international society.

**b. Great Power's impact on China's Democratic Development**

From now on, in the above assumption that China is a potential Great Power and regional power rather than a Great Power, I will display Great Power's impact on China's democratic development. In the process, I will reveal the idea of the inevitable relationships between the predominant norm of international society and the role of Great Powers. In particular, I will illustrate how Great Powers can influence democratic development under pluralistic principles, which is interest-oriented socialization. At this juncture, I will avoid explaining why China reflects a pluralist international society.<sup>461</sup> But, I will investigate how the US as a Great Power can put an impact on China's democratic development in a pluralist international society, via its using interest-based socialization, under the consideration of the US hegemonic relationship with China.

First of all, I have to mention the relationships between the US and China as hegemonic. We can think of strong hegemony and moderate hegemony. As mentioned earlier, Bull mentions Great Power's three types of unilateral exploitation of preponderance, 'dominance,' 'primacy' and 'hegemony', and claims that Great Power exercises hegemony over the lesser powers in a particular area or constellation, and if necessary, with its use of reluctant and occasional force (Bull, 1977:207-209).

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<sup>461</sup> I mentioned this in Chapter I.

This sounds like strong hegemony. On the other hand, hegemony can be understood as leadership among equals, which could be moderate hegemony.<sup>462</sup> In my dissertation, I prefer to use the term hegemony closer to ‘moderate hegemony,’ than to strong hegemony, for the relationship between the US and China, which can be seen in “American relations with Canada, Mexico and most of South America” in some sense (Donnelly, 2006:162). Nevertheless, the US relationship with China can be recognized as more competitive than its relationship with Canada. Watson advocates moderate hegemony as well, saying:

**a hegemony is not a dictatorial fiat.** The hegemonies which I have looked at, whether exercised by an individual power or a small power, involve continental **dialogue between the hegemonial authority and the other states** (Watson, 1992:15-16).

In a simple way, as mentioned above, moderate hegemony can even be understood as leadership among equals.<sup>463</sup> This can satisfy pluralist principles, such as equal sovereignty and territorial integrity.

In the post-Cold war era and the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the US remains as a hyperpower in Buzan’s term, or a Great Power in Bull’s term. China can’t be in a position to be called a Great Power and has been unable to challenge American military, technological and economic supremacy yet (Zhu, 2006:89). In particular, China does not yet have enough projective power on the global level, and it has deployed its troop in its own immediate vicinity alone (Bull, 1977:108). This clearly indicates power in inequilibrium between the US and China, which makes very hard China fully challenge the US supremacy in international society (Bull, 1977:108). In the

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<sup>462</sup> See, for more information, Donnelly (2006:162).

<sup>463</sup> Jack Donnelly is used to saying this in a simple way to explain the concept of hegemony.

post-Cold War era and 21<sup>st</sup> century, the US can be recognized as a Great Power, when considering that the wide spread of norms of liberal multi-lateralism is heavily related with U.S. military and economic dominance in international society.

However, China has become a rising economic and military power, even challenging the U.S in some sense, since one of principles of China's foreign policy is to weaken the global hegemonic power. Even the international community can expect China to become an increasingly forceful challenger to the existing norms and rules of international society, as China's economic and military power is getting stronger and stronger (Shambaugh, 1996:187). As a challenger against the US, on the basis of its *real-politik* perspective, China could vocally raise its voice against the US about two cases, Kosovo and the 2003 Gulf War. China criticized the 1999 Kosovo case and the Persian Gulf War in 2003 as the outcomes of *real-politik* in international system. Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan said that the US-led military campaign in the 2003 Gulf War greatly damaged the U.N. constitution and international law, and that it would lead to regional and global instability.<sup>464</sup> At this juncture, we can perceive that the relationship between the US and China is, in some sense, a rivalry rather than friend or enemy in Wendt's terms, even though I said the US relationship with China as a hegemonic, in particular when considering that the George W. Bush administration labeled China as a 'strategic competitor'(Zhu, 2006:123). My point is that we are aware of US leadership in the relationship between the US and China, but we should not totally disregard some level of competitive challenging relationship between China as a regional power (a potential Great Power) and the US as a Great Power, especially in the Asia-Pacific region.

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<sup>464</sup> See "China readies for future U.S. fight." *CNN*. March 28, 2003.

Under the above relations between the US and China, it is hard to expect the use of force for the promotion and consolidation of democracy, in particular when considering that China represents a pluralist international society. In a pluralist international society, we can perceive how China has benefited from its direct and indirect interest-based social relationships with the US as a Great Power. This can bring out certain pressure to China to accept the norms and values of international society, and has caused China to accept Great Power's norms and values such as human rights and democracy, which have been gradually accepted as the norms and values of international society. Nevertheless, China does not seem to officially accept its slow movement toward democracy. Below, I will look into how interest-oriented socialization can get China to adjust itself to the norms and values of international society.

First of all, it is worth looking at definitions of socialization and engagement, even if I should have done it in Chapter I. Socialization can indicate an important indicator of proclivities and learnings (Shambaugh, 1996:203). As a matter of fact, socialization can be understood as “the process of learning” in which “norms and ideals are transmitted from one party to another” (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990:289). To be precise, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, Socialization refers to:

the process of forming associations or of adapting oneself to them; esp. the process whereby an individual acquires the modifications of behaviour and the values necessary for the stability of the social group of which he is or becomes a member.<sup>465</sup>

In consideration of this concept of socialization, at this juncture, I will use

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<sup>465</sup> See the website available at:  
[http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50229739?single=1&query\\_type=word&queryword=Socialization&first=1&max\\_to\\_show=10](http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50229739?single=1&query_type=word&queryword=Socialization&first=1&max_to_show=10)

socialization and engagement interchangeably. Engagement can be translated in Chinese with *jiechu*, which means the verb to ‘engage’ (as in engaging the enemy), but its common usage reflects ‘contact’ (Shambaugh, 1996:208). In general, engagement can be understood as ‘peaceful evolution’ or ‘soft containment’(Shambaugh, 1996:208). I prefer to use ‘peaceful evolution through contact.’ All in all, we can assume that the goal of engagement and socialization is to transform international and national behavior on the basis of rules and norms of international society, and to smooth the legitimization of the hegemonic power to maintain international society and promote the well-being of international society.

In the consideration of concepts of socialization and engagement, I will examine the Sino-US relationship in the post-Cold War era and the 21<sup>st</sup> century, which will reveal how the US as a Great Power has influenced China’s path toward democracy. As mentioned above, the inequilibrium relationship between the US and China does not necessarily mean that the US can easily use its force to install democracy in China, because China is not only strong enough to defend itself but also it can greatly damage America itself, with its conventional and absolute weapons in the worst case, and because it is not at all an outlaw state. China is not one of them, Saddam’s Iraq, Kim Jong-Il’s North Korea and Ahmadinejad’ Iran, which were put into the category of the middle size outlaw states that can be easily defeated by the US hyper military power. Nevertheless, many people do not think that in some sense, Iran can be an outlaw state.

In this circumstance, the US should adopt its engagement policy on the basis of interest-based socialization to China, as it has done so far since 1971, as the US primary policy toward China, which has brought out China’s more positive attitude and language toward international society and has ultimately led to democratic

development in China. Zhu explains how norms and values can be spread under this relationship between the US and China, saying:

If the hegemonic power can incorporate the challenging power, through multilateral approaches, into the international community where they share vital interests, wars will be less likely between them during the power transition. Weaving a rising power into an interdependent world also exposes it to international norms and practices. If the challenging power can benefit from these norms and practices, it may well accept the existing rules and is less likely to challenge the status quo violently (Zhu, 2006:92).

The interest-rooted socialization can lead to China's integration in international society, which gets China to accept the norms and values of international society.

China, in fact, has benefited from the international environment dominated by the US and it has already become part of the international establishment (Zhu, 2006:95). The growing political and economic interdependence between the US and China raises the costs and the disincentives for any military conflicts. Nevertheless, China won't tolerate US intervention in the Taiwan issue. For instance, we can think of the increased trade volume between the US and China from US\$1 billion (1978) to US\$100 billion (2003), along with the US increased trade deficit with China from \$161.9 billion in 2004 to \$201.6 billion in 2005 (Total \$ 725.8 bn).<sup>466</sup> Also, since the early 1980s, US businesses have rushed to supply China with everything from financial services to convenience stores; at the end of 2004, the US had become

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<sup>466</sup> See "Fresh US trade warning to China." *BBC News*. February 19, 2006. However, I admit the fact that "on the eve of 1914, Britain and Germany were each other's second largest customers for both exports and imports and their trade accounted for a huge portion of their GNPs – 52 and 38 percent, respectively. See Kenneth Waltz (2000). Also, "until Pearl Harbor, the US traded with Japan, and General Motors and Ford, among other major US companies, operated profitably in Germany even after Germany's declaration of war on the US in 1941." See Zhu (2006:143). But, we should not disregard the important role of economic factors to influence the relationship between China and the US. As a matter of fact, China's open door policy is rooted primarily in economic interests from the West.



China's number two trading partner; and according to China's Ministry of Foreign Trade, at the end of 2005, the US could overtake Japan as China's largest trading partner (Zhu, 2006:116).<sup>467</sup> The US has favored China in various ways, such as MFN status and WTO membership in order to integrate China into international society. All of these have provided China with the incentive to be engaged in international society. This will help understand why China has become a more acceptable member of international society. Furthermore, this can facilitate China becoming a decent and respectable Great Power. Nevertheless, this might be an outdated argument that economic interest-socialization can bring out China's alteration. It cannot be ignored. China has transformed itself toward democracy, even if very slowly. According to the 1996 survey, around 73.5 % of Chinese students advocated democracy as the best political system to protect civil rights, even if 63.8 % of students are afraid of social instability derived from radical transformation from authoritarianism to democracy (Chan, 2000: 220). To become a decent, respectable and responsible Great Power, China is supposed to allow political pluralism as well as human rights.<sup>468</sup> In particular, when considering that many scholars are, on and off, used to comparing China's past revisionist position (Mao's China) to Germany's past revisionist position (pre-WWI Germany and Nazi Germany), it might be inevitable to make China a more moderate, decent, and even democratic Great Power, which will continuously bring out a more sound environment for its capitalist market dynamism in the long run.<sup>469</sup> Nevertheless, China officially claims that its economy is a socialist

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<sup>467</sup> In 2003, the bilateral trade volume already exceeded US \$ 100 billion. By the end of 2004, China ranked number four in the US foreign trade. See Zhu (2006:116).

<sup>468</sup> Ibid, pp.184.

<sup>469</sup> We cannot separate economy from society. See Polanyi (1965).

market economy rather than a capitalist market economy, and most of Chinese leaders have been reluctant to adopt democracy as their ideal form of government.

As another interest-incentive type of socialization, we'd better look at security interest, to demonstrate that socialization can alter China's domestic structure. From 1971 to 1991, the US had been an ally against the USSR, and in the post-Cold War era and the 21<sup>st</sup> century, it is still an ally against regional and even global threats such as terrorism and nuclear proliferation. But, China is not seeking the promotion of a specific ideological vision of the world and does hardly put other states under its ideological leadership, while the US has been promoting and consolidating democracy across international society, and so we can say that ideological struggle between democracy and communism is officially over (Zhu, 2006:91). In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the US and China have shared more common ground to sustain regional stability in the Asia Pacific region, and even at the global level on the basis of the US's hegemonic relationship with China. The US has been a good controller and leader in the Asia Pacific region, constraining arms race via looking out China, Russia and Japan's potential military capabilities, and taking on the burden of regional security, especially from North Korea nuclear issue. Nevertheless, the regional security issues have been shared with China, Russia, Japan and South Korea. The US hegemonic power has been used to indirectly and directly push China toward democracy, by providing material incentives and new insight on international society as well.<sup>470</sup> George W. Bush stated:

In this new century, America will remain engaged in Asia,  
because our interests depend on the expansion of freedom

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<sup>470</sup> John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan point out the significant role of material incentives to promote certain values across international society. See Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990:299).

and opportunity in this region. We hear voices calling for us to retreat from the world and close our doors to these opportunities. These are the old temptations of isolationism and protectionism, and America must reject them.<sup>471</sup>

This implies that China's socialization with the US itself has produced some pressure on China's moving toward democracy.

As a matter of fact, as Buzan mentioned in Regional Security Complex Theories (RSCT), the regional distinguishing characteristics emphasizing the lower level of the formation of regional alliances or institutions in Asia than in Europe, reveals that the US is still needed to play a significant role in the Asia Pacific, which has brought out Chinese interests.<sup>472</sup> Nevertheless, I have to add two ideas: one is that each region is slowly getting similar to the EU, such as the Association of South East Asian Nations' (ASEAN) agreement for a closer political unit and a free trade zone by 2015<sup>473</sup>; and the other is that each state has its own distinguishing characteristics - e.g. differences between China and Japan, even though each region has its own distinguishing characteristics. For instance, as mentioned in Chapter I, China itself has rarely accepted any kind of collective security system, even with its reluctance to give South Asian Nations a forum (Saich, 2001:276). In November 2006, at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in Hanoi, "the US-backed

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<sup>471</sup> President Bush spoke at the National University of Singapore on the way for 21 nations Apec summit in Vietnam. *The New York Times*. November 16, 2006.

<sup>472</sup> RSCT adopts a blend of materialist and constructivist approaches. On the material sides, it uses ideas of bounded territoriality and distribution of power. On the constructivist side, RSCT uses the securitization theory, which emphasizes on the political processes by which security issues get constituted. See Buzan and Waever (2003:4). Also, as Buzan pointed out, we can notice that each region and even its sub-region might have its distinguishing characters. For instance, as Buzan put it, in Northeast Asia, an older conflict formation was heavily infiltrated by superpower rivalry, even if it remained visible in the local securitization rhetoric, whereas in Southeast Asia there was a more dynamic regional bi-polarization, albeit one strongly formed by Cold War impositions. See Buzan and Waever (2003:142).

<sup>473</sup> See "Asian nations pledge closer ties." *BBC News*. January 13, 2007.

proposal to create a huge region-wide free-trade zone” has met severe resistance due to practical hardship as well.<sup>474</sup> In consideration of different circumstances between Asia (more pluralist international society/more bilateral relationship) and Europe (more solidarist international society/more multilateral relationship), we can see China’s interests from its bilateral relationship between China (regional power) and the US (Great Power) in dealing with security issues. As mentioned above, due to the lack of the institutions for collective management of crisis in Asia, China’s socialization with the US for security issues can help manage regional issues, such as arms race and terrorism. Nevertheless, the US’s theater Missile Defense program with Japan had caused some tension between the US and China. Also, we should not forget the fact that China’s competitive relationships with the US itself in some sense can contribute to pluralistic principles especially in Asia, though the US’s relationship with China can be recognized as hegemonic. However, China’s engagement with the US itself has indirectly and directly pushed China toward democracy.

Along with the above reasons, China still has many other various reasons to be socialized with the US, and in turns, the US also has enough reasons to be socialized with China. Below, I will examine this one in more details. Via interest-based socialization, China has gradually adapted itself to the US value and norm, such as human rights and democracy which have been increasingly understood as norms and values of international society, even if China has been officially reluctant to accept democracy. In other words, China has not directly challenged international order and US leadership, since China does not have even actual capability and intention to

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<sup>474</sup> See “APEC vows to revive trade talks.” *CNN*. November 19, 2006.

challenge them yet (Zhu, 2006:95). We cannot expect that in the near future, China will be a revisionist power like Nazi Germany again that exported its own ideology or attempted to change the characteristics of international society. Instead, it is continuously expected to become a status quo power, at least unless China stops benefiting from the US dominated international political and economic society to which China can contribute in various issues as well.

Currently, the US direct and indirect influence on China's path toward democracy can be easily observed. For instance, many members of congress rarely have anything positive to say about China, in terms of human rights and rule of law to Taiwan and Tibet (Zhu, 2006:98). It is worth looking at Henry Kissinger's remark:

Republicans see China as a threat; Democrats view it as laboratory for the spread of American values. Both view China through th prism of their party's experience over the last 30 years. Unfortunately, **too many Republicans have substituted China for the collapsed Soviet Union and seek to deal with it by the methods that accelerated the collapse of the Soviet empire: diplomatic confrontation, economic ostracism, and ideological warfare. Too many Democrats act as if the principal goal of American policy should be to replicate our institutions and principles in China, even at the cost of our many other interests at stake in Asia and without regard for the complexities of Chinese history.**<sup>475</sup>

This indicates the US intention to build up democratic norms and values in China, and the tone itself can be seen as hegemonic tendency in some sense. In my dissertation, I prefer the dove's position to advocate "peaceful evolution" via trade and engagement, over hawk's position to choose confrontation including military conflict,

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<sup>475</sup> See Larence J. Brahm (2001:63). Also, see Zhu (2006: 98-99).

in terms of the promotion and consolidation of democracy in China.<sup>476</sup> As for me, in the post-Cold War era, an engagement policy is more plausible than a containment policy that had been the US's primary foreign policy against China until before Richard Nixon's administration. Nevertheless, I do not totally disregard harsh measures, such as economic and military sanction. For instance, in 1989, the Chinese government's crackdown against democratic movement led to the US economic and diplomatic sanctions, along with former President George H. W. Bush's severe criticism against the Chinese government's actions. The Tiananmen Square sanctions are the followings:

a continuance of the suspension of overseas private investment corporation financing (imposed earlier by the President); a continuance of the suspension of trade and development agency (TDA) financing; a continuance of the suspension of export licensing for defense articles and helicopter parts; a continuance of the suspension of export licenses for satellites contracted to be launched in China; a suspension of export licenses for crime control and detection instruments and equipment; a denial of export licenses for any goods or technology used in nuclear production; and the U.S. opposition to multilateral efforts to liberalize the application of export controls that limited goods or technology to China, such as suspension of the export licenses for satellites to China in February 2000 (Rennack, 2003:2 and 8).

This can be direct pressure to push China to accept human rights and democracy, even though China is still very reluctant to officially adopt democracy for its form of government. However, the side-effect of China's military crackdown against democratic development has softened its measure, whereas democratic activists have constrained themselves as well. Also, as a matter of fact, since the 1989 Tiananmen

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<sup>476</sup> Former Secretary of State, Colin Powell can be moderate, whereas former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and former Vice President Dick Cheney are considered as hardliners. See Zhu (2006:99).

incident, the US has been the only state in international society to impose economic and military sanctions against China, which include the practice of US representative voting against or abstaining on many World Bank loans to China and the withholding of some US export-import Bank China-related loans and credit guarantees (Zhu, 2006:100). And, in April, 1991, former US President, George H.W. Bush initiated a special 301, to investigate China's piracy of American intellectual property and to bar the sale of American components for a Chinese domestic communication satellite, which are originated in China's violation of human rights in Tibet (Xinghao, 1991:1163). This can be interpreted as indirect pressure to push China toward political freedom as well as human rights. In fact, as Zhu pointed out, after two decades of economic social transformations, today's China seems far freer than before 1978, even if under a one party, Communist Party's rule (Zhu, 2006:103). As a matter of fact, Chinese news paper, People's Daily is even calling on Party organizations to enhance Party democracy in the election of delegates to the 17<sup>th</sup> Communist Party of China (CPC) national congress.<sup>477</sup> According to People's Daily, "Party organizations at various levels are urged to respect and safeguard the democratic rights of more than 70 million Party members in the election process, which has already begun and will end by June next year"<sup>478</sup>

Also, it is worth looking at leaders' socialization which contributed to democratic development. Zhu displayed the meetings of leaders of states. Zhu states:

Every US President since Richard Nixon has visited China.  
Major Chinese leaders have also visited the United States in

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<sup>477</sup> See, "People's Daily advocates democracy in national congress elections." *People's Daily*. January 20, 2007.

<sup>478</sup> Ibid

1979. Despite a rocky start, President George W. Bush's administration has moderated its approach to China. It is truly remarkable that President Bush and President Jiang met three times within a year October 2001 and October 2002. And in return for then Vice President Hu Jintao's April 2002 US visit, Vice President Dick Cheney visited China in April 2004. President Bush and President Hu have also planned to exchange state visits in 2005. Clearly, leaders from both sides are interested in maintaining and developing this important bilateral relationship (Zhu, 2006:129).

The meetings of high-ranking officers between China and US can indirectly give some pressure to China to learn American core values, such as human rights and democracy, which have become gradually values and norms of international society. Also, this can ultimately make China inevitably face even the issue of democracy and democratization, in particular when considering the US promotion and consolidation of democracy across international society in the 21<sup>st</sup> century (Zhu, 2006:184). John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan said that hegemonic norms and values can influence the policy-making process through close connection among elites, which can bring out more cooperative outcomes (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990:290-291).<sup>479</sup> At this juncture, we can say that socialization itself can eventually alter ruling elites' normative orientation in the target state, even if it can also affect the hegemon elites' understanding of the target state, at least modifying their social and political structure to dominate it. Nevertheless, we cannot fully expect this one from relationships between China and the US yet, since the domestic conditions in China, like the weak middle class and citizens' low awareness of democracy do not yet fully prepare elites for their reception of the newly emerging dominant norm and value, 'democracy,' in

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<sup>479</sup> Also, John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan mentioned that socialization can happen via three mechanisms: normative persuasion, external inducement and internal reconstruction. As causal chain, we can see "external inducement-> policy change (cooperation via coercion) -> norm change (cooperation via legitimate domination)." See Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990:291).



the 21<sup>st</sup> century.<sup>480</sup> However, we cannot deny that China has been slowly moving toward democracy, respecting more and more human rights via socialization, which can help China to become a decent Great Power as well.

In terms of engagement and containment policy, scholars and leaders advocate the engagement policy rather than the containment policy toward China. As David Shambaugh put it, it might be true that in dealing with China, engagement is more plausible than containment and might be the best option available to integrate China into the existing rule-based, institutionalized and normative international community (Shambaugh, 1996:181). In April, 2001, former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger warned against the containment policy for the treatment of China, saying that it would isolate the US in Asia and the world (Christoffersen, 2002:384-386). Also, former Singapore Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew argued against the US containment policy and unilateralism (Christoffersen, 2002:388). In fact, the confrontational approach that Bush had taken with China, and his tough geopolitical approach to Asia, threatened U.S. alliances with South Korea and Japan, and would marginalize Asian multilateral regimes like ASEAN, ARF, and APEC (Christoffersen, 2002:384). Japan has revealed its fear of the possible outcome of the US containment policy against China, which could lead to the tension and confrontation between Japan and China (Christoffersen, 2002:386). Along with Japan, ASEAN, and the European Union's anti-containment policies against China, the US has opted for an engagement policy since 1971 (Shambaugh, 1996:207). Instead of a containment policy, in fact, the US primary mechanism toward China must be the engagement policy, even if the containment policy cannot be totally disregarded, as some scholars reveals the

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<sup>480</sup> Ikenberry and Kupchan point out this. See Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990:292).

relationship between China and the US, saying that China and the US struggle but cooperate, disagree but coordinate, battle but do not fall out, and disagree but do not antagonize (Christoffersen, 2002:374). In this sense, we can say that in the post-Cold War era, the US-Sino relationship can be recognized as a complex mixture of disagreement and cooperation in some sense, but the primary policy of the US has been engagement rather than containment (Zhu, 2006:90).

There are several events for China's engagement in international society, via the US efforts. For instance, we can think of the 1972 former President Richard Nixon's surprise visit to China (its reconstruction of the relationship with the developed states); in the early 1980s, the US assistance of China's modernization via trade and investment; and China's participation in the WTO at the end of 2001 (Zhu, 2006: 93). All of these are in some sense behind the US effort of integration of China into international society, in particular, the US favor to China as the most favored nation status (MFN), while demonstrating the necessity of the US weight for China's continuous development and its compliance with the norm and value of international society. Ding Xinghao states:

Washington had certainly found the MFN to be a useful card, and one that could make leaders in Beijing more conciliatory. With advice from officials at working levels of concerned departments and from research institutions in Beijing and Shanghai, Chinese leaders became aware of the economic cost if the United States should terminate China's MFN status. In these circumstances, Beijing released 200 more detainees in early May and intended to make some additional concessions (Xinghao, 1991:1160).

This can ultimately be seen as the US effort to goad China to adopt the path toward democracy and its peaceful surge as a Great Power in the end. At this juncture, also, we should not forget that the interest-based socialization can be US primary mechanism to integrate China into international society and to get it to learn and

internalize norms and values of international society, like human rights and democracy, as a good cooperative member of international society.

Also, the US incorporation of China into the WTO members is very meaningful, which ensured that China could learn the rules of games and even be a writer of new rules in international society, not to mention its exposure to international norms and values, such as human rights and democracy (Zhu, 2006:126). China's membership in the WTO can strengthen its position of pluralistic principles of international society. For instance, China's chief negotiator on WTO membership said "when our country joins an international organization, our top priority remains our sovereignty and our national interest....we will not do anything contradictory to our national interest" (Yongtu, 1999:2-3). However, we cannot deny that China's identity and character can be altered via interest-oriented socialization, which can, at least, minimize its potential disruptive behaviors and maximize the integration of China into international society in which certain common norms and values are shared among the members of international society.

Besides the WTO, the US has retained a generalized engagement with East Asia through its membership in APEC and the ARF that reflects explicitly the linkage between economic and military relations in the Asia-Pacific (Buzan and Waeber, 2003: 166). As for the US, APEC and the ARF can be recognized as a mechanism to transform China in both domestic and international arena.<sup>481</sup> In fact, as the 2006 APEC summit in Hanoi showed, it is a good mechanism for China to play a significant role as a regional power and potential Great Power, let alone a citizen of international society. This will raise the possibility that China will eventually accept

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<sup>481</sup> I will touch on how ASEAN and ARF can have impact on China's transformation again, when I attempt to reveal the close relationship between IOs and China's path toward democracy.

norms and values of international society, human rights and democracy, which could be hardly imagined in its past revisionist attitude against international society. As mentioned in earlier chapters, we can assume that in May 2004, China's constitutional change to allow private property and human rights could be in part derived from China's rational calculation-based engagement, primarily 'economic development and stability.' This might indicate a more peaceful world in the future. As the UK and the US managed their power transition peacefully from the late nineteenth century until the end of World War II due to their democratic institutions and cultures, and as the characteristics of the Cold War itself could have been quite different from what we experienced if the Soviet Union was a democracy rather than a totalitarian dictatorship, we can positively expect the future constructive relationship between China and the US.<sup>482</sup> Further, we might possibly expect a peaceful power-transition from US to China, if China's overall supremacy over the US can take place in the late 21<sup>st</sup> century, beyond its potential economic supremacy over the US by 2025 and can become the largest democratic state across international society.<sup>483</sup> Nevertheless, Chinese leadership has been deeply engaged in traditional power politics.

To sum up, China reflects a pluralist international society, and the relationship between the US and China can be understood as hegemonic on one hand but as competitive on the other hand. In consideration of these, as a Great Power, the US has been more likely to adopt an engagement policy based on interest-oriented socialization in dealing with China. Great Power's facilitation of integrating of China into international society via its providing material-interest incentives can bring

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<sup>482</sup> The US and its alliance would not bother to be worried about China's shooting down the weather satellite if China is authentically liberal democracy. See "Concern over China's missile test." *BBC News*. January 19, 2007.

<sup>483</sup> See, for more information, Oded Shenkar (2004).

out cooperative relationship with its neighboring states, making China face political pressure on itself toward democracy, which has slowly but gradually led to alteration in China's identity and character. The US has made an effort to integrate China into international society via China's socialization with members of international society, which has brought out its cooperative language and behavior in international society. Also, as China has become more and more engaged in international society, China can have more and more stakes in others' interest and even in general interests of international society as a whole. In its socialization with members of international society, also, China has slowly followed general norms and values of international society, which can eventually alter even China's domestic political structure, like moving towards democracy from authoritarianism. This is what the US has expected from China, and this is why the US has favored China in various ways, such as MFN status and WTO membership in order to integrate China into international society. This is not only the US optimal option for China's path toward democracy, but also its most plausible way to assist China's participation in the club of Great Powers. Furthermore, this might bring out its participation even in the capitalist democratic security community in the long run.

However, as Hongying Wang points out, the Chinese traditional view derived from China's centerism and nationalism might limit the role of socialization with Great Power to alter China's identity and characteristics (Wang, 2000:489, Shambaugh, 1996:204-209). In addition, we should keep in mind the assumption that the effects of socialization might vary in relation to each state's distinguishing circumstances like internal and external variables (Wang, 2000:489, Shambaugh, 1996:204-209). But, it is worth looking at how material incentives the US has provided to China can have an impact on China's path toward democracy under the

US hegemonic relationship with China. All in all, we can't diminish the great effect of socialization via Great power's role on China's peaceful evolution of identity and characteristics, in particular when comparing China's behaviors and language today with its behaviors and language during Mao's regime. In other words, China is slowly moving toward democracy, even if very slowly.

### ***3. B) Great Power's Role in Democratic Development in South Korea***

In the post-Cold War and 21<sup>st</sup> century, South Korea reflects aspects of a solidarist international society. In this international society, Great Power, that is, the US is more likely to adopt value-oriented socialization via persuasion and legitimacy. This consolidates democracy in South Korea. In turn, South Korea's democratic development based on economic achievement and political maturity has strengthened its relationship with the US, and can facilitate the capitalist democratic security community or mature anarchy in Buzan's terms.

For several decades, South Korean people have gradually internalized democracy as the most decent form of government. In the post-Cold War era and 21<sup>st</sup> century, we cannot deny the fact that South Korea has entered into a capitalist democratic security community as well as a solidarist international society. A majority of Koreans have been very royal to democracy, as in May 1997, 68% of the South Korean population (more than two third) and in 2004, 58% of South Korean population revealed loyal commitment to democracy (Park and Shin, 2006:671-2). Also, as Park and Shin point out, for ten years (1993-2003), South Korea gained an average rating of 2.0 on Freedom House's seven-point scaled of political rights and civil liberties, and in the 2005 report, South Korea got an average of 1.5 (Park and Shin, 2006:668). This indicates that most ordinary Koreans are highly likely to reveal support for democracy. Nevertheless, there has been some fluctuation, due to

the economic crisis in South Korea, for instance, “the drop of 14 % in preference for democracy at the beginning of the economic crisis in late 1997”(Park and Shin, 2006:672). My point is that South Korea should be seen as different from China because for a majority of South Korean population, democracy is an end itself rather than a means to an end, which has made possible ‘value-oriented socialization’ based on a learning process.

Along with the characteristics of a solidarist international society, in fact, we should perceive that the US can be recognized as primacy and leadership over South Korea in its relationship with South Korea. As above, Bull mentioned that the concept of the primacy can convey the idea that a Great Power can make a disproportionately large contribution to the achievement of a common purpose (Bull, 1977:208-209). Such contribution provides the leadership to the Great Power, which Small Powers and Middle Power conceded (Bull, 1977:208-209). This can be seen in the solid alliance relationships between the US and South Korea. A more than fifty-year alliance between the US and South Korea has significantly contributed to South Korea’s relations with the US and its foundation for democratic promotion and consolidation, because the US has guaranteed South Korea’s security in a large manner and accelerated its economic development and political maturity (Kim, 2004c:157).

In this section, I will reveal the US’s massive material contribution to South Korea, focusing on several aspects, such as the security aspect, economic aspect, social aspect and political aspect. And, I will briefly illustrate the US value-oriented socialization with South Korea. All of these can illustrate the relationship between the US and South Korea as the US primacy over South Korea, and show the US contribution to South Korea’s democratic consolidation, which can eventually help us

comprehend how South Korea and the US can consolidate democratic norms and values in international society. Nevertheless, South Korea's democracy was primarily emerging from the inside rather than the outside.

Let us focus on the below questions to examine Great Power's role in South Korea's democratic consolidation. What impact could the US's material contribution and value-oriented socialization have on South Korea's democratic consolidation? How could US's material contribution and value-oriented socialization with South Korea have an impact on South Korea's democratic consolidation? To answer these questions, first of all, in economic issue, I will examine how South Korea's economic relationship with the US can have an impact on South Korea's democratic development. South Korea's economic relationship with a Great Power has indirectly and directly influenced South Korea's path toward democracy, since the US military government (1945-1948) introduced a capitalist market economy (Im, 2006:160). In fact, we can guess how possibly and why South Korea has become a mature democratic regime, when considering South Korea's solid relation with the US beyond the military sector.

In this section, I will show that as a Great Power, the US has re-enforced South Korea's democratic consolidation via its economic relationship with South Korea. In the consideration of South Korea's level of democracy, I will examine how a Great Power's economic relationship with South Korea can contribute to South Korea's consolidation of democracy. In this juncture, first of all, I will briefly examine how a Great Power can provide South Korea with economic interests in the post-Cold War era and the 21<sup>st</sup> century. And I will emphasize how as Great Power, the US economic value and norm can affect South Korea's consolidation of democracy on the basis of its economic wealth and stability.



As a Great Power, the US has supported economic reforms by providing the principal market in the international society and by providing the leadership in promoting an open international trade, financial system and economic assistance.<sup>484</sup> South Korea cannot be exceptional at all. For instance, during the period from 1946 to 1973, economic assistance from the US amounted to US \$ 5.7 billion, beyond US military assistance such as US \$6.8 billion and the US 37, 000 troops, and during the duration of the first five years plan, grants from the US counted for the largest part of South Korea's foreign capital (Kleiner, 2001: 257). This could greatly contribute to economic development on the basis of its gradual stability and order. Further, this could be regarded as the foundation for South Korea's path toward democracy in the long run.<sup>485</sup> In fact, we can identify it as the foundation of US primacy in its relationship with South Korea.

In South Korea's scale of trade with the US, we can see a close relationship. Since the late 1980s, the US has become South Korea's largest and most significant trading partner and it was the second largest export market, source of imports and supplier of foreign direct investment in 2003.<sup>486</sup> Primary U.S. exports to South Korea include semi-conductors, machinery, air-craft, agricultural products, beef, etc.<sup>487</sup> In turn, South Korea has become the seventh-largest market for US goods, and the second largest market for its agricultural products and beef.<sup>488</sup> South Korea's trade

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<sup>484</sup> See, for more information, "Fact Sheet: U.S. Economic Relations with East Asia and The Pacific." *US. Department of State Dispatch*. Vol. 6, Issue 31. July 31, 1995. pp 599.

<sup>485</sup> See, for more detail, Juergen Kleiner (2001: 313).

<sup>486</sup> See Mark E. Manyin (2004).

<sup>487</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>488</sup> *Ibid.*

relationship with the US was estimated to be worth around US \$72 billion in 2005, while in the same year, it has a \$10.8 billion trade surplus from the US.<sup>489</sup>

Also, we can observe the US favors toward South Korea in trade, as the US favors toward China such as the MFN. For instance, until 1998 when the US and South Korea signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on foreign access to Korea's auto market, Seoul had legally protected its auto-producers from foreign counterparts, charging 80% tariff on imported motor vehicles (Manyin, 2004:11). Nevertheless, it is the world's fourth-biggest producer of automobiles (Manyin, 2004:11). In fact, even after 1998 when Korean benefits from special consideration under the Generalized System of Preferences for developing countries were removed (Macdonald, 1990:216) and so tariff had been reduced from 80% to 8 %, the trade imbalance has not been shifted at all – e.g. in 2003, South Korea imported 4,460 US cars, whereas South Korean auto manufacturers exported over 630,000 cars to the US (Manyin, 2004:11). Nonetheless, this does not necessarily mean that there has been only one way of benefit. In 2002, Hyundai Motor Company (HMC) in South Korea announced that it would build a \$1 billion plant in Montgomery, Alabama, with 2000 workers and in May, 2005, the facility began the official production, with the expectation of 300,000 vehicles per year at full capacity.<sup>490</sup> The relationships between South Korea and the US have been increasingly based on mutual interests.<sup>491</sup>

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<sup>489</sup> See "Seoul, US lock horns again." *Asia Times*, September 6, 2006.

<sup>490</sup> See Hyundai website available at: <http://www.hmmausa.com/company.aspx?id=28>

<sup>491</sup> In fact, mutual interests can be seen in various ways. For instance, The ROK even aided the victims of Hurricane Katrina with \$ 30 million contribution. See "US-Korea Free-Trade Pact Expected to Foster Sustainable Growth." The website is available at: <http://tokyo.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-20060215-07.html>. In 2004, South Korea contributed to overseas development assistance with over \$ 400 million, which can ultimately help the promotion of democracy and human rights in international society. See "US-Korea Relations: 2006 and beyond." The website is available at <http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/58893.htm>

Nevertheless, as indicated above, we can see that South Korea's economic success is primarily derived from its economic partnership with the US, which could be the foundation for South Korea's democratic promotion and consolidation.

However, in economic interaction between the US and South Korea, we should not forget several hardships in economic relationship between the US and South Korea. For instance, on one hand, Washington had not been satisfied with Seoul's regulation to discriminate against foreign firms like automobiles and consumer electronics, its restrictions in labor market and agricultural market (the most closed market in the OECD) (Manyin, 2004:10). On the other hand, Seoul was not happy with an anti-dumping duty on Korean exports of steel and semi-conductors (Manyin, 2004:16). These issues are problematic to both states, along with South Korea's gradual decline of dependence on the US market. But, once again, we cannot deny the fact that South Korea has had massive economic interests through its economic interaction with the US for more than fifty years, as in 1985 35% of Korean exports were in the US market (Macdonald, 1990:213). Also, we should keep in mind the fact that the US has been South Korea's principal sources of capital investment and of technology (Macdonald, 1990:22). This can indicate that Great Power's provision of material incentives should be recognized as its primary attraction to states.

However, South Korea's economic interaction with the US should be more than simply the reason for material incentives. In other words, in general, an economic relationship conveys the idea that economic interests can be a simple means to attract other states to adjust itself to or accept certain values and norms, which can be seen in China's case. The material aspect cannot be disregarded at all in

international society. However, South Korea's democratic consolidation was derived from more than material incentives from the US. There was authentic voluntary acceptance of democracy, in particular, since 1987. Furthermore, since South Korea overcame its economic crisis in 1997-8, South Korea has escalated its process of democratic consolidation. As mentioned above, South Korea can be categorized into the members of the capitalist democratic security community in Buzan's term. But, South Korea's economic structure was used to being marked as crony capitalism. This economic structure had been used by military regimes in South Korea, which was influenced by the methods used in Japan after WWII (Horowitz, 2002: 88).<sup>492</sup> This can help us comprehend that power structure and economic structure (also, social structure as Polanyi stressed) cannot be separated from each other.<sup>493</sup> When taking a look at South Korea's evolution to economic democracy from authoritarian crony capitalism, we can perceive that the US has given pressure to South Korea's economic liberalization (Macdonald, 1990:215). For instance, since the late 1970s, South Korea has gradually favored liberalization on international trade and foreign participation in Korean economic activity. In the post-Cold War era and 21<sup>st</sup> century, the US administrations, in particular, the Clinton administration's economic boom on the basis of neo-liberalism, especially in 1990s can escalate economic liberalization across international society, in particular, putting pressure upon Northeast Asian states to adopt neoliberal model, opening their protected domestic market (Im, 2006:159). South Korea cannot be excluded, even if neoliberal ideas could not explain South

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<sup>492</sup> When considering South Korea's crony economic structure as Japan's legacy during its colonial period over Korea (1910-1945), we can't disregard the impact of the US and UK' troops' presence on Iraq's social, economical, and political structure.

<sup>493</sup> This is, in part, derived from Japan's occupation of South Korea for more than three decades.

Korea's rapid economic growth before its economic crisis. South Korea has radically reformed its economic structure since it faced the 1997-1998 economic crisis which was primarily due to its lack of the flow of capital as well as its crony capitalist economic structure.

Neoliberalism under the guide of the Augmented Washington Consensus via international financial institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has had an impact on South Korea's economic openness and transparency, in particular when experiencing its economic crisis.<sup>494</sup> Nevertheless, the Augmented Washington Consensus differentiates itself from the original neo-liberal aspect to constrain the activism of civil society (Beeson and Islam, 2005: 203). The Augmented Washington Consensus does not seem to contribute to South Korea's democratic development, but it has been greatly contributing to South Korea's democratic consolidation. As a matter of fact, since the Asian economic crisis, such Augmented Washington Consensus had been recognized as the solution for economic crisis. Beeson and Islam state:

the core policy proposals pertaining to macroeconomic prudence, deregulation, privatization and liberalization now had to be supplemented by a renewed commitment to poverty reduction and wide-ranging institutional reform that fell under the rubric of good governance (Beeson and Islam, 2005:204).

The emphasis of the Augmented Washington Consensus on economic transparency and economic openness, along with the rule of law and the reduction of poverty, cannot be inevitably separated from the social and economic structure, which can

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<sup>494</sup> See, for more detail, Beeson and Islam (2005). In general, neoliberalism claims that a market economy, independent of government intervention is the critical prerequisite for engendering and maintaining economic prosperity beyond both time and space. Neoliberalism poses a direct challenge to the values and norms of regulated capitalism that had dominated international society for two decades after WWII, and that in 1980s and 1990s concreted the rise of neoliberalism.

bring out economic democracy (harmonious interest as essence of democracy). We can say that this has contributed to democratic consolidation in South Korea.

When considering the fact that crony capitalism facilitated the corruption of the political system in South Korea, like the arrest of former South Korean President's (Kim Young Sam) second son, Hyun-Chul, Kim for bribery from businessmen on May 17, 1997, its reform of economic structure via more openness and transparency based on rule of law has gradually reduced the corruption derived from the close connection of money and power. At this juncture, we can see that economic reform is not only derived from economic interests, but also from the South Korean population's mature democratic attitude. Economic reform has gradually led to economic democracy in South Korea, and economic democracy in South Korea has greatly contributed to democratic consolidation in South Korea. Due to this, we can say that neoliberalism under the guide of the Augmented Washington Consensus that the US has spread across international society, is closely connected with consolidation of democracy in South Korea. This can be seen as a Great Power's role in South Korea's democratic consolidation. We cannot deny the fact that, as a Great Power, the US contributed to South Korea's consolidation of democracy.

In political issues, we can't deny the US political pressure on South Korea's democratic development. Since 1945, the US had been influencing South Korea to accept democratic norms and values during the Cold War period. In fact, the US provided the starting conditions for Korean democratic development. For instance, the three-year US military government (1945-1948) in South Korea made available universal suffrage to all adult Koreans in the fundamental election of Constitutional Assembly of 1948, introducing liberal democratic institutions such as rule of law and multi-party system (Im, 2006:160). This implies that the initial stage of democracy

was given to Koreans by the US as a Great Power.<sup>495</sup> As for the US, South Korea's democracy has been very significant, and it might be more primarily for strategic interests in an instrumental sense rather than an end itself. In particular, during the Cold War era, South Korea's democracy had been recognized as a bulwark against the communist bloc, as North Korea had been recognized as a bulwark against democratic community. The Reagan administration had intention to pressure Chun's regime to democratize South Korea, and in the highest attention of democratic movement in South Korea in June 1987, the 40<sup>th</sup> U.S. President Ronald Reagan sent a letter to Chun in support of the establishment of 'democratic institutions,' which indirectly influenced democratic reform programs such as direct presidential elections and restoration of banned politicians like Kim Dae-Jung (Fowler, 1999:287-288). Also, as Representative of the U.S. House, Stephen J. Solarz said "like the Philippines, South Korea is an example of a country where we can more effectively protect our strategic interests by promoting our political values" (Fowler, 1999:286). According to geo-political perspective, Korea has been at the nexus of regional powers' interests, and its capital is close to Beijing, Vladivostok and Tokyo, which means that around 700 million people live within a radius of 1,200 kilometers of Seoul (Levin, 2004:42). Even in the post-Cold War era and 21<sup>st</sup> century, the geopolitical significance of the Korean Peninsula cannot be diminished, and its democracy can be still considered as US strategic interests to cope with North Korea and China, which can facilitate to modify China and North Korea's identities and characteristics. Nevertheless, after the Cold War era, some scholars such as Hyug-Baeg Im claim that in the post-Cold War era and 21<sup>st</sup> century, the US's strategic interests in South Korea has been reduced,

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<sup>495</sup> This might give some hope to Iraq's democracy which I will mention later.

while emphasizing more economic interests, which means the transformation from geo-political interests to geo-economic interests (Im, 2006:162).

But, currently, the US primary concerns in international society are about three countries, Iraq, North Korea, and Iran, and about weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), terrorism (after 9/11) and democracy. This indicates that the US's strategic interests in South Korea's democracy cannot be reduced at all, as long as North Korea's nuclear issue cannot be solved and its characteristics and identity (an outlaw state) cannot be altered. In fact, as mentioned in previous chapters, I admit that the US can more easily promote democracy in the post-Cold War era and 21<sup>st</sup> century than in the Cold War era, due to the end of ideological struggle on global level. For instance, as Hyug Haeg Im puts it, the US grant of Kwangju massacre in 1980 could be one of examples of the US foreign policy's priority of security over democracy during the Cold War era, in its favor of authoritarian regimes against communism (Im, 2006:172). But, since then, the US has been very reluctant to approve Seoul's use of military force against its own civilian democratic movement in South Korea, stressing peace, prosperity and democracy (Im, 2006:172). However, in South Korea's democracy, the most important thing is South Korea's close relationships with the US for more than fifty years, with its direct exposure to the norms of democracy and human rights. Also, the US has been very patient with democratic progress in South Korea, when considering that it took more than four decades (1945-1987) until South Korea started getting into authentic democratic reform and that it took more than five decades until South Korea could start enjoying a decent democratic system.

Today, we can feel more and more democratic consolidation in South Korea, as the increasing percentage of satisfied citizens with democracy demonstrates. The



percentage of satisfied citizens with democratic performance has increasingly risen, for instance, from 44 % in 1998 to 47 % in 2001 and in 60 % in 2004 (Park and Shin, 2006:673). This indicates that South Korea's democracy has become gradually consolidated. In particular, we can perceive that the younger generation's perception on democracy can reflect South Korea's gradual democratic consolidation, when taking a look at some generational gaps between the pre-Korean war generation (old generation) and the post-Korean war generation (young generation, especially under ages 40). The old generation is still likely to prefer authoritarian political structure over democratic political structure, like Park Jung-Hee's regime, in consideration of South Korea's economic miracle and of its face of threat from North Korea. The old generation is highly likely to appreciate what the US did to South Korea such as its help to defend South Korea from communist infiltration during Korean War and massive economic and military aids during the post war period. By contrast, the young generation tends to regard political freedom and human rights as very significant, even though a small portion of young generation seem to be radical anti-American. The young generation is deeply exposed to American pop culture such as Hollywood Movies, hamburgers, Coca-Cola, Starbucks Coffee, etc. but also they are thoroughly embedded in democratic norms and values as well. At this juncture, my bottom line is that this young generation is more deeply embedded in norms and values of international society, human rights and democracy than the old generation, even if this generation might be less likely to appreciate what the US did. This generation does not permit second Kwang-Ju massacre that was primarily rooted in authoritarian dictatorship. This indicates South Korea's rising level of democratic consolidation. This has contributed to the US effort to democratic promotion and consolidation in international society. In fact, the 2002 election demonstrated South

Korea's democratic consolidation. A majority of the young generation voted for Roh Moo Hyun who was a former labor worker lawyer/human rights lawyer, and one of Kwang-Ju massacre prosecutors as a member of the National Assembly against former President Chun Doo-Hwan, and who has never been given any opportunity to study in any university. His presidency can be marked as South Korea's turning point toward its mature democracy. When considering all of these, South Korea's democratic consolidation process can contribute back to the US role in the promotion and consolidation of democracy as well as human rights in international society in the end, not to mention South Korea's solid relationship with the US.

Regarding security issues, we can see how the US as a Great Power can have an impact on South Korea's promotion and consolidation of democracy. The US and the Republic of Korea (ROK) founded an effective alliance during the three-year Korean War that took over 33,000 US troops and left over 100,000 wounded soldiers.<sup>496</sup> In 1954, it was formalized by signing the US- ROK Mutual Defense Treaty (Kim, 2004a:191). The alliance enjoyed the fifty-eighth anniversary on October 2011. Jae-Chang Kim described the Cold War and post-Cold War alliance between South Korea and the US, by saying:

**During the Cold War**, the alliance used a strategy of deterrence against North Korea even as both nations prepared to defeat the enemy in case deterrence failed. This strategy worked well for both partners of the alliance because the US and the ROK wanted the **status quo on the peninsula.....After the Cold War, however, two states of the alliance are now using their own dynamic methods in dealing with North Korea in contrast to the more static modes used during the Cold War** (Kim, 2004a:191).

Also, we can think of Bush's remark in January 2002 "North Korean regime is a

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<sup>496</sup> See Mark E. Manyin (2004).

member of axis of evil”, and of ROK’s engagement policy toward North Korea (Kim, 2004a:191). The military alliance between the US and South Korea has been successful. Such alliance can consolidate South Korea’s democracy. Victor Cha points out mutual benefits via such military alliance:

For the United States today, a range of indicators determines the success of a military alliance. It (1) deters aggression; (2) facilitates US power accretion and projection; (3) shares risks and costs among the parties; (4) enables common tactics and doctrine through joint training; (5) promote a division of security roles; (6) severs US security objectives in the broader regional context; (7) facilitates cooperation in production and development of military equipment; (8) facilitates a reasonable quality of life and hospitable environment for US forces stationed abroad; (9) reflects shared political values; and (10) elicits political support among domestic constituencies (Cha, 2004:122).

These show how the close alliance between the US and South Korea can facilitate their relative security, which escalates South Korea’s process of democratic consolidation and help the US effort to develop democracy in international society. In the post-Cold War era and 21<sup>st</sup> century, the US role is still absolutely needed to guarantee South Korea security as the fundamental element for South Korea’s democratic consolidation. South Korea is still given the US 28,500 troops assistance, and the US even plans to invest \$11 billion to reinforce the combat power of the US forces in South Korea over the next three years on the program to upgrade missile systems and military intelligence assets in order to cope with North Korea’s world fourth largest army better (Kim, 2004a:196). Besides, today, North Korea’s nuclear issue is not only beyond South Korea’s capability unless South Korea nuclearizes itself, but also it can be marked as a regional security issue or even an international security issue. This can be confirmed by the Japanese government’s claim that North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons would be nightmare to Japanese

security. Further, North Korea has been marked as an 'outlaw state' in Simpson's term and as part of 'the axis of evil' in Bush's term, and the US concern about WMDs and terrorism has been increased since 9/11 in 2001. At this juncture, we can perceive that these can strengthen the solid relationship between the US and South Korea, which can reinforce mutual interests. In its awareness of this fact, the US facilitates South Korea's consolidation of democracy in the post-Cold War era and 21<sup>st</sup> century. Also, the above indicate that the US's relationship with South Korea can be seen as primacy.

However, the US relationship with South Korea can't be seen as a rosy picture all the time. For instance, as Kim puts it, we can find anti-Americanism such as ideological, policy-oriented and emotional aspects (Kim, 2004c:159). A very small radical group is obsessed with socialist vision of one Korea, which has been rejected and disregarded by a majority of population, and some portion of civilians, in particular liberal intellectuals were opposed to Bush's administration's hawkish position against North Korea, which can conflict with South Korea's Sunshine policy (Kim, 2004c:160). The 2002 protest for the incidence of the death of two schoolgirls demonstrated the underlying anti-Americanism in South Korea. Even some scholars like Kurt M. Campbell mentioned this anti-Americanism. Campbell states:

US alliance with Japan and South Korea, respectively, remain the linchpins for larger American pursuits in Asia, and it is difficult to imagine to how the United States could manage effectively without close partnerships in Tokyo and Seoul. Yet, just as **US relations with Japan are probably stronger than at any time in modern history, US ties with South Korea are weaker and under greater tension.** This imbalance puts a strain on both Japan and South Korea, but each in different ways. **For Japan, the alienation between Washington and Seoul raises the prospect that someday soon Japan will bear the burden of hosting the US military presence alone in Asia and serve as the lone security entry point for the America into the regions**

(Campbell, 2004: 31).

Campbell's argument might be right in some sense, but I do not agree to his description of today's relationships between South Korea and the US with three primary reasons: first, in 2002, the massive protest for the death of two school girls can be interpreted with anti-Americanism, but it might be nothing, when compared with massive Japanese protest for three American soldiers' rape of 12 years-old school girl in Okinawa - indeed, in 2012, Washington eventually decided to withdraw 9000 US troops from Okinawa; second, South Korean government deployed around 3,300 troops along with the 500 medical and support personnel in the Kurdish-controlled town of Irbill in northern Iraq as the third largest contributing foreign troops following the UK troops, even after Japanese troops were withdrawn due to Iraq's insecure and unstable future; and third, in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, it is very hard to expect the US troops' complete withdrawal from the Korean peninsula, as long as North Korea has posed the great threat to international society with the world fourth largest army (1.21 million armed personnel) and with its possible nuclear weapons, and it has been regarded as China's bulwark against the US direct influence. Nevertheless, the situation might be altered after the unification of two Koreas.<sup>497</sup> Also, South Korea does not need to be constrained as much as Japan has been indirectly restrained by the

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<sup>497</sup> In fact, I really doubt that the US will completely withdraw its forces from the Korean Peninsula after the unification of two Koreas, when considering that the Korean Peninsula can be recognized as the intersection or bridge among three regional powers (Russia, China and Japan) and one Great Power/Hyper-Power, (the US). For strategic reasons, the US might want to put its troops in the Korean Peninsula to counter-balance Russia's and especially China's rising power, while assisting Japan and South Korea in some sense. Buzan claims that global power structure can be interpreted as one super-power (the US) plus four great powers (China, the EU, Japan, Russia). See Buzan (2004b:87). This implies that the Korean Peninsula is the very attractive zone for the US strategic reasons. However, it might be hard to deploy the US troop continuously there after the unification of two Korea, since as for Korea, itself, there will be very few of persuasive reasons to permit the US troop. In fact, the local South Korean community has increasingly viewed the presence of the US bases as an obstacle to local development due to prostitution, traffic violations, environmental containment, disturbances from military firing exercises, etc. Woo-Soo Kim briefly mentioned this issue. See Kim (2004c:167).

US due to Japan's past imperialist aggression, even though Japan has been also advocated by the US in various ways. In short, 'South Korea is NOT Japan.'<sup>498</sup> All of these can reject Campbell's ideas, in particular, the following ideas:

US ties with South Korea are weaker and under greater tension.....for Japan, the alienation between Washington and Seoul raises the prospect that someday soon Japan will bear the burden of hosting the US military presence alone in Asia and serve as the lone security entry point for the Americans into the regions (Campbell, 2004:31).

Furthermore, Campbell's description of anti-Americanism should not be interpreted as the idea that the solid relationship between the US and South Korea is fragile. For instance, according to the survey of Joongang Ilbo in June 2003, a large portion of South Korean people, around 63% of respondents still advocate the presence of US troops on Korean soil, not to mention 90% respondents' regard of South Korea's relationship with the US as very significant (Kim, 2004c:175, fn. 5).

However, in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, Won-Soo Kim claims that two allies do not have identical priorities in their perception of threats, even if the US and South Korea still have many common grounds (Kim, 2004c: 169). He stated that South Korea has feared any outbreak of conventional conflict on the peninsula, whereas the US has feared WMD proliferation and its transfer to terrorists (Kim, 2004c: 169). However, instead of different priorities, the bottom line is that they have shared many common grounds. In particular, both states have reached the same point that democratic development and security are closely related. As for the US, the promotion and consolidation of democracy along with human rights in international society can be

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<sup>498</sup> The US troops in Japan like Okinawa and Yokosuka can be interpreted so as to constrain Japan's excessive military power as well, even if it has been known to counter-balance China's military power, in particular when considering that its neighboring states still fear its potential aggression in the future in the absence of the US influence. Also, South Korea is not an outlaw state (not Saddam's Iraq and not Kim Jong-Il's North Korea), but a decent mature democratic country, which we should keep in mind.

the primary solution to global terrorism that has been recognized as the greatest threat to American national security. Washington (& Downing Street as well) thoroughly believes that the promotion of democracy in international society is the panacea to global threats to international society beyond their own national interests. Seoul has a similar tendency, as its foreign policy such as human rights and democracy demonstrates, in particular, in dealing with North Korea. Thus, two states' mutual socialization has consolidated South Korea's democracy further. In this context, I do not think that we should care too much about anti-Americanism in South Korea. On the whole, above, all factors could fabricate the groundwork for South Korea's mature level of liberal democracy. At this point, we can perceive South Korea's relations with the US as a Great Power as an essential part to drive South Korea into a mature liberal democratic country.

### ***3. C) Great Power's Role in Iraq's Path toward Democracy***

In this section, I will broadly scrutinize Great Powers' role in Iraq's path toward democracy. I will primarily focus on Great Powers' invasion of and their presence in Iraq, even if I will briefly mention their withdrawal from Iraq. But, unlike many other scholars, I will seek for positive points rather than negative points for Great Powers' use of force in Iraq, as the initial big step toward democracy. As E.H Carr put it in his work, "Conditions of Peace," I will demonstrate the use of force as necessary, as long as it is impartially used in order to uphold order and security in any event (Carr, 1942:255). Iraq cannot be exceptional. Ultimately, in this section, I will reveal how Great Powers can have an impact on Iraq's democratic development.

Let us start with the characteristics of the relationships between the US/the UK and Iraq. As mentioned in Chapter I, Iraq itself reflects the characteristics of a liberal anti-pluralist international society. In a liberal anti-pluralist international

society, the use of force is the primary mechanism for democratic development. When considering this, we might also think the relationship between Great Powers and Iraq in a liberal anti-pluralist international society as dominance in Bull's term.<sup>499</sup> According to Bull, the concept of dominance is short of imperial sovereign relationships, but can be characterized by the habitual use of force against the lesser power states, disregarding the principles of equal sovereign rights and political independence (Bull, 1977:208-209). Nevertheless, in my dissertation, I tend to use the concept of dominance as a strong concept of hegemony and a weak concept of dominance. This could be seen in the US/UK presence in Iraq from their invasion, which is their contribution to Iraq's national building process toward a decent democratic regime as a new identity and character. In Great Powers' dominance over lesser power states, at this juncture, the use of force might be justified for the promotion and consolidation of democracy in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In consideration of these, I will explore Great Powers' role in promoting and consolidating democracy in Iraq.

As a matter of fact, lots of democratic legacies can be easily found in Great Powers' former colonies. For instance, the Westminster Parliamentary System in Australia, India, Ireland, Jamaica, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and Malta can be good examples of the legacy of British colonial rule.<sup>500</sup> This indicates Great Powers' historical efforts and contribution to the fusion between their social, cultural and political structure and target state's traditional social, cultural and political

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<sup>499</sup> The US force structure was developed during the 1960s, on the account of doctrines that the US forces should be prepared to fight simultaneous conflicts. The US developed capabilities to fight simultaneously a major land war in Europe, a major land war in Asia, and a brush-fire war somewhere in the southern hemisphere. The doctrines has brought out today's US supreme military power, which has been called a hyper-power and makes it possible the relationship of dominance between the US and Iraq. See Michael Glennon (2002).

<sup>500</sup> See the website: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Westminster\\_System](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Westminster_System)



structure, via their use of force and presence of force. This could contribute to the promotion and consolidation of democracy. In particular, during the middle nineteenth century, Britain could be successful in changing the normative orientation of Indian elites, by facilitating political liberalization and secularization (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990:307). Ikenberry and Kupchan explained well about Britain's impact on Indian political and social values by saying:

Before the British Presence, Indian politics was dominated by religious affiliation and practice, the cast system, and strong local and regional allegiance. By the end of the 1800s, Western notions of administrative efficiency and justice had led to the gradual secularization of politics; the importance of the caste system had declined somewhat; and the spread of English had helped overcome the political regionalism that had been perpetuated by linguistic diversity. In short, British political values and practices had intermingled with and, in some instance, replaced the traditional norms eroding under the pressure of colonialism.....**India's political elite actually came to believe in western values rather than simply mouthing acquiescence because of British coercion** (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990:309-310).

Also, in the post-war era, the US forces had occupied Germany and Japan during long period, bringing out successful political and social reforms to embrace the principles of liberal democracy on the new constitutions. Indeed, we can recall one Japanese scholar's remarks that as the years have passed, the influence of occupation reforms has penetrated into the very core of society and that the reforms themselves have been exercised as a powerful effect on character of politics and on history (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990: 307).<sup>501</sup> Also, we can make a positive assumption that Iraq can be gradually embedded in democratic norms and values. Below, I will primarily examine two stages in the use of force: Great Powers' invasion and

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<sup>501</sup> See for the original context, Takemai Eiji (1983: 359-60). Also see Masataka Kosaka (1972: 65).

occupation. Nevertheless, I will briefly mention about withdrawal. This can demonstrate how Great Powers can contribute to the promotion and consolidation of democracy in Iraq. I sincerely hope that this part can be helpful to comprehend Great Powers' use of force in international society and their role in democratic development in international society. Before assessing Great Powers' role in the democratic development in Iraq, I want to proclaim Carr's remark in his work, "Conditions of Peace", that peace cannot be achieved by states simply avowing not to resort to war, without their use of force and their will (Carr, 1942:241-280, Wilson, 1998:13).

**a. Great Powers' Invasion of Iraq and Democracy**

In general, we can think of three stages, 'invasion,' 'occupation' and 'withdrawal' in the use of force when considering Iraq's circumstance. As one stage, 'invasion,' we cannot deny the US and the UK's contribution to Iraq's path toward democracy in some sense. In this section, I will investigate whether or not invasion can alter Iraq's identity and characteristics, and even political environment in the Middle East. Let us briefly scrutinize the relationships between invasion and democratic development, which can help us comprehend how Great Powers can have an initial great impact on democratic development in a liberal anti-pluralist international society. Nevertheless, at this juncture, once again, I will use some context of Chapter I in which I illustrated liberal anti-pluralism.

In 2003, Great Powers, the US and UK-led coalition forces invaded Iraq, and they toppled Saddam's regime. This has been recognized as Iraq's turning point in kicking off its process toward democracy, which can be recognized as the good example of Great Powers' use of force for the promotion and consolidation of democracy. However, as I mentioned in Chapter II (international law), it is very

hard to expect the use of force in contemporary international society, except for some cases. For instance, Article 2 (4) of Chapter I in the UN Charter clearly claims the prohibition of the use of force against other nation states.

All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations (Article 2, Section 4).<sup>502</sup>

This evidently shows that the principles of equal sovereignty and non-intervention should not be violated in international society. Nevertheless, Article 42 and Article 51 of the Chapter VII in the Charter of the United Nations have been recognized as the basic guiding principles for the use of force in contemporary international society.

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations (Article 42).<sup>503</sup>

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security (Article, 51).<sup>504</sup>

These two Articles obviously show that the use of force is not absolutely prohibited

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<sup>502</sup> Available at the website: <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml>

<sup>503</sup> Ibid

<sup>504</sup> Ibid

due to the principles of non-intervention and equal sovereignty. In contemporary international society, the use of force can be, in some sense, justified whenever absolutely necessary to prevent 'the threats to peace,' 'the breaches to peace' and 'the acts of aggression.' The above two Articles have been most times respected by UN member states in international society. And also, the use of force has been sanctioned only on the authority of the Security Council (Mayall, 2000: 319-332). All of these reasons can justify the use of force in current international society.

However, in reality, in international society, we can observe many other legitimate uses of force for many reasons, such as a right to intervene to put a stop to serious human rights abuses or violation of international humanitarian law – e.g. genocide, mass expulsion or systematic rape - and even a right to promote or restore democracy (Byers, 2005:85). Also, Great Powers' use of force in international society has been very often expected, whenever the UN failed to respond to the crisis, such as East Timor, Rwanda, Bosnia, Sierra Leone and Kosovo. In particular, as the reasons of the UN's failure to respond to the crisis, we can think of the cases that some major powers' interests are involved in the crisis or that there are different views within the Security Council on the right of the UN to intervene in internal conflict – e.g. we can still see perceive China and Russia's opposition to UN's humanitarian intervention, even if the US, the UK and France support such intervention, which can be seen as in Kosovo's case (Hilaire, 2005:154). Furthermore, Article 43 of the UN Charter cannot be implemented in practice so far - Article 43 mentions:

all members make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining

international peace and security.<sup>505</sup>

Even Great Powers such as the US have not supported a standing U.N. army, and Security Council has rarely asked the US to use armed force. For instance, in the US, Republican and Democratic members of Congress believe that this could weaken the national ability to defend its own interest, if the US forces are used to serve on a regular basis under UN command, like both conservative members of Congress's criticism on Clinton administration's proposal to endorse Article 43 framework (Glennon, 2003:340). The US is never expected to provide the US forces upon any United Nations Security Council's request complete freedom to use them, which former Secretary of State, Warren Christopher revealed by saying "we do not exclude the possibility down the road of an Article 43 kind of force, but I must say at this point it seems quite remote"(Glennon, 2003:339-341).

Above, my point is that the use of force by Great Powers as legitimate can be excused for maintenance and promotion of the well-being of international society. Also, I attempted to demonstrate that the Security Council cannot be fully reliable in international society, particularly if its resolution might influence some permanent members' own interest, which could be confirmed by the Kosovo crisis and the Rwanda crisis, revealing the malfunction and limit of Security Council's role in dealing with international affairs. Above, we can perceive the malfunction and limit of the United Nations, Great Powers' reluctance to follow the UN's leadership due to various reasons like Article 43, and the necessity of the role of Great Powers in international society.<sup>506</sup>

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<sup>505</sup> See Article 43 of Chapter VII in UN Charter, the website available at : <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm>

<sup>506</sup> Glennon reveals the relationship between the US and the UN. See Michael Glennon (2003).

As a matter of fact, in addition, as Tom Farer points out, on and off, states have to adopt the choice of response to ‘urgent moral appeals’ rather than the choice of ‘rigid compliance with formal prohibition’ (Farer, 1993: 341). At this point, the moral appeal is aimed at Great Powers, since without the role of Great Powers, such appeal will ultimately turn out to be in vain. As mentioned above, the 1994 Rwanda’s genocide or the 2006 Sudan’s Darfur’s genocide undeniably demonstrate how significant the roles of Great Powers are in international society. All of these obviously uncover that the use of force in international society cannot be limited to individual state self-defense and collective self-defense of states alone (Article 51 of Chapter VII in the UN Charter). Great Powers should act unilaterally, whenever necessarily, even in case that the five permanent members of Security Council cannot reach the consensus for the use of force. Bush revealed it in his letter accompanying the submission of his National Security Strategy, saying “in the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action,” and “the greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction”(Bush, 2002: v and 15, Jervis, 2003:373), which can be, in fact, demonstrated by the US past experiences of its inaction until the outbreak of WWI, WWII and 9/11. The Great Powers’ action might prevent or at least slow down the transition process of potential threat into a real major menace. All in all, Great Powers’ use of force beyond boundaries can be legitimized /even possibly legalized, as long as it is highly limited to outlaw states with decent price, which can endorse the welfare of international society as a whole in the long run.

However, such use of force is not easy at all, and it cannot be expected all the time in international society. By December, 2006, around 3,000 Americans had lost

their lives serving in Iraq, and 21, 000 Americans had been wounded.<sup>507</sup> Up to 2006, the US had spent around US \$400 billion on the Iraq War and the cost was around US \$8 billion per month.<sup>508</sup> Approximately \$2 trillion for the final cost of the U.S. involved in Iraq was expected.<sup>509</sup> Especially, when considering the fact that Iraqi casualties had been over 150,000 deaths and around 2 million Iraq's people left Iraq to Syria since 2003, the price is high.<sup>510</sup> This can be one lesson for Great Powers to choose the option of use of force. Nonetheless, it is not wrong to alter the outlaw state, but instead, it might not be wise to do in terms of timing and price. However, what if Iraq will eventually turn out to be a decent leading democratic regime in the Middle East?

In the Cold War and the post-Cold War era, the US's promotion of democracy can be seen as Great Power's role, even if we can mostly perceive some different characteristics in the US promotion of democracy between in the Cold War period and in the post-Cold War period, such as a simple ideological struggle. Panama's case (Dec. 20, 1989) might be a good example for the US's promotion of democracy. It might be similar to Iraq's case. Nevertheless, Grenada's case (Oct. 25, 1983) might be different from Iraq's case since "the US never claimed that it was intervening in Grenada to restore democracy"(Byers, 2005: 87). Michael Byers made a good point by saying:

While the right of self-defense in protection of nationals  
was the primary goal justification advanced by Washington,

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<sup>507</sup> See James A. Baker, III, Lee H. Hamilton, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Edwin Meese III, Sandra Day O'Connor, Leon E. Panetta, William J. Perry, Charles S. Robb, and Alan K. Simpson (2006:32).

<sup>508</sup> Ibid

<sup>509</sup> Ibid

<sup>510</sup> *BBC News*. December 10, 2006.

the defense of democracy claim garnered the most support from academics. Professor Anthony D'Amato of Northwestern University described US actions in Panama (and previously Grenada) as milestones along the path to a new non-statist conception of international law. Professor Michael Reisman of Yale University heralded **a new era in which the people, not governments, are sovereign.....The US government invoked democracy to support the invasion of Panama in two ways: as the exercise of a right to act unilaterally to promote democracy in other countries, and as the provision of assistance to a democratically elected head of states, Guillernmo Endara, who had ostensibly consented to the action** (Byers, 2005:88-89).

At this juncture, I want to emphasize people rather than government as sovereign, which reflects some parallel between Panama's case (General Manuel Noriega's dictatorship) and Iraq's case (Saddam Hussein's dictatorship). Maybe, Panama's case might open the door toward 'Great Powers' use of force for the promotion of democracy' in the post-Cold War era and 21<sup>st</sup> century. Nevertheless, the 1999 Kosovo intervention, the 2001 Afghanistan intervention and the 2003 Iraq invasion can be seriously taken as examples for Great Powers' use of force as legitimate and further legalized possibly in the late 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Along with weapons of mass destruction and Al-Qaeda's linkage with Saddam's regime, the liberation of Iraqi people was one of primary excuses for the Iraq War, which can be seen in the spectrum of the old liberal idea and a liberal anti-pluralist international society.<sup>511</sup> As Gerry Simpson puts it, via the Gulf War in 2003, the coalition of the US and UK got the Iraqi people to sovereign right which had been taken away from them by the dictatorship (Simpson, 2005:7). In Simpson's terms, the 2003 war was for substantial sovereignty rather than formal sovereignty which is

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<sup>511</sup> The two reasons, the weapon of mass destruction and Al-Qaeda's linkage with Saddam's regime seemed to turn out to be non-sense. Nevertheless, we might accept the US fear on the WMD in some sense as one of primary causes of the US invasion of Iraq. I will touch on this in the below.



Koskenniemi's idea such as Kuwait's formal sovereignty exercisable by the state of Kuwait (Simpson, 2005:7). Simpson claims that the US and UK invasion of Iraq could be interpreted as even the protection of substantial sovereignty (Simpson, 2005:7). This claim can facilitate the assumption that the use of force can be used for the promotion and consolidation of democracy, if the target regime is absolutely an outlaw state. Along with this logic, it might be justifiable that in March, 2003, the US toppled the Baathist regime, and the US has transformed the country into a functioning liberal democracy (Fukuyama, 2004:95). In his speech on February 26, 2003, George W. Bush stated: "we meet here during a crucial period in the history of our nation, and of the civilized world. Part of that history was written by others; the rest will be written by us," and he laid out the agenda for democratization of Iraq and for the transformation of the politics of much of the Middle East which includes the progress on the Israel-Palestinian dispute and the promotion of pluralism in the Arab World (Fukuyama, 2004:95). At this point, I claim that Great Powers might have full privileges to use even their physical force for the promotion and consolidation of democracy, if it is ultimately necessary to boost up the wellbeing of international society in the long run. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, international law has still officially prohibited the use of force for pro-democracy, and even in current international society, the use of force is still hardly accepted for the promotion and consolidation of democracy, without condemnation from some countries. But, we can make the use of force possible as long as it can be highly limited to the alteration in the identity and characteristics of outlaw states alone.

We can see Iraq in this sense. Condoleezza Rice made remarks concerning Iraq, when she revealed some level of justification of the US and UK's invasion of Iraq, by saying:

In the past two generation, it was Saddam Hussein who took a society that was already rife with sectarian and religious divisions and drove it to the brink of the state of nature. He committed genocide and filled mass graves with 300,000 souls. He slaughtered entire villages of Shia and Kurds. And he carried out a nationwide policy of ethnic cleansing to make Iraq's Sunni minority dominant throughout the country. To be certain, he repressed a good number of Sunnis, too.<sup>512</sup>

This does not only reflect the invitation of external intervention to such wrong-doing in Iraq, but also the necessity of democracy in Iraq. In fact, when considering Iraq's circumstance, as Byers points out, what other kind of intervention can be legitimized, in particular if we know that pro-democratic intervention can ultimately become a panacea to governments' atrocities against their own civilians, their invasions of neighboring states for their own interests, and even terrorism? (Byers, 2005:91).

At this juncture, the US and the UK's invasion of Iraq can be legitimized in some sense, and this can be illustrated with Great Powers' role of 'dominance' in my understanding that can be characterized with a strong concept of hegemony and a weak concept of dominance in Bull's terms in a liberal anti-pluralist international society. Great Powers' role of dominance can be the alterative mechanism to socialization so as to bring out Iraq's new identity and characteristics. As constitutive relationships between agents and structure, in particular, mutually constitutive relationships between Great Powers and structure (a liberal anti-pluralist international society) imply, Great Powers can be legitimized to promote democracy in Iraq via their use of force, and a liberal anti-pluralist international society advocates the role of Great Powers in promoting and consolidating democracy.<sup>513</sup>

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<sup>512</sup> Former US Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice made speech at Ewood Park, Blackburn, United Kingdom, on March 31, 2006.

<sup>513</sup> As Robert Jervis points out, we should keep in mind the fact that Small Powers' and the Middle

Dominance can be advocated by the US National Security Strategy of September 2002, G.W. Bush's remarks, and neo-conservatives such as Elliot Abrams, Paul Wolfowitz, Irving Kristol and Charles Krauthamer. For instance, first, we can think of Paul Wolfowitz's "Defense Planning Guidance" draft's primary three points in 1992: "The number one objective of U.S. post-Cold War political and military strategy should be preventing the emergence of a rival super-power"; "Another major U.S. objective should be to safeguard U.S. interests and promote American values"(democracy, human rights as well as capitalism); and "If necessary, the United States must be prepared to take unilateral action."<sup>514</sup> Second, we can assume "the Bush Doctrine": "A policy of preventive war, should the US or its allies be threatened by terrorists or by rogue states that are engaged in the production of weapons of mass destruction"; "The right of self-defense should be extended in order to authorize preemptive attacks against potential aggressors, cutting them off before they are able to launch strikes against the U.S."; and "The duty of the US to pursue unilateral military action when acceptable multilateral solutions cannot be found."<sup>515</sup> Third, we can observe the documents of the National Security Strategy of the United States of America, which emphasizes the idea that the US's possession of unprecedented and unequalled strength and influence in the world must be used to favor freedom.<sup>516</sup> All of these can clearly reflect US dominance, which can help us understand the US invasion of Saddam's Iraq in some sense.

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Powers' values and norms (even the Great Powers' allies) can rarely influence Great Powers' ideas and behaviors. See Jervis (2003:388).

<sup>514</sup> See Barton Gellman (1992).

<sup>515</sup> See, for more information concerning Bush Doctrine, the website available at: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bush\\_Doctrine](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bush_Doctrine)

<sup>516</sup> See Bush (2002).

However, the above seems to focus too much on the US's self-interest alone. For instance, according to an April 2002 poll, the overwhelming majorities of people in many European countries felt that the US policy toward Iraq and the Middle East in general was based primarily on its own interests.<sup>517</sup> Also, when considering that George W. Bush emphasized American military supremacy beyond challenge and when that the Bush administration walked away from the Kyoto treaty, the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the protocol implementing the ban on biological weapons, the US's role itself in international society appears to focus on its own narrow national interest alone. Further, the US invasion of Iraq might be misunderstood as to even build its empire, in pursuit of control of the supply of oil as economic interests and of penetrating its influence into the region of the Middle East as political interests. However, as Jervis points out, such criticisms might be too short and biased. For instance, the desire to control a large supply of oil was not the primary motivation for the Iraq's war, when considering that 15 of the 19 terrorists of 9/11 were Saudi Arabian nationals and Saudi Arabia is the world's largest net oil exporter, containing 261.9 billion barrels of proven oil reserves.<sup>518</sup> 'Why not Fahad's Saudia Arabia but Saddam's Iraq?' In fact, the National Security Strategy of the U.S. reveals the relationship between the US dominance and the welling-being of international society, by saying:

The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom and a single sustainable model for national successes: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise.... Make the world not just safer but better....a

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<sup>517</sup> See Adam Clymer (2002).

<sup>518</sup> See "Country Analysis Briefs: Saud Arabia." The website is available at: <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/saudi.html>

path is not America's alone. It is open to all.<sup>519</sup>

We can think of this in connection with the US and UK's invasion of Iraq as well. As mentioned in Chapter I, due to the end of the Cold War era ideological struggle, the promotion of democracy is highly likely to be realistic. In particular, as for the Bush administration, it could be a time of great chance to promote democracy in the Middle East (Jervis, 2003:381).<sup>520</sup> Also, we can think of other reasons such as outlaw state status and the US fear of WMD and Terrorism for its preventive war, even if the US's economic and political interests cannot be totally disregarded, because today's terrorism, WMD and tyrannical governments themselves can literally pose a great threat to security not only to the US and but also to the general interest of international society. Robert Jervis made some points concerning preventive war, by saying:

These threats cannot be contained by deterrence. Terrorists are fanatics, and there is nothing that they value that we can hold at risk; rogues like **Iraq are risk-acceptant and accident prone**. The heightened sense of vulnerability increases the dissatisfaction with deterrence, but it is noteworthy that this stance taps into the longstanding Republican critique of many American Cold War policies. **One wing of the party always sought defense rather than deterrence**. Because even **defense may not be possible against terrorists or rogues, the United States must be ready to wage preventive wars and to act against... emerging threats before they are fully formed**, as Bush puts it. **Prevention is not a new element in world politics**, although Dale Copeland's important treatment exaggerates its previous centrality. Israel launched a preventive strike against the Iraqi nuclear program in 1981; during the Cold War, U.S. officials contemplated attacking the USSR and the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) before

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<sup>519</sup>See "The National Security Strategy Of The United States of America." September 2002. The website is available at: <http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/USnss2002.pdf>

<sup>520</sup> The Bush administration called the US invasion of Iraq as preemptive attack. But we should say that instead of preemptive attack, we have to call it preventive attack, which is the proper description and use for the US invasion of Iraq.

they could develop robust nuclear capabilities (Jervis, 2003:369-370).

Above, instead of simple deterrence or defense, the idea of the preventive war might work in a more efficient way, and it could be interpreted in a broad way; the war for the promotion of democracy, even though it must be highly limited to the outlaw states alone that pose the great threat to Great Powers and general interests of international society.

Actually, the idea of preventive war itself reflects the idea of US dominance, since the preventive war doctrine is based on strength and on associated desire to ensure the maintenance of the US dominance with a high degree of confidence (Jervis, 2003: 370). Thus, we can say that Great Powers' (the US and UK's) role in the promotion and consolidation of democracy in Iraq can be understood in terms of preventive war and their role of dominance in some sense. In other words, the US and UK's invasion of Iraq as their contribution to Iraq's initial stage for new national building process toward a decent democratic regime along with a new identity and character can be understood as the role of Great Powers and the US's dominance relationship with Iraq. Outlaw states cannot be guaranteed sovereign equal rights, in particular when they pose great threat against the whole international society and face Great Powers whose privilege and responsibility are primarily for the maintenance and wellbeing of international society.<sup>521</sup> Saddam's Iraq was obviously put into the category of outlaw states, and so the U.S./U.K. coalition forces' invasion of Iraq and their alteration in Iraq's identity and characteristics could be understood as Great Powers' duty. The Bush administration articulated, especially in the president's June 2002 West Point speech and in the National Security Strategy of the United States

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<sup>521</sup> See, for more information, Simpson (2004).

(2002), a doctrine of preemption or, more properly, preventive war that in effect would put the United States in a position of governing potentially hostile populations in countries that threaten it with terrorism (Fukuyama, 2004:95). G.W. Bush mentioned outlaw states at West Point on June 2002 by saying:

Today our enemies see weapons of mass destruction as weapons of choice. For rogue states, these weapons are tools of intimidation and military aggression against their neighbors. These weapons may also allow these states to attempt to blackmail the U.S. and our allies to prevent us from deterring or repelling the aggressive behavior of rogue states. Such states also see these weapons as their best means of overcoming the conventional superiority of the U.S. (Jervis, 2003:369).

When considering this, the US and UK's promotion and consolidation of democracy in Iraq via their use of force should be considered as the process of Great Powers' tasks for promotion and consolidation of their values, which can alter the identity and character of outlaw states and bring out more peaceful and better international society. We might even think that in the absence of a strong US and UK's international intervention, their security and value will be threatened (Jervis, 2003:383), and the whole picture of international society might be far worse and more darkened than now - e.g. fascism over democracy, socialism over capitalism, depression over freedom, and genocide over human rights.

All in all, in general, it is still very hard to expect the use of force in contemporary international society, except for some cases like Chapter VII of the UN Charter and Security Council Resolutions. However, in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, we might expect more flexible use of force for the maintenance and wellbeing of international society, in particular to alter the identity and characteristics of outlaw state, promoting democracy. Iraq can be a good example. The Bush administration believed that liberation of Iraq would produce democracy there, and furthermore, it would

encourage democracy in the Middle East, with its strong beliefs that the more democracies that exist, the greater the stability, the more peaceful the relationships among them, and the lower the threat of terrorism.<sup>522</sup> As Jervis puts it, if Iraq's new regime ultimately becomes a mature democracy and it can bring out stability to the Middle East, not to mention discouragement of tyrants and encouragement of reformer in whole international society, we can think of the US and UK's invasions of Iraq as worthwhile (Jervis, 2003:386). Through Iraq's case, we can see the role of Great Powers in the democratic development across international society, even with their use of force. This can be made possible in the US's dominance over Iraq in a liberal anti-pluralist international society.

#### **b. Great Power's Presence in Iraq and Democracy**

In this section, I will seek the positive relationships between Great Powers' presence and democratic development in Iraq. Nevertheless, in some sense, foreign occupation/presence of troops might be misunderstood as the symbol of imperialism. The second stage, 'presence' can be understood as a process for building the decent democratic nation of Iraq. This period was expected to get Iraq to adopt democratic social and cultural structures, and adjust itself to them in order to sustain and consolidate democratic political structure in Iraq, which could be seen in Great Powers' role of dominance in Japan and Germany. Nevertheless, this did not necessarily mean that Great Powers completely would abolish Iraq's distinguishing cultural and social intuitions. Instead, they fused differences into harmony, which in the past could be observed in Japan's success of democracy.<sup>523</sup> Thus, we can say that

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<sup>522</sup> See Jervis (2003:366-367).

<sup>523</sup> Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal stress the fusion of cultural differences. See Buzan and Segal (1998).



the US and the UK's rebuilding decent democratic regime has been regarded as Great Powers' great contribution to Iraq's distinguishing path toward democracy in some sense.

Since the end of the Gulf War in 2003, the US and the UK-led coalition forces had been present in Iraq on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 1483 and 1637.<sup>524</sup> This had facilitated building Iraq's nation as a decent democratic regime which should be different from Saddam Iraq's identity and characteristics. In the past, the US and the UK's troops had been relatively around 141,000 and 7,200 troops, along with approximately 16,500 military personnel from the twenty-seven coalition partners, in Iraq.<sup>525</sup> Also, the US had set apart a total of around \$34 billion to advocate the reconstruction of Iraq, of which around \$21 billion had been set for the 'Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund.'<sup>526</sup> The Bush administration requested \$1.6 billion for reconstruction in FY 2006 and received \$ 1.485 billion, and it requested \$750 million for FY 2007.<sup>527</sup> On January 11, 2007 G. W. Bush made a statement, announcing 21,500 troops which would be sent to Baghdad, primarily focusing on its order and security. When looking into the US's great aid to Iraq's civilians, we can think of the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) that was installed to authorize U.S. military commanders in Iraq to respond to

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<sup>524</sup> Security Council Resolution 1637 which legitimized the U.S.-led military presence in Iraq, expired on December 31, 2006, and Zebari said Iraq would seek a one-year extension. See *BBC News*. October 30, 2006.

<sup>525</sup> See James A. Baker, III, Lee H. Hamilton, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Edwin Meese III, Sandra Day O'Connor, Leon E. Panetta, William J. Perry, Charles S. Robb, and Alan K. Simpson (2006:6).

<sup>526</sup> *Ibid*, pp.25.

<sup>527</sup> *Ibid*

humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements for immediate assistance for Iraq's civilians and for the reconstruction of Iraq.<sup>528</sup> For instance, we can think of economic assistance like "trash pickup, water, sewers and electricity in conjunction with clear, hold, and build operations."<sup>529</sup> This program was given a total \$ 753 million in FY 2006.<sup>530</sup>

The above demonstrates well that the primary purpose of the US and UK-led forces' presence cannot be to colonize Iraq or install their puppet government in Iraq. Instead, their primary goals are to assist Iraq's government to secure order, to bring back ordinary lives to Iraq's civilians and to ultimately facilitate Iraq's democracy. These can be the fundamental steps to build up liberal democracy in Iraq. The US and UK forces' presence had been quite necessary, when considering the violence by Sunni Arab insurgency, Shiite militia and death squads and, as a small portion, by al Qaeda and affiliated Jihadist groups.<sup>531</sup> This might be the US and UK's national and moral interests in preventing Iraq from sliding into chaos as well.<sup>532</sup> In fact, Tony Blair's remarks help us understand the US general intention toward other states in international society. Tony Blair mentions:

One of the reasons why it is now so important to win the  
conflict is to ensure that others do not make the same

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<sup>528</sup> See "Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP)." The website is available at: [https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/852570FA0037A6FC/\(JAGCNetDocID\)/7CD0D5D7B5E564D68525715E006DB593?OpenDocument](https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/852570FA0037A6FC/(JAGCNetDocID)/7CD0D5D7B5E564D68525715E006DB593?OpenDocument)

<sup>529</sup> See James A. Baker, III, Lee H. Hamilton, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Edwin Meese III, Sandra Day O'Connor, Leon E. Panetta, William J. Perry, Charles S. Robb, and Alan K. Simpson (2006:87).

<sup>530</sup> Ibid.

<sup>531</sup> Ibid, pp. 3.

<sup>532</sup> Ibid, pp. 2.

mistake in the future. That in itself will be a major step to ensuring that the next decade and the next century will not be as difficult as the past. If NATO fails in Kosovo, **the next dictator to be threatened with military force may well not believe our resolve to carry the threat through. .... At the end of this century, the U.S has emerged as by far the strongest state. It has no dreams of world conquest and is not seeking colonies.** If anything Americans too ready to see no need to get involved in the affairs of the rest of the world. America's allies are always both relieved and gratified by its continuing readiness to shoulder burdens and responsibilities that come with its sole superpower status (Blair, 2004:111).

This can be advocated by G.W. Bush's remarks. George W. Bush stated, at West Point on June 1, 2002, "America has no empire to extend or utopia to establish. We wish for others only what we wish for ourselves – safety from violence, the rewards of liberty, and the hope for a better life." Further, the Iraq Study Group Report reveals how the US has made some effort to push Iraq toward democracy, via various means including debt relief. It states:

**The US is also recently working with the United Nations and other partners to fashion the International Compact on Iraq.** The goal is to provide Iraqis with greater debt relief and credits from the Gulf States, as well as to deliver on pledged aid from international donors. **In return, the Iraqi government will agree to achieve certain economic reform milestones, such as building anti-corruption measures into Iraqi institution, adopting a fair legal framework for foreign investors, and reaching economic self-sufficiency by 2012.**<sup>533</sup>

These disclose that the US has never had any intention to colonize Iraq for its own national interests, like, purely oil purpose occupation. These help us confirm the idea that the US and UK's presence of troops in Iraq was primarily for democratic development and prosperity in Iraq and for general interests of international society.

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<sup>533</sup> Ibid, pp.27.

However, as mentioned earlier, Iraq's steps toward democracy have so far required high prices. For instance, due to sectarian cleansing, in particular inside or around Baghdad, around 1.6 million had been displaced within Iraq, and around 1.8 million Iraqis had fled Iraq.<sup>534</sup> The Iraq Study Group Report described Iraq's situation well:

Four of Iraq's eighteen provinces are highly insecure – Baghdad, Anbar, Diyala, and Salah ad Din. These provinces account for about 40 percent of Iraq's population of 26 million. In Baghdad, the violence is largely between Sunni and Shia. In Anbar, the violence is attributable to the Sunni insurgency and to al Qaeda...In Kirkuk, the struggle is between Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen. In Basra and the south, the violence is largely an intra-Shia power struggle. The most stable parts of the country are the three provinces of the Kurdish north and part of the Shia South....However, most of Iraq's cities have a sectarian mix and are plagued by persistent violence.<sup>535</sup>

In consideration of this, we could hear a loud voice against the US and UK's presence of troops in Iraq such as about 66% of Americans' disapproval of the Bush administration's handling of the war. Further, the Iraq Study Group led by James Baker, III and Lee H. Hamilton even recommended their troops' rapid withdrawal from Iraq due primarily to the high price, and suggested that at least the US should not make an open-ended commitment to maintain large numbers of American troop deployment in Iraq.<sup>536</sup>

However, as for me, the Iraq Study Group's suggestion did not seem plausible enough to be accepted, and in some sense, its suggestion itself could be recognized as self-controversial, when considering that it was deeply concerned about the impact of

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<sup>534</sup> Ibid, pp. 4.

<sup>535</sup> Ibid. pp.6.

<sup>536</sup> Ibid. pp.73-75.

instability derived from Iraq's violence on 'Iraq's interest,' 'regional interest' and 'general interest' of international society, which could not be separable from the US's interest, while simultaneously advising the US forces' withdrawal from Iraq by early 2008, before Iraq could be secured and stabilized for the young democracy's taking root in Iraq. The Iraq Study Group even said "if the situation in Iraq continued to deteriorate, the consequences could be severe for Iraq, the US, the region, and the World."<sup>537</sup> On January, 20, 2007, The US Defense Secretary, Robert Gate mentioned "the failure of Iraq is not an option."<sup>538</sup> The Iraq Study Group emphasized Iraq's circumstances by saying:

Continuing violence could lead toward greater chaos, and inflict greater suffering upon the Iraqi people. A collapse of Iraq's government and economy would further crippled a country already unable to meet its people's needs. Iraq's security forces could split along sectarian lines. **A humanitarian catastrophe could follow as more refugees are forced to relocate across the country and the region. Ethic cleansing could escalate. The Iraqi people could be subjected to another strongman who flexes the political and military muscle required to impose order amid anarchy.** Freedom could be lost. Other countries in the region fear significant violence crossing their borders. Chaos in Iraq could lead those countries to intervene to protect their own interests, thereby perhaps sparking a broader regional war. **Turkey could send troop into northern Iraq to prevent Kurdistan from declaring independence. Iran could send in troops to restore stability in southern Iraq and perhaps gain control of oil field. The regional influence of Iran could rise at a time when that country is on path to producing nuclear weapons.**<sup>539</sup>

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<sup>537</sup> Ibid. pp.33.

<sup>538</sup> See the UK News Paper, *Sun*. January 20, 2007.

<sup>539</sup> See James A. Baker, III, Lee H. Hamilton, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Edwin Meese III, Sandra Day O'Connor, Leon E. Panetta, William J. Perry, Charles S. Robb, and Alan K. Simpson (2006:33-34).

When considering the above, we can perceive that the Iraq Study Group recognized the instability and disorder derived from sectarian violence, rather than from the presence of the US and UK's troops. However, its ultimate suggestion was Iraq's own political reconciliation and US rapid withdrawal of troops by early 2008. But, as for me, unlike the Iraq Study Groups' judgment, nothing could be solved by itself, and human disaster would get worse and worse. I believed the presence of the US and UK's troops as quite necessary, at least for basic security and order so as to build up successful democracy in Iraq. Furthermore, I agreed with the Bush administration's decision to send additional 21,500 troops to Iraq, (17,500 troops to Baghdad and 4,000 troops to Sunni Anbar Province) on January 11, 2007, which was totally opposite to what the Iraq Study Group suggested. Below, I will reveal seven reasons for this one.<sup>540</sup> First, the troops primarily focused on the Baghdad arenas. The stability and security of Baghdad and its near arenas should be guaranteed as prior, which is common sense. With no order and no security in the capital, what could we expect? We could not expect others such as even political reconciliation without order and security.

Second, with additional troops, the US should literally be more engaged in stopping civil strife. As for me, the US military position for Iraq's civil war was primarily its reluctance to stay in, due to two reasons: its fear of another Vietnam War and Maliki's government's halting the US engagement in civil strife. However, without its more active engagement to stop civil strife, there would be no chance to get the political reconciliation among the opposition groups. Without order, justice cannot be effectively carried out (Bull, 1977). In other words, without order, justice

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<sup>540</sup> I appreciate Dr Eric Herring's criticism on my support toward the US additional 21,500 troops on which G.W. Bush made announcement.

will be more likely to turn out to become a victim. Rwanda and Bosnia's cases demonstrate this point. Without active engagement in civil strife with more troops, Iraq would hardly reach even political reconciliation - first, stop violence and then carry out whatever - e.g. reconciliation and democracy.

Third, some scholars doubted that 21,500 troops would be enough. They wanted to withdraw the US troops from Iraq, saying "the US has power but it does not have capability to stabilize Iraq and to make successful democracy in Iraq." They also argued that the purposes of additional troops were not new enough to alter Iraq's environment.<sup>541</sup> Maybe, they might be right. However, the US had been reluctant to be fully engaged in stopping civil strife, as mentioned above. With full swings, we could expect a better chance to stabilize Iraq. According to one of Korean proverbs, if you stop in the middle of the process, it will be far worse than doing nothing. If the US dropped its task (even to guarantee security and order as the foundation for building up democracy in Iraq) in the circumstance that around 34, 500 Iraqi people/civilians and policemen were killed in 2006, Iraq's situation would have gotten worse and worse. We could not expect Iraqi voluntary political reconciliation by itself, not to mention Iraq's democracy, as ethnic cleansings could be hardly stopped in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo without external intervention, especially Great Powers' intervention. Further, we should not expect Iraq to become a democracy by itself, by saying "after toppling Saddam's regime, everything is up to you." We should not forget that Iraq was a failed state in 2006 and 2007, and Iraqi history had a cycle of violence, dictatorship and rebellion.<sup>542</sup>

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<sup>541</sup> Roni Bart and Eric Herring tend to reveal negative perspective on the Bush Administration's decision. See the website available at:<http://scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0701/S00189.htm>

<sup>542</sup> See, for more information, an appendix in my dissertation.

Fourth, democracy does not emerge very easily. Japan had a US military government (around 1945-1952); and Germany (around 1945-1955), and both of them still have US military forces on their territory: Japan (around 40,000 troops) and Germany (around 70,000 troops).<sup>543</sup> Also, the US had been continuously indirectly engaged in building up and guiding decent democracies in both countries. That's why we can see today's prosperous two democratic states which have exceedingly contributed to the order and wellbeing of international society (especially in Asia and Europe). These examples cannot be exactly identical to Iraq's case. But for certainty, the US and UK troops' presence in Iraq could contribute to forming democratic social and cultural structure to cultivate and maintain democratic political structure. In particular, when considering the Shia population is overwhelmingly larger than the Sunni or Kurd, Iraq's democracy might sprawl into a majority rule, an empty formalism in Jack Donnelly's term. As mentioned in Chapter I, democracy is not a majority rule alone at all. One of significant elements for democracy is 'harmonious interests' on the basis of the guarantee of minority rights – e.g. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In order to secure the harmonious interests, first of all, we have to assure the rule of law in Iraq's society, which is one of the reasons why the US and the UK's forces should be present in Iraq for a while. On January 21, 2007, Iraq's government spokesman Ali Al-Dabbagh said in his interview with CNN, revealing the plan aiming at crackdown on both Shiite militias and Sunni insurgents, "Nobody will be untouchable here in Iraq now. Everybody will be subject to the law, and whether he/she is from any party or any sect,

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<sup>543</sup> See "Japan." *GlobalSecurity.org*. The website is available at: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/okinawa.htm> Also, see Tim Kane, "Center for Data Analysis Report Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950-2003." *The Heritage Foundation*. The website is available at: <http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/cda04-11.cfm>



whether he's Sunni or Shiite, the plan will not exclude anyone."<sup>544</sup> Now that the rule of law has been efficiently applied to Iraq's society, while Shias, Sunnis and Kurds have been treated equally under the rule of law, today we can see that sectarian bias has been reduced and sectarian violence has gradually disappeared as well.

Fifth, as a Great Power, the US has more responsibility and privilege to deal with international affairs. On average, 535,000 troops from 1950 to 2000 have been spread across international society and more than a fifth of all U.S. servicemen were stationed on foreign soil. Indeed, according to the 2003 datum, 387,920 troops were stationed on foreign soil.<sup>545</sup> They are in more than fifty states - e.g. Germany, Japan, Republic of Korea, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Thailand, Spain, Turkey, Canada, Cuba (Guantanamo-bay), Iceland, Mexico, Taiwan, Greece, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, etc.<sup>546</sup> And by mid-2006, 150,000 US troops were in the Middle East, such as Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait, not to mention Iraq.<sup>547</sup> Today, its defense budget is more than around US \$600 billion which no state can dare to challenge in international society. Indeed, the 2006 US defense expenditure was approximately US \$535 billion. On average, in the post-Cold War era and the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the US defense expenditure has been far more than \$350 billion. The US has had enough power which no state can dare to challenge in international society, and furthermore, it has had enough capability to carry out its responsibility for the maintenance and well-being of international society. In terms of Iraq, the US has had enough capability to stabilize Iraq and get Iraq to become a mature democracy in the long run, which can

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<sup>544</sup> See "25, U.S. Troops die on one of deadliest days in Iraq." *CNN*. January 21, 2007.

<sup>545</sup> See [Robert Longley](http://usgovinfo.about.com/od/defenseandsecurity/a/troopdeploy.htm). "Database Tracks U.S. Troop Deployment Since 1950." The website is available at: <http://usgovinfo.about.com/od/defenseandsecurity/a/troopdeploy.htm>

<sup>546</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>547</sup> See the website available at: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military\\_of\\_the\\_United\\_States](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_of_the_United_States)

greatly contribute to the well-being of international society. It is right that as a Great Power, the US did not leave Iraq in a bad past circumstance - on average, 100 Iraqis died on a daily basis – in particular at least when considering the presence of the US and UK forces as significant to secure the law and order in Iraq’s society. Its responsibility was and is to assist Iraq’s path toward a decent democratic regime. Nevertheless, the US has made some mistakes and the Iraq Study Groups wrongly suggested that the US troops would better get out of Iraq by the early 2008, leaving all of burdens to Iraq’s people with its hope that every conflict would be solved by itself.

Sixth, in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, Iraq should be one of prior US foreign policies, since as Joseph Lieberman, a Democratic Senator from Connecticut in US pointed out on December 29, 2006, the failure in Iraq would be a strategic and moral catastrophe for the United States and its allies, and furthermore for the whole international society.<sup>548</sup> The Iraq Study Group acknowledged this point, even saying “The Iraqi government cannot now govern, sustain, and defend itself without the support of the US,” the UK and others.<sup>549</sup> The US withdrawal from Iraq’s past disastrous circumstance, itself would have been not only ‘immoral’ but also ‘irresponsible.’ All of these demonstrate that the US and UK troops’ withdrawal seemed, in reality, very hard to be materialized. Nonetheless, the Iraq Study Group wrongly suggested the opposite direction, ‘the US immediate withdrawal of troops’ due to the US military burden.<sup>550</sup>

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<sup>548</sup> See Joseph Lieberman (2006).

<sup>549</sup> See James A. Baker, III, Lee H. Hamilton, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Edwin Meese III, Sandra Day O’Connor, Leon E. Panetta, William J. Perry, Charles S. Robb, and Alan K. Simpson (2006:32).

<sup>550</sup> I admit that there had been a loud voice to request the US and UK troop’s withdrawal from Iraq. But, as for me, it does not make sense that the US should withdraw its troops due to its lack of military capability. We can think of several options, if the US needed more troops in Iraq. For instance, the

Seventh, many people were concerned with the idea that the Iraq War might be another Vietnam War. However, in fact, the US's withdrawal of troops itself would bring out similar outcome to what the US faced after its withdrawal of troops from Vietnam. We should keep in mind the fact that there are significant differences between the Vietnam War and the Iraq War. The US and UK troops' presence in Iraq was primarily to transform Iraq's identity and characteristics from an outlaw state to a democratic state, whereas the US troops' presence in Vietnam was primarily for its illusive thought of domino theory. Also, the US troops' presence in Iraq was neither for its support of one side (Sunnis) nor the other side (Shias), but it was for Iraqis' reconciliation and democracy in Iraq, whereas in Vietnam, the US troops' presence was deeply involved in civil war, supporting the authoritarian Saigon regime (Republic of Vietnam) fighting against Viet-Cong (National Liberation Front) - as Great Britain supported Sunnis alone during its occupation of Iraq (1920-32). Further, around 4500 U.S. casualties in Iraq might be dwarfed, when compared with Vietnam – the death of 58, 000 U.S. military personnel.<sup>551</sup> These are distinguishing points between the Iraq War and the Vietnam War. However, the US rapid withdrawal of its troops from Iraq might have brought out a similar outcome, 'the lost war' in the Middle East. In fact, as mentioned earlier, its side effect might have been bigger than Vietnam syndrome – e.g. more severe civil strife, a haven for Al-Qaeda, and Iran's influence. All in all, the US troops' presence in Iraq was not wasting its massive resources and time in the Middle East, but it contributed to not only Iraq's democratic development but also ultimately to the well-being of international society.

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US could have redeployed some of its troops from other regions such as Europe and East Asia to Iraq. The US has around 400,000 troops oversea.

<sup>551</sup> See "Iraq War still being compared to Vietnam." *Examiner.com*. The website is available at: [http://www.examiner.com/a-527732~Iraq\\_War\\_Still\\_Being\\_Compared\\_to\\_Vietnam.html](http://www.examiner.com/a-527732~Iraq_War_Still_Being_Compared_to_Vietnam.html)

The US troops' presence was needed at least until peace ultimately settled in Iraq. For me, all seven reasons can advocate the US troops' presence in Iraq as the necessity rather than the given option.

Along with the US, the UK as a Great Power had made its dedication of an extraordinary amount of resources to Iraq's democracy, not to mention its contribution for Iraq's stability and order; and in addition to 7,200 troops, the UK had been an active player at every stage of Iraq's political development in spite of its military death toll of 119 by 2006.<sup>552</sup> Like US, the UK felt some level of moral and political obligation to facilitate Iraq's democratic development, which required its military presence at least for helping its security and stability. In fact, on December 12, 2006, UK Defense Secretary, Des Browne told MPs that British forces would Not cut and run from Iraq.<sup>553</sup> This shows as a Great Power, the UK's determination to play a significant role in building up the foundation for democratic development in Iraq. There were several evidences for the UK forces' contribution to Iraq's democracy. For instance, the UK forces transferred Basra's security to Iraq's forces by the spring of 2007. This can confirm the UK intention to authentically assist Iraq's democracy rather than to colonize it for oil or to set its puppet government. Also, unlike the UK's past biased support for the Sunni sectarian group alone during its occupation of Iraq (1920-1932), the UK has been supporting the harmonious relationship among Sunnis, Shias and Kurds, which can be essential for democratic development in Iraq. On December 7, 2006, British Prime Minister Tony Blair declared that the US and the UK (along with their coalition forces) had pursued no sectarian biased policy, in his

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<sup>552</sup> See James A. Baker, III, Lee H. Hamilton, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Edwin Meese III, Sandra Day O'Connor, Leon E. Panetta, William J. Perry, Charles S. Robb, and Alan K. Simpson (2006:32). Also, see "The UK military death toll in Iraq." *BBC News*. October, 24, 2006.

<sup>553</sup> See "UK Won't cut and run from Iraq." *BBC News*. December 12, 2006.

visit to Washington, emphasizing the significance of Iraq's democracy to Iraq itself, its region and international society as a whole, not to mention the US and UK's interests.<sup>554</sup> At this juncture, we can say that the presence of the US and UK troops did not simply assist Iraq's national building process, but also Iraq's democratic development along with Iraq's new identity and characteristics, which would ultimately bring out regional interests and general interests of international society in the long run.

As for me, the US and UK-led coalition forces should stay in Iraq until, at least, it can accomplish its short-term goal of policy that "Iraq can govern itself, sustain itself and defend itself" as the fundamental foundation for Iraq's democratic development.<sup>555</sup> Nevertheless, if possible, I hoped that the US and the UK troops would have continued to remain until Iraq became a mature democracy like Japan and Germany, since this could facilitate the emergence and maturity of a democratic social and cultural structure to maintain and consolidate a democratic political structure in Iraq. If we think of Foucault's terms 'disciplinary power,' 'discourse,' 'normalization' and 'knowledge,' the US and UK troops' presence in Iraq could be understood as helping Iraq democratize itself little by little.<sup>556</sup> On December 29, 2006, the execution of the dictator Saddam Hussein on the basis of the outcome of Iraq's judicial process, that is, 'the rule of law', which is for his past cruelty and crimes

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<sup>554</sup> Iraq was occupied by Britain during the course of World War I; in 1920, it was declared a League of Nations mandate under UK administration, and it had been governed by the UK until Iraq attained its independence in 1932. See the website available at: <http://www.businessbookmall.com/Editorial%20Iraq%20History.htm>

<sup>555</sup> See James A. Baker, III, Lee H. Hamilton, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Edwin Meese III, Sandra Day O'Connor, Leon E. Panetta, William J. Perry, Charles S. Robb, and Alan K. Simpson (2006:40).

<sup>556</sup> Recently, I have enjoyed reading Tanja E. Aalberts's dissertation/book, "Politics of Sovereignty"(2006). She tried to develop triad among sovereignty, international law and international society, using Foucault's logics. We can think of Iraq's democratic development in Foucault's terms.

against humanity via his terrorizing his nation and Iraq's neighboring states, such as 148 victims from the village of Dujail and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, could match the international legal standard, and this could be recognized as Iraq's movement toward democracy, in terms of equality before the rule of law (rather than gun before law). This was made possible under the US and UK troops' presence in Iraq.<sup>557</sup> This reminds me of E.H Carr's remarks in his work, "Conditions of Peace":

power will be required both to afford the guarantee of reciprocity and fair treatment which is a condition of any international system, and to check the inclination of local interests to exploit chaos for short-terms advantages (Carr, 1942:255).

Also, the presence of Great Powers, the US and the UK's troops in Iraq in international society which I described as a liberal anti-pluralist international society, for democratic promotion and consolidation, might not seem liberal in some sense.<sup>558</sup>

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<sup>557</sup> We might think of neo-trustship as a possible option to support democratic development in the post-cold war era and 21<sup>st</sup> century. As a matter of fact, the presence of the US troops and UK troops in Iraq might be understood as its comparison to neo-trustship in some sense, which might be a plausible mechanism to alter the identity and characteristic of the outlaw states, quasi-state or failed states, via its promotion and consolidation of democracy in some sense. Richard Caplan, James Fearon and David Laitin introduce the concept of neo-trusteeship. Fearon and Laitin state: **"The terms (neo-trusteeship) refer to the complicated mixes of international and domestic governance structures that are evolving in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and, possibly in the long run, Iraq. Similar to classical imperialism, these efforts involve a remarkable degree of control over domestic political authority and basic economic functions by foreign countries. In contrast to classical imperialism, in these new form of rules subjects are governed by a complex hodgepodge of foreign powers, international and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and domestic institutions, rather than by a single imperial or trust power asserting monopoly rights within its domain. In contrast to classical imperialism, but in line with concepts of trusteeeship, the parties to these complex interventions typically seek an international legal mandate for their rule. Finally, whereas classical imperialists conceived of their empires as indefinite in time, the agents of neo-trusteeship want to exit as quickly as possible, after intervening to reconstruct or reconfigures states so as to reduce threats arising from either state collapse or rogue regimes empowered by weapons of mass destruction (WMD)."** See Fearon and Laitin (2004:7). Here, when considering the aspects of neo-trusteeship, neo-trustship might be misunderstood as imperialistic, which can be seen in China's colonization of Tibet. However, neo-trustship might not be imperialistic. Nevertheless, it is a possible coercive and anti-democratic mechanism to rebuild a decent liberal democracy, by using Great Powers along with international organizations and non-governmental organizations that might be recognized as for rebuilding a decent liberal democracy.

<sup>558</sup> As mentioned in Chapter I, in terms of liberal anti-pluralism, Tanja. E. Aalberts pointed out the lack of toleration in liberal anti-pluralism (2006:153). But as for me, the primary mechanism, the use of

However in fact, the presence itself was quite necessary to build up the foundation for Iraq's liberal democracy in the long term, in particular the transformation from Iraq's past identity and character such as illiberal, indecent and criminal state to liberal, decent and democratic regime. At least, the presence of Great Powers' troops in Iraq for certain period could accelerate democratic progress in terms of social, cultural, political, and even economic structures. The presence of Great Powers does not necessarily mean Great Powers' elimination or devaluation of Iraq's distinguishing social and cultural institutions and structures, but instead it should mean the harmonious fusion of different aspects such as Iraq's distinguishing façades and democratic façades, which can be seen in Japan's successful democratic story.<sup>559</sup> In terms of this point, Great Powers need to make more efforts to understand the target states' social, cultural, political and economic structures. Nevertheless, there were many problems for the US efforts to bring out fruitful outcome. For instance, all of US efforts in Iraq, military and civilian had been often handicapped by Americans' lack of language skills and their lack of social, cultural, political and economical understanding. This could give Iraqi people a bad impression of Americans, such as stupidity and arrogance in harsh expression. The top US diplomat, Alberto Fernandez admitted that American had been 'stupid' and 'arrogant' in Iraq for the downward spiral in Iraq, even though he apologized for his comment later.<sup>560</sup> The Iraq Study Group Report revealed the reality of the lack of personnel to link

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force of liberal anti-pluralism might not be liberal, but we should keep the idea that the use of force in liberal anti-pluralism should be allowed as long as the use of force is highly limited to the outlaw states alone.

<sup>559</sup> See Buzan and Segal (1998).

<sup>560</sup> See "US' arrogant and stupid' in Iraq." *BBC News*. October 22, 2006. Also see "US official retracts Iraq remarks." *BBC News*. October 23, 2006.

Americans with Iraqis. It said:

Our embassy of 1,000 has 33 Arabic speakers, **just six of whom are at the level of fluency**.....Civilian agencies also have little experience with complex overseas interventions to restore and maintain order – stability operations – outside of the normal embassy setting. The nature of the mission in Iraq is unfamiliar and dangerous, and the United States has had great difficulty filling civilian assignment in Iraq with sufficient numbers of properly trained personnel at the appropriate rank.<sup>561</sup>

Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that there was no process of the alteration in Iraq's identity and characteristics via the fusion and harmony of differences. In fact, the fusion of differences is possible, as South Korea, Japan, Malaysia and Indonesia demonstrate. And in international society, Iraq is not the first case for Great Powers to alter the identity and characteristics of a certain state via their presence such as Japan, Germany, Italy, and the Philippines. If all in all Iraq ends up becoming a decent democratic state along with assistance from Great Powers, through its process of alteration in its identity and characteristics, Great Powers' military presence in the conflicting state will be worthwhile as others such as Japan and Germany's successful democracies demonstrate. Nonetheless, it cannot be guaranteed to be successful all the time whenever Great Powers attempt to alter the identity and character of target states via their presence of troops. In terms of Iraq's case, however, like in Japan and Germany, the US and the UK committed massive amount of troops, time and money for building up a decent democratic Iraq. This indicates a highly positive outcome in Iraq in the long run.<sup>562</sup>

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<sup>561</sup> See James A. Baker, III, Lee H. Hamilton, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Edwin Meese III, Sandra Day O'Connor, Leon E. Panetta, William J. Perry, Charles S. Robb, and Alan K. Simpson (2006:92).

<sup>562</sup> Besides, I already mentioned the distinction between Iraq War and Vietnam War. Also, the US and UK's involvement is derived from the incentive of authentic assistance in a large part, rather than from pure rational calculation such as oil and US influence in the Middle East, in particular when



### **c. Great Powers' military withdrawal from Iraq and Democracy**

In this chapter, honestly, I have to say that I am not reluctant to mention about Great Powers' withdrawal of troops from Iraq, since the US already decided to withdraw its troops from Iraq until December 18, 2011, though its withdrawal was a conditional basis to guarantee Iraq's security. But, unlike the Iraq Study Group's proposal – i.e. withdrawal by the early 2008 -, this kind of withdrawal does not disturb me very much. Indeed, I am okay with the Obama administration's withdrawal decision. However, once again, in this section, I will briefly stress the danger of the rapid withdrawal without any condition, even if I already mentioned this in the previous section.

The Iraq Study Group Report itself recommended that the US had better withdraw its force by early 2008. However, the early 2008 withdrawal itself was controversial, irresponsible and immoral, which could bring out the similar outcome with that of Vietnam War. According to the UN report, more than 34, 400 civilians and police were known to be killed in 2006 in violence across the country.<sup>563</sup> Severe insecurity and instability could hardly be ignored. In this circumstance, the US rapid withdrawal itself without any condition might bring out further human disaster, as well as the rule by fear, which would further the extremist cowards in their attempts to take power, by manipulating the fears of the people.<sup>564</sup> Also, another Saddam's dictatorship was expected to take place, which put Iraq back into its historical cycle of

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considering more than 60% of the US public which supported its withdrawal of troops (*CNN News*, January 2007). The US and UK involvement is for more than simply oil and Iran's challenge against the US dominant power.

<sup>563</sup> See "Bombers rock Baghdad University." *BBC News*. January 17, 2007. Also, see "New figures show 23,000 Iraqis killed in 2006:paper." *Reuters*. January 8, 2007.

<sup>564</sup> See "IRAQ: It is too late for U.S. to pull out." *The Florida Times Union*. January 8, 2007. Also see "Bombers rock Baghdad university." *BBC News*. January 16, 2007.

violence, dictatorship, and rebellion. Besides, we can think of other reasons for opposition to the US and UK's rapid withdrawals without any condition in the Middle East: three civil wars in the Middle East – i.e. Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine which have been deeply involved in Iran and Syria; fragile regimes in Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan and Iraq; and Terrorism (Al-Qaeda's violence).<sup>565</sup> Thus, the failure of Iraq itself might lead to chaos in the Middle East and in international society as a whole, because it could have had a great impact on its neighboring states such as Iran (Shias), Turkey (Kurds), Jordan, Syria, Israel and Palestine, in particular geo-political and economic sense. When considering a broad picture concerning Iraq, it was very hard to expect that the US would rapidly withdraw its troops from Iraq by early 2008. In fact, importantly, Iraq has become the hub of the US interests in the Middle East and the priority of the US foreign policy. As mentioned earlier, as for the US, economic and political interests could not be ignored as well, when Iraq has the second largest proven oil reserves in the world and when Iran appears to be a rising regional power with its potential nuclear weapons.<sup>566</sup> This reflects the reality that the US could not simply walk out of the Middle East region, standing by and watching the possible outcomes such as Iran's growing influence as well as Iraq's becoming a possible haven for Islamist terrorists and a battle zone for civil strife. However, I did not expect the US and UK's troops to stay for decades until Iraq's democracy becomes mature and successful enough. I preferred a flexible time table to withdraw the US and UK's troops from Iraq on the accordance with Iraq's progress level of stability and security, which is ultimately related to Iraq's democratic development.

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<sup>565</sup> See David Rothkopf (2006).

<sup>566</sup> Ibid.

## **Conclusion**

In this chapter, I started with the concept and role of Great Powers, and showed Great Powers' different impact on democratic development, such as interest-oriented socialization, value-oriented socialization and the use of force. Also, I used three preponderant types of Great Powers, 'hegemony,' 'primacy' and 'dominance.' These relatively different preponderant types of Great Powers reflect the different degrees of the use of force, such as 'reluctance of the use of force,' 'legitimacy,' and 'the habitual use of force.' In consideration of these, I tried to primarily emphasize the role of Great Powers in promoting and consolidating democracy, while simultaneously revealing the inevitable relationship between Great Powers and predominant norms of international society. This can facilitate democracy as the emerging new standard of civilization in the post-Cold War era and 21<sup>st</sup> century. And we can see the historical limited progress in international society, such as the end of the slave trade (the early 19<sup>th</sup> century), compliance with international law beyond Western states (the late 19<sup>th</sup> century), self-determination (1960s), human rights (1980s) and democracy (possibly post-Cold War era and 21<sup>st</sup> century). When considering Great Powers' rights and duty for the maintenance of international order and promotion of well-being of international society, we cannot deny Great Powers' contribution to historical limited progress in international society. In the post-Cold War era and 21<sup>st</sup> century, Great Powers have put a great impact on the promotion and consolidation of democracy in international society. In this chapter, we could see the triad relationship between democracy, the nature of international society and Great Powers as an outcome of the limited progress, and especially how Great Powers can adopt different mechanisms to push states toward democracy. Like other chapters, China, South Korea and Iraq help us understand how Great Powers' relatively

different preponderant types can influence democratic developments, while in the awareness of different structures of international society: pluralist, solidarist and liberal anti-pluralist, and in the awareness of different relationships between Great Powers and lesser powers: hegemony, primacy and dominance. Great Powers do not use a single method to promote and consolidate democracy, and they have to adopt their various methods for democratic developments, in accordance with each state's characteristic and identity and each international society's characteristic, let alone different relationships between Great Powers and lesser powers.

Great Powers cannot explain every international affair in international society, but their norms, interests, behaviors, and relationships with others elucidate international affairs well enough, since their perception and interests have been widely shared with many other powers.<sup>567</sup> In the post-Cold War era and 21<sup>st</sup> century, the US and UK, as Great Powers, have promoted and consolidated democracy across international society. As we have observed that in Europe, Asia, America, Africa, and the Middle East, the increasing numbers of states have become democratic, Great Powers' norm, democracy and more states' adoption of democracy cannot be regarded as simply co-incident. Taken together, Great Powers have greatly influenced democratic development in international society in the post-Cold War era and 21<sup>st</sup> century. We cannot separate democratic success from the role of Great Power that is very critical for the well-being of international society.

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<sup>567</sup> As Bull points out, we cannot disregard the close co-relationships between Great Powers' interests, and general interests of international society. Hedley Bull states "in the 1940 and in the 1950s, the United States became heir to the tendency to identify its own interests with those of the world at large, which Carr had found in Britain in the 1930s." See Hedley Bull (1969).

## **Chapter V. International Organization and Democracy**

### **Introduction**

In Chapter IV, I pointed out the UN's failing role in the management of international affairs. However, it does not necessarily mean that it is completely useless and ineffective. Instead, I have to say that its function is still recognized as significant, even if there are many weaknesses and malfunctions in a UN system. In other words, generally, international organizations might be misunderstood as a simple tool for Great Powers or as an impotent mechanism in international society, but, we should keep in mind the fact that they can be still recognized as one of the significant institutions maintaining the order and promoting the well-being of international society, let alone even their contribution to the expansion of international society. Indeed, many international relations scholars recognize the important role of international organizations in international society. For instance, unlike neo-realists such as Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer,<sup>568</sup> liberals and neo-liberal institutionalists like Robert O Keohane are well aware of the significant role of international organizations in international society. Also, English School scholars, like Martin Wight, Hedley Bull, Barry Buzan and Peter Wilson are aware of the significant role of international organizations as the secondary institutions of international society in Barry Buzan's term, along with their obsession with the primary institutions of international society (Evan and Wilson, 1992: 341, Barry

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<sup>568</sup> As for neo-realists, international institutions are simply "epiphenomenal." See, for more information, Kenneth N. Waltz (1979), Chap.6. Also see Stephen D. Krasner (1983:5).

Buzan, 2002). When considering the above, we can say that international organizations cannot be disregarded in order to properly comprehend international relations in a broad sense. Nevertheless, many international organizations need their reforms to get them to function in a more effective way in the evolutionary nature of international society.

As indicated in other chapters, as democracy starts becoming the new emerging standard of civilization and the new wave expansion of international society in the post-Cold War era and 21<sup>st</sup> century, the significant role of international organizations in democratic development cannot be undermined, in particular when considering that as indicated above, international organizations have become an increasingly ever-present part of international relations and so their presence in an international arena cannot be disregarded (Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke, 2005:9). In this chapter, I will focus on how international organizations can have an impact on democratic development in international society. Also, in the process, like previous chapters, with regard to different structures of international society – i.e. pluralist, solidarist, and liberal anti-pluralist - I will reveal that each different international society partly determines how international organizations can have an impact on democratic development, including election monitoring to encouragement of transparency. For instance, we might think that more election monitoring, more encouragement of transparency and more sanction or enforcement mechanisms as primary examples can be seen relatively in pluralist, solidarist and liberal anti-pluralist structures of international society, albeit I admit that there is not a distinguishing clear-cut line, but a blurred line. Indeed, three case studies, China, South Korea, and Iraq can help us understand how international organizations can bring about different paths toward democracy due to their relative different

international societies. All in all, we cannot disregard the significant role of international organizations in democratic promotion and consolidation across international society. Also, in Chapter V., I will be given a chance to explain how the international organizations are one of the important institutions to maintain international order and security and to promote the well-being of international society, importantly, albeit I will put more emphasis on international organizations' contribution to democratic promotion and consolidation – i.e. the expansion of international society - in the long run. Indeed, I will reveal that as the secondary institution of international society, international organizations have implemented numerous missions for the management of international society, the well-being of international society, and even the expansion of international society. Below, first of all, I will start with the origin and definition of international organizations as the secondary institutions of international society, and I will touch on the roles of international organizations in international society before examining their impact on democratic development.

### **1> International Organization**

I will start with examining the origin of international organization. When we look into the historical development of international organizations, we can notice that there are many precursors of contemporary international organizations (Armstrong, Lloyd and Redmond, 2004:1). First of all, we can think of a treaty or contact between two rulers as one of the origins of international organization, as Gerard J. Mangone mentioned “the treaty or contract between two rulers for an enduring record of interstate practice” of the past can be regarded as the first step toward international organization (Mangone, 1954:14). For instance, we can find various treaties among ancient Greek city-states toward international organization. Gerard J. Mangone

pointed out this, by saying:

Although the Greek people were politically divided into city-states, the homogeneity of their religion and culture encouraged a multiplication of interstate agreements beyond all other ancient experience. Well over 200 **inter-Aegean treaties** have been reckoned prior to 338 B.C. Frequent warfare among the Greek cities called for numerous articles of peace, but these terms often went further than the settlement of current claims by providing for arbitrary tribunals composed of both the litigants and a neutral to smooth out any new frictions arising between signatory states. In both the One Year Armistice (423 B.C.) and the Peace of Nicias (421 B.C.), the Athenians and Spartans agreed in the event of future disputes to have recourse to law.....as many be agreed upon between the parties. **Not only were treaties of alliance abundant in Greece**, but several pacts included an exchange of citizenship and reciprocal trading privileges for the contracting parties (Mangone, 1954:14).

In addition, we can think of various leagues as a significant step toward the international organization. From the perspective of early international organizations, we can think of the several amphictyonic councils and political confederations as the unique pattern of Greek history, which contributed to the emergence of international organizations (Mangone, 1954:18). Gerard J. Mangone made a good point on this, by saying:

The amphictyonic councils, of which the Delphic council was the most illustrious, were composed of representatives of those tribes devoted to the same temple. Bound by the same religion, some city-states would agree upon the joint maintenance and security of holy places and provide for a council to discuss or manage such matters. The council members swore to observe the inviolability of shrines and the safety of pilgrims, and they pledged themselves to moderate rules of warfare: for example, the interruption of water supplies and the razing of cities were forbidden. The Delphic Amphictynoy, however, touched political regulation only as an incident to its function as a religious cooperative (Mangone, 1954:18).

The Amphictyonic Council of ancient Greece was not a means to manage the



consequences of the sovereign independence of the city states, but a celebration of cultural unity among the Greeks, such as common religious observance and the protection of the shrine at Delphi (Armstrong, Lloyd and Redmond, 2004:1). However, importantly, its members were required to swear an oath designed to limit the harm they could do to each other in the event of war, and so this might be regarded as the basis for the argument that the Amphictyonic Council was an International Governmental Organization (IGO), albeit unfortunately this argument was, by and large, disregarded (Armstrong, Lloyd and Redmond, 2004:1).

Moreover, we can say that, as a legacy of ancient Rome, Christianity had greatly contributed to the emergence of international organizations. For instance, the Roman Catholic Church was the most international institution emerging into a role which would put its emissaries in every Christian capital, call great international councils, and actually transcend political sovereignties (Mangone, 1954:15-16). This can be regarded as a step toward the modern international organization. In particular, in Renaissance Italy, living in the memory of the continuous international relations of Rome and united by a common Christian faith hardened international customs and multiplied international agreements (Mangone, 1954:17). However, the hypothetical unity of Western Christendom led to questions about the validity of perceiving it as a true association of independent political communities (Armstrong, Lloyd and Redmond, 2004:2).

Importantly, also, the practices of a regular meeting of heads of government or their representatives in modern international organizations, as periodic gatherings, originally grew out of the 1815 Congress of Vienna (Congress System) (Feld, Jordan and Hurwitz, 1983:2). Quite importantly, at this juncture, “the congress system” was inaugurated with the Congress of Vienna as the first international organization in

September 1814 (Russett and Oneal, 2001:159). And, the Congress of Vienna can be seen as a starting point of the modern international organization, when the Napoleonic War can be a historically distinguishing line between the past (above) and the modern international organization (Mangone, 1954:28). From this point onwards, indeed, we can notice that there are three big differences between the past and the modern international organization (Mangone, 1954:28). With respect to the modern international organization, we can notice the followings:

first, the stress is on a multilateral agreement rather than a bilateral accord; second, treaties under modern international organization attempt to harmonize continuity and self-perpetuation of the basic document with modification of the terms; and third, most characteristically, modern international organization is institutionalized by periodic councils and permanent secretariats (Mangone, 1954:28).

These three aspects can be seen in the Congress of Vienna as the first modern international organization. Also, we can notice that the Congress opened the new era of international organization into the stream of international politics, in particular when considering that the Congress of Vienna gathered to clear up the unsettled political problems which the years of warfare had raised in Europe, and that it opened the age of consultation in international organization as the big step toward the development of the modern international organization (Mangone, 1954:35, 40).<sup>569</sup>

In the nineteenth century, importantly, the fact that the industrial revolution struck Europe greatly contributed to the emergence of many international organizations (Mangone, 1954:67). As a result of industrialization, various international problems emerged (Mangone, 1954:67). In fact, David Armstrong, Lorna Lloyd, and John Redmond made four points on this, by saying:

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<sup>569</sup> Multilateral conferences cultivated the habit of consultation. See Mangone (1954:51-53).

First, the greater number of international transactions increased the risk of conflict arising out of some trivial dispute....Secondly agreed regulations and common standards had to be determined for such purposes as patenting inventions, classifying goods for customs duties and deciding exchange rates between currencies..... Thirdly, the traditional insistence by states upon a rigid interpretation of their sovereign rights was emerging as a significant barrier to the efficient conduct of international business....Fourthly, the economies of the major powers were becoming increasingly interdependent, which provided them with certain mutual interests to set against their many rivalries (Armstrong, Lloyd and Redmond, 2004:2-3).

Thanks to these kinds of complexity, by the nineteenth and early twentieth century, governments sought new forms of interstate cooperation, which has been known gradually as international organizations (Feld, Jordan and Hurwitz, 1983:1). This ultimately brought about a favorable environment for the emergence and proliferation of international organizations (Armstrong, Lloyd and Redmond, 2004:2). Indeed, many different kinds of international organizations were created; for example, Telegraph (An International Bureau of Telegraphic Administrations), Postal Union (the Universal Postal Union), Health (Alexandria Health Council), Science (the International Geodetic Association and the Metric Union), and Commerce (a sugar union) (Mangone, 1954:73-89).<sup>570</sup> These kinds of organizations became specialized agencies of the United Nations system after WWII (Claude, 1968:33). This clearly demonstrates that the 19<sup>th</sup> century international organizations greatly contributed to the development of modern international organizations.

The Hague system also greatly contributed to the development of modern international organizations. Most importantly, a leading feature of the Hague System was its approach toward universality, which is different from a club of European

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<sup>570</sup> At this juncture, we can see some functionalist tendency.

Great Powers, that is, the Concert of Europe whose primary concerns were about European community's interests alone (Claude, 1964: 6-7). In the Hague conference in 1907, for instance, the representatives of all constituted states had met together to talk about interests which they had in common and which contemplate the good of all mankind (Claude, 1964: 25). Importantly, with regard to universality, the Hague system included non-European states and small states on equal terms with the great powers (Claude, 1964: 25). In short, at the Hague, even non-European and small states enjoyed independence and equality as much as Great Powers did (Claude, 1964: 25). Hence, the Hague Conferences ushered in the signal of global international organizations – i.e. the League of Nations and the United Nations – beyond mere European organizations (Claude, 1964: 28).

However, the events of 1914, such as the outbreak of WWI, proved that sporadic consultation could not suit the rapidly mounting international pressures of the twentieth century, and so in 1919, world leaders created the real modern international organization – i.e. the League of Nations (Mangone, 1954:61-62). In other words, the League of Nations was created to prevent the accidental war in the future (Claude, 1964: 41). In fact, the League tried to assure each member to submit its own disagreement with another member to either judicial remedies or the Council of the League before waging the war (Mangone, 1954:133). With regard to the development of international organizations, the League of Nations was very meaningful. There were differences between the nineteenth century international organizations like the Congress of Vienna, and the twentieth century international organizations such as the League of Nations. For instance, if we say that the nineteenth century was an age of international consultation on political affairs, we can say that the twentieth century began a period of collaboration (Mangone, 1954:128).

In other words, the League of Nations was the mechanism for states to collaborate on the serious problems which influence the peace of the world. This contributed to the development of modern international organizations. Also, the creation of the League of Nations can be conceived as the first attempt to combine into one general organization the different elements of organizational improvement which had appeared during the previous century (Claude, 1968:33). Indeed, Inis L. Claude emphasizes that the League was the first general international organization in several senses (Claude, 1968:33). Inis L. Claude states about it:

(a) it pulled together the threads of the great-power council, the general conference of statesmen, and the technically oriented international bureau; (b) it was a multipurpose organization, although its primary focus was on the political and security problems of war and peace; and (c) it was, in principle, a world-wide institution, even though it retained much of the nineteenth-century emphasis upon the centrality of Europe in international affairs (Claude, 1968:33-34).

All in all, we can possibly say that the League of Nations itself clearly indicates the development of modern international organizations.

However, now that the League of Nations could not stop WWII, world leaders created the new system to prevent war, which was the United Nations (UN) for international collaboration (Mangone, 1954:154). But, like the creation of the League of Nations, the creation of the United Nations was primarily for the prevention of accidental war in the future. Indeed, after WWII, the League of Nations was eventually replaced by the UN, and the UN got its major features from the nineteenth-century heritage and the lessons of experience, both positive and negative, given by the League (Claude, 1968:34). Thanks to this, we can say that the UN should be recognized as the total collection of the past international organizations including the Concert of Europe and the League of Nations (Claude, 1964: 54-55).

Today, the UN comes to be understood as the central component of a various and decentralized system of international institutions including autonomous specialized agencies and regional organizations (Claude, 1968:34). Importantly, unlike the drafters of the League of Nations, the creators of the UN were aware of the difference between the objective requirements and the subjective possibilities of an effective world order, and so, unlike the League of Nations, the UN has been continuously playing an important role in managing international society and it is continuously expected to play a crucial role in managing international society and even in expanding international society (Claude, 1964: 65).

Along with the birth of the UN, many international organizations including the European Economic Community (EEC), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) have greatly thrived since the end of WWII (Russett and Oneal, 2001:160). For instance, there were 37 international organizations in 1909, 132 international organizations in 1956, and 293 international organizations in 1990 (Russett and Oneal, 2001:160). Indeed, the expansion of international organizations are still lasting today (Rittberger, Zangl and Staisch, 2006:4). Their numbers have not only increased visibly, but also their political significance, their financial resources and their personnel have increased (Rittberger, Zangl and Staisch, 2006:4). In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, thus, we can expect many international organizations to continue to thrive.

Let us turn to the examination of the definition of the international organization. First of all, the term 'international organization' came into both scientific and everyday vocabulary astonishingly lately (Rittberger, Zangl and Staisch, 2006:5). During the last third of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, expressions like international

public union, international office or commission were commonly used for international organization (Rittberger, Zangl and Staisch, 2006:5). The term ‘international organization’ was presumably introduced in scientific discourse around 1867 by the Scottish legal scholar James Lorimer in some of his later publications (Rittberger, Zangl and Staisch, 2006:5). By 1880, the German publicist Constantin Frantz was campaigning “federalism as a principle for international organizations”(Rittberger, Zangl and Staisch, 2006:5). And, importantly, Georg Jellinek considered international organization under the study of association between states (Rittberger, Zangl and Staisch, 2006:5). More importantly, the term ‘international organization’ was indirectly acknowledged in Article 23 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which indicates the creation of specialized international organizations for the endorsement of international cooperation, although Article 24 of the Covenant used the older expressions like international office and commission (Rittberger, Zangl and Staisch, 2006:5-6). Eventually, only after WWII, most importantly, a comprehensive concept of international organization was accepted and the organizations themselves adopted this name (Rittberger, Zangl and Staisch, 2006:6).

However, it is not easy to clearly grasp the definition of international organization, even if it is defined as the secondary institution of international society in Barry Buzan’s term, since regime is also the secondary institution of international society.<sup>571</sup> Indeed, as Robert O. Keohane put it, the term, ‘institution,’ itself is a fuzzy concept (Keohane, 1989:162). Let us compare the regime with international organizations, in order to grasp the definition of international organization better.

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<sup>571</sup> See Barry Buzan (2002).

First of all, let us start with Stephen D. Krasner's definition of regime. Stephen D. Krasner defines regimes as principles (beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude), norms (standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations), rules (specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action), and decision-making procedures (prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice) around which actor expectations converge in a given issue area (Krasner, 1983:1-2). This definition has been widely accepted in the arena of international relations (IR), but, as Buzan points out, there are still some problems in Krasner's definition of regime – e.g. no clear, mutually exclusive concepts (Buzan, 2004a:163-167).

Robert O. Keohane attempts to define international regime with the following:

Regimes are institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by governments that pertain to particular sets of issues in international relations. In Oran Young's terminology, they constitute 'negotiated order' (Young, 1983:99). Examples include the international monetary regime established at Bretton Woods in 1944, the Law of the Sea regime set up through United Nation-sponsored negotiations during the 1970s, and the limited arms control regime that exists between the United States and the Soviet Union (Keohane, 1989:4).

And, also, Robert O. Keohane defines international organization with the following:

Formal intergovernmental or cross-national nongovernmental organizations. Such organizations are purposive entities. They are capable of monitoring activity and of reacting to it, and are deliberately set up and designed by states. They are bureaucratic organizations, with explicit rules and specific assignments of rules to individuals and groups. Hundreds of intergovernmental organizations exist, both within and outside the United Nations system. Cross-national nongovernmental organizations are also quite numerous (Keohane, 1989:3-4).

At this juncture, the definitions of international regime and organization can help us grasp the distinction between international regime and international organization.

Unlike the primary institutions of international society, international organizations as



the secondary institutions of international society are physical entities possessing offices, personnel, equipment and budgets, along with bureaucratic creations designed to achieve specific ends and satisfy well articulated goals and needs (Evans and Wilson, 1992:340). Thus, international organizations have contributed to the efficiency of a wider, and more fundamental, set of the primary institutions (Evans and Wilson, 1992). In Wight's and Bull's writings, for example, organizations like NATO and GATT are significant to the extent that they strengthen and make more efficient the more basic institutions - primary institutions of international society, such as diplomacy, international law, and the balance of power (Evans and Wilson, 1992).

International organization is usually understood as international governmental organization, since its membership is sovereign state (Feld, Jordan and Hurwitz, 1983:2). However, in my dissertation, international organization should be interpreted with inclusive terms rather than exclusive terms, in particular when considering that Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) can often be instigated by governmental organizations or funded by governments, and some NGOs implement some tasks for the government, albeit NGOs are not governmental bodies (Vedder, 2007:3). Thus, international organizations can be recognized as three main types, international governmental organizations (IGOs), regional organizations and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs).<sup>572</sup> They have been primarily for promoting cooperation on various issues including resolution of conflict situations (Feld, Jordan and Hurwitz, 1983:2).

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<sup>572</sup> In general, an NGO is defined as "an essentially non-profit, voluntary citizens' group which is organized at a local, national, or international level, and is locally, nationally, or internationally active." Also, it depends at least in part on donations from private citizens. According to the World Bank, NGOs can be defined as private organizations in pursuit of activities to alleviate suffering, elevate the interests of the poor, look after the environment, offer basic social services, or carry out community development. See, for information, Anton Vedder (2007: 2 -3).

From now on, I will touch on the nature of international organizations. I will attempt to demonstrate that realists or liberals alone cannot explain the nature of international organizations. There are different kinds of perspectives on international organizations. Those different kinds of perspectives on international organizations are necessary to understand them better. First of all, I will start with a realist perspective on international organizations. Realists are highly likely to classify states in terms of a hierarchy on the basis of material capability (Pease, 2003:47). And so, realists account for the creation and nature of international organizations via a power hierarchical relationship (Pease, 2003:47). In other words, there are certain hierarchical relationships among states in international organization – e.g. the UN Security Council.<sup>573</sup> For realists, international organizations are simply adopted by powerful states to carry out their power politics more effectively and to strive for their self-interest (Rittberger, Zangl and Staisch, 2006:15). Indeed, for realists, international organizations should be understood as the social arrangements among states by which the interests of the powerful are institutionalized (Pease, 2003:47). Thanks to this, the existence of a hegemon possessing tremendous power resources determines the establishment and the success of international organizations (Rittberger, Zangl and Staisch, 2006:15). Also, international organizations can only contribute to international cooperation if a hegemonic state is willing to endure an over-proportionate percentage of the cooperation costs – hegemonic condition -and it ties other states into the organizations via the judicious use of carrots and sticks (Keohane, 1980, Rittberger, Zangl and Staisch, 2006:16). For many realists, thus, the rise and fall of international organizations, let alone their maintenance, are

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<sup>573</sup> See Barry O’Neill (1997).

determined by hegemony (Keohane, 1984:31). To put it differently, we can ultimately say that for many realists, as leading states decline and other states rise, the international organizations comprising that world order are either portrayed as obsolete or are reshaped to reflect the new power distribution (Pease, 2003:48).

There are many examples to support the above realist arguments. The Concert of Europe was “an exclusive club for great powers,” whose self-appointed members guarded the European community and directed its affairs, and so we can call the Concert of Europe a concert of great powers (Claude, 1964: 6-7). And, in the nineteenth century when the modern international organizations such as the Congress of Vienna started emerging, the opinion of the small disinterested states was not recognized as relevant to the solution of international political conflicts (Mangone, 1954:58). Also, many people assumed that the League of Nations was doomed to fail because of the abstention of the US – i.e. Great Power (Claude, 1964: 249). Indeed, E. H. Carr contended that the League of Nations needed the overwhelming predominance of power of its supporters in order to make it work properly in an international arena that reflected discrimination, unfairness, and power politics (Archer, 2001:117). And, the UN Security Council’s five permanent members are composed of major powers. Indeed, founding fathers of the UN proposed and proceeded to build the UN upon the belief of major powers unity (Claude, 1964: 20). Hence, an effective UN system cannot be possible without genuine collaboration among major powers or in the opposition to major powers, let alone the absence of their various supports including military and finance (Claude, 1964: 69). During the Cold War era, the UN could not efficiently work due to two superpowers’ competitions – i.e. the US and the USSR -, particularly in the case that the UN actions could hurt superpowers’ interests. This indicates that the effectiveness of

international organizations is closely correlated to the powerful states (Pease, 2003:47). And, as another example, during the Cold War era, NATO was basically an American instrument to manage power in the face of the Soviet threat (Mearsheimer, 1994-5:13-14). All of these are good examples to indicate that power matters seriously in international organizations. At this juncture, as John J. Mearsheimer put it, international organizations seem to be fundamentally “a reflection of the distribution of power” in the world (Mearsheimer, 1994-5:7).

Above, I had examined a realist perspective on international organization.<sup>574</sup> The realist perspective does not seem to be wrong when considering numerous cases to support realist assumption on international organizations. However, we should be aware of the fact that power is not panacea, though it is a necessary element to grasp the nature of international organizations, and that international organizations cannot be negligible in international society. For instance, as for many realists, international organizations simply bear the imprint of powerful states. In short, they reflect the capabilities or interests of powerful states. However, as for weak states, international organizations can be a mechanism to ameliorate powerful states’ domination. For instance, the weaker states like Belgium, Portugal or even France in the EU attempted to bind the stronger such as Germany into a form of relationship that avoids domination (Archer, 2001:125). In other words, international organizations can play a significant role in containing the dominant powers, which is quite different from a realist account that international organizations primarily serve the interests of dominant powers. Also, realists have failed to address global issues

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<sup>574</sup> Above, I did not mention many reasons why realists tend to undervalue the role of international organization, in order to emphasize the role of power in international organization, but reasons are significant to understand the realist perspective on international organization. The reasons are the central logic of anarchy, security competition, dominance, struggle for power, relative-gain consideration, self-help system, concern about cheating and so on.

like welfare questions and pollution, which dominate the world of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, let alone their failure to predict the end of the Cold War (Archer, 2001:126). We know well that even the most powerful state cannot solve global problems by itself, even though, as realists repeatedly emphasize, some global issues are closely related with national security, in particular when considering that no state alone can cope with global terrorism. This clearly demonstrates the necessity of international cooperation among states via international organizations, regardless of Great Powers, Middle Powers and Small Powers. As another critique, I cannot completely deny the fact that mostly international organizations reflect the interests of powerful states, but we can also notice some level of independence of international organizations from powerful states. For instance, when considering the following international organizations - the International Committee of the Red Cross, Amnesty International, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the World Confederation of Labor, the International Organization of Standardization, the International Chamber of Commerce, the International Co-operative Alliance and the World Federation of United Nation Associations, - we cannot say that international organizations are simply instruments for powerful states. In particular, the International Committee of the Red Cross has provided relief assistance in warfare and disaster zones, and has, by and large, looked after many suffering people whom governments have been unable or unwilling to help (Archer, 2001:80). Also, Amnesty International has well coordinated massive pressure to help prisoners of whatever political hue (Archer, 2001:80). Thus, at this juncture, we can see some level of independence of international organizations. Also, we can see that international organizations cannot be a tool for major states alone, but also for the common good of international society. All in all, when considering the above

critiques of a realist perspective on international organization, we need another perspective, such as a liberal perspective, on international organizations to grasp the nature of international organizations better, at least to know that there are other important elements existing in international organizations. Let us turn to the liberal perspective on international organizations.

In general, we can even say that international organization is the typical expression of liberalism, as international organizations like the League of Nations and the United Nations found their philosophical origins in liberalism (Claude, 1964:13, 71). In particular when considering that former US President Woodrow Wilson supported the formation of the League of Nations to embody the conscience of the community of nations and contribute to the creation of a worldwide public opinion displaying the common norms and values of different societies, which might make possible the prevention of war, we can clearly grasp the picture that international organizations themselves reflect a liberal idea (Rittberger, Zangl and Staisch, 2006:21). Unlike realism, liberalism is pretty optimistic about the contribution and interdependence of international organizations in international relations (Pease, 2003:64). For instance, though Mearsheimer claims “institutions are not an important cause of peace, and institutions matter only on the margins”(Mearsheimer, 1994-5:7), liberals point out the significant roles of international organizations in various issues: collective security, welfare of international society, promotion of common values and norms – i.e. liberal norms and values – and assistance of victims of international politics (Pease, 2003:64-67).<sup>575</sup> In other words, as for liberals, international organizations are able to prevent war, mobilize human and material

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<sup>575</sup> In a later section, I will touch on the contribution of international organizations to international society.

resources, and spread norms and values in a great effort to cultivate good international society, in particular when considering that today's international organizations are agents of socialization for a political and economic order via which everyone can profit (Claude, 1964: 393, Pease, 2003:67). In short, to liberals, international organizations are not peripheral and negligible, but significant and influential in international society. Indeed, the fact that most international organizations have proven to be quite stable and long-lived, in particular when considering that of the 34 international organizations that were present in 1914, 18 were still operating in 1989, indicates the necessity of international organizations in international society (Russett and Oneal, 2001:160). Also, the fact that even two-thirds of Canadians surveyed in January 2003 said that they would trust the UN rather than the Bush administration, in case of the disagreement over the state of Iraqi weapons, confirms the necessity of international organizations in international society.<sup>576</sup> All in all, as we can see, liberalism can provide an alternative perspective to the realist perspective on international organizations, in particular when considering that liberalism cherishes the important role of international organization in the increase of international cooperation and international interdependence, let alone its emphasis on the role of non-state actors in international relations. Indeed, at this juncture, as Keohane and Nye put it, we can see that "in battle, the sword is mightier than the pen, but over the long run, pen guide swords," albeit this does not necessarily mean that either of them can be disregarded (Keohane and Nye, 1977:242).

Let us take a look at a neoliberal institutionalist perspective on international organizations in order to understand the liberal perspective on international

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<sup>576</sup> Ipsos-Reid/CTV/Globe and Mail poll was released on January 17, 2003. See Alexander Thompson (2006:12, fn. 37).

organizations better, which can ultimately help us comprehend the nature of international organizations. From now on, I will examine international organizations via the spectrum of neoliberal institutionalism. Unlike John J. Mearsheimer's claim that international organizations have minimal influence on state behavior, and so hold little promise for promoting stability in international society, neoliberal institutionalists believe that, as an independent variable rather than a dependent variable, international institutions can play a leading role in managing international society, let alone their contribution to peace and stability (Mearsheimer, 1994-5:7). Precisely speaking, for neoliberal institutionalists, international organizations are collective goods to promote the mutual interests and development of common values, and so they are valuable to states and will continuously remain even in the absence of a hegemon (Keohane, 1984:244-6, Pease, 2003:63). Indeed, though, as for institutionalists, international organizations do not displace states, they enable states to reach mutually beneficial, cooperative outcomes in international relations, cultivating common values (Schweller and Priess, 1997:3, Pease, 2003:63). Most importantly, also, institutionalists tend to believe that international organizations can temper the ill effects of anarchy and the suboptimal outcomes, while emphasizing the principle of absolute gain rather than that of relative gain, and various mechanisms to cope with the free ride problems (Pease, 2003:62-64). Neoliberal institutionalists argue the following positive and important roles of international organizations: to lower transaction and information costs to member states; to regulate state behavior and promote transparency; under condition of complex interdependence, to become valuable assets to states; and to provide tangible benefits to members, who then come to be willing to share the cost of preserving international organizations even after hegemony, since non-hegemonic powers would find it rational and in their self-



interest to uphold existing international organizations (Keohane and Nye 1977:24-25, 35, Keohane, 1984, Keohane, 1989, Pease, 2003:62).<sup>577</sup> All of these explain why even rational egoists are willing to cooperate via international organizations and why states continue to join international organizations in the decline or absence of hegemonic power. Also, importantly, they demonstrate that power cannot be panacea. Indeed, we should keep it in mind that what the UN most requires for the purpose of helping to create a meaningful world community is not new instruments of coercion, but precisely the various tools for doing useful work in the world which it has been busily forming (Claude, 1964: 401). However, at this juncture, as indicated earlier, neo-liberal institutionalism itself does not necessarily mean the complete failure of realism, in particular the neo-realist perspective on international organizations. As Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye claimed “complex interdependence sometimes comes closer to reality than does realism”(Keohane and Nye 1977:23), at this juncture, the neoliberal institutional perspective on an international organization seems to be closer to reality than the realist perspective, but not always at every circumstance, which can confirm that we need various perspectives on international organizations in order to grasp the nature of the international organization better. This also explains why we need three traditions.

Let us turn to the contribution of international organizations to international society. International organizations have contributed to the governance and welfare of international society. And so, I will examine how international organizations can

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<sup>577</sup> Complex interdependence has three main characteristics: first, multiple channels; second, an absence of hierarchy among issues; and third, no military force by governments toward other governments within the region, or on the issues, when complex interdependence prevails. Keohane and Nye claim that under complex interdependence, international organizations help set the international agendas, and act as catalysts for coalition-formation and as arenas for political initiatives and linkage by weak states. See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye (1977).

manage international society, contributing to the welfare and the expansion of international society, which can help us understand the inevitable co-relationship between international organizations and international society. First of all, we have to acknowledge that international organizations are necessary for international society. When looking into the relationship between international organizations and international society, international organizations should be recognized as more than simple gadgets to cope with current problems in international society (Claude, 1964: 5). Indeed we can possibly assume that international organizations reflect a characteristic phenomenon of the international society, and also, international organizations influence international society (Claude, 1964: 6-7). In other words, we can say that international organizations reflect the fabric of international society, and that the fabric of international organizations is not fixed and given but evolved on the basis of the fabric of international society - e.g. today North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is not the same as NATO during the Cold War era. We can also see that international organizations influence the fabric of international society – e.g. the Congress of Vienna contributed to the end of the slave trade in international society. When considering this, we can hardly imagine the separation of international organizations and international society. In short, we should pay attention to international organizations as a significant means to understand international society, let alone the management of international society, the welfare of international society and even the expansion of international society.

Let us examine how international organizations can govern international society, investigating various functions of international organizations in international society. First, we can think that international organizations have contributed to the deterrence of the destruction of international society. In terms of security, in

particular collective security, we cannot deny the significant role of international organizations for international society. Collective security has been the primary concern of the builders of international agencies (Claude, 1964: 223). For instance, the balance of power system started being subject to significant revision, and the principle of collective security emerged, when the League of Nations was formed (Claude, 1968:37). Indeed, we can see a great step toward the formal establishment of the elements of a collective security system, when considering Article 10, Article 11, and Article 16 in the League Covenant (Mangone, 1954:160-162, Claude, 1964: 239).<sup>578</sup> Gerard J. Mangone made a point on the collective security in the League of Nations, by saying:

In the eyes of the League, a state committed an act of war upon the community, and every member promised to sever all commercial and financial relations with the aggressor immediately. If the Council should decide upon further coercion to protect the covenants of the League, it could invite member states to supply contingents of military or naval forces. Such troops would be permitted to cross the territory of all member states in order to approach the outlaw (Mangone, 1954:133).

Nonetheless, members of the League were unwilling to accept the obligations and risks which an operative system of collective security connoted for them, and the

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<sup>578</sup> Article 10:“The member of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled”; Article 11: “Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole league, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations.....”; Article 16: “Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Article 12, 13, or 15, it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not. It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air forces the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League .....” See The Covenant of the League of Nations. The website is available at: [http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th\\_century/leagcov.asp](http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp)

League of Nations ultimately failed to translate the concept of collective security into a working system – e.g. German and Japanese aggressions in the 1930s (Claude, 1968:37-38, Mearsheimer, 1994-5:33). Also, indeed, as Inis L. Claude put it (Claude, 1968:37), the principle of collective security can be clearly seen in the UN Charter, in particular, Article 1, “to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace.”<sup>579</sup> Also, we can easily find some good examples concerning UN collective security, such as the Korean War (1950-53) and the Gulf War (1991). This demonstrates that international organizations have facilitated collective security, which has contributed to the maintenance of international society and the management of international society.

With regard to security, we can think of various international organizations like the UN, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Western European Union (WEU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and so on. These international organizations have greatly contributed to the governance of international society, in particular the security of international society. For instance, importantly, we can think of the OSCE which has contributed to peace and security in international society. Emanuel Adler explains the OSCE as an explicit and distinct security community-building institution (Adler, 1998:119). According to Adler, the OSCE has played a critical role in achieving a common security space (Adler, 1998:153, fn. 4). Adler describes how the OSCE had contributed to the emergence of a security community. Adler states:

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<sup>579</sup> See Charter of the United Nations. The Website is available at: <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml>

Through political dialogue, the establishment of a liberal normative structure for the entire OSCE region, and constant pressure to implement normative commitments, the OSCE first imprinted the development of political community during the Cold War, when it contributed to the emergence of civil societies in the East, and then to the peaceful end of the Cold War. Since the end of the OSCE region and, in spite of the ethnic conflicts now ranging in the OSCE region and the fact that two steps forward have sometimes been followed by one step backward, OSCE practices have been helping to increase the interdependence and transactions between East and West and to lay the foundation for a liberal transnational collective understanding in the area from Vancouver to Vladivostok. By means of seminar diplomacy – a relatively new tool for pursuing state interests, which integrates academic expertise and diplomatic discourse and practice – and other innovative means of cooperation, the OSCE and other post-Cold War European security institutions have been making significant political efforts to change the inter-subjective knowledge through which identities are defined. Also, by stimulating cooperative behavior through a plethora of face-to-face interactions on a large variety of technical, practical, and normative subjects, these security community-building institutions are gradually strengthening civil society in former Communist countries and changing people's beliefs about who they are. By teaching others and themselves to cooperate...actors are simultaneously learning to identify with each other – to see themselves as a 'we' bound by certain norms (Adler, 1998:121).

The OSCE has clearly contributed to the management of international society, along with the common good of international society and even the expansion of international society, in particular when considering that a normative framework for its member states is derived from adherence to multi-party democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and liberal economic systems (Adler, 1998:128).<sup>580</sup> All in all, we can say that international organizations have greatly contributed to the security of international society.

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<sup>580</sup> In a later section, I will touch on how international organizations have contributed to democratization across an international arena.

Second, international organizations have urged states to seek peaceful solutions. One of the primary tasks of international organizations is to make available a variety of peaceful substitutes for the technique of violence, and to encourage their utilization by the parties in disputes, which can be seen in the Hague system, the League of Nation and the United Nations (Claude, 1964: 200-201). For example, although many people say that the League failed to settle several disputes that paved the way for WWII, during the first ten years of its life, the Council successfully tackled seventeen cases likely to lead to a rupture, and put to an immediate end hostilities which had broken out on seven or eight occasions between members of the League (Claude, 1964: 209). As one of the outstanding examples, we can think of the termination of a violent controversy between Greece and Bulgaria in 1925.<sup>581</sup> Also, the UN Charter commits member states to search for peaceful solutions, and in any case to renounce coercive solutions of disputes, and authorizes outsiders, ranging from uninvolved states to the Secretary-General, to instigate collective action for encouraging peaceful settlement, in particular when considering Article 14 (Claude, 1964: 205).<sup>582</sup> As examples, we can think of the pacific

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<sup>581</sup> “On 22 October 1925, the Bulgarian foreign minister wired the Secretary-General of the League that a border incident had led to a flagrant invasion of Bulgarian territory by Greek forces. The Bulgarian government, therefore, requested a meeting of the Council of the League without delay to repair the breach of Covenant obligations. Within twenty-four hours Aristide Briand, Acting President of the Council, exhorted the two governments that until the Council heard both sides of the case, no further military movements should be undertaken and that all troops should retire at once behind their respective frontiers. Three days later the representatives of Bulgaria and Greece were confronted by a stern Council which requested that, before anything else was done, hostilities cease and each state withdraw its troops immediately from the affected area. To this unequivocal proposition the two belligerents acceded. Military attaches of Great Britain, France, and Italy hastened to the scene of the encounter to verify the actions of Greece and Bulgaria. On 31 October 1925, just nine days after the charge of aggression, the military attaches wired the Council of the League: ‘Reoccupation of the Bulgarian posts by the Bulgarian troops took place without any incident. There is complete calm on both sides. The Bulgarian population which had evacuated the invaded territory has nearly all returned and life is again taking up its normal course.’” See Gerard J. Mangone (1954:144).

<sup>582</sup> Article 14: Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to

settlement in 1956 with the formation of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) and in 1960 with the establishment of the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) (Claude, 1968:38).

Third, international organizations have contributed to trusteeship which can help cultivate states (non-members) to become full members of international society (Claude, 1964: 318). For instance, we can think of the UN trusteeship<sup>583</sup> – e.g. the UN Trusteeship Council. Today, we can often see the UN mandate for trusteeship, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, East Timor, Bosnia and Kosovo (Claude, 1964: 328). This trusteeship does not only civilize barbarian states to become decent members of international society – i.e. the expansion of international society - but also improve the welfare of international society, let alone the management of international society (Claude, 1964: 342). Thus, we can say that international organizations can help civilize barbarian states to be decent members of international society, let alone contribute to the management of international society.<sup>584</sup>

Fourth, international organizations have promoted the welfare of international society. Many international organizations have implemented numerous programs in reaction to the demand for international aid to underdeveloped countries (Claude, 1968:39). For instance, the UN has greatly contributed to the welfare of international society. Article 55 of the UN Charter is one of these examples.

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impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present Charter setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. See, for more information, “Charter of United Nations.” The website is available at: <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter4.shtml>

<sup>583</sup> The UN trusteeship was developed from the League’s trusteeship. See, for more information, Inis L Claude Jr (1964: 322-323, 328).

<sup>584</sup> Today, international organizations goad states to comply with certain norms and values of international society – e.g. human rights and democracy - which is one way to civilize states to become the decent member of international society. I will touch on this later.

With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote: a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development; b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion (Article 55).<sup>585</sup>

Indeed, as parts of the UN system, we can think of various organizations, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the World Food Programme (WFP), which have contributed to the welfare of international society. Also, outside the UN system, we can think of some international organizations that have contributed to the welfare of international society. For instance, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is to assist the victim of war, primarily civilians and prisoners of war (Pease, 2003:242). And, we can think of Oxfam's contribution to the governance and welfare of international society, by its addressing of the structural causes of poverty and injustice beyond famine, especially the relationship between poverty, human rights, development and trade (Aaronson and Zimmerman, 2006:999, 1008).<sup>586</sup> All in all, we can clearly see that international organizations have greatly promoted the welfare of international society.

Fifth, international organizations have historically promoted and consolidated various norms and values across international society. Some of the earlier

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<sup>585</sup> See "Charter of the United Nations." The website is available at: <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml>

<sup>586</sup> Indeed, in 2000, the Oxfam member organizations reached agreement to move beyond providing famine relief and assistance to the poor. I will touch on this later.



international organizations, particularly international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) even in the nineteenth century had contributed to the promotion and consolidation of certain values and norms – e.g. Anti-Slavery Society (the rejection of slavery), the International Committee of the Red Cross (control of the effects of war), and Aborigines’ Protection Society (protection of native people) (Archer, 2001:96). With regard to human rights, international multilateral human rights monitoring bodies have increasingly appeared since the end of the WWII, albeit the International Labor Organization (ILO) was created in 1919 (Donnelly, 1994: 204-205). For instance, we can easily find many international organizations, such as the ILO, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (the UN Human Rights Council), Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the Council of Europe, the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the International Committee of Jurists (Rittberer, Zangl and Staisch, 2006:45-48, 193-208, Donnelly, 1994:205-217, Armstrong, Lloyd and Redmond, 2004:243-245). In the late 20<sup>th</sup> century and the 21<sup>st</sup> century, we can often see that the UN helps to promote and consolidate democracy across international society.<sup>587</sup> All in all, international organizations have promoted and consolidated numerous norms and values across an international arena. This greatly contributes to the management of international society, and the common good of international society, let alone the expansion of international society.

Sixth, with regard to the environment, we can also think of several international organizations, such as the United Nations Environment Programme

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<sup>587</sup> I will touch on the contribution of international organizations to the promotion and consolidation of democracy in a later section.

(UNEP), the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth International (FoEI), and the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). These international organizations have played a critical role in international cooperation for the protection of the world's climate and environment (Rittberger, Zangl and Staisch, 2006:192). For instance, the IPCC was set up under UN auspices in 1988 and is the most highly publicized global environmental assessment project (Keohane, Macedo and Moravcsik, 2009:19). The IPCC includes governments that endorse the summary reports for policy-makers and provide legitimacy for its work, but its main activities are run by networks of scientists (Keohane, Macedo and Moravcsik, 2009:19). Importantly, over the past twenty years, the IPCC has provided the most authoritative information on climate change available to policymakers in a highly salient way – e.g. its receipt of the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize (Keohane, Macedo and Moravcsik, 2009:19). All in all, we can see that numerous international organizations have attempted to tackle environmental problems.

All things considered, we can say that international organizations have played significant roles in numerous arenas like security, peaceful settlement, welfare, trusteeship, promotion and consolidation of norms and values, and environment. Also, we can firmly say that international organizations have greatly contributed to the governance of international society, the well-being of international society, and even the expansion of international society. In short, international organizations are one of essential institutions for international society. In the next section, I will mention the contribution of international organizations to democratization across international society. This can confirm the significant roles of international organizations in the governance of international society, the well-being of international society, and the expansion of international society.

## **2> International organizations and democracy**

In this section, I will attempt to demonstrate how international organizations have promoted and consolidated democracy across international society. First of all, we have to be aware of the fact that, as democracy has gradually become a new standard of civilization and the new wave expansion of international society in the post-Cold War era and the 21<sup>st</sup> century, many international organizations in international society tend to promote and consolidate democracy, in particular when considering that international organizations reflect the fabric of international society. Also, we have to know why states join international organizations that goad them to become mature democratic states, and why states maintain their memberships in international organizations, even though they have been under the pressure of political liberalization. And so, I will try to reveal that there are some reasons why states are highly likely to join international organizations and maintain their memberships in international organizations, albeit international organizations put massive pressure on member-states for their political liberalizations. In the process, also, we can see that how international organizations can goad member-states to become more democratic. For example, states can have many benefits from their joining international organizations and maintaining memberships in international organizations, even though I do not think that I need to explain such benefits, in particular when considering that Turkey has desperately pursued the membership in the EU, and, in the past, China had desperately pursued the membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Edward D. Mansfield and Jon C. Pevehouse made several sharp points about why countries, in particular democratizing countries are highly likely to join international organizations, by saying:

Because doing so sends a credible signal to domestic and

international audiences that political reform efforts are sincere. **Entering an IO can help leaders in transitional states credibly commit to carry out reforms since these institutions convey information, help ameliorate time-inconsistency problems, and improve the reputation of new member states. Membership can also discourage regime opponents from threatening emerging regimes by imposing potentially high costs on countries that renege on IO commitments.** Each of these mechanisms can assist in the process of **deepening democracy giving leaders in nascent democracies strong incentives to join IOs** (Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006:162-163).

As Edward D. Mansfield and Jon C. Pevehouse put it, we can easily find that to enter IOs can help leaders in transitional states credibly commit to complete democratic reforms and can diminish the prospect of reversing to authoritarianism, in particular if the organizations consist primarily of democratic members – e.g. EU (Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006:138). In particular, leaders who want to carry on political liberalization can benefit from a mechanism of international organizations that ties their hands, presents information about their policy goals, and differentiates them from leaders who wish to use the rhetoric of reform to accumulate power in the absence of genuine liberalization (Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006:141). Indeed, membership in international organizations can help the leaders of democratizing countries credibly commit to reform efforts, since international organizations can raise the cost of deviating from these efforts and backsliding, more specifically when considering that international organizations can provide information about members' actions and have the reputational impact of violating an IO's rules, not to mention imposing conditions for new members (Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006:141). There are some examples. In 1991, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic created the Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA) in order to prove to the EU that they were firmly committed to both political and economic liberalization (Mansfield and

Pevehouse, 2006:143). Also, the EU sternly enforced the conditions of its Association Agreement with Slovakia when President Vladimir Meciar's behavior toward Slovakia's Hungarian minority and his political opponents did not satisfy EU standards (Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006:143). And so, indeed, the EU even officially eliminated Slovakia from its first list of applicant countries (Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006:143). More importantly, Alina Mungiu Pippidi indicated the close relationship between international organizations – i.e. the EU - and democratization in Central and Eastern Europe, by saying:

I do not, in all fairness, know whether Romania's joining Europe is the only formula for a good future for the Romanians or, indeed, if it is possible. It is difficult to anticipate what 'Europe' will mean and imply by the time Romania is already to join. But it is **my strongest belief that 'Europe' is the only strong incentive, for the political class and the people, to further the democratization of the country** (Pippidi, 1999:149).

Let us take a closer look at how international organizations can goad member-states to become more democratic. The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) can be a good example. Its members have been firmly committed to democracy, while “locking in the domestic political status quo against their non-democratic opponents” (Moravcsik, 2000:243-244). And as another example, we can think of the Council of Europe that has promoted democracy as well as human rights throughout Europe.<sup>588</sup> In fact, many observers of the Council of Europe have claimed that Council membership can be seen as a way of certainly locking a country into an inter-governmental democratic network, with its binding international conventions and treaties, in an attempt to protect it more efficiently from its own antidemocratic

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<sup>588</sup> See, for more information, “Who are We?” *Council Of Europe*. The website is available at: <http://www.coe.int/aboutcoe/index.asp?page=quisommesnous&l=en>

enemies within (Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006:142). Importantly, also, as indicated above, we can often see that violating the terms of membership tends to bring about a suspension of specific benefits and even risks eviction from the organization (Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006:143). This is one of the ways to put pressure on member-states to keep their political liberalization. For instance, the European Community (EC) suspended Greece's associate membership in 1967 when the military came to power (Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006:143).<sup>589</sup> Indeed, former Greek Foreign Minister Constantine Mitsotakis's remarks concerning the role of EC confirms the fact that international organizations have greatly contributed to the promotion and consolidation of democracy. Mitsotakis stated:

Naturally, we do not expect our nine partners in the Community to become the guardians of Greek democracy. **By joining a broader group of like-minded Western democracies, however, our own democratic institutions will be reinforced, through constant contact and interchange,** but mainly because from now on Greece will share the destiny of its Community partners....**They (prospective dictators) are bound to know that the abolition of democracy entails immediate ostracism from the Community.** This could have grave internal and external consequences. So in this respect, **the EC is a safe haven** (Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006:143).

Also, we can recall that the Council of Europe suspended Turkey's membership in that organization after the September 1980s coup (Pevehouse, 2002: 530).<sup>590</sup>

Moreover, most importantly, international organizations tend to exert external pressures on authoritarian regimes to undertake democratization. Indeed, as Jon C. Pevehouse put it, we can often see that international organizations can employ pressure in various ways ranging from explicit de-legitimization of the authoritarian

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<sup>589</sup> I will touch on this later.

<sup>590</sup> I will mention this later.

regime by IO members through diplomatic pressure to direct economic sanctions against the regime (Pevehouse, 2002:522). For instance, Burma had to give up the 2006 chairmanship of a key Asian regional forum, since Burma had been under pressure to institute democratic reforms before taking the helm of the Association of South East Asian Nation (ASEAN).<sup>591</sup> Also, as another example, we can think of the Organization of American States (OAS)'s pressure on Guatemala after the self-coup of Jorge Serrano in May 1993 (Pevehouse, 2002:523-524). The OAS lodged high-profile protests and moved to impose sanctions against Serrano's regime, which was regarded as a significant part of Serrano's calculations to step down (Farer, 1996, Pevehouse, 2002:518).<sup>592</sup>

Equally as important, international organizations, particularly security-oriented organizations, are able to help persuade the military elites to acquiesce to democratization by not only generating externally advocated guarantees, but by helping to make military officers stay away from their interest in domestic policies (Pevehouse, 2002: 527). There are several cases. In Hungary the military received direct assistance from its alliance partners, such as NATO during Hungary's democratic transition (Pevehouse, 2002: 527). Also, after Franco's death, Spain's entry into NATO has kept its army away from the domestic political process as its army underwent important modernization and re-orientation (Pevehouse, 2002: 528-529). At this juncture, when we think of 'the separation of military and domestic political process' and 'civilian supremacy over military missions and institutions'

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<sup>591</sup> See "Burma will not take Asean chair." *BBC News*. July 26, 2005.

<sup>592</sup> I will touch later on the OAS's contribution to the promotion and consolidation of democracy in detail.

(Huntington, 1991b:251, Pevehouse, 2002:528),<sup>593</sup>we can firmly say that international organizations have greatly contributed to the promotion and consolidation of democracy (Pevehouse, 2002: 528).

All in all, we can say that many international organizations have contributed to the promotion and consolidation of democracy across international society. However, not every international organization does so. Some international organizations like the Warsaw Pack and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization may undermine domestic democracy (Pevehouse, 2002: 529; Keohane, Macedo and Moravcsik, 2009:23-25). However, we cannot completely deny the fact that many international organizations have greatly contributed to the promotion and consolidation of democracy across an international arena. Below, I will investigate several international organizations in more detail, which have promoted and consolidated democracy across international society. This can help us understand how international organizations can have a great impact on the promotion and consolidation of democracy across international society.

In the consideration of the above, let us investigate further on how international organizations can promote and consolidate democracy and how international organizations have had an effect on paths toward democracy. When considering the role of international organizations in democratic development in international society, we have to think of two ways to promote democracy: IGO and INGO's paths toward democracy. The international governmental organizational path toward democracy can be recognized as the top-down democracy promotion, whereas the international non-governmental organizational path toward democracy

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<sup>593</sup> Huntington puts emphasis on curbing military power and promoting military professionalism as essential elements for democracy. See Samuel P. Huntington (1991b).



can be understood as the bottom-up democracy promotion. The top-down democracy promotion is carried out via governments, formal institutions and processes, whereas the bottom-up democracy promotion is to focus on strengthening civil society and public awareness and on developing local capacity (Newman, 2004: 190). In short, we can say that in terms of the promotion and consolidation of democracy, international governmental organizations tend to focus on the governmental level, while non-governmental organizations incline to emphasize ordinary citizens, by linking citizens with their governments in pursuit for global democratic movement.<sup>594</sup>

Let us turn to the role of international governmental organizations and that of regional governmental organizations for democratic development. As primary international organizations for democratic promotion and consolidation, we can think of the United Nations (UN), the European Unions (EU), the Council of Europe, the African Union, the Commonwealth, Organization of American States (OAS), Organization for Economic-Cooperation and Development (OECD), and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the World Trade Organization (WTO), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and World Bank. These international organizations have indirectly or directly contributed to the promotion and consolidation of democracy.

Let us explore several international organizations which have greatly contributed to the promotion and consolidation of democracy. First of all, as one of the international governmental organizations, I want to touch on the significant role of the UN in democratic development in international society, such as United Nations

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<sup>594</sup> See, for more information, Edward Newman (2004).

General Assembly Resolution 55/96 (entitled “Promoting and Consolidating Democracy”).<sup>595</sup> When considering the UN’s contribution to democratic development, we can recollect the 1991 UN General Assembly’s pressure on Haiti’s democratic process. In 1991, following the 1987 Organization of American States’ action to resume Haiti democratic process, the UN General Assembly strongly condemned the illegal replacement of the constitutional President of Haiti and confirmed as deplorable any entity resulting from that illegal situation (Teson, 1996:46). This indicates the UN’s support of democratization in international society. However, I should admit that the primary goals of the UN have not been directly related with democratic development. Democracy is not the precondition for UN membership, which is different from the prerequisite for EU membership. Instead, its membership only requires peace-loving states to accept obligations in the present Charter and perform them (Rich and Newman, 2004: 5). In fact, we should recall that many members of the UN are still not multi-party democracies in their domestic political structures, not to mention liberal democracies (Rich and Newman, 2004:5).

However, as Rich and Newman point out, the UN has indirectly tended to advocate electoral democracy as the basic ideal governance model, for every state in international society (Rich and Newman, 2004:5). In other words, we cannot completely deny the fact that the UN has greatly contributed to the promotion and consolidation of democracy across international society. For instance, the United Nations Development Fund’s criteria, published in 1995, illustrated the UN’s support of democracy, by saying:

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<sup>595</sup> See, for more information, A/RES/55/96. The website is available at: <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/565/15/PDF/N0056515.pdf?OpenElement>

- . Cooperation with institutions of civil society
- . Freedom of association and participation
- . Bureaucratic and financial accountability
- . Efficient public-sector management
- . Freedom of information and expression
- . A fair and reliable judicial system (Niblock, 1998: 231-232).

As mentioned above, we are able to see the UN's tendency to indirectly promote democracy, although some members of the UN do not yet adopt democracy as a decent form of government. Around two-thirds of UN members can be recognized as democratic and there is no aggressive opposition to democracy from the members of the UN (Farer, 2004b: 38). Actually, as the members of the UN have become more and more increasingly democratic, we cannot deny the fact that the UN reflects increasingly democratic norms and values. For decades, the UN has been playing a significant role in conveying certain values and norms across international society such as decolonization and self-determination during the Cold War era, and in the late 20<sup>th</sup> century and the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the UN has indirectly propagated democracy and even facilitated democracy across international society like the UN's monitoring referenda, let alone human rights (Rich and Newman, 2004:29, Ludwig, 2004:169). For instance, in Angola, Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, and Nicaragua, the UN was requested to assist the process of election (Ludwig, 2004:170). Within the UN system, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and as one of UNDP subdivisions, United Nations Volunteers (UNV) have been directly or indirectly engaged in the electoral assistance (Ludwig, 2004:177).<sup>596</sup>

The electoral assistance is part of the peace-making processes as the aggressive role of the UN, which can be different from the roles of the UN during the

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<sup>596</sup> Also, see other institutes outside the UN system, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), International Foundation for Election System (IFES), and Administration and Cost of Elections (ACE).

Cold War era. One of the transformations in the role of the United Nations in the post-Cold War era is that the UN is not merely satisfied with peace-keeping alone, but also it has been in pursuit of peace-making since the end of the Cold War. We can say that in the post-Cold War era and the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the UN electoral assistance is the sign of the evolution of the character of the UN, such as even peace-making rather than only peace-keeping, which has greatly contributed to democratic development in international society (Ludwig, 2004:170). In short, we can clearly say the great contribution of the UN to democratic development across international society.

As a matter of fact, the UN has done more than just electoral assistance, not to mention civic education. As one of the significant historical milestones in the UN, first in 1991 (as mentioned earlier) and later in 1994 and 1995, the General Assembly decided to encourage not only the provision of electoral assistance, but also democratization itself (Ludwig, 2004:186). In particular, in 1994, United Nations Security Council Resolution 940 for the restoration of Haiti's democracy via its authorization of the deployment of the multi-national coalition can obviously convey the message that the UN can provide the defense of democracy.<sup>597</sup> Further, as former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali put it in his 1996 Agenda for Democratization, the General Assembly has averred the foundation for a United Nations role in democratization by clearly confirming the relevant principles, purposes and rights articulated in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political

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<sup>597</sup> See, for more information, Strobe Talbott (1994). However, Prof. Ved P. Nanda argues that Haiti's mission has something to do with international peace rather than democracy (in his class at University of Denver), but I doubt that how much Haiti can pose threat to its neighbors and to international security. My point is that we should be aware of the importance of democracy in international society. However, I thoroughly appreciate Prof. Ved P. Nanda's enormous generosity and help to finish this chapter and international law chapter, even though we do not agree on various issues.

Rights.<sup>598</sup> And, we can recall that the General Assembly decided to:

include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-first session the item entitled ‘support by the United Nations system of the efforts of governments to promote and consolidate new or restored democracies.’<sup>599</sup>

All in all, we can notice that the role of the UN has gradually included an agenda for the promotion and consolidation of democracy. Nevertheless, officially, the UN has been quite reluctant to intervene in countries in the name of promotion of democracy.

The above indicates that the UN in some sense can be recognized as the international agent for democratization, in particular when considering that the purposes of the UN are the promotion of the principle of equal rights, self-determination of peoples, human rights and fundamental freedom for all, without any discrimination as to race, sex, language or religion (Newman, 2004: 193). As a matter of fact, the UN Charter is primarily based on the sovereign state, but the UN Charter can be interpreted in a more flexible way to strengthen democratic development across international society. For instance, in the UN Charter, ‘we the peoples’ can be understood in the way that the people’s will should lie behind that sovereignty, that all persons are born free and equal in dignity and rights and that all persons have a right to participate in the government of his/her state, directly or through freely chosen representatives (Newman, 2004:193). Indeed, in 1998, the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) formed an International Panel on Democracy and Development with the purpose to analyze the relation between democracy and development and to offer recommendations for future UNESCO projects concerning democracy (Neto, 2008:8). This indicates that

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<sup>598</sup> See Boutros Boutros Ghali, “An Agenda for Democratization.” UN. Doc. A/51/761.

<sup>599</sup> See GA Res. 50/133.

we can connect the UN with the norms and values of democracy, and we can assume that the UN can be a strong candidate to promote democracy in international society. Once again, as in the era of the post-Cold War and the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the nature of the UN has been evolved to become gradually more peace-making rather than peace-keeping, the UN has been progressively more expected to promote and consolidate democracy across international society.

Although the primary goals of the UN are security and peace, we cannot avoid the great contribution of democratization to security and peace in international society in the long run.<sup>600</sup> For instance, as Newman put it, since the September 11 terrorist attacks on the US, we have been more and more aware of the close connection between good governance and security (Newman, 2004:190). Especially, when considering that Afghanistan could be a good example for corrupt, unstable, ineffective, and repressive governance, ‘an outlaw state’ which could not only bring out the misery for millions in that country, but also the terrorist havoc, we can perceive the correlative relationship between democracy and the primary goals of the UN (Newman, 2004:190). If good governance is one of the pillars for democracy and can guarantee security and peace in international society, democracy and the UN cannot be inseparable from each other. In other words, as democracy can ultimately contribute to world peace and security, we can say that there is a shared ground between democracy and goals of the United Nations.<sup>601</sup> When considering the close connection between democracy and the goals of the UN, we can understand the reason for the recent creations of the United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDEF) and

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<sup>600</sup> We can think of democratic peace theory.

<sup>601</sup> If we also accept democratic peace theory as plausible, we can perceive the close relationship between democracy and the UN.

of the United Nations Democracy Caucus. The UNDEF is a pure democracy fund rather than a development fund or a human rights fund, in order to strengthen the voice of civil society in the various democratic processes.<sup>602</sup> Indeed, on September 2005, during the Millennium Summit review conference, representatives of more than 150 member states confirmed their support to the formation of a UN fund to promote democracy, and the meeting's final statement recognized that democracy is a universal value on the basis of the free will of the people in deciding their political, economic, social and cultural system (Neto, 2008:8). The UN Democracy Caucus is to provide some networks of like-minded democratic nations to work together in order to enhance the work of the UN in various arenas, in particular human rights, good governance and the rule of law, while contributing to the creation of an international environment in which democracy can flourish.<sup>603</sup> In short, the UN Democracy Caucus can help secure human rights, expand economic development and preserve peace for a sound environment to promote and consolidate democracy across international society.<sup>604</sup> All in all, we can say that the UN has had an impact on democratic development, and it should be more deeply involved in the promotion and consolidation of democracy.

Let us turn to regional organization in order to demonstrate how regional organizations can contribute to democratic development in international society. At this juncture, I will scrutinize North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Organization of American States (OAS) and European Union (EU). First of all, I will start with the role of NATO. NATO which was found in 1949, was initially

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<sup>602</sup> See "The United Nations Democracy Fund." The website is available at: <http://www.un.org/democracyfund/index.htm>

<sup>603</sup> See "Promoting Democracy in the United Nations." *U.S. Department of State*. The website is available at: <http://www.state.gov/p/io/rls/fs/2004/36412.htm>

<sup>604</sup> Ibid

designed to provide for the common defense of the United States, Canada, and their Western European allies under Article 51 of the UN Charter, and it explicates the geographical boundaries of alliances territory with its emphasis on the key responsibility of the UN Security Council to maintain international peace and security (Butler, 2000:273). During the Cold War era, the role of the NATO alliance was primarily to respond against a growing Soviet threat and a resurgent Germany. Such primary and original reasons for the creation of NATO can be described well by George Kennan. Kennan mentioned:

In the long run, there can be only three possibilities for the future of western and central Europe. One is German domination. Another is Russian domination. The third is a federated Europe, into which the parts of Germany are absorbed but in which the influence of the other countries is sufficient to hold Germany in her place. If there is no real European federation and if Germany is restored as a strong and independent country, we must expect another attempt at Germany domination (Kennan, 1948:515).

With these reasons, the creation of NATO gave the Western European nations some security guarantee against resurgent Germany as well as Russia.<sup>605</sup> Also, during the Cold War era, NATO could strengthen the capitalist democratic community via close socialization among members, in particular transforming and rehabilitating West Germany.<sup>606</sup> As John Ikenberry put it, NATO is primarily a security alliance institution, but the role of NATO has been to lock in political and even economic relations within the Atlantic area (Ikenberry, 2003:64). Thus, NATO can be recognized as one of the institutions to facilitate and consolidate capitalist democratic community, tying Europe to the US, as West Germany's transformation of identity and

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<sup>605</sup> See Llovd C. Gardner (1984:100).

<sup>606</sup> See John Ikenberry (2003: 61).



characteristics demonstrates, which resulted in the reorientation of Europe.<sup>607</sup> In particular, in the post-Cold War era, NATO has become less a military alliance and more a grouping of like-minded democratic states in pursuit of the preservation and extension of democratic community in Europe and beyond Europe (Ikenberry, 2000b:95). The North Atlantic Military Committee's MC 327 can help us comprehend the expansion of the role of NATO. It defines "peace support operations as ranging from conflict prevention activities, peace-making, peace-keeping, humanitarian aid missions and peace-building, to peace-enforcement"(Butler, 2000:275). This implies that the role of NATO is more than just a collective self-defense regional organization, especially when considering its roles of peace-enforcement and peace-building. Peace-enforcement, peace-making and peace-building can be understood as to promote democracy. For instance, although Kosovo case can be seen to be humanitarian intervention, NATO's Kosovo intervention case demonstrates the close relationship between democracy and NATO, since the primary goal of the US-led NATO's strike against Yugoslavia was to "end Europe's last dictatorship" and to "bring democracy to Serbia"(Yunling, 2000:117). We should keep in mind the fact that the Kosovo case can be seen as peace-building and democratization. This can be confirmed by former British Prime Minister Tony Blair's claim that NATO's campaign in Kosovo was quite necessary for the long-term regional peace via removing a dictator (Yunling, 2000: 120). At this juncture, we can see the close relationship between democracy and NATO. Further, when we consider the above evolutionary characteristics of NATO, we can even say that the expansion of NATO can be marked as to help expand and consolidate the capitalist

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<sup>607</sup> Ibid. pp.63. Also, see, for more information, Gustav Schmidt (1995).

democratic community. In July 1997, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were officially invited to become the members of NATO, which followed a decision made at the January 1994 NATO summit in Brussels to enlarge NATO to accept the members from Eastern and Central Europe (Ikenberry, 2003:66). Such NATO enlargement has facilitated the promotion and consolidation of democracy, as it can consolidate democratic and market gains in Eastern and Central Europe, building an expanded Western democratic community along with its assistance for domestic transitions under way in Eastern and Central Europe (Ikenberry, 2003:66). In particular, when considering one of NATO officials' remarks "We are enmeshing them in the NATO culture, both politically and militarily so they begin to think like us and – over time – act like us," as Ikenberry points out, we can perceive that NATO membership indirectly requests democracy and a capitalist market economy (Towell, 1998:275, Ikenberry, 2003:66).

However, I have to admit that in some sense, NATO cannot be a full institution for promotion and consolidation of democracy, when considering the past legacy of NATO as an alliance mechanism to fight against communism during the Cold War era. For instance, in the past, as Russett put it, NATO did not reject Greece and Turkey when they turned against democracy (Russett, 2005:403). Since 1952, Greece has enjoyed NATO membership, but in 1967, Greece's military dictatorship suspended many political liberties.<sup>608</sup> Nevertheless we should recognize that in 1974, Greece held democratic elections and created a parliamentary republic, with abolishment of the system of the monarchy. Further, Greece joined the European Community/European Union, and became the 12<sup>th</sup> member of the euro zone in 2001.

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<sup>608</sup>See the website: <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/gr.html>

Like Greece, also in the past, Turkey had military dictatorship in 1950, and the Turkish Army had carried out three coups in 1960, 1971 and 1980, not to mention its intervention to force Turkey's first Islamist Prime Minister, Necmettin Erbakan from power in 1997, even if Turkey has become a multi-parties democratic political system.<sup>609</sup>

However, the transformation of states from military dictatorship to liberal democracy can be made more possible within NATO. As mentioned above, Spain's case can confirm the role of NATO in the promotion and consolidation of democracy, since Spain's entry into NATO shows its indirect role to secure democracy. Its NATO membership could modernize, improve and reorient Spain's army in military technology via its joint maneuvers with NATO (Pevehouse, 2005:25). As a result, the Spanish military could be reoriented away from domestic politics and become more professional (Pevehouse, 2005:25). In this sense, we can say that NATO can play a significant role in reshaping the preferences of actors, while contributing to the promotion and consolidation of democracy (Pevehouse 2005: 25). Due to this, NATO expansion can be understood as to facilitate the promotion and consolidation of democracy, and NATO has been gradually recognized as one of the significant institutions for democratic development in international society.

As one of the regional organizations, the Organization of American States (OAS) has had politically and economically a great impact on shaping and shoving the behavior of states. The OAS has had impressive declarations and committees dealing with human rights and democracy (Vogelgesang, 1979:221-222). The OAS Charter, drawn up in 1948 and revised in 1967, declares that American states proclaim

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<sup>609</sup> See "Turkish ruling party warns army." *BBC News*. April. 27, 2007.

the fundamental rights of the individual without distinction as to race, nationality, creed, or sex, and it designates the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) (Vogelgesang, 1979:222). Also, Article 1 of the OAS Inter-American Democratic Charter, 40 ILM (2001) 1289 declares that the people of the Americas should have a right to democracy and their governments have an obligation to promote and defend it. And, when considering the members of the OAS, we find that most members of the OAS are democratic. The organization directly or indirectly request democracy as a membership condition. Indeed, the OAS has been more closely connected to the promotion and defense of democracy, since it was founded in 1948. Its first sign of a crucial commitment to pro-democracy principles came in 1979 with the passage of a resolution that condemned the human rights record of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua (Cooper and Legler, 2001a:105). In the post-Cold War era, there has been a growing consensus among OAS members to pursue collective action to promote and defend democracy, and this can be seen in inter-American legal documents such as the Santiago Commitment and Resolution 1080 (1991), the Washington Protocol (1992), the Managua Declaration (1993), and the Declaration and Plans of Action of the Miami and Santiago Summits of the Americas (1994,1998) (Cooper, and Legler, 2001a: 103). Especially, the Declaration of Santiago can be recognized as a symbolic milestone in the creation of regimes to protect democracy in the hemisphere.<sup>610</sup> Resolution 1080 declares that the OAS Permanent Council should be convened if the democratic process is interrupted in any of the OAS member states, and a meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs or a special

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<sup>610</sup> See Monica Herz, "Latin American Security System." *Instruments of Analysis*, pp. 49-51.

session of the General Assembly can be assembled within a 10 day period.<sup>611</sup> Also, with the Protocol of Washington, on December 14, 1992, the OAS added ‘the treat of suspension’ to Article 9 of the OAS. The amendment to Article 9 of the OAS Charter states:

A member of the Organization whose democratically constituted government has been overthrown by force may be suspended from the exercise of the right to participate in the session of the General Assembly, the Meeting of consultation, the Councils of the Organization and the Specialized Conferences as well as in the commissions, working groups and any other bodies established (OAS 1992, Cooper and Legler, 2001a: 107).

This displays the OAS’s support for democratic development. The OAS has used two methods, ‘pressure’ and ‘acquiescence’ to affect the development of democracy (Pevehouse, 2005: 136). Nicaragua (1979), Panama (1989), Haiti (1991), Peru (1992), and Guatemala (1993), can be good examples to advocate this idea, while denouncing anti-democratic governments. At this juncture, I will briefly mention about Peru and Guatemala. The impact of the OAS on Peru’s democracy confirms the OAS’s significant role in the promotion and consolidation of democracy. In 1992, Peru’s President, Fujimori declared the implementation of a Government Emergency and National Reconstruction, dissolving parliament and suspending the judiciary on April 5, 1992, when he had tension with judiciary and legislature (Pevehouse, 2005:129). The following OAS reaction called upon him to restore democracy, declaring “Fujimori’s move was a blow to democracy”(Pevehouse, 2005:130). Besides, the OAS threatened to impose sanctions against Peru, while organizing the international community against Peru, including the suspension of assistance from the international financial community (Pevehouse, 2005: 131). This reaction of the

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<sup>611</sup> Ibid.

OAS indirectly or directly brought Peru back on track to democratization. Peru even accepted an OAS mission to Peru under the adoption of Resolution 1753 which authorized a high-level team of ministers to travel to Peru to strengthen democracy (Cooper and Legler, 2001b:128). As we can see, the OAS's contribution to Peru's democratic development cannot be discounted.<sup>612</sup> As mentioned briefly before, the OAS for Guatemala can demonstrate as well that the OAS has advocated young democracies, such as the OAS's pressure on Guatemala after the self-coup of Jorge Serrano. Jon C. Pevehouse states this point, by saying:

**One example of this scenario would be the Organization of American States' pressure on Guatemala after the self-coup of Jorge Serrano. In May 1993, Serrano dissolved Guatemala's legislature and courts, and announced that he would rule by decree. Led by several of the smaller democratic members of the organization, the OAS lodged high profile protests and moved to levy sanctions against the regime. After five days, Serrano was forced from office by military, which reinstated a civilian president. Many observers credit the OAS response as an important part of Serrano's calculations to step down** (Pevehouse, 2005:19).

The role of the OAS in Guatemala demonstrates how the OAS as a regional organization has pushed non-democracies to liberalize, while de-legitimizing autocratic regimes via various means, including public condemnation, political or economic sanction, and even exclusion from the organization (Pevehouse, 2005: 20). All of these cases demonstrate that as a regional organization, the OAS has had a great impact on democratic development. Nevertheless, I admit that the OAS

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<sup>612</sup> Here, I do not want to reveal the US great contribution to Peru's democratization, even though we cannot ignore it, in particular when the US suspended aid to Peru and put heavy pressure on several aid organizations such as IMF to withhold over \$2 billion in financial assistance, which ultimately could drove Fujimori to make concession toward democracy (Pevehouse, 2005:132). The primary reason is that the promotion of democracy is not only the key value and norm of Great Power, the US, but also international organization usually cannot be severed from the will and interests of Great Powers. At this juncture, my point is that as a regional organization, OAS's contribution to democratic development cannot be discounted in international society.

members' commitment to collective initiatives to safeguard democracy underscores the conflicting foreign policy principles in that region: the perennial tension between the prodemocracy collective interventions and the respect for non-intervention and state sovereignty (Cooper and Legler, 2001a). And, we can see some states which still reject the norms of democracy such as Chavez's Venezuela – e.g. semi-authoritarian regime, lack of freedom of speech, and Chavez's trenchant critique of party politics - even if once it was considered as South America's most stable democracy and it was a promoter of Resolution 1080. However, for certainty, we cannot deny the OAS's great contribution to democratic promotion and consolidation in international society.

As another regional organization, the European Union is a good example to demonstrate how international organization can facilitate democratic development. The EU has been well known as the most powerful community for democratic development, in particular when considering that within the area of the EU, bilateral diplomatic missions already are being eclipsed by the inner communicative activity of the EU.<sup>613</sup> Most importantly, the EU has always had a commitment to democracy and has never had a non-democratic member, and every member of the EU should adopt a democratic form of government (Russett, 2005:404).

Originally, the EU democratic commitment can be found in the Treaty of Rome. Democracy was a condition for membership in article 237 of the Treaty of Rome that began the integration process in 1950 and the commitment was strongly advocated by the European Parliament in 1962, proclaiming that a joining state has to ensure truly democratic practices and respect for fundamental rights and freedom

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<sup>613</sup> See Alan K. Henrikson (2005b).

(Russett, 2005:404). Also, successive reform of the European treaties such as Single European Act (SEA) in 1987, Treaty of Maastricht in 1993 and Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999 brought out an extension of the arena of EU policy (Witte, 2002:236). In the process, the EU has specified that accession would rely not only on “the political and economic performance of the candidate states, but also on the EU’s state of preparation, more of its institutional structure” (Witte, 2002:237). This can be interpreted in two ways. One is that new member states should become fit for the European Union to ensure that their joining the EU cannot hurt the actual competitiveness and stability of actual members (Giorgi and Pohoryles, 2005:408). On the other hand, the structure of the EU itself should have enough capability so as to include new member states, in the awareness of the impact of the new member states on the structure of the EU.<sup>614</sup> Under this assumption, the EU has a common foreign and security policy to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (Solonenko, 2005:59).

Iryna Solonenko states:

Throughout the 90s this approach began to more strongly emphasize democracy in the EU’s external policy. The 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam proclaimed human rights to be a cornerstone of EU external policy, and the Nice Summit in December 2000 launched the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and called for more coherence between the EU’s external and internal policies. **According to ‘The European Union’s role in Promoting Human rights and Democratization in the third Countries’ (as of 8 May 2002), promoting human rights and democratization became a main concern of EU external relations** (Solonenko, 2005:59).

As we can see, at this juncture, democratic commitment of the EU can be strongly felt.

Many European Union countries and its candidates demonstrate this point. For

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<sup>614</sup> See Liana Giorgi and Ronald J. Pohoryles (2005).



instance, in 1981, Greece became a full member of the European Community/EC (Pevehouse, 2005:172). Nonetheless, until that point, Greece had several difficulties to join the EC/EU. For example, after the 1967 Greek military coup, the European Commission suspended the Greek Association Treaty with Greece, and threatened to cancel the agreement entirely. Greece has not ignored such pressure from the EU, in particular when considering that nearly half of Greece's total trade was with the EU (Russett, 2005:404). Also, Bulgaria and Romania became the new EU members (26<sup>th</sup> and 27<sup>th</sup>) on January 1, 2007. However, both of them had experienced massive difficulty in order to become EU members. They even missed the first round of EU expansion into Eastern Europe due to their failure to implement democratic and market reform.<sup>615</sup> Bulgaria had faced criticism for its failure to adopt a new anti-corruption penal code and for insufficient efforts in combating organized crime, and Romania had a lack of press freedom and problems with corruption.<sup>616</sup> As a candidate of EU membership, Turkey has been pursuing EU membership, but its membership has been slow due to its questionable record of democracy such as human rights violations in Northern Cyprus, not to mention EU's concern about Turkey's commitment to political reform (Pevehouse, 2005:38).<sup>617</sup> After the September 1980 coup, also, Turkey even experienced suspension from the Council of Europe (Pevehouse, 2005: 48). Thus, Turkey's membership in EU will be very meaningful, if it becomes a new EU member. At least, Turkey's entry to the EU will reflect Turkey's status as a democratic regime, even if Turkey's entry to it will be

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<sup>615</sup> See "Viewpoints: Balkan boost for EU." *BBC News*. January 16, 2007.

<sup>616</sup> See "EU backs Bulgaria and Romania bid." *BBC News*. April 13, 2005.

<sup>617</sup> Also, see "Turkey guilty of human rights abuse." *BBC News*. May 10, 2001. And, see "Turkish ruling party warns army." *BBC News*. April 27, 2007.

more than just recognition of Turkey's democratic regime by others. As Turkey joins the EU, it can break down the general prejudice against the EU as a Christian club, and also, it can help Turkey's consolidation process of democracy. Furthermore, via Turkey's membership in the EU, we might confirm that democracy does not recognize cultural differences. All in all, all of these examples can strongly advocate the idea that the EU promotes and consolidates democracy in international society. So far, I have briefly touched on international governmental organizations and regional organizations to reveal close relationships between international organizations and democratic development in international society.

Let us turn to international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) for democratic development. In regard to INGOs for the promotion of democracy, we can consider Freedom House, the Council for a Community of Democracies (CCD), the Ford Foundation, the Carter Center, Oxfam, Amnesty International (AI), Human Rights Watch, etc.<sup>618</sup> As mentioned above, their primary role is to assist the bottom-up democracy across international society. It is worthwhile to take a brief look at the function of the INGOs for democratic development. The above INGOs have clearly strengthened democracy via the followings:

funding pro-democratic civil society actors in transitional societies, organizing exchanges of democratic leaders; providing expertise for institution-building; encouraging accountability and transparency by conducting informal oversight and scrutiny, and funding local projects aimed at strengthening democratic processes (Newman, 2004: 192).

Also, large-scale INGOs have played a significant role in democracy assistance via even observing and validating elections, advertising governments, and assisting in

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<sup>618</sup> Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch are recognized as primary non-governmental organization for human rights. But we cannot deny their contribution to democratic development.

building democratic institutions (Newman, 2004:193). Carothers makes a good brief summary on the role of the NGO in the promotion and consolidation of democracy. Carothers mentioned that the NGOs have fostered civil society development especially in issues like human rights, women's issues and election monitoring; assistance to build independent media; support for independent labor unions; and programmers that seek to promote a better understanding of democracy for citizens via civic education projects, conferences and seminars on democracy, and educational exchange programmes (Carothers, 2000:188). The significant role of NGOs in the promotion and consolidation of democracy cannot be diminished and disregarded at all.

Let us take a look at several NGOs that promote and consolidate democracy. I will start with Freedom House. As an INGO, Freedom House is a non-profit, non-partisan organization for economic and political freedom in international society. In particular, Freedom House has been very active in supporting the infrastructure of civic life and democratic values across international society.<sup>619</sup> It has been in opposition to tyranny in Latin America, apartheid in South Africa, Soviet Communism, domination of Eastern and Central Europe, and religiously based authoritarian dictatorial regimes including Sudan, Iran and Saudi Arabia.<sup>620</sup> Its primary function is to play a role in a catalyst for freedom, democracy and the rule of law via its analysis, advocacy and action.<sup>621</sup> It can be recognized as one of the leading

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<sup>619</sup> See "Promoting Democracy Through Diplomacy." *Hearing Before the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress, Series No. 109-82, May 5, 2005.* The website is available at: <http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/archives/109/21022.pdf>

<sup>620</sup> See "Welcome to Freedom House." The website is available at : <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=2>

<sup>621</sup> Ibid

advocates of the world's young democracies, in debilitating legacies of tyranny, dictatorship and political repression, and in supporting human rights, democracy, free-market economics, the rule of law and independent media.<sup>622</sup> For instance, in Jordan, Freedom House worked to prevent violence against women; in Algeria, to seek justice for victims of torture; in Uzbekistan, to stem a brutal dictatorship; and in Venezuela, to protect and promote human rights.<sup>623</sup> Overall, Freedom House has advocated democracy across international society, not to mention its measurement of the democratic level of each country.

As another example, we can think of the Council for a Community of Democracies (CCD). First of all, we'd better know more about the Community of Democracies (CD).<sup>624</sup> The Community of Democracies was launched in Warsaw, Poland, in June of 2000, which was drawn from a diverse mix of regions, cultures, and religions, dedicating itself to a key set of democratic principles and has advocated cooperation among democracies in international society.<sup>625</sup> The Council for a Community of Democracies, which is a NGO incorporated in Washington D.C. was formed to support a global democratic movement.<sup>626</sup> As an INGO, CCD has exclusively focused on the community of democracies.<sup>627</sup> For instance, CCD contributed in various ways to the success of the 2005 Santiago Ministerial

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<sup>622</sup> Ibid

<sup>623</sup> Ibid

<sup>624</sup> In Chapter III, I mentioned Community of Democracies as well

<sup>625</sup> See, for more information, the webstie: <http://www.community-democracies.org/>

<sup>626</sup>See "Council for a Community of Democracies." The website is available at: <http://www.ccd21.org/>

<sup>627</sup> Ibid

Conference of the Community of Democracies.<sup>628</sup> Its mission can be summarized with the followings:

- . To strengthen collaborating among governments and democracy advocates in building an effective worldwide community of democratic nations based on the initiative of the June 2000 Warsaw Community of Democracies Conference.
- . To help implement resolutions promulgated at the 2002 Community of Democracies meeting in Seoul, Korea; to assist national and international non-governmental organizations formulate a strategic vision for the future of the Community of Democracies and to support that vision by their participation in the 2005 meeting to be held in Santiago, Chile.
- . To share among governments and non-governmental organizations their pro-democracy programs and resources.
- . To promote collaboration among democratically elected parliaments and among delegations to be the United Nations --including the organization of a UN democracy caucus --- and collaboration among other international organizations in support of democratic practices.<sup>629</sup>

However, we should keep in mind the fact that this INGO is different from other INGOs for democratic development, since it advocates the community of democracies, that is, groups of democratic states rather than each individual state.

As the third example, we can think of the Ford Foundation as well. The Ford Foundation is transnational, albeit its international staff remains mostly American (Nye and Keohane, 1973: XVI). The Ford Foundation has made grants in all 50 U.S. States and in many countries across international society, while strengthening democratic values, reducing poverty and injustice, promoting international cooperation and advancing human achievement as its goals.<sup>630</sup> It has 12 offices in

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<sup>628</sup> Ibid

<sup>629</sup> See "CCD's Mission." *Council for a Community of Democracies*. The website is available at: <http://www.ccd21.org/visionmission.htm>

<sup>630</sup> See "Who We are." *Ford Foundation*. The website is available at: <http://www.fordfound.org/about/mission.cfm>

Africa, Asia, Latin America and Russia.<sup>631</sup> It has programs for democratic development, including ‘asset building and a community development program,’ ‘a peace and social justice program’ and ‘a knowledge, creativity and freedom program.’<sup>632</sup> Also, in the peace and social justice program, in particular, the civil society unit is primarily there to strengthen democratic civil society, seeking to increase participation in public affairs beyond the act of voting and to strengthen civil society organizations.<sup>633</sup> In short, the Ford Foundation has had an impact on democratic development.

Also, we can think of Oxfam that has been known as the world’s most influential international development organization (Aaronson and Zimmerman, 2006:999). Oxfam was created in 1942 as a relief organization (Aaronson and Zimmerman, 2006:1008). Oxfam International is a confederation of 14 like-minded organizations working together and with partners and allies around the world to lead to lasting change.<sup>634</sup> And, Oxfam International works with more than 3,000 local partner organizations, helping “people living in poverty to exercise their human rights, assert their dignity as full citizens and take control of their lives.”<sup>635</sup> Also, Oxfam emphasizes equity about making the rules fair for poor people and guaranteeing that justice prevails (Aaronson and Zimmerman, 2006:1010). Indeed, we can say that

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<sup>631</sup> See “Global Offices.” *Ford Foundation*. The website is available at: [http://www.fordfound.org/global/map\\_flash.cfm](http://www.fordfound.org/global/map_flash.cfm)

<sup>632</sup> See “Program.” *Ford Foundation*. The website is available at: [http://www.fordfound.org/program/program\\_main.cfm](http://www.fordfound.org/program/program_main.cfm)

<sup>633</sup> See “Peace and Social Justice.” *Ford Foundation*. The website is available at: <http://www.fordfound.org/program/govern.cfm>

<sup>634</sup> See “About us.” *Oxfam International*. The website is available at: <http://www.oxfam.org/en/about>

<sup>635</sup> See “What we do.” *Oxfam International*. The website is available at: <http://www.oxfam.org/en/about/what>

Oxfam's work on human rights and democracy focuses on the 'voice of poverty,' in particular as social and political citizenship, albeit its traditional task was famine relief (Aaronson and Zimmerman, 2006:1010).<sup>636</sup> In short, we can assume that when poor people are denied the right to affect the decisions that influence their lives, Oxfam International helps the voices of the poor to reach policy-makers.<sup>637</sup> For instance, in Uganda, Oxfam worked to influence policy makers to triple government spending on water and sanitation.<sup>638</sup> Most importantly, in 2006, Oxfam Haiti launched a national campaign against armed violence, while helping set up a committee of national and international organizations to lead the campaign and working with a thousand young people in areas most affected by armed violence, when fear of armed violence discouraged Haitians from voting in the presidential elections on February 7, 2006.<sup>639</sup>

Moreover, we can think of Amnesty International (AI) as a democracy enhancing international organization. AI is the best known non-governmental organization (NGO) in the field of human rights (Thakur, 1994:144). AI has more than 2.2 million members and subscribers in more than 150 countries and regions<sup>640</sup> AI has been investigating and judging human right abuses around the world without any discrimination on grounds of race, region, or ideological belief (Thakur,

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<sup>636</sup> Also, see "Democracy and Human Rights." *Oxfam: Generation why*. The website is available at <http://www.oxfam.org.uk/generationwhy/issues/democracy/>

<sup>637</sup> Ibid

<sup>638</sup> Ibid

<sup>639</sup> See "Oxfam: Armed violence discouraging Haitians from voting in presidential elections." *Oxfam International*. The website is available at: [http://www.oxfam.org/en/news/pressreleases2006/pr060203\\_haiti](http://www.oxfam.org/en/news/pressreleases2006/pr060203_haiti)

<sup>640</sup> See "Who we are." *Amnesty International*. The website is available at <http://www.amnesty.org/en/who-we-are>

1994:148). Also, despite being prevented by AI rules from investigating or taking action in respect of abuses in their own countries, members of AI have an internal role in contributing to the development and promotion of a human rights culture in their own country (Thakur, 1994:149). All in all, AI has contributed to human rights and democratic development across international society.

Finally, we can think of Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch is an independent and non-governmental organization that was advocated by contributions via private individuals and foundations across international society, and it has never accepted governmental funds directly or indirectly.<sup>641</sup> In general, it has been well known to protect the human rights of people in international society, and it has been actively engaged in prevention of discrimination and political freedom.<sup>642</sup> So far, I have revealed a few of examples of INGOs that support democratic promotion and consolidation in international society.<sup>643</sup>

To sum up, I have to mention that every international organization in international society does not necessarily contribute to the process of the promotion and consolidation of democracy, but as I pointed out above, many international organizations have directly and indirectly contributed to the promotion and consolidation of democracy, especially via various ways, like enhancing states' legitimacy, and the process of socialization. In other words, the external pressure from international organizations can push authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes

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<sup>641</sup> See "About HRW." The website is available at: <http://www.hrw.org/about/>

<sup>642</sup> Ibid.

<sup>643</sup> In this part, I did not clearly mention the bottom-up approach as non-governmental organization approach to promote democracy, but I will emphasize it when I deal with China case. However, I admit that the bottom-up approach and the top down approach cannot be clearly separated. Nevertheless, my point is that international governmental organization tends to adopt the top-down approach whereas international non-governmental organization tends to adopt bottom-up approach.



to undertake liberalization and further liberalization, as a force for democratization.<sup>644</sup> As an excessive way, international organizations can create economic difficulties and diplomatic isolation for any authoritarian regime, which can help de-legitimize it at home, and which can help mark it as a pariah state or an outlaw state abroad.<sup>645</sup> Also, importantly, international organizations provide the opportunity for socialization among states, which can lead to transparency, similar patterns of behavior among states, and further even change in the domestic structure of states toward democracy. On the whole, these international organizations can be recognized as facilitators to promote and consolidate democracy as the emerging new standard of civilization and a new wave expansion of international society. Below, I will start examining how international organizations can have an impact on democratic development in three countries, China, South Korea and Iraq.

### **3> Case Studies for International Organizations and Democratic Development.**

In this section, I will examine three cases, China, South Korea, and Iraq. These three cases, China, South Korea and Iraq can help us understand how international organizations can have an impact on the promotion and consolidation of democracy across international society and lead to each different path toward democracy in international society.<sup>646</sup> Like other chapters, each case belongs to each different international society, pluralist, solidarist and liberal anti-pluralist. With regard to this point, I will reveal that international organizations have adopted

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<sup>644</sup> Pevehouse pointed out how international organization can indirectly or directly shape the behavior of states toward liberalization and further democratization. See, for more details, Pevehouse (2002:522).

<sup>645</sup> For example, as Pevehouse puts it, “the Council of Europe suspended Turkey’s involvement in the organization after the September 1980 coup.”(Pevehouse, 2002: 530).

<sup>646</sup> Nevertheless, China and Iraq’s cases still need more time to see.

different paths to push each state toward democracy. In this section, I will examine how IGOs and INGOs can have an impact on China (interests), South Korea (legitimacy) and Iraq's (force) democracies.

### **3. a. International Organization and China's Democratic Development**

#### **1) International governmental organization's role in democratic development in China**

Let us start with China's entry into the United Nations. China's entry into the most far-reaching IGO, 'the United Nations' was realized on October 25, 1971, and it has been the only Asian and developing state that has enjoyed permanent membership in the Security Council (Kim, 1977:713, 720). This has been understood as China's official re-integration into the international community (Kent, 2002:344). Beside the UN, in fact, China has joined increasingly many other international organizations in international society. For instance, by 1966, China had been a member of only one international governmental organization (IGO), but by 2002 it had become a member of around fifty IGOs, including the International Labor Organization (ILO), Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), etc. (Kent, 2002:345). Under this specific circumstance, we can say that China is actively engaged in IGOs, and importantly that the more IGOs China has joined, the more China's domestic and foreign policies have been constrained by the norms and values of international society. Nevertheless, most importantly, its participation in many IGOs has been authentically originated in its incentives of narrow self-interests.<sup>647</sup>

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<sup>647</sup> I will explain this later. Also, Justin S. Hempson-Jones mentioned this point. See Justin S. Hempson-Jones (2005).

However, we should not forget that China had been very reluctant to use international organizations. Mao's China had been reluctant to rely on IGOs, even the United Nations, albeit China has cherished the UN charter system, which can be recognized as a pluralistic principle (Kim, 1977:742). There are primary three reasons. First, as for Mao's China, IGOs had been regarded as instruments of Western imperialism and hegemonism (Hempson-Jones, 2005:707).<sup>648</sup> For example, in the 1960s, Beijing disdained "the U.N. as a dirty international political stock exchange in the grip of a few big powers."<sup>649</sup> And the Chinese newspaper, People's Daily (Renmin Ribao) advocated this view, revealing the following language and attitude: "what kind of thing is the UN? It is a tool of US imperialism, number one overload, and the Soviet Unionist ruling clique, number two overlord, to press ahead with neo-colonialism and big nation power politics."<sup>650</sup> Second, Chinese pride had been embedded in the principle of self-reliance. In other words, China's pride had been too strong to become a recipient of any UN assistance program, which is deeply derived from the Maoist version of *dependencia* theory (Kim, 1977:742, Kim, 1992b:142). Mao's China had been the only Third World country that gave but never accepted any bilateral and multilateral aid (Kim, 1977:742). Third, there had been no Chinese direct economic interests in its joining of the UN and other IGOs (Kim, 1977:742).

However, as Samuel S. Kim points out, the turning point emerged in 1978-1979 when China made a dramatic reversal from giving aid to seeking aid, which

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<sup>648</sup> China is used to claiming that Chinese foreign policy is based on anti-hegemonism and anti-imperialism.

<sup>649</sup> I quoted this from Hempson-Jones' article (2005: 712).

<sup>650</sup> See *People's Daily*. January 10, 1965 and July 8, 1967.

stemmed primarily from Deng's three key objectives: anti-hegemony, modernization and unification (Kim, 1992b:142). This new direction emerged, thanks to the part of failure of the Cultural Revolution that led to a total economic destruction. Due to the failure of the Cultural Revolution, China's per capita income at the end of the Cultural Revolution, was one of the lowest in the world, around on par with that of Somalia.<sup>651</sup> Deng's reform was necessary to remedy China's deep wound. China's modernization in science and technology pushed China closer to international society via its more aggressive participation in international organizations, which has brought out alteration in China's identity and characteristics. As a result, China started playing a significant role in the United Nations by the 1980s and it joined all IGOs in the UN system. Until late 1981, China had revealed a negative attitude toward U.N. peace-keeping operations, but after then along with its identification with the third world and putative strategic de-alignment from the US, China has gradually shown its positive language and attitude toward the peacekeeping operation. On December 14, 1981, China, for the first time, voted for the extension of the U.N. peacekeeping force in Cyprus (Kim, 1992b:148). By late 1982, Beijing even claimed itself as a champion of U.N. peacekeeping, by saying:

The more tumultuous the international relations, and the more seriously threatened are world peace and international security, the more important and pressing becomes the task of strengthening the United Nations (Kim, 1992b:148).

Also, China voted for all non-peacekeeping resolutions, with its approval of 52 resolutions from 1981-1990 on Middle East Issues (Hempson-Jones, 2005:714). In 1992, China even sent 47 military observers and 400 military engineers to the

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<sup>651</sup> See Catharin E. Dalpino (2000:18) and Lucian W. Pye (1990: 10).

operation of the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).<sup>652</sup> Furthermore, China has increased financial contributions to the UN, whereas some states have reduced their financial contributions to the UN.<sup>653</sup> This denotes the close relationships between China and the UN, and China is a part of international society, and this means that China started being aware of the norms and values of international society as its potential own ones.<sup>654</sup>

Along with the transformation in China's attitude toward international organizations, indeed, we can perceive China's altering concept of international organizations – e.g. a system-transforming approach during the exclusion period of 1949-1970, to a system reforming approach in the 1970s, to the system maintaining and system exploiting approach of the 1980s and 1990s (Kent, 1997/98: 520-21).<sup>655</sup> At this juncture, we can perceive that although China was used to rejecting the norms and values of international society because, according to China's perspective, they seemed biased toward the Western Great Powers, once participating in international organizations, China has been acting as a system-maintainer rather than as a system reformer, revisionist or system-transforming revolutionary (Kim, 2004b:51). Nonetheless, China only remains as a system-maintainer, as long as it can bring about China's national interests first. China's participation in international organizations

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<sup>652</sup> Over 1990s, China seemed to approve peace-keeping operations on civil wars, humanitarian crisis, and communal conflicts, in a flexible way. However, we should not be confused in terms of China's concept of pluralist international society. China is still strongly obsessed with pluralistic international society, as the 1999 Kosovo case demonstrated.

<sup>653</sup> At Jackson/Ho China-East Asia Forum in University of Denver, I had a chance to talk to Qingguo Jia who is a Professor and Associate Dean at Peking University in the School of International Studies. He emphasized China's role in the UN.

<sup>654</sup> Samuel Kim claims that Beijing has been asking increasingly what IGOs can do for China, and less and less what it can do to reform or transform the world of international organizations. See Samuel S. Kim (1992b).

<sup>655</sup> Also, see, for more detail, Samuel S, Kim (1994).

can be recognized as a socializing mechanism via which China has gradually become like other members of international society. When considering this, we can expect China to eventually become democratic, as democracy itself starts being recognized as the new emerging standard of civilization in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

As for China, international organizations are not seen as supranational, but as political entities like sovereign states (Kent, 1997/98:520). This is meaningful to understand China's perception on international society and its motivation of engagement in international organizations: a pluralistic international society and self-interest. China's concept of international organization is based on China's concept of international society, that is, a pluralist international society. Section 5 of China's Independent Foreign Policy of Peace reveals this point, by saying:

China would like to establish and develop relations of friendship and cooperation with all the countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence namely, mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.<sup>656</sup>

Along with the above, China has been seriously critical of 'the use of force' in the name of the United Nations Charter on the ground that the United Nations is an international organization with its responsibility for international peace and security, thanks to its historical painful experience of interventions from other nations, such as the Opium War (Kim, 1992b:150). Also, China's motivation of engagement in IGOs is authentically oriented in self-interest. For instance, during the Persian Gulf War crisis, Beijing's initial response was 'silence' for its own interests (Kim, 1992b:149). China abstained over Resolution 678 to authorize the forcible ejection of Iraqi forces

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<sup>656</sup> See "China's Independent Foreign Policy of Peace." *Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations*. The website is available at: <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceun/eng/gyzg/wjzc/default.htm>

unless they had withdrawn from Kuwait by the agreed deadline (Hempson-Jones 2005:714). This implies that the UN's effectiveness in dealing with China will be more likely determined by how much the UN can bring about China's national interests. Thanks to this, we can assure that China is belonging to a pluralist international society, and that interest(material)-based socialization is the most plausible option to alter China's identity and characteristics. As a matter of fact, China's international organizational behavior can be characterized by a max-mini approach, which is a strategy of maximizing the benefits of organizational participation through state-enhancing rather than state-diminishing, and minimizing normative costs like dependency and loss of sovereignty (Kent, 1997/98:521). As for China, international organizations can confer on China international prestige, status and domestic legitimacy, albeit China has tended to stress bilateral relations in the resolution of conflict (Kent, 1997/1998:520). To China, international organization can be a good mechanism for projecting and enhancing international status – i.e. a potential Great Power-, maintaining its strategic independence, preserving an environment conducive to its own development goals and promoting internal developmental aims via foreign investment, expanded trade, technology transfer, and development assistance (Kent, 2002:348).<sup>657</sup> In short, China's participation in international organizations has enhanced China's power and assisted China's participation in globalization, not to mention its modernization and its status of a potential Great Power (Kent, 2002:345). We can say that China's concept of an international organization can be understood as instrumental in its pursuit of its own interests.

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<sup>657</sup> We should not forget that China's participation in international organizations can strengthen its notion of a pluralist international society in some sense.

More importantly, as briefly mentioned earlier, for China, international organizations provide the arenas for socializations in its pursuit of its own interests. For instance, Beijing has regarded the UN's mechanism and IGOs as an amiable platform to project its own perspective toward international society and to receive a response or an impact from international society. In other words, we can assume that the UN mechanism and IGOs act as a socializing mechanism to connect China to international society. Samuel S. Kim illustrates this point by saying:

The annual general debate in the General Assembly's plenary session affords Beijing free global prime time to pronounce its own definition of the international situation in the form of its annual state-of-the world report. In the unique domain of this quasi-global parliamentary meeting, many normative proposals are adopted in the form of recommendatory resolutions with few implementing actions. This may be the primary reason why the General Assembly is so important to the Chinese style of dramatizing its moral righteousness. **The General Assembly is the surest and cheapest way to China's international forum shopping...** (Kim, 1992b:141).

This helps us understand how China comes to think and act like other members of international society. In truth, we cannot deny the fact that China has been increasingly patient enough to be regulated by IGOs. China does not completely disregard the influence and restraint of international organizations on its domestic and foreign policy (Kent, 2002:349). At the initial stage, indeed, China rejected each norm and value of international society, but it has tried to keep its harmonious balance between its adaptation to international society and its self-interests – e.g. domestic stability, economic interests, international reputation, etc. China has gradually adjusted itself to international society and adopted norms and values of international society, such as democracy as well as human rights. China's participation and ratification of human rights treaties, such as the UN Convention against Torture



(CAT), the UN Human Rights Commission and the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities advocate the fact that China has gradually accepted the norms and values of international society (Kent, 2002:353).

The UN's reaction to the massacre incident of June 1989 and the International Labor Organization's reaction to Chinese's mistreatment of workers advocate China's gradual acceptance of the norms and values of international society. Due to the June 1989 massacre, Beijing acquired a pariah anti-people regime as a new national identity (Kim, 1992b:144). This incident is very significant to the UN. The UN could condemn the permanent member of the Security Council for its human rights abuse at home. Samuel S. Kim illustrated the importance of the incident to the UN very well:

In August 1989, the U.N. Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, a subsidiary expert body of the Commission on human rights, passed by a secret vote of 15-9 the first resolution in U.N. history criticizing one of the Big Five of the Security Council for human rights abuses at home (Kim, 1992b:144).

In February 1990, the International Labor Organization intensified international delegitimization for China's mistreatment of workers who had endorsed the pro-democracy movement. Those kinds of severe criticisms for China's reluctance to comply with international norms eventually got China to recognize human rights as an integral part of global normative politics by 1982, and China eventually ratified or acceded to seven U.N. sponsored multi-lateral human rights treaties on women, racial discrimination, refugees, apartheid, genocide, and torture (Kim, 1992b:145). Also, in the UN human right treaty committee and in the ILO Governing Body Committee on Freedom of Association, China has even accepted a harsh process of monitoring

from 1990 to the present, even exposing itself to public shaming, but it has not withdrawn from its participation in those bodies and gradually complied with austere reporting requirements (Kent, 2002:355). At this juncture, we can perceive China's transformation of itself within international organizations. We can see that China has altered its language and attitude toward international society within international organizations, which has led to an alteration in China's identity and character. Under this circumstance, more tellingly, in China, even many Chinese scholars and students are increasingly engaged in human rights and democracy (Kim, 1992b:146).

However, once again, we should keep in mind the fact that China's incentive of such transformation has been pretty much derived from its own self-interest, including its great desire to become a Great Power. This indicates how China can be altered in its process of pursuit of its own interests. Samuel S. Kim illustrates well about the impact of international organizations on an alteration in China's identity and characteristics. Kim said:

Through generous and aid and friendly policy advice, always with special sensitivity to the pretenses and claims of the self-styled moral regime, IGOs managed to enter the castle of Chinese state sovereignty, thereby influencing the processes by which Chinese state sovereignty, thereby influencing the processes by which Chinese national interests are redefined and Chinese modernization requirements and priorities are reformulated. **International Organizations have certainly helped post-Mao China to bridge information, knowledge, capital, and technology gaps with a minimum of political control.....The price that China has to pay to maintain membership in good standing and to maximize its benefits is compliance, at least rhetorical, with the norms and policies of IGO.** This may explain Chinese refusal to exercise its veto power in the Security Council and its generally positive voting behavior in the General Assembly. Such compliance can also reflect and effect some readjustment or restructuring of certain principles of Chinese foreign policy, such as world peace and development or global interdependence (Kim, 1992b:155).

This can be seen as the interest-based socialization. The interest-based socialization in IGOs has altered China's language and attitude toward international society, which seems to bring out more positive signs to China's democratic development. As an example, let us take a look at an impact of the International Labor Organization (ILO) as one of United Nations specialized agencies on China's democratic development. As mentioned above, in 1971, the People's Republic of China was accepted as a member of the United Nations. This made it possible for China to gain membership in the ILO. However, the ILO stresses the freedom of association as the standard of the ILO. In particular, Convention No.87 ascertains the rights of workers and employers to join organizations of their own choosing without previous authorization (Kent, 1997/98:522). From the perspective of the ILO, China should become a full member of the ILO, subject to the ILO constitution, due to its status such as a large and powerful state and a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council (Kent, 1997/98:524). However, China has not fully advocated the ILO, and it did not yet ratify No. 87 and 98 which are concerning freedom of association (Kent, 1997/98:525). The Chinese government claimed itself as responsible for its own domestic affairs, with its firm belief of sovereign rights on the basis of Article 2, para.7 of the UN Charter (Kent, 1997/98:525). However, China could not avoid the pressure of ILO standards from international society. China's failure to meet the ILO standards like the freedom of association weakened their support for its candidacy for chairmanship of the ILO governing body (Kent, 2002:351). This kind of case can be easily found in international society, such as Burma and Sudan: as mentioned before, in 2005 Burma was forced to renounce the 2006 chairmanship of Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) due to its lack of democracy and

Sudan was also forced to give up the 2007 chairmanship of Organization of African States for the same reason.<sup>658</sup> This can be indirect pressure on China to comply with the norms and values of international society, and this can indirectly push China toward democracy. As a matter of fact, in 1994, Article 7 of the new Labor Law of China eventually declared “a trade union shall represent and protect the lawful rights and interests of workers and organize its activities autonomously and independently”, and Article 8 also declares “each worker should participate in democratic management or consult on equal level with his/her employing unit about the protection of lawful rights and interests of workers through staff meetings.”<sup>659</sup> These indicate that China is slowly adapting itself to the norms of international society, albeit it does not satisfy No. 87 on the freedom of association enough. This can be a positive sign that China is slowly moving toward democracy.

As another example, we can think of the contribution of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) to China’s democratic development. The aims of the UNDP are the protection and promotion of the universal values of the rule of law, human rights and democracy.<sup>660</sup> The UNDP started its operations in China in September 1979, and it has fostered human development to empower women and men to build better lives in China.<sup>661</sup> Also, today, 84% of UNDP projects in China are nationally implemented in collaboration with more than a dozen government

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<sup>658</sup> See “Burma Will not take Asean Chair.” *BBC News*, July 26, 2005. Also, see “Waging Peace: Building a safe and democratic world: letter to member states of the African Union,” The website is available at: [http://www.wagingpeace.info/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=261:8-january-2007-letter-to-member-states-of-the-african-union&catid=22:sudan-letters&Itemid=43](http://www.wagingpeace.info/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=261:8-january-2007-letter-to-member-states-of-the-african-union&catid=22:sudan-letters&Itemid=43)

<sup>659</sup> I quoted these from Ann Kent’s article (1997-98: 530).

<sup>660</sup> See UNDP Democratic Governance. The website is available at :<http://www.undp.org/governance/>

<sup>661</sup> See UNDP: China. The website is available at: <http://www.undp.org.cn/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=2&topic=12&catid=10>

ministries and with even NGOs and private sectors.<sup>662</sup> During the 21 years from 1979 to 2001, the UNDP had provided China with a total assistance of some US\$ 500 million.<sup>663</sup> Also, since 1980s, the UNDP has provided a total of \$50 million assistance, with 30 reform/governance projects having been carried out, including:

restructuring administrative organs, economic system, financial system, planning management system, economic laws, custom administration, capital market operation, foreign investment introduction and reforming social security system.<sup>664</sup>

With these benefits, China has been more and more engaged in international organizations, and it has adjusted itself to the norms and values of international society. And, as the nature of international society reflects more democratic norms and values, and the nature of international organizations has gradually included more democratic values and norms, it is very hard for China to totally reject human rights and democracy in the long run, in particular when considering that the respect of human rights and fundamental freedom was already expressed in the Dumbarton Oaks proposal more than a half century ago.<sup>665</sup> Indeed, it seems to be almost impossible for China to avoid human rights and democracy, in its pursuit for its national interests from its deep engagement in international organizations.

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<sup>662</sup> Ibid

<sup>663</sup> See China International Center For Economic And Technical Exchanges. The website is available at: <http://www.cicete.org/english/achievement.htm>

<sup>664</sup> Ibid

<sup>665</sup> See Dumbarton Oaks: Chapter IX. Arrangements for International Economic and Social Cooperation -“Section A. Purpose and Relationships. 1. With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations, the Organization should facilitate solutions of international economic, social and other humanitarian problems and **promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms**. Responsibility for the discharge of this function should be vested in the General Assembly and, under the authority of the General Assembly, in an Economic and Social Council.” The website is available at: <http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1944/441007a.html>

## **2) International non-governmental organizations' role in democratic development in China.**

The concept of NGOs for Chinese people in Salamon's definition can be understood as formal, private, non-profit distributing, self-governing and voluntary (Ma, 2002:309). Nonetheless, even Chinese NGOs cannot make their own decision in political and ideological matters (Ma, 2002:310). In fact, China is one of the few countries in which the NGO has some difficulty with promotion of human rights and democracy, because it still has constrained the deep involvement of the NGO in Chinese politics. However, the NGO has provided various interests to China, and this has been one of the mechanisms to urge China to move toward democracy.

When considering the relationships between China and the NGO, we can notice that between 1949 and 1978, China harshly suppressed most independent organizations including religious groups and rejected any freedom of association (Ma, 2002:308). However, as mentioned previously, due to the failure of the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) which could pose great threat to the Party's legitimacy via total destruction of economy, China had to change its direction (Ma, 2002:308). It was Deng Xiaoping's economic reform that led to economic and political alteration in China. Deng's reformation of China did not only bring out economic openness, but also lessened political control (Ma, 2002:308-309). Even the unprecedented flourishing of student association emerged in the 1980s (Ma, 2002:309). Under this specific circumstance, China's participation in NGOs had been increased tenfold in the years 1977-89 (Kim, 1992b:141). According to the Ministry of Civil Affairs, in China, by the end of 2003, there were 142,000 registered NGOs (Morton, 2005:521). In China, in 2004, there were 285,000 registered NGOs, and a little larger number,

290,000, which were unregistered.<sup>666</sup> These numbers are highly expected to be continuously increased. Also, importantly, we cannot completely disregard some level of influence of NGOs to China.

China has massively benefited from INGOs. For instance, between 1993 and 2000, the China foundation for Poverty Alleviation (CFPA) received US\$ 3.6 billion in total funds from INGOs, and China's umbrella organization for NGOs, the China Association for NGO Cooperation (CANGO) was given roughly US\$ 1.3 million in 2003 alone (Morton, 2005:521). INGOs in China act like substitutes for the state by providing basic social welfare services such as health care, education, AIDS prevention, environmental reform, economic justice, and low cost energy supply to advocate the disabled and the disadvantaged groups (Morton, 2005:522). Due to these benefits and China's inability in economic and social services, the Chinese government has increasingly allowed INGOs to operate, even claiming "small government and a big society" as a big slogan since the Mid-1990s (Ma, 2002:306). However, as mentioned above, the Chinese government put some regulation on the INGOs, such as the impossibility of conducting survey research in China in a proper way (as in the US and other western countries) and a strict regulation governing registration (Ma, 2002:307, 310). Nonetheless, the Chinese government has been generous to the INGOs as long as the INGOs do not overtly challenge official rules and they simply provide relief or other basic services (Dalpino, 2000:62).

However, we cannot deny the fact that the INGOs themselves indirectly goad China toward democracy, advocating freedom of association and strengthening

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<sup>666</sup> See "China Environment Forum." The website is available at: [http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic\\_id=1421&fuseaction=topics.event\\_summary&event\\_id=182907](http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1421&fuseaction=topics.event_summary&event_id=182907)

emerging civil society as essential parts for democratic development in China. For instance, when thinking that the INGOs have greatly contributed to the above CFPA and CANGO, we can perceive their contribution to the freedom of association as China's movement toward democracy. Also, with regard to the relationships between the INGOs and civil society, as implied above, we cannot deny that the INGOs in China are making substantial contribution to China's social and economic development by engaging in public benefit activities, like the followings:

the environment, health, education, scientific research, cultural services, poverty relief, legal aid, social welfare, and services to disadvantaged groups such as orphans, the elderly, and the disabled.<sup>667</sup>

All of these have facilitated an emerging civil society in China. We can certainly say that the INGOs have played a significant role in boosting civil society. In China, we can observe both the expansion of civil society and the growth of NGOs (Morton, 2005:519). Along with this, we might expect more positive signs of democratic development in China via the active engagement of INGOs in China's society.<sup>668</sup> When considering close triad relationships among democracy, civil liberty and INGOs, we can expect China's movement toward democracy. As the bottom-up democratic development, independent INGOs pay their attention to the interests of people rather than that of government, and even make the voice of people heard to the Chinese government. As Morton put it, in fact, INGOs can be seen as an agency to connect the local with international partners as well as to connect the local with the

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<sup>667</sup> See "the World Bank and NGOs in China." The website is available at: <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/CHINAEXTN/0,,contentMDK:20600359~menuPK:1460599~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:318950,0.html>

<sup>668</sup> We cannot deny the fact that civil society is closely related with democratization, even if someone might argue that civil society does not always equates with greater democracy. Katherine Morton mentioned this point. See, Morton (2005: 520).



government, so as to exchange idea and share experience (Morton, 2005:522). This exchanged and shared idea can have an impact on China's democratic development, and the INGOs can be recognized as democratic infiltrating agencies that can deeply penetrate into China's society in a pluralist international society.

As for the INGO for democratic development in China, we can think of the Ford Foundation and the Carter Center. The Ford Foundation has facilitated universal suffrage, the system of "one vote one value" in China (Shelley, 2000:231). Also, the Ford Foundation is so far the largest grant-giving institution in China, and it has played a significant role in promoting grassroots organizations that can strengthen civil society in China (Ma, 2006:181).<sup>669</sup> The Beijing Office adopts the following themes, indirectly influencing democratic development in China: a commitment to gender equality, a focus on poor and disadvantaged groups, an emphasis on participation as a core value that promotes community-based empowerment, support for civil society, respect for diversity, and promotion of philanthropy.<sup>670</sup>

As another INGO, the Carter Center has indirectly facilitated China's path toward democracy. The Carter Center has assisted elections in China. In March 1998, the Center initiated a joint project with China's Ministry of Civil Affairs to standardize village election procedures, with its focus on four main arenas:

developing a computer system for collecting data on village elections; providing advice and assistance to the Ministry of Civil Affairs on developing uniform election procedures; sponsoring Chinese officials to observe elections in the United States and other countries; and assisting in the development of

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<sup>669</sup> For instance, in 2000, the Ford Foundation gave over five million USD to programs and conferences for the promotion of communication and cooperation between China and the rest of world. Also, from the opening of its Beijing office to 2001, it spent around US \$ 128 million on Chinese institutions and China-related programs. See Ma (2006:183-189).

<sup>670</sup> See "Ford Foundation." *Century Online China Art Networks*. The website is available at: <http://www.chinaartnetworks.com/feature/wen29-5.shtml>

civic education program and publicizing information on village elections in China.<sup>671</sup>

In September 2005, the China village elections project became the China program.<sup>672</sup>

Also, the Carter Center has gradually expanded its activities:

monitoring and reporting on political and electoral innovative; conducting better-governance seminars for local governmental officials; providing assistance in amending elections laws and conducting election pilots; translating English democratization and political transition theories into Chinese; establishing learning centers for ordinary Chinese citizens; and publishing a book series on China's political developments.<sup>673</sup>

Most importantly, the Carter Center has benefited from the high level access to political and media channel due to Jimmy Carter's involvement, and it can put pressure on the Chinese government toward democracy (Shelly, 2000:228). Due to all of these activities, China has increasingly opted for openness, fairness, and competitiveness on the basis of the rule of law. This indicates the Carter Center's contribution to democratic development in China.

All in all, we can say that the INGOs in China assist the establishment of basic democratic systemic elements such as a secret ballot, a choice among candidates, a public count, regular elections and transparency at village level. All of these activities of the INGOs have been beneficial to China, and the INGOs can push China closer to democracy. Nevertheless, for China, in some sense, such INGOs' effort to promote democracy in China has been used for instrumental purposes. For instance, as Shelley put it, the election itself can be used as instrumental propaganda so as to

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<sup>671</sup> See, "China Program." *The Carter Center*. The website is available at: [http://www.cartercenter.org/peace/china\\_elections/index.html](http://www.cartercenter.org/peace/china_elections/index.html)

<sup>672</sup> Ibid.

<sup>673</sup> Ibid

show a positive image about China in international society.<sup>674</sup> However, we cannot totally deny the fact that the INGOs have had an impact on democratic development in China, since China's effort for such a positive image itself can play an indirect significant role in the democratic development in China. We have already seen China's similar attitude in its dealing with human rights, which the Chinese government has gradually accepted, such as the 2004 Constitutional reform. All in all, as many INGOs have provided China with various benefits such as social welfare, economic assistance and assistance with election procedures with which it feels an inability to deal with by itself, China has been slowly goaded to keep its step on its long journey toward democracy in a pluralist international society. All in all, we can say that INGOs have had an impact on democratic development in China in a pluralist international society.

### **3. b International Organization and South Korea's Democratic Development**

#### **1) international governmental organizations' role in democratic development in South Korea**

South Korea belongs to a solidarist international society and so external pressure plays a different role in South Korea (value-oriented) from in China (interest-oriented) or in Iraq (enforcement-oriented). In this section, I will reveal how international organizations have assisted South Korea's democratic development, along with their impact on its path toward democracy in a solidarist international society. Let us start with South Korea's engagement in IGOs. When considering South Korea's membership and engagement in IGOs, they have been very essential under South Korea's notable circumstance, in particular, the divided Korean peninsula

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<sup>674</sup> Beckey Shelly pointed out this. See Beckey Shelley (2000).

which is the most militarized zone per square mile and the last Cold War zone. In the Cold War era, South Korea had primarily sought for recognition as a sovereign state from international organizations, which brought about more legitimacy for South Korea than North Korea in international society.<sup>675</sup> For South Korea, international organizations had been regarded as one of the mechanisms to primarily gain and guarantee the legitimate external sovereignty. Since the late Cold War era, however, South Korea's participation in IGOs have made it modify its domestic repression on democratic movement, including freedom of association, freedom of speech and freedom of arbitrary arrest. Further, they have gradually goaded it to comply more with the norms and values of international society like human rights and democracy. Nevertheless, South Korea's democratic movement is primarily derived from an internal rather than an external impact. However, when considering that currently South Korea can be recognized as a mature democracy in international society, we should be aware of IGOs' contribution to South Korea's democratic development. In particular, we should acknowledge the shared values and norms between South Korea and IGOs, which are the promotion of human-welling, democracy, peace and prosperity.<sup>676</sup> This can help us understand how IGOs consolidate South Korea's democracy.

South Korea got its admission to the world organization, the United Nations in 1991 (Koh, 2000:199). Nonetheless, before 1991, South Korea had already joined activities of the UN specialized agencies, such as a UN observer mission in New York

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<sup>675</sup> There had competitive and confrontational relationships between the two Koreas in international organizations, which South Korea had been used to dominating, since North Korea began to join various international organizations in 1973. See Pak (2000:152).

<sup>676</sup> Chi Young Pak points out Seoul's belief that "South Korea's active participation in the UN's effort for international peace and human well-being will be the only way to promote its national interest in the age of complex interdependence of the world." See Pak (2000: 152).

since 1951 (Pak, 2000:150). And South Korea has steadily increased its participation in the activities of the United Nations as well (Koh, 2000:199). For instance, South Korea has joined U.N. Peacekeeping Operations, including the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), Operations in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), the U.N. Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) and the U.N. Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III) (Koh, 2000:209). Also, from 1996 to 1997, South Korea served the UN as a non-permanent member of the Security Council.<sup>677</sup> And, South Korea has even committed an eight-hundred person military unit to the U.N. Standby Arrangement System (Koh, 2000:203).

In addition to UN agencies, South Korea has increasingly participated in other IGOs, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). In 1960, South Korea joined only nineteen IGOs, but in 1998, it participated in fifty two IGOs (Koh, 2000:200).<sup>678</sup> In particular, outstandingly from 1985 (thirty six) to 1998 (fifty-two), we can see the clearly increased numbers of IGOs (Koh, 2000:200). This indicates that South Korea has been deeply engaged in international society, not to mention its close relationships with IGOs.

Unlike others, China and Iraq, as mentioned above, South Korea belongs to a solidarist international society. On September 29, 1993, South Korea's Foreign Minister Han Sung-Joo in the United Nations revealed South Korea's official position, by saying "South Korea has firm support for the international movements to promote

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<sup>677</sup> See UN News Centre, "General Assembly set to elect new non-permanent members of Security Council". The website is available at: <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=20257&Cr=general&Cr1=assembly>

<sup>678</sup> This data came from Table 9.1. ROK Participation in International Organizations Compared to That of Eight Other Countries, 1990-98. See B.C. Koh (2000).

human rights” (Koh, 2000:202). This is not only the same direction as the United Nations, but also, it indicates that South Korea does respect solidarist principles of international society, and indeed, currently, South Korea can be seen to be in the mature stage of democracy. In South Korea’s process of democratic consolidation, we should not disregard IGOs’ contribution as well. For instance, the OECD can be a good example for South Korea’s democratic consolidation.

First of all, let us examine a few of the IGOs for democratic consolidation in South Korea. Let us explore the OECD. The OECD has thirty four member countries, and they have a shared commitment to democratic governments and market economies.<sup>679</sup> As Carl B. Hamilton put it, a member country of the OECD ought to be a pluralistic democracy, with its respect for human rights and its market economy in exposition to international competition.<sup>680</sup> On December 12 1996, South Korea was accepted as a member of the OECD.<sup>681</sup> This indicates that South Korea was recognized as a decent democratic regime, given a significant opportunity to consolidate democracy in the OECD. Also, when South Korea applied for membership in the OECD in 1995, the OECD’s Trade Union Advisory Committee made South Korea’s admission conditional on its compliance with ILO requirement, not to mention South Korea’s openness of economy (Kim and Moon, 2000:58, Kim, 2000c:259).<sup>682</sup> As mentioned in the earlier chapter, the requirement was the following:

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<sup>679</sup> See “About OECD.” *Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development*. The website is available at: [http://www.oecd.org/about/0,2337,en\\_2649\\_201185\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/about/0,2337,en_2649_201185_1_1_1_1_1,00.html)

<sup>680</sup> See Carl B Hamilton (2002).

<sup>681</sup> See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Ratification of the Convention on the OECD.” The website is available at: [http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,2340,en\\_2649\\_201185\\_1889402\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,2340,en_2649_201185_1889402_1_1_1_1,00.html)

<sup>682</sup> Also see Eduardo Lachica (1995: A.9.B).

ILO called for abolition of the ban on third-party intervention in labor disputes and on multiple labor unionism, restoration of the basic labor rights of the public officials and school teachers, and termination of government interference in labor union activities (Kim and Moon, 2000:58).

This indicates that the OECD put some pressure on South Korea's consolidation of democracy via its request for South Korea to comply with the rules of other international organizations, which can facilitate democratic development in South Korea. Also, in consideration with the OECD's emphasis on openness, we can assume its contribution to democratic development, in particular if openness would enhance democracy through its impact, such as more transparency and less corruption in South Korea. Carl B. Hamilton reveals the close relationship between openness and democracy, by saying: "a democracy cannot be a closed country or economy.....democracy in general and democratization have contributed to the lowering of trade barriers in a number of developing countries since 1970s" (Hamilton: 2002:13). Along with this fact, we should keep in mind the close relationships among openness (political, social and economic openness), liberalization and democratization.<sup>683</sup> Recently, South Korea's transparency is ranked as the 24<sup>th</sup> place among 30 member countries of the organization.<sup>684</sup>

As another example, we can think of the United Nation Development Program (UNDP). The UNDP's partnership with South Korea can be traced back to 1965, and from 1965 to 2000, the UNDP provided around \$100 million to South Korea.<sup>685</sup>

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<sup>683</sup> Catharin E. Dalpino reveals the close relationships between liberalization, openness and democracy, claiming that "democratization is usually preceded by liberalization, though democracy cannot be taken as the assured outcome of a liberal experiment. See Dalpino (2000:4).

<sup>684</sup> See "Korean Society: Korea jumps to 40<sup>th</sup> in the world in transparency." The website is available at: <http://www.zofona.com/korean-society.html>

<sup>685</sup> See "UNDP Republic of Korea." The website is available at: <http://undp.or.kr/index.html>

In turn, nevertheless, South Korea has contributed \$15 million to the program (Pak, 2000:152). Also, the UNDP has contributed to South Korea's democratic development in various ways, like promotion of sustainable human development, reduction of poverty, gender equality and development of a social security system.<sup>686</sup> In particular, the UNDP has put emphasis on gender equality as a priority. It has indirectly reduced gender inequality in South Korea, which can facilitate South Korea's consolidation of democracy. In fact, gender equality should be recognized as essential for democracy. As Ronald Inglehart, Pippa Norris and Christian Welzel put it, gender equality implies toleration, self-expression and individual freedom.<sup>687</sup> In regard to this point, we can say that increasing the emphasis on gender equality as the process of democratization can increase the chances for a mature democracy, as more democratic states attempt to guarantee more gender equality.<sup>688</sup> South Korea cannot be the exception to this. In South Korea, women have suffered from gender inequality, which has had a negative impact on South Korea's mature stage of democracy. Bang-Soon Yoon describes the situation of women in South Korea well, by saying:

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) ranked South Korea 61 among the 64 countries for which gender empowerment measures data are available, and Korea ranked 45 out of 49 countries in equal opportunity. In terms of women's legislative representation, Korea ranks 102 among the 123 countries surveyed (as of the end of 2002), far lower than the average for women's

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<sup>686</sup> See "UNDP Republic of Korea." The website is available at: <http://undp.or.kr/>

<sup>687</sup> See Ronald Inglehart, Pippa Norris, and Christian Welzel. "Gender Equality and Democracy." The website is available at: <http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~pnorris/Acrobat/Gender%20equality%20&%20democracy.pdf>

<sup>688</sup> Ibid. Inglehart, Norris and Welzel explain the different degree of gender equality in different culture.



representation (in a single-house government or in a lower house) at the global level (15.2 percent) or in the Asian region (15.4 percent)” (Yoon, 2003:4)...”Women’s political space in formal government institutions has been extremely limited in the National Assembly, executive offices, and judiciary” (Yoon, 2003:12). “In Korea, Women’s political marginality needs to be understood within a larger political framework of South Korea politics, which include the structure of power; **a boss-centered, patronage political system; political culture; and the women’s movement**” (Yoon, 2003:6).....”South Korea’s unique geopolitical situation as a divided nation has supported a **militarism** that also has had ramifications for women. **Confucianism**, which determines social hierarchy based on class, gender, seniority, and official status, still dictates the male-oriented political culture (Yoon, 2003: 16-17).

However, we can perceive that such gender inequality has been altered toward an egalitarian model in South Korea. For instance, in July 2005, the Supreme Court granted married women in South Korea equal property rights with men concerning the inheritance of property owned by family clans, which can be the landmark for gender equality since previously, married women were only considered to be part of their husband’s family and were not eligible to inherit family property.<sup>689</sup>

The reduction of inequality in South Korea can be primarily seen as a result of South Korea’s economic growth, but we should pay attention to the UNDP’s role in South Korea.<sup>690</sup> The UNDP has been working with South Korea’s government, research institutions and other NGOs in order to promote gender equality, along with its emphasis on monitoring the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) indicator, gender responsive budgeting and gender mainstreaming in national policy.<sup>691</sup> UNDP

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<sup>689</sup> See “South Korea (2006).” *Welcome to Freedom House, Country Report*. The website is available at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&country=6994&year=2006>

<sup>690</sup> See “UNDP Country Programme for the Republic of Korea (2005-2008).” The website is available at: [http://www.undp.org/rbap/Country\\_Office/CP/CP\\_ROK.pdf](http://www.undp.org/rbap/Country_Office/CP/CP_ROK.pdf)

<sup>691</sup> See “UNDP ROK Country Programme: Promoting Gender and Equality.” The website is available at: <http://www.undp.or.kr/rok/rok2.html> UNDP’s gender empowerment measures are calculated on

female equality index rates South Korea 37<sup>th</sup> in the world, and the UNDP ranked South Korea 61 among the 64 countries for which gender empowerment measures data are available.<sup>692</sup> Also, as noted above, South Korea ranked 45 out of 49 countries in the equal opportunity country rankings (Yoon, 2003:4). As mentioned above, with regard to women's legislative representation, South Korea ranks 102nd among the 123 countries surveyed, pretty lower than the average for women's representation (in a single or in a lower house) at the global level (15.2 percent) or in the Asian region (15.4 percent)(Yoon, 2003:4).<sup>693</sup> These figures get attention from government and civilians on gender gaps in education, earned income, representation in parliament, which has led to indirect and direct pressure to alter gender inequality in South Korea. Also, South Korea has made significant progress in promoting gender equality in the past decades through introducing various legal and institutional frameworks, like enactment of the Gender Discrimination Prevention and Relief act in 1999, Women's Development Act in 1995, and Equal Employment Act in 1987; and establishment of the national governing body, the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family in 2005.<sup>694</sup> All in all, as the UNDP has indirectly influenced the reduction of gender inequality in South Korea, we can say that it can facilitate South Korea's

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the basis of data on political participation and decision making, economic participation and decision making, and power over economic resources. There are three dimensions to measure: female representation in national parliaments as an indicator of political representation; senior positions in the economy (proxied by female representation as legislators, senior officials, and managers and representation as professional and technical workers; and earned incomes of males and females. See "Human Development Report 2001." The website is available at: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/completenew1.pdf>. pp. 239. Also, see Stephan Klasen (2006).

<sup>692</sup> See "Women, gender issues in Korea." The website is available at: <http://www.geocities.com/uiocastasia2002/KSP10.htm>

<sup>693</sup> Also, see Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU). "Women in National Parliaments" (February 2003). The website is available at: [www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm](http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm)

<sup>694</sup> See "UNDP ROK Country Programme: Promoting Gender and Equality." The Website is available at: <http://www.undp.or.kr/rok/rok2.html>

consolidation of democracy. Nonetheless, someone might argue that gender equality has nothing to do with the promotion and consolidation of democracy, which is completely wrong, in particular when considering that women rights and gender equality have been more guaranteed in mature democratic countries than authoritarian countries.

So far, I have briefly touched on an impact the IGOs have had on South Korea's democratic development. The IGOs have had an impact on South Korea in various ways. In particular, their impact on South Korea's democratic consolidation cannot be ignored.<sup>695</sup> Also as South Korea has become a decent and stable democracy, South Korea has contributed back to the roles of IGOs, such as its engagement with the UNDP to help the reduction of poverty and human development in third world countries, which is closely related to the promotion of democracy in international society. South Korea spends around \$12 million annually on its activity in IGOs as a provider of international aid, which can be spent for development assistance in foreign countries (Cha, 2000b:226). For instance, in cooperation with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, South Korea has indirectly helped North Korea and Iraq in terms of developments and humanitarian reliefs.<sup>696</sup> In addition, the South Korean government has greatly contributed to the United Nation Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in particular for Mongolia, Uzbekistan, North

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<sup>695</sup> In this chapter, I did not mention how international labor organization (ILO) could have an impact on South Korea's democratic development, since I did touch on it in international law chapter, but we should keep it mind that ILO is one of good examples to demonstrate how IGOs have had an effect on the promotion and consolidation of democracy in South Korea.

<sup>696</sup> See Shin-wha Lee (2003). Also see UNHCR, The UN Refugee Agency: Government of The Republic of Korea – UNHCR donor profile and donor history. The website is available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.htm>

Korea and African countries.<sup>697</sup> All in all, the relationships between South Korea and IGOs have been close and effective, and IGOs have certainly aided South Korea's consolidation of democracy in a solidarist international society.

## **2) international non-governmental organizations' role in democratic development in South Korea**

Along with IGOs, INGOs have had an impact on South Korea's democratic development. As for South Korea, INGO is significant. The fact that South Korea has increasingly joined INGOs demonstrates their importance. For instance, in 1960, South Korea joined only one hundred and two INGOs, but in 1998, it participated in one thousand two hundred fifty INGOs (Koh, 2000:200).<sup>698</sup> Like many IGOs, many INGOs have greatly contributed to democratic development in South Korea. As examples, we can think of Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) as INGOs for democratic development in South Korea. In this section, I will primarily touch on AI and HRW that have an impact on South Korea's democratic consolidation, even if South Korea is put into the category of a solidarist international society as well as a capitalist democratic security community – i.e. in South Korea, human rights and democracy have been authentically accepted since they are understood as legitimate-oriented norms and values rather than interest-oriented. In other words, external pressure plays a role in South Korea's democratic consolidation in a different way from China's democratic development.

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<sup>697</sup> South Korea triples its contribution to UNESCO's education project. It will triple its contribution to UNESCO education projects and the fund is expected to be more than \$300,000 annually for three years. See the website available at: [http://portal.unesco.org/education/en/ev.php-URL\\_ID=51572&URL\\_DO=DO\\_TOPIC&URL\\_SECTION=201.html](http://portal.unesco.org/education/en/ev.php-URL_ID=51572&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html)

<sup>698</sup> This data came from Table 9.1. ROK Participation in International Organizations Compared to That of Eight Other Countries, 1990-98. See Koh (2000).

Let us start with AI. AI has done many various things in South Korea. Most importantly, what it has done so far for consolidation of democracy in South Korea is to reduce the impact of the National Security Law (NSL). AI has attempted to guarantee the freedom of speech, that is, the rights to express dissident views.<sup>699</sup> AI has directly and indirectly reduced the possibility of abuse of the NSL in South Korea, which contributes to democratic consolidation in South Korea. In South Korea, as mentioned in an earlier chapter, the NSL has been used arbitrarily to curtail the right to freedom of expression and association, providing long sentences or even the death penalty for loosely defined anti-state activities.<sup>700</sup> For instance, article 7 is against freedom of consciousness and freedom of expression. Article 7 states the following:

Praising or Sympathizing – up to 7 years in prison for those who praise, encourage, disseminate or cooperate with anti-state groups members or those under their control, being aware that such acts will endanger the national security and the democratic freedom.<sup>701</sup>

Between February 1998 and August 1998, over 180 people such as students, activists, publishers and trade unionists were arrested under the NSL.<sup>702</sup> Also, the released political prisoners are still required to report regularly to the police under the Security Surveillance Law.<sup>703</sup> The Security Surveillance Law that was enacted in 1989, tracks

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<sup>699</sup> See “Transnational Civil Society and the National Identity Question in East Asia.” The website is available at: [http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary\\_0286-21663758\\_ITM](http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-21663758_ITM)

<sup>700</sup> See “South Korea: Human Rights Concern.” *Amnesty International USA*. The website is available at: [http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/south\\_korea/index.do](http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/south_korea/index.do)

<sup>701</sup> See “South Korea’s National Security Law.” The website is available at: <http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/55a/205.html>

<sup>702</sup> See “Amnesty International, Republic of Korea” (September 1, 1998). The website is available at: <http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA250271998?open&of=ENG-394>

<sup>703</sup> See Chung-in Moon, Youngjae Jin and Wook Kim, “Democracy Report for South Korea.” The website is available at [http://www.idea.int/publications/sod/upload/South\\_Korea.pdf](http://www.idea.int/publications/sod/upload/South_Korea.pdf) pp. 10.

the activities of certain political prisoners after their release in order to prevent any danger of their recommitting crimes, like espionage and anti-state activities; to promote their return to a normal sound social life; and to maintain national security and social peace.<sup>704</sup> AI has criticized it for its application in an arbitrary and secretive way to threaten and harass former prisoners of conscience and long-term political prisoners who do not post any security threat.<sup>705</sup> AI has brought out indirect and direct pressure to the government to lessen the weight of the NSL, which consolidates democracy in South Korea. For instance, AI made recommendations to the government. There are several recommendations that are worth looking at. They are the followings:

- . The National Security Law should be amended in accordance with international standards so that **the rights to freedom of expression and association are protected**, in accordance with international standards.

- . Pending legislative amendment, **use of the National Security Law should be minimized, in particular, there should be a halt** to the current high numbers of arrests for non-violent activities under Article 7 of the National Security Law. The law should not be used to crack down on peaceful political and industrial protest in the context of the current economic crisis.....

- . **The arbitrary use of the Security Surveillance law to harass and restrict the activities of former prisoners of conscience and long-term political prisoners who were convicted unfairly is a violation of their basic rights and should be halted.**

- . **South Korea should ratify ILO conventions 87 and take steps to ensure that trade unionists are able to exercise their rights to freedom of association, in accordance with international labor standards.**

**Trade Unionists and workers should be permitted to organized and take part in legitimate and non-violent strike action without harassment of arrest, in**

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<sup>704</sup> See “Amnesty International, Republic of Korea.” The website is available at: <http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA250271998?open&of=ENG-394>

<sup>705</sup> Ibid.

**accordance with their rights under international human rights and labor standards.....**

. The Government should take steps to implement the recommendations of international bodies.<sup>706</sup>

In fact, the NSL has been modified since May 1991 when the Roh Taewoo government was forced to amend the NSL; for example, to allow contact with communist organizations, except for those who are engaged in ideological support to Kim Jong Il's regime and linked with North Korea and those who visit North Korea without South Korea's government's permission.<sup>707</sup> This would have been harder without AI's role and South Korean civilians' voluntary will against the NSL. This demonstrates that AI has been significant in consolidating democracy in South Korea, along with South Korean civilians' high level of awareness of democracy. Especially, it should be noticed that the INGO's mobilizing ability broke down the government's monopoly.<sup>708</sup> As a matter of fact, on October 16, 1997, AI's Secretary General Pierre Sane even wrote a letter to all candidates of the presidential election in South Korea to prevent the abuse of the NSL.<sup>709</sup> Along with these aspects of AI, we can acknowledge AI's role in democratic development in South Korea, especially when considering AI's contribution to the freedom of consciousness and freedom of speech as well as its role in checking and balancing of the South Korean government's abusing power. In other words, AI has contributed to more liberalization in South Korea, which is an

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<sup>706</sup> Ibid.

<sup>707</sup> Ibid

<sup>708</sup> Ibid

<sup>709</sup> See "Republic of Korea (South Korea): A human rights agenda for the Presidential election: open letter to all candidates." The webstie is available at:  
[http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/ASA250321997ENGLISH/\\$File/ASA2503297.pdf](http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/ASA250321997ENGLISH/$File/ASA2503297.pdf)

essential condition for consolidation of democracy.<sup>710</sup> At this juncture, we cannot deny the contribution of AI to South Korea's democracy, let alone human rights.

Also, AI is even concerned with the rights of migrant workers in South Korea, criticizing the labor conditions including delayed payments and exploitation. Nevertheless, South Korea is the first country in Asia to protect the rights of migrant workers in law, such as the Act concerning Employment Permit for Migrant Workers (EPS act), and it has led the region in legislation for the protection of migrant workers, which confirms that South Korea belongs to a solidarist international society.<sup>711</sup> But we should not forget that there are some remnants of discrimination, exploitation, unpaid wages and appalling working conditions. Thanks to this, AI urges governments to pay attention to these problems and tackle them. As the South Korean society treats minorities and foreign workers in a more fair way, we can expect a more consolidated democracy in South Korea, since the South Korean society has been gradually expected to tolerate differences, which is one of the essential elements for democracy.<sup>712</sup> All in all, at this juncture, we can see that AI, along with civilian voluntary action, plays a significant role in pushing more liberalization and more democracy, which consolidates democracy in South Korea.

As another INGO we can think of, Human Rights Watch (HRW) has consolidated democracy in South Korea in some sense. Like AI, HRW is very

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<sup>710</sup> As many democratic scholars mention, we should keep in mind the fact that liberalization does not necessarily lead to democratization, but it is one of essential conditions for democratization.

<sup>711</sup> Approximately 360,000 migrant workers are working in South Korea, and they came from China, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Nepal, the Philippines, Indonesia, etc. See "South Korea." *Amnesty international USA*. The website is available at: [http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/south\\_korea/document.do?id=ENGASA250092006](http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/south_korea/document.do?id=ENGASA250092006)

<sup>712</sup> Korean non-profit organizations such as the Seoul Ethnic Koreans' Church and the Sunnam Migrant Workers' House, the Seoul Bar Association and the Korea Legal Aid Corporation (KLAC) have helped minorities and foreign workers. See Chung-in Moon, Youngjae Jin and Wook Kim, "Democracy Report for South Korea." The website is available at: [http://www.idea.int/publications/sod/upload/South\\_Korea.pdf](http://www.idea.int/publications/sod/upload/South_Korea.pdf)



sensitive to human rights concerns, including the National Security Law (NSL), imprisonment of conscientious objectors to military service, the death penalty, etc.<sup>713</sup> HRW even challenges governments and those who hold power to end abusive practices.<sup>714</sup> Indeed, in South Korea, HRW has played various roles in consolidating South Korea's democracy. For instance, like AI, it has complained about the widespread mistreatment of migrant workers, and about South Korea's reluctance to recognize non-Korean refugees and asylum seekers.<sup>715</sup> As mentioned earlier, although this might not be seen as directly related with democratic consolidation, there is some connection between 'fair treatment of non-Korean refugee and asylum seeker' and 'democratic consolidation.' We should not forget that toleration and fair treatment toward foreign workers as social liberalization can indirectly contribute to the consolidation of liberal democracy in South Korea.

Like AI, HRW has criticized the NSL for its criminal charges against people who praised North Korea. For instance, a criminal trial against Professor Kang Jeong-Koo of Seoul's Dongguk University can be a good example. He was charged with violating the NSL for writing pro-North Korea columns and making pro-North Korea remarks – violation of Article 7. In this case, Brad Adams, the Asia director of HRW claims that the trial itself was the violation of the international law and an embarrassing relic of South Korea's military regimes, because what Kang did should

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<sup>713</sup> See "South Korea, Events of 2006." *Human Rights Watch*. The website is available at: <http://hrw.org/englishwr2k7/docs/2007/01/11/skorea14758.htm>

<sup>714</sup> See "About HRW." The Website is available at: <http://www.hrw.org/about/>

<sup>715</sup> In South Korea, there are about 360,000 migrant workers, and about two-thirds are believed to be undocumented. Migrant workers are not allowed to form trade unions and suffer from human rights violations, such as physical and verbal abuses by their employers, and limited chances of redress when their rights are violated. See the Website available at: <http://hrw.org/englishwr2k7/docs/2007/01/11/skorea14758.htm>

be seen as simply, a peaceful expression of political views.<sup>716</sup> Also, as another example, a monitoring group associated with HRW even sent a letter to former Korean President Kim Dae-Jung, in order to call for all charges against former political prisoner and long-time human rights worker, Mr. Suh Joon-Sik to be dropped.<sup>717</sup> These examples can show how HRW has contributed to democratic consolidation in South Korea.

Further, HRW has been indirectly influencing North Korea, which cannot only spread a norm of human rights, but also a norm of democracy, via South Korea that can be put into the category of mature democracy. In other words, HRW has even influenced South Korea's foreign policy, in particular in dealing with North Korea's human rights violation. For instance, HRW urged South Korea to press North Korea to start meaningful dialogues with UN Human Rights experts.<sup>718</sup> HRW had requested Seoul to alter its policy of silence (silence diplomacy) on North Korea's human Rights record and to adopt a more aggressive attitude against the anti-liberal democratic regime, since South Korea has been often quiet on North Korea's denial of the freedoms of information, association, movement and religion, and its lack of organized political opposition, labor activism, or independent civil society, not to mention arbitrary arrests, torture, lack of due process and fair trial, executions and other issues of grave concern.<sup>719</sup> As a result of these efforts, the Ministry of Foreign

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<sup>716</sup> See Brad Adams (2006).

<sup>717</sup> See "Asia: South Korea." The website is available at: [http://hrw.org/doc/?t=asia&c=skorea&document\\_limit=20,20](http://hrw.org/doc/?t=asia&c=skorea&document_limit=20,20)

<sup>718</sup> See "South Korea: Policy Shift may help rights in North Korea." *Human Rights Watch News*. The website is available at: <http://www.hrw.org/news/2006/11/16/south-korea-policy-shift-may-help-rights-north-korea>

<sup>719</sup> Ibid

Affair and Trade announced on November 16, 2006 that South Korea would vote in favor of the resolution to call on North Korea to fully respect human rights and fundamental freedom.<sup>720</sup> Due to the impact of HRW and other external organizations on South Korea, South Korea started speaking up, giving pressure on North Korea's regime to take a step toward human rights and liberal democracy in the long run. This indicates that HRW has consolidated democracy in South Korea, via its influence on South Korea's foreign policy, which makes South Korea facilitate democratic development as well as human rights in international society. All in all, INGOs have an impact on democratic consolidation in South Korea.

### **3.c International Organization and Iraq's Democratic Development**

#### **1) International governmental organizations' role in the democratic development in Iraq**

In this section, I will focus on how IGOs have had an impact on Iraq's democratic development in a liberal anti-pluralist international society in the post-Cold War era and 21<sup>st</sup> century. In the process, I will emphasize the assumption that the UN had legitimized the US-led multinational forces' presence in Iraq, which has been helpful to Iraq's young democracy, in particular when considering that democracy can hardly have roots in society where security is not guaranteed. In this section, unlike the cases of China and South Korea, I will primarily focus on the role of the UN, even though Iraq is a member of many international organizations, including the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, and the Arab League -Iraq is a founding member.

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<sup>720</sup> However, South Korea had been absent or had abstained from voting on similar resolutions, due to its consideration of peace and security as prior. See "South Korea: Policy Shift may help rights in North Korea." *Human Rights Watch News*. The website is available at: <http://www.hrw.org/news/2006/11/16/south-korea-policy-shift-may-help-rights-north-korea>

In 1945, Iraq joined the United Nations.<sup>721</sup> Today, the UN performs in all of the 18 governorates of Iraq and operates at community, governorate and national levels.<sup>722</sup> Also, now, there are around 170 international staff and over 420 national staff, all based in Iraq.<sup>723</sup> However, overall, in the past, Iraq and the UN had negative relationships rather than positive relationships. We can observe the negative relationships between the UN and Iraq during Saddam's regime, such as the Security Council Resolutions 661 and 678, not to mention monitoring missions against Iraq like the U.N. Monitoring, Inspection, and Verification Commission (UNMOVIC) (Fukuyama, 2006:200). Also, we can recall the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) as teeth of the United Nations against Iraq. UNSCOM was primarily established for overseeing the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles in Iraq on the basis of Resolutions 687, 707 and 715.<sup>724</sup> It was set up to ensure Iraq's compliance with Resolution 687 for the disarmament of Iraq in regard to its non-conventional weapons programs.<sup>725</sup> It had two primary purposes: to inspect and oversee the destruction or elimination of Iraq's CBW and ballistic missile capabilities and their production and storage facilities; and to monitor Iraq over the longer term to ensure continuous compliance.<sup>726</sup> All of these Resolutions indicate that the UN had used a stick more often than a carrot against Iraq.

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<sup>721</sup> See "Background Note: Iraq." *U.S. Department of State*. The website is available at: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6804.htm>

<sup>722</sup> See "Frequently Asked Questions." *The United Nations in Iraq*. October 2009. The website is available at: <http://www.iauiraq.org/reports/FAQ-En.pdf>

<sup>723</sup> Ibid

<sup>724</sup> See "Fact Sheet: Iraq: The UNSCOM EXPERIENCE." *Sipri*. The website is available at: <http://editors.sipri.se/pubs/Factsheet/UNSCOM.pdf>

<sup>725</sup> Ibid.

<sup>726</sup> Ibid

As mentioned earlier, Iraq belongs to a liberal anti-pluralist international society. In this context, the UN can have highly possible, alternative methods to interest-oriented or value-oriented mechanisms to promote democracy, which is an aggressive mechanism. In particular, when considering that the UN has been known as one of the few international organizations to deal with international security with its teeth, the UN's impact on Iraq cannot be degraded. Nevertheless, as mentioned in the earlier chapter, the UN has been known to be weak and incompetent, especially in use of force, and also its teeth are more likely to come from collaboration and cooperation among major powers. Indeed, I admit that the UN alone is not strong enough to properly manage international affairs. For instance, the UN had no further option to deal with Saddam's Iraq after the seventeen Security Council Resolutions. Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld made this point, even saying "If the UN did not take action against Iraq the UN would be irrelevant and fall into the dustbin of history," in a comparison of the UN's inability to act against Iraq to the League's incompetence after Italy's invasion of Abyssinia in 1935 and Germany's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1938.<sup>727</sup> Also, as Charles Krauthammer put it, the Security Council was formed six decades ago, and it seems to need a remodel, primarily thanks to its malfunction derived from the current out-dated model to manage international affairs (Grigorescu, 2005:27).<sup>728</sup> Furthermore, in a similar line, we can find the malfunction of the UN due to the lack of consensus among major powers. In other words, the US and UK had perceived Iraq as a greater threat than other permanent members, and this prevented collective action in the Security Council

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<sup>727</sup> I quote this from Alexandru Grigorescu's article (2005:27). We know that one of reasons for the League of Nations' failure, including Italy's invasion of Abyssinia and Germany's invasion of Czechoslovakia, is no privilege for Great Power.

<sup>728</sup> See Charles Krauthammer (2003: A-37).

and any UN authorization for the US and UK's military action (Grigorescu, 2005:31). The Security Council has very often not reached a consensus on how to deal with outlaw states, as the Iraq's case demonstrated. And via a different spectrum, someone might argue that in dealing with Iraq, as a matter of fact, the US and UK's coalition forces' invasion of Iraq itself might appear to demonstrate the UN's inability to control Great Powers, especially when considering their use of force without the UN authority.<sup>729</sup> In short, all of these indicate that the UN does not have enough capability to fully manage international affairs, especially, the outlaw states - Saddam's regime demonstrates this point - especially in the absence of major powers' cooperation and collaboration.

However, it does not necessarily mean that the UN is always completely ineffective in international society in dealing with outlaw states and transforming them toward democracy.<sup>730</sup> For instance, as Grigorescu put it, the UN's full economic sanctions and weapon inspections against Saddam's regime significantly reduced Saddam's military and economic power and even the US costs for going to war in 2003(Grigorescu, 2005:31, 37). In fact, some scholars even argue that the UN sanctions and the weapon inspections against Saddam's regime were successful, when considering that the US-led coalition forces could not find any WMD in Iraq. Nonetheless, they could not alter Saddam's major policy. In other words, in the cooperation and collaboration among major powers, the UN has teeth such as economic sanctions and even other collective military actions, to give some pressure

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<sup>729</sup> In fact, the UN and Great Power should re-enforce each other to manage international affairs properly.

<sup>730</sup> Also, the UN has been able to set up around sixty peacekeeping operations that have contributed to international security. This also demonstrates that the UN is not dead enough to be disregarded. See Grigorescu (2005: 38).

on the outlaw states in some level. At this juncture, the UN's sanctions and inspections, in some sense, can be understood as what the UN has done in its own best, to deal with Saddam's Iraq. These could be interpreted as the UN's efforts to alter Iraq's identity and character in some sense as well.<sup>731</sup>

When considering the relationships between Great Powers and the UN, as mentioned above, also, the US-led invasion of Iraq might be seen as the UN's inability to control Great Powers in some sense. However, despite this, we should regard it as the UN's flexibility to give Great Powers some opportunity unilaterally to deal with international affairs, in particular outlaw states, whenever the five permanent members of Security Council cannot reach the consensus, and whenever there is an endless lack of disarmament from target states.<sup>732</sup> This could be interpreted as privileges for the Great Powers. What if Great Powers such as the UK and the US had invaded Italy and Germany and changed their identities and characters, just after Italy's invasion of Abyssinia in 1935 and Germany's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1938? Can we expect the same outcome as the WWII, if Great Powers alter the identity and character of those regimes in advance in cooperation with the League of Nations? At this juncture, I have to make two points, throughout Iraq's case. One is that Great Powers have the privilege to deal with outlaw states unilaterally, and the other is that the UN should be more flexible and cooperative in the Great Powers' role in managing international affairs, in particular when

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<sup>731</sup> I admit that more than one million people were killed due to sanction, with the intact Iraqi regime. However, due to inspection and sanction, Iraq had been gradually weaker and weaker militarily and economically. Nevertheless, the US and UK waged the war rather than used the wait-and-see strategy, since there had been no trust between Washington and Baghdad.

<sup>732</sup> Grigorescu compared the UN with the League of Nation, in order to reveal the UN's effectiveness and flexibility, which distinguishes the UN from the League of Nation. We should not forget the fact that one of reasons for the failure of the League is that it was too idealistic such as no consideration of the privilege of Great Powers. See Grigorescu (2005:38).

considering that one reason for the failures of the League of Nations was its inflexibility and its reluctance in giving some privilege to Great Powers.<sup>733</sup> In reality, due to the UN inability in various ways – e.g. Article 43 of the UN Charter - the rights of the Great Powers should be guaranteed and in turn their duties should be properly carried out. In Iraq, the US-led coalition forces toppled Saddam’s regime – indeed, we know that the world is far safer in the absence of Saddam’s regime - and this has facilitated democracy. This can be the Great Powers’ duty to maintain and promote the well-being of international society in the long run in some sense. At this point, I am not saying that the UN must be always subject to Great Powers, but their relationships must be cooperative in the management of international affairs, since, practically, the UN is incapable of dealing with international affairs by itself, and since democracy is good enough for all in international society. On September 16, 2004, nonetheless, Kofi Annan, former Secretary General of the UN, speaking on the US-led coalition forces’ invasion of Iraq, even said, "I have indicated it was not in conformity with the UN Charter. From our point of view, from the Charter point of view, it was illegal.”<sup>734</sup>

However, we can perceive that the UN was flexible in supporting the unilateral role of Great Powers in dealing with outlaw states in some sense, when considering that the UN tended to legitimize and legalize the presence of US-led multinational forces in Iraq via UN Security Council Resolutions 1483 and 1637. The UN plays a significant role in facilitating Iraq’s democratic, political, social and

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<sup>733</sup> We can think of political context and legal context in distinguishing the League of Nation from the United Nation. One is that the US was not a member of the League of Nations. The other is that the League of Nations did fail to adopt the enforcement mechanisms against aggression, such as Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia.

<sup>734</sup> See “Iraq War.” *Wikipedia*. Available at the website: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq\\_War#\\_note-19](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_War#_note-19)



economic structure via its indirect cooperation with Great Powers. UN Security Council Resolutions 1483 and 1637 demonstrate this point. On May 22 2003, Security Council Resolution 1483 reveals this point, saying:

1. Appeals to Member State and concerned organizations to assist the people of Iraq in their efforts to reform their institutions and rebuild their country, and to contribute to conditions of stability and security in Iraq in accordance with this resolution. 2. Call upon all member states in a position.....for Iraq and to help meet the **humanitarian and other needs of the Iraqi people by providing food, medical supplies, and resources necessary for reconstruction and rehabilitation of Iraq's economic infrastructure.....**4. Calls upon the authority, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and other relevant international law, **to promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective administration of the territory, including in particular working towards the restoration of conditions of security and stability and the creation of conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political future.**<sup>735</sup>

Resolutions 1483 and 1637 made the US-led multinational forces' presence in Iraq legally accountable, as the US-led MNF acceded Resolutions 1483 and 1637, not to mention that the UN Security Council Resolutions 1483 and 1637 encouraged international efforts to rebuild the capacity of the Iraqi civilian police force.<sup>736</sup> Resolutions 1483 and 1637 not only guarantees the legal participation of international organizations, and that of the US-led MNF,<sup>737</sup> but also guarantees the UN as a middle man which can link the international community with Iraq, thus helping Iraq's young

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<sup>735</sup> See S/RES/1483 (2003). The website is available at: <http://www.iamb.info/pdf/unsc1483.pdf>

<sup>736</sup> Ibid. Also see S/RES/1637 (2005). The website is available at: <http://www.david-morrison.org.uk/scrs/2005-1637.pdf>

<sup>737</sup> Resolutions 1483 and 1637 demonstrate how important the UN has been in international society, when considering that the UN was the only international organization that could give legitimacy to the US-led MNF's presence in Iraq.

democracy.<sup>738</sup> In particular, when considering the fact that Iraq had formally notified the U.N. Security Council that it wanted the U.S.-led multinational forces to remain in place due to the Iraqi troops and police's inability, we can see the U.N. role in connecting Iraq with the international community, not to mention the legalized presence of the US-led forces in Iraq. In all of these contexts, former President George W. Bush said in his State of Union speech: "in Iraq, multinational forces are operating under a mandate from the United Nations."<sup>739</sup> The UN could ultimately help Iraq internalize itself with the norms and values of international society in a flexible, legitimate and legal way, while legitimizing and legalizing the US-led MNF's presence to facilitate Iraq's young democracy. At this juncture, we can say that the UN and Great Powers have been cooperatively reinforcing each other in managing international society, which eventually facilitates the promotion and consolidation of democracy in international society in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.<sup>740</sup> This is one of the differences between the League of Nations and the United Nations - the former was far less cooperative with Great Powers than the latter, which is one of the reasons for the failures of the League of Nations in international society. However, the UN and Great Powers are not always cooperative. Instead, on and off, the UN can be assumed to play a role in checking and balancing the role of Great Powers indirectly, even if its negative reputation can be described as a tool for the interests of Great Powers. For instance, the Security Council set up a special account, and created an international monitoring board to watch over Great Powers, in May 2003 to ensure

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<sup>738</sup> See Laurence Boisson De Chazournes (2003).

<sup>739</sup> I quote this from Kaveh Afrasiabi (2007).

<sup>740</sup> I won't mention again here that in the post-cold war and 21<sup>st</sup> century, Great Powers have promoted and consolidated democracy as an emerging new standard civilization across international society, since I did it in the previous chapter.

that the US-led MNF did not misuse Iraqi resources, which can be seen as to check and balance the overly misused power of the US-led MNF.<sup>741</sup> This indicates that we cannot disregard the tendency that the UN might be only an official mechanism to reduce the abusive tendency of Great Powers. Nonetheless, no one should have the illusion that the UN can replace the Great Powers' roles in particular, the military role in Iraq.<sup>742</sup>

Besides the UN's legitimization and legalization of the US-led MNF's presence in Iraq and its cooperation with Great Powers for Iraq's young democracy, the UN has directly contributed to Iraq's national reconstruction, shaping Iraq's young democracy in various ways. For instance, most importantly, U.N. election experts trained more than 8,000 Iraqi electoral workers, in order to assist the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI) for a fair and free election, while assisting the recruitment and training of 148,000 poll workers for the estimated 5,578 polling centers around Iraq (Fukuyama, 2006:210). And 23 different agencies and organizations from the greater U.N. family are helping to coordinate aid and reconstruction in Iraq, and 46 different projects have been approved, receiving a total funding of more than \$ 490 million (Fukuyama, 2006: 210). Also, UN agencies, for instance, the World Food Program (WFP), the U.N. Development Program (UNDP), the U.N. Office for Project Services (UNOPS), the United Nations Educational Scientific Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) have been actively engaged in humanitarian efforts, reconstruction and democracy in Iraq (Fukuyama, 2006:201).

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<sup>741</sup> See Irwin Arief (2006).

<sup>742</sup> See Carlos Pascual and Brian Cullin (2007).

As a lead agency of the Food Security cluster, WFP is vigorously involved in a range of activities including:

collaboration with the World Bank to address the issue of food security and protection of the most vulnerable groups in the context of a Public Distribution System (PDS) reform; ‘safety net’ activities, including school feeding and supplementary feeding; and continuation of poverty and food security assessment and analysis.<sup>743</sup>

For example, a total of 19,196 mt of commodities – e.g. High Energy Biscuits, wheat flour, vegetable oil and pea/wheat blend – have been sent into Iraq under WFP operations.<sup>744</sup>

The UNDP for Iraq’s reconstruction can be summarized with three pillars: ‘democratic governance,’ ‘economy and employment’ and ‘infrastructure rehabilitation and the environment.’<sup>745</sup> In particular, in terms of Iraq’s democracy, the UNDP has supported the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), along with its provision of technical assistance for the election, which can implement the aspirations of the people of Iraq to live in a democratic society.<sup>746</sup> Also, the UNDP has assisted the early stages of independent media development including the creation of the first independent news agency in Iraq and the training of Iraqi journalists, which has encouraged freedom of expression.<sup>747</sup> Moreover, the UNDP is vigorously

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<sup>743</sup> See “WFP Activities in Iraq.” Available at the website: [http://one.wfp.org/country\\_brief/middle\\_east/iraq/monthly\\_update/0404\\_iraq.pdf](http://one.wfp.org/country_brief/middle_east/iraq/monthly_update/0404_iraq.pdf)

<sup>744</sup> See “WFP Iraq Operation Update.” Vol. 14. May 2005. The website is available at: <https://www2582.sslidomain.com/uniraq/documents/Monthly%20Update%20WFP%20Iraq%20Ops%2014.pdf>

<sup>745</sup> See “UNDP in Iraq.” Available at the website: <http://www.iq.undp.org>

<sup>746</sup> See “UNDP supports Iraqis in electing their future government.” *UNDP: Newsroom*. Available at the Website: <http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/2010/march/undp-supports-iraqis-in-electing-their-future-government.en>

<sup>747</sup> See “Short History of UNDP Iraq.” *United Nations Development Program: Republic of Iraq*. Available at the website:

advocating the development of the rule of law and justice, working with the Ministry of Justice and the Higher Judicial Council in putting up the capacity of legal and judicial institutions in Iraq.<sup>748</sup> And the UNDP is advocating human rights, working with the Ministry of Human Rights and the Ministry of Justice.<sup>749</sup>

Currently, UNOPS supports Iraq's democratic transition. Since 1999, UNOPS has assisted elections in 15 countries spanning over four continents.<sup>750</sup> One of them is Iraq. For instance, throughout 2008, UNOPS had supported the IHEC.<sup>751</sup> In other words, UNOPS assisted the institutional development of the IHEC.<sup>752</sup> Also, UNOPS assisted the mobilization and training of 45,000 domestic electoral observers for election day.<sup>753</sup>

UNESCO contributes to Iraq's democratization. For example, UNESCO has a mandate to defend freedom of expression, and so it strongly advocates the Iraqi government and the Iraqi media in the improvement of a national media and communication policy that endorses freedom of expression, respect for the free and sustainable media and free access to information corresponding to internationally

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[http://www.iq.undp.org/Default.aspx?data=C2vBlscNsCFjo\\_2bhGKDD0JErL1Yvd00qcvdolftl\\_2fHC\\_VedLA0kgXGkHdDOKIIqSisEKw\\_2fNckl8CF6wJXwiwSdiRu6PJT7W7o3wYF7C2QxPCCWhbRd9vCEofEApBYkWGMq](http://www.iq.undp.org/Default.aspx?data=C2vBlscNsCFjo_2bhGKDD0JErL1Yvd00qcvdolftl_2fHC_VedLA0kgXGkHdDOKIIqSisEKw_2fNckl8CF6wJXwiwSdiRu6PJT7W7o3wYF7C2QxPCCWhbRd9vCEofEApBYkWGMq)

<sup>748</sup> Ibid

<sup>749</sup> Ibid

<sup>750</sup> See "Elections." *UNOPS*. Available at the Website: <http://www.unops.org/english/whatwedo/focus-areas/census-elections/Pages/elections.aspx>

<sup>751</sup> Ibid

<sup>752</sup> Ibid

<sup>753</sup> Ibid

recognized standards.<sup>754</sup> This clearly indicates that UNESCO contributes to the Iraqi transition to democracy, particularly via strengthening and building a media sector committed to freedom of expression.<sup>755</sup>

As the UN Refugee Agency, UNHCR protects and assist refugees and displaced people. For example, UNHCR is working to satisfy the needs of internally displaced persons (IDP) via “the construction of schools, clinics and community centers” and via “providing counseling and special care for the most vulnerable.”<sup>756</sup> Indeed, a UNHCR initiative has been aimed at augmenting the capacity of Iraq’s national, regional and local authorities to help IDP.<sup>757</sup> But, UNHCR has remotely controlled its Iraq operation from Amman and Kuwait city via national staff based in Iraq, international staff on short tasks, liaison with government counterparts and an extended network of 24 NGO partners across Iraq.<sup>758</sup>

As the lead United Nations agency, UNICEF has given vulnerable Iraqi children and families vital assistances including emergency health care, safe drinking water, sanitation, education and critical protective services throughout Iraq.<sup>759</sup> For instance, UNICEF has responded to the urgent needs of more than 12,000 families

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<sup>754</sup> See “Towards Democracy in Iraq.” *UNESCO and Iraq*. Available at the website: [http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/ev.php-URL\\_ID=18230&URL\\_DO=DO\\_TOPIC&URL\\_SECTION=201.html](http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/ev.php-URL_ID=18230&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html)

<sup>755</sup> See “UNESCO and Iraq.” Available at the website: [http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.phpURL\\_ID=24958&URL\\_DO=DO\\_TOPIC&URL\\_SECTION=201.html](http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.phpURL_ID=24958&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html)

<sup>756</sup> See “Iraq.” *UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency*. Available at the website: [www.unhcr.org.uk/how-you-can-help/emergencies/Iraq.html](http://www.unhcr.org.uk/how-you-can-help/emergencies/Iraq.html)

<sup>757</sup> See “Supporting UNHCR: Iraq.” *UNOPS*. Available at the website: <http://www.unops.org/english/whatwedo/partners/Pages/UNHCR.aspx#3>

<sup>758</sup> See “UNHCR Iraq Operation 2006, Supplementary Appeal.” April 2006. The website is available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/4565b4422.html> pp.2

<sup>759</sup> See “UNICEF appeals for \$37 million to save vulnerable Iraqi children.” *UNICEF*. Available at the website: [http://www.unicef.org/emerg/iraq\\_42810.html](http://www.unicef.org/emerg/iraq_42810.html)

and 3,000 individuals by providing “safe water, hygiene materials and emergency health supplies in Sadr city.”<sup>760</sup> Also, UNICEF is at present investing over US\$8 million in humanitarian interventions in 59 communities across Iraq, and this action is in places where families are suffering severe vulnerability as a direct consequence of conflict, epidemic and natural disaster.<sup>761</sup> All in all, UNICEF has been deeply engaged in humanitarian efforts to help many Iraqi people in desperate situation.

The UNAMI was heralded in Security Council Resolution 1500 adopted on 14 August 2003.<sup>762</sup> The UNAMI advocated the development of innovative operational options for continued UN involvement in Iraq.<sup>763</sup> Also, importantly, the UNAMI has provided the IHEC with advice and assistance on a wide range of electoral issues, including a nationwide overhauling of the voter registry to increase accuracy and reduce the potential for multiple voting.<sup>764</sup> For instance, in July 2009, the IHEC, with assistance from UNAMI, had a successful and violence-free election in the Kurdistan region of Iraq.<sup>765</sup>

The United Nations even set up the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq to fund activities in Basra, Fallujah, and elsewhere, and this fund has received 24 donors to come forward with more than \$ 1 billion in assistance for these activities

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<sup>760</sup> See “Unicef Humanitarian Action Update: Iraq.” June 11, 2008. Available at the website: [www.unicef.org/infobycountry/files/Iraq\\_HAU\\_June\\_2008.pdf](http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/files/Iraq_HAU_June_2008.pdf)

<sup>761</sup> See “UNICEF Humanitarian Action Update: Iraq” February 17, 2009. Available at the website: [www.unicef.org/infobycountry/files/Iraq\\_HAU\\_17\\_February\\_2009.pdf](http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/files/Iraq_HAU_17_February_2009.pdf)

<sup>762</sup> See “About UNAMI.” The website is available at: <http://www.uniraq.org/aboutus/aboutus.asp>

<sup>763</sup> Ibid

<sup>764</sup> See “Ban congratulates Iraqis on violence-free provincial elections.” *UN News Center*. Available at the website: <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=29746&Cr=iraq&Cr1>

<sup>765</sup> See “The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq.” Available at the website: <http://www.betterworldcampaign.org/un-peacekeeping/missions/iraq.html>

as well (Fukuyama, 2006:210). All of these engagements in Iraq demonstrate how important the UN system has been, especially with its support for the US-led MNF as well as democratic promotion in Iraq.

When considering the above UN direct, various, significant activities in Iraq's rebuilding and democratization, we might even think that the UN should have more responsibility in Iraq. For instance, the UN might need to take more responsibility for Iraq's basic education and training from the registration of claims to the preparation of ballots.<sup>766</sup> As a matter of fact, the UN has been told that it might do a better job than the US-led MNF in various aspects since someone might argue that the UN might have more credibility than the US-led coalition forces, in particular when considering popular Iraqi figures' perception of the US-led coalition forces:

Shiite leader Ayatollah Sistani (who can be said to indirectly represent sixty percent of the population), will not deal with the coalition on long-term political matters because that they are viewed as occupying forces (Uruqhart, 2004:228).

In fact, the legitimacy of the coalition was simply not accepted by most Iraqis.<sup>767</sup> A 2005 poll for the British Ministry of Defense found that eight out of 10 Iraqis strongly opposed the presence of coalition forces, and between 70% -90% want to see a timeline for the withdrawal of coalition troops.<sup>768</sup> This indicates that the United Nations seems to have more political legitimacy in the Middle East than the US.<sup>769</sup> Also, the UN chief, Ban Ki-moon has pledged:

a more active UN role in assisting in building an inclusive political process, helping to cultivate a regional environment

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<sup>766</sup> See Kaveh Afrasiabi (2007).

<sup>767</sup> See Menzies Campbell (2006).

<sup>768</sup> Ibid.

<sup>769</sup> See Juan Cole (2006).



supportive of a transition to stability, and pursuing reconstruction through International Compact.<sup>770</sup>

In fact, despite the destruction of UN offices in Iraq on August 19, 2003 which killed 22 UN workers, the UN has been continuously supportive to Iraq's reconstruction in the post-war era.<sup>771</sup> All of these imply that the United Nations seem to have more chances than the US-led MNF in Iraq.

However, I do believe that both the roles of the UN and the US-led MNF were absolutely necessary for successful democracy in Iraq, in particular when considering the past situations: according to UNAMI, 6,376 civilians were violently killed in November and December 2006, and during 2006, a total of 34,452 civilians were violently killed and 36,685 wounded<sup>772</sup>; even 12,000 police officers have been killed since 2003, which means that on an average, 10 police officers were killed every single day<sup>773</sup>; and the rule of law was challenged by the existence of militias and other groups who continuously acted with impunity, confirming an urgent need for the state to assert control over its security forces and all armed groups in the country.<sup>774</sup> With regard to Iraq's specific circumstance, Great Powers and the UN cannot successfully carry out their mission without the other, especially when considering that as mentioned above, the US-led MNF was necessary and it had been legitimized by UN

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<sup>770</sup> I quote this from Kaveh Afrasiabi (2007).

<sup>771</sup> Due to the destruction, the UN had chosen a low profile, but it has never given up its mission. See Kaveh Afrasiabi (2007).

<sup>772</sup> See "UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), Human Rights Report, 1 November -31 December 2006." pp. 2. The website is available at:  
<http://www.uniraq.org/FileLib/misc/HR%20Report%20Nov%20Dec%202006%20EN.pdf>

<sup>773</sup> Ibid, pp 3.

<sup>774</sup> See "UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), Human Rights Report, 1 November – 31 December 2005." The website is available at:  
<http://unami.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=mVYbM4FJFc%3D&tabid=3174&language=en-US>. pp. 1

Security Council Resolutions 1483 and 1637. Also, we should keep in mind the idea that democracy cannot be successful without the guarantee of security and order, as justice cannot last without order.

All in all, the UN can be seen as an institution to goad the outlaw state to conform to the values and norms of international society in the long run. We cannot deny the UN's direct and indirect role in transforming the outlaw state into a member of the international society, via its process of modifying the language and behavior of the outlaw state so as to make it become a decent democratic state. Saddam's Iraq had been marked as the outlaw state and had posed a threat to its neighboring states, such as Kuwait and to a whole international society, but, since 2003, Iraq has been altered. The UN has greatly contributed to such change. All in all, the UN has facilitated Iraq's path toward democracy, via indirectly backing Great Powers' role, such as the US-led MNF, and being directly engaged in rebuilding Iraq, although Iraq still has so many difficulties on its road toward a mature democracy.

So far, I have touched on the United Nations for democratic development in Iraq. In the process, I have attempted to reveal how international organizations can have an impact on democratic development in Iraq in a liberal anti-pluralist international society. At this point, unlike China and South Korea, I tended to stress an 'enforcement mechanism' rather than 'interest' or 'legitimacy,' while revealing the importance of cooperative relationships between the UN and Great Powers like through sanctions and Resolutions 1483 and 1637. Nonetheless, I briefly mentioned non-enforcement mechanisms of the UN agencies such as the UNDP, UNOPS and UNESCO, for Iraqi transition to democracy. All in all, I have to say that IGOs have had an impact on democratic development in Iraq, along with Great Powers, in particular when considering Resolution 1483 and Resolution 1637.

## **2) International non-governmental organizations' role in the democratic development in Iraq**

Like China and South Korea, in Iraq, some non-governmental organizations are indirectly engaged in the promotion and consolidation of democracy as well. Some INGOs play a significant role in reacting across sectarian lines to reinforce dialogue and understanding, and several U.S.-based organizations have employed substantial resources to help Iraqis develop their democracy.<sup>775</sup> Nevertheless, as the Iraq Study Group points out, we are well aware of the fact that the participation and activity of INGOs had been constrained by the lack of security.<sup>776</sup> But we can't deny the fact that INGOs have had an impact on Iraq's democratic development in various ways.

There are various INGOs for democratic development, like the Iraq Foundation, to help rebuild and democratize Iraq. These INGOs can influence the promotion and consolidation of democracy in Iraq, by emphasizing 'freedom,' 'the rule of law,' 'transparency,' 'the check and balance system,' 'order' and 'justice,' not to mention 'protection of human rights.'<sup>777</sup> This shows one of the aspects of INGOs, which is to promote and consolidate democracy in the Middle East.

Let us take a look at the Iraq Foundation as a non-profit, non-partisan, non-governmental organization, which was established in 1991 by Iraq's expatriates.<sup>778</sup>

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<sup>775</sup> See James A. Baker, III, Lee H. Hamilton, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Edwin Meese III, Sandra Day O'Connor, Leon E. Panetta, William J. Perry, Charles S. Robb, and Alan K. Simpson (2006:31).

<sup>776</sup> Ibid.

<sup>777</sup> See, for example, "Iraq: Activists call on army, police to respect women's rights." *Irin News*. February 8, 2006.

<sup>778</sup> See "The Iraq Foundation." Available at the website:  
<http://www.iraqfoundation.org/foundation.html>

According to the group's 2002 IRS Form 990, the Iraq Foundation received \$ 1.66 million in support for 2001, 99.97 percent of that figure derived from public funding sources.<sup>779</sup> It promotes and consolidates democracy as well as human rights in Iraq, while working for a better international understanding of Iraq's potential as a contributor to political stability and economic progress in the Middle East.<sup>780</sup> Its primary philosophy is the following:

Iraq commands considerable human and natural resources and enjoys a tradition of intellectual and economic prominence in the Middle East. A peaceful Iraq can serve as a stabilizing force and as a catalyst for security and economic prosperity in the region. However, Iraq will only live in peace within its borders and with its neighbors once democracy and accountable government are established. The Iraqi people will only flourish when their civil and human rights are respected.<sup>781</sup>

Its major objectives are the followings:

- . To expand the constituency for democracy among Iraqis. The Foundation works extensively with Expatriate Iraqis, who today constitute over 10 % of the Iraqi Foundation. Whenever possible, the Foundation maintains direct or indirect contacts within Iraq as well
- . To highlight human rights abuses in Iraq. Human Rights abuses by the Iraqi state, dismal for the past thirty years, have escalated and multiplied. In a 1995 report, the UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights called Iraq's human rights situation *the worst of any country since World War II*. Without sufficient recognition and exposure of the problem, it will be impossible to embark on a healthy future for Iraq.
- . To educate non-Iraqis about Iraq and strengthen support for a democratic new beginning. The Foundation endeavors to give a clear understanding of the consequences of totalitarianism in Iraq and the cost in personal suffering, economic collapse, and social disintegration.

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<sup>779</sup> See "Iraq Foundation." Available at the website:  
[http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Iraq\\_Foundation](http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Iraq_Foundation)

<sup>780</sup> See "The Iraq Foundation." Available at the website:  
<http://www.iraqfoundation.org/foundation.html>

<sup>781</sup> See "Iraq Foundation: Philosophy." Available at the website:  
<http://www.iraqfoundation.org/aboutus/mission.htm>

. To educate non-Iraqis about the potential for Iraq to become a major contributor to democratic reform and socio-economic development in the region in a climate of democracy and an open society.<sup>782</sup>

At this juncture, we can see liberal thought and democratic norms, which can be understood as a contributing factor of the Iraq Foundation to democratic development in Iraq.

It has several projects, such as the Iraq Constitution Assistance Project (ICAP), raising democratic awareness and citizen participation in a democratic process; Human Rights Education (HRE), the apprehending of human rights; the Iraqi American National Network (IANN), capacity-building of developing Iraqi communities around the United States; and the Iraq Civil Society Program (ICSP), encouragement of women's participation in all facets of public life in Iraq.<sup>783</sup> In particular, along with Freedom House,<sup>784</sup> ICAP has been promoting Iraqi democratization via a shared knowledge on constitutional development and notable democratic awareness and civic participation in the constitutional process and democratic change.<sup>785</sup> Also, as part of the ICAP Project, Iraq Democracy Watch is trying to make democracy a reality in Iraq, and to monitor the democratic development in Iraq, especially the implementation of articles in the constitution

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<sup>782</sup> See "Free Iraq Foundation: About Objectives." Available at the website: <http://www.wiser.org/organization/view/64cd2a1fba9e76d42d94af1157dbf5f4>

<sup>783</sup> See the website available at: [www.iraqfoundation.org/projects\\_new](http://www.iraqfoundation.org/projects_new)

<sup>784</sup> As a non-profit and non-government organization, Freedom House has monitored Iraq's progress of democracy. For instance, it rated Iraq's political rights improvement from 7 to 6, thanks to the holding of the series of modest elections to a transnational national assembly in January 2005 and the subsequent formation of a transitional government. See "Welcome to Freedom House, Country Report, Iraq." Available at the website: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&country=6983&year=2006>

<sup>785</sup> See "Iraq Constitution Assistance Project." Available at the website: <http://www.iraqfoundation.org/projects/constitution%20assistance/constassistindex.htm>

concerning Iraqi citizens' rights and freedoms.<sup>786</sup> When considering the above projects, we can clearly notice that the Iraq Foundation greatly contributes to Iraqi transition to democracy.

In addition, importantly, the Iraq Foundation has been working with the American Bar Association and the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, which carries out and advocates the legislative agenda of Iraq's pledge campaign, and which institutionalizes the objectives of Iraq's pledge across the social and political spectrum.<sup>787</sup> It is worthwhile looking at the five laws of the Iraq's Pledge platform.

A law to secure freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and freedom of assembly

A law to preserve the existence of civil courts for matters of personal status (such as marriage and divorce) as an alternative to religious court.

A law to ensure the independence of Iraq's Supreme Court by requiring that all judges have a high degree in law and experience as practicing judges.

A law to strengthen the High Commission for Human Rights by enabling it refer cases to the Supreme Court for review

A law to enable the High Commission for Human Rights to enforce the right of equal opportunity for all Iraqis.<sup>788</sup>

Moreover, the Iraq Foundation has organized a watchdog group to supervise parliamentary legislation related to the above five laws, to examine the debates in parliament influencing the five laws, and to oversee voting and trace the statements and positions which parliamentarians make.<sup>789</sup> All of these show that the Iraq Foundation has indirectly and directly strengthened Iraq's young liberal democracy.

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<sup>786</sup> See "Iraq Democracy Watch." Available at the website:  
[http://www.iraqfoundation.org/projects/consitution%20assistance/iraq\\_democracy\\_watch.htm](http://www.iraqfoundation.org/projects/consitution%20assistance/iraq_democracy_watch.htm)

<sup>787</sup> See "Pledge for Iraq (PFI) Campaign." *Iraq Foundation*. The webstie is available at:  
[http://www.iraqfoundation.org/projects\\_new/ahd\\_al-iraq/ipindex.htm](http://www.iraqfoundation.org/projects_new/ahd_al-iraq/ipindex.htm)

<sup>788</sup> Ibid.

<sup>789</sup> Ibid.

## **Conclusion**

In general, although international organizations have been very often recognized as an incompetent tool for the interests of Great Powers, we should not forget the fact that international organizations can be seen as an institution to maintain order and security and to promote common good in international society. And, most importantly, many international organizations have influenced democratic development in international society. They have indirectly and directly contributed to democratization as the new emerging standard of civilization and the new wave expansion of international society in the post-Cold War era and 21<sup>st</sup> century.

International organizations can be divided into IGOs and INGOs. IGOs and INGOs have slightly different approaches to promote and consolidate democracy: IGOs are more likely to opt for the top-down approach, whereas INGOs are more likely to opt for the bottom-up approach. They can be relatively seen as the top-down democratic promotion and the bottom-up democratic promotion. Nonetheless, sometimes it is hard to distinguish one approach from the other.

Like other chapters, in this chapter, I adopted three countries to demonstrate how international organizations can have relatively different methods to promote and consolidate democracy on the basis of each different international society. As China, South Korea and Iraq reflect relatively different international societies, pluralist, solidarist and liberal-anti-pluralist, international organizations have opted for relatively different mechanisms to promote and consolidate democracy: China (interest: desire to be Great Power), South Korea (legitimacy: voluntary acceptance) and Iraq (enforcement: UN Security Council Resolutions 1483 and 1637). All in all, international organizations have cultivated and consolidated democratic elements in each state. They obviously have an impact on democratic development, while

contributing to the fact that democracy becomes an emerging new standard of civilization and the new wave expansion of international society in the post-Cold War era and the 21<sup>st</sup> century.



## **Conclusion**

In the post-Cold War era and the 21<sup>st</sup> century, democracy has been gradually recognized as the predominant norm of international society. Indeed, we can even think that democracy has become the newly emerging standard of civilization and the new wave expansion of international society, in particular when considering even Libya, Tunisia and Egypt's moves toward democratization in 2011. My dissertation reflects this global phenomenon. In other words, my dissertation is about democratization across international society.

In my dissertation, I adopted the English School as one of predominant IR theories for democratization. I underline the English School as the IR theoretical background for the promotion and consolidation of democracy, while showing that the English School is the widest and the deepest IR theory. The English School is fit for the explanation of democratization across international society, in particular when considering its unique assets including pluralistic methodology, interdisciplinary character, international society (pluralist, solidarist and liberal anti-pluralist international societies), Great Powers, the standard of civilization, and outlaw states. In my dissertation, I also used the concepts of inner circle and outer circle relative to democratic countries and non-democratic countries, as democracy becomes the newly emerging standard of civilization in the post-Cold War era and the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Furthermore, I underscored the phenomenon that the inner circle has been greatly enlarged and the outer circle has been diminished in the post-Cold War era and the

21<sup>st</sup> century, as an increasing number of countries have become democratic across international society. This phenomenon indicates that more and more states have become civilized, when considering that democracy has become the newly emerging standard of civilization in the post-Cold War era and the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Moreover, in my dissertation, I attempted to show external variables and internal variables which have an impact on paths toward democracy as well.<sup>790</sup> As external variables, I mentioned three different international societies: a pluralist international society, a solidarist international society, and a liberal anti-pluralist international society. Each different international society has brought about relatively different paths toward democracy. For instance, we can see more often interest-oriented socialization in a pluralist international society, value-oriented socialization in a solidarist international society, and the use of force in a liberal anti-pluralist international society. And, in my dissertation, importantly, I attempted to show that institutions within three different international societies have greatly promoted and consolidated democracy across international society. In particular, Hedley Bull's three institutions – i.e. international law, diplomacy, and Great Powers - and international organization as the secondary institution of international society have greatly contributed to the promotion and consolidation of democracy across international society. Precisely speaking, international law, diplomacy, Great powers and international organizations have been significant institutions of international society, as they have contributed to maintaining international order and even promoting the well-being of international society. And, importantly, those institutions have played a significant role in promoting and consolidating the norms

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<sup>790</sup> Please read an appendix in order to understand how internal variables can have an impact on paths toward democracy.

and values of international society. As in the post-Cold War era and the 21<sup>st</sup> century, democracy has become the predominant norm and value of international society, institutions facilitate the promotion and consolidation of democracy across international society.

In terms of institutions' promotion and consolidation of democracy across international society, we can notice that institutions tend to choose various mechanisms rather than one, on the basis of each circumstance; for example, a target state's identity and character and a type of international society – i.e. pluralist, solidarist, or liberal anti-pluralist international society. As noted above, I tend to emphasize three mechanisms – i.e. interest-oriented socialization, value-oriented socialization and the use of force – in order to promote and consolidate democracy across international society.

In my dissertation, I adopted China, South Korea, and Iraq in order to demonstrate that each country has its own unique path toward democracy. However, in general, we can see three general types – i.e. interest (interest-based socialization), legitimacy (value-based socialization) and force (use of force) – for democratization, since China, South Korea and Iraq belong to relatively a pluralist international society, a solidarist international society, and a liberal anti-pluralist international society. In other words, China has cherished pluralistic principles such as equal sovereignty and non-intervention, and is recognized as an authoritarian regime rather than an outlaw state. Also, China has been in pursuit of economic development and Great Power status. Under these circumstances, interest-oriented socialization should be adopted for China's democratization. Indeed, China has gradually but slowly moved to democracy due to its pursuit of national interests. South Korea has cherished solidaristic principles, voluntarily adopting human rights and democracy as significant

norms and values. In other words, in South Korea, a majority of people have authentically accepted democracy as well as human rights. And so, South Korea becomes a full member of a solidarist international society. Thus, at this juncture, we can think of the value-oriented socialization for South Korea's consolidation of democracy. Saddam's Iraq had been recognized as an outlaw state that posed an existential threat to its neighboring states and further to international society, let alone Saddam's cruel dictatorship. These aspects of Iraq made the use of force necessary to bring about its democratization. This indicates that Iraq became a member of a liberal anti-pluralist international society in which the use of force can be justified, even if the target state must be an outlaw state.

All in all, what is important is that external factors and institutions – i.e. international law, diplomacy, Great Powers, and international organizations - have greatly contributed to these three countries' democratization, even though they have relatively different paths toward democracy. However, at this juncture, though I tend to emphasize the external factors and institutions for the promotion and consolidation of democracy, this does not necessarily mean that internal variables can be completely disregarded. In an appendix, I stressed internal variables which influence paths toward democracy. As internal variables, I mentioned history, culture, politics, economics, military, and foreign policy. Those internal variables can have an impact on paths toward democracy. To sum up, democracy has become the newly emerging standard of civilization and new wave expansion of international society in the post-Cold War era and the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

## **Appendix: Internal Variables and Democracy**

### **Introduction**

In my dissertation, I attempt to show that the relatively different path toward democracy can be, in a large part, determined by the characteristics of each international society, internal variables and external variables as independent variables. But, in this appendix, I will examine internal variables, which can have an impact on a path toward democracy. Also, I will demonstrate that internal variables cannot be disregarded for the promotion and consolidation of democracy, although in my dissertation, I pay more attention to characters of international society and external variables on which I touched in the earlier chapters, than to internal variables. All in all, in this appendix, I will ultimately reveal how internal variables including history, culture, politics, economy, military power and foreign policy can affect the democratic path, which can ascertain that democracy has become steadily a standard of civilization across international society. Each case study, China, South Korea and Iraq can help comprehend how each country's internal variables can have an impact on each country's democratic path.

First of all, I will take a look at China's internal variables for its democratic path. In China's history, I will attempt to investigate how its humiliating past and its brief democratic experience can have an effect on its path toward democracy. With regard to Chinese culture, I will demonstrate the compatibility between Confucianism and democracy, with emphasizing some aspects of Confucianism, which can be seen

as democratic norms and values, such as a pluralistic life, moral equality and human dignity. With respect to Chinese politics, I will reveal that China's democratization must be slowly evolutionary rather than radically revolutionary, due to Chinese leadership's fear of instability and disunity drawing from any radical change toward democracy. In terms of China's economy, I will explain how its economic growth based on the adoption of a market economy can bring out its gradual political freedom. Regarding military power, I will explain why Great Powers cannot embrace the use of force for China's democratization, suggesting alternative options such as interests anchored in the rational calculation and interest-oriented socialization. On the subject of China's foreign policy, I will explore how pragmatism as its primary aspect of foreign policy, can contribute to China's path toward democracy.

Secondly, I will take a look at South Korea's internal variables which can have an impact on its path toward democracy. In terms of South Korea's history, I will emphasize South Korea's strategic location, and its traditional legacy of *Saddae Chuui* (reliance on a big power), along with the continuous influence of regional hegemonic powers on the Korean Peninsula. Regarding South Korea's culture, I will examine how Christianity has greatly contributed to South Korea's democratic development, and I will stress that South Korea's democratic success in the co-existing society of four religions, Christianity, Buddhism, Shamanism, and Confucianism verifies the idea that democracy does not recognize different cultures. In South Korea's politics, I will underline civilian roles in its democratic development, which was mass protest-driven rather than elite protest-driven. With regard to South Korea's economy, I will underscore a positive correlation between economic development and democratic development, and also I will investigate the close relationship between outcomes of economic development, like growth of living standard and high education, and

democratic development, although I will briefly refer to South Korea's economic reform from crony capitalism to economic democracy, which has reinforced South Korea's democratic consolidation. On the subject of South Korea's military power, I will disclose the fact that South Korea's military superiority over North Korea's military power has steadily generated a positive environment for South Korea's democratic development, underlining the idea that justice can hardly last in the absence of order or security. In terms of South Korea's foreign policy, I will explore how South Korea's foreign policy can bring about a more open and more democratic environment.

Finally, I will look at Iraq's internal variables which can influence its path toward democracy. In Iraq's history, I will emphasize the old cycle of violence, dictatorship, ill-liberal foreign occupation and rebellion as barriers to Iraq's path toward democracy, which could help justify the use of force by the US-led coalition forces in 2003 so as to overthrow Saddam's regime and to introduce a new cycle of cooperation, democracy, peace and prosperity in Iraq.<sup>791</sup> Regarding Iraq's culture, I will reveal that Islamic culture can be compatible with democracy. With respect to Iraq's politics, I will point out Sunni's dominance, Saddam's dictatorship, Baath Party's role, and close relationship between military and politics as obstacles to Iraq's democratic development. In Iraq's economy, I will demonstrate that Iraq's economic failure could be an obstacle to its democratic development. In terms of Iraq's military, I will show that Saddam's military power could not help Iraq's democratic development as long as Saddam's Iraq was an outlaw state which posed an existential threat to its region and international society, let alone brutal dictatorship. On the

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<sup>791</sup> As for me, the US-led coalition forces' invasion of Iraq in 2003 can be recognized as a stimulant for a change in paradigm in Thomas Kuhn's terms. See Kuhn (1996).

subject of Iraq's foreign policy, I will demonstrate that Iraq's foreign policy based on anti-imperialism, pan-Arabism and regional hegemony could not be compatible with Iraq's democratic development. All in all, via three cases, I will emphasize the fact that internal variables have impacts on paths toward democracy.

**A. *China's internal variables and its path toward democracy***

**1. *China's history and its path toward democracy.***

China's historical background is a significant independent variable to shape or shove its path toward democracy. Let us take a look at China's historical background, while keeping in mind the question on how China's past experience can have an impact on its path toward democracy. In general, China had been well known as the Middle Kingdom, the center of civilization, the center of the world or a superior position to any other society until the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, especially in a cultural and political sense.<sup>792</sup> However, China's defeat in the 1839-1842 Opium War marked China's turning point toward its deterioration and weakness in the international arena. Also, as a result of the defeat of the Opium War, China was forced to become a member of international society, via its reluctant compliance with Western norms and values.<sup>793</sup> In the process, there had been unequal treatment – e.g. even during the Cold War era, Great Powers' failure to recognize the communist government of China, and China's inability to take a seat at the United Nations, much less a permanent membership in the Security Council, until 1971 (Armstrong, 1993: 269).

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<sup>792</sup> China has been recognized as the Middle Kingdom until the late 19th century. As the US has been embedded in its exceptionalism, therefore, China had been embedded in its own unique kind of exceptionalism. See Buzan (2004b) and Zhang (2001).

<sup>793</sup> The disappearance of the kowtow of foreign diplomats toward the Chinese emperor can be recognized as China's reluctant acceptance of sovereign equality as a western norm in international society. See, for more detail, Zhang (2001:60).



The above can be a brief historical background about why China regarded international society as an unfair Western hegemonic order, and about why China appeared as a revolutionary state against international society for around the last 150 years.<sup>794</sup> China's defeat in the Opium War and its following period of humiliation from 1839 to 1949 led to China's hostile attitude and reaction against international society, like the Boxer Rebellion in 1900. Due to China's historical background, importantly we can hardly expect China to adopt norms and values of democracy which has slowly become predominant in an international society, but instead, we can easily comprehend why China became a revisionist state, rejecting international order as well as international norms.

However, it will be problematic, if we entirely reject the possibility of China's democratization simply due to its humiliating past. In fact, China's humiliating experience can be one incentive for its democratic movement. There can be close relationships between China's adoption of democracy and its ambition for Great Power status in international society, drawing from its strong nationalism.<sup>795</sup> In the twentieth century, all Chinese leaders from Sun Yat-Sen, Chang Kai shek, Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaping to Jiang Zemin, and in the twenty-first century, Hu Jintao have

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<sup>794</sup> See, for more details, Foot (2000) and Zhang (1998).

<sup>795</sup> American strong nationalism has been well known and been easily observed in particular since terrorist attacks on the US homeland on September 11, 2001. However, when comparing the US nationalism with Chinese nationalism, we can perceive that Chinese nationalism is no less strong than American nationalism, though personally I feel that Chinese nationalism might be even far stronger than American nationalism. As a matter of fact, Chinese strong nationalism had been prominent via the whole process of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games. In particular, in the aftermath of the March unrest in Tibet and chaos surrounding the Olympic torch relay in London and Paris, many Chinese were outraged, and their strong nationalism was confirmed. In China, some internet users called for a boycott of French goods, and large demonstrations were held at several Carrefour supermarkets. Even at the Carrefour next to Friendship Shopping in Xinzhuang, teenagers milled outside with T-shirts saying "Tibet Was, IS and Always will be part of China." See, for more information, Geoff Dyer (2008).

shared a deep bitterness derived from China's humiliating history, and have determined to blot out humiliation and restore China to its rightful place as a Great power (Zhao, 2004: 70). According to this strong nationalism, China's possible pursuit of democracy can be materialized with functional or instrumental reason. In other words, as Suisheng Zhao puts it, Chinese quite often regard democracy as a tool to elevate China and to help put it into the category of Great Powers (Zhao 2000:46-47). In fact, a majority of Chinese intellectuals and ordinary Chinese citizens have increasingly believed that democracy itself can make China a strong nation and get it to be recognized as a Great Power in international society. Thus, it is not impossible to expect China to become democratic, in particular when considering China's alteration after Deng's open door policy.

Indeed, China has gradually changed to become voluntarily engaged in international society. In particular, if democracy gradually becomes the big wave of international society and slowly becomes the standard of civilization in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, China is highly expected to move closer and closer to democracy, especially as it has been more and more aware of the fact that democracy can be a decent form of government for Great Powers. For instance, along with Deng Xiaoping's four modernizations of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and defense, 'democracy' has been marked as the 'fifth modernization' (Zhao, 2000: 46). Also, Wei Jingsheng claimed three reasons for China's democracy demand. First, democracy is in opposition to the autocracy of the Chinese system. Second, democracy could bring out prosperity. Third, democracy could provide freedom (Zhao, 2000:46-47). The above indicates how China's nationalism derived from its past humiliating experience as well as its discontent with an authoritarian political system can request China's democratization. All in all, we can say that China's

humiliating past can indirectly bolster China's likelihood to adopt democracy. In other words, China's humiliating past is not a fundamental obstacle to its democratic development, but can be one of incentives to goad China to adopt democracy in the long run.

Actually, when scrutinizing China's past political systems, we can uncover that democratic systems are not totally new to China. As Suisheng Zhao puts it, China already had every different kind of democratic institution, such as a presidential system, parliamentary system and federalism like Sun Yat-sen's republican government in 1911 and a presidential system in 1912 (Zhao, 2000: 33). In addition, China had experienced a multi-party system in the past. Before the time of the late Qing dynasty, China had never had any political party, since it had been prohibited by Chinese emperors. However, since the 1911 revolution, China's political parties started emerging (Zhao, 2000:38). From 1911 to 1913, China had 682 parties or associations and around thirty of them could be literally recognized as political parties with complete political platforms, although China's multi-party politics eventually ended up one party authoritarian system (Yufa, 1985:32, and Zhao, 2000:38). When considering that China had briefly experienced democratic institutions and a multi-party system, not to mention Taipei's multi-party democracy, it does not seem to be overly optimistically to expect China's democracy to allow a two-party or multi-party system in the future. As a matter of fact, we should not forget the fact that in the past, many Chinese had great desire for democracy, such as the May Fourth Movement 1919, Wilsonian idealism after WWI (i.e. the principle of democracy, self-determination and the protection of the weak)(Hsu, 2000:503), and the democratic movement in Tiananmen Square in 1989. Overall, we can say that on one hand, China was used to rejecting international society due to its shameful past, but on the

other hand, it has slowly moved itself toward democracy due to its shameful history and its brief democratic experience on the strength of Chinese desire for democracy.

## **2. China's culture and its path toward democracy**

In general, Chinese culture has been acknowledged as quite different from Western culture. This is one of the reasons why many scholars rarely expect the blossoming of democracy in China. However, we should not jump to the conclusion that Chinese cultural factors are the fundamental obstacles to China's promotion of democracy. In this section, I will focus on Confucianism as a primary aspect of Chinese culture, while displaying the compatibility between Confucianism and democracy and disclosing how Confucianism can have an impact on China's path toward democracy.

Confucianism has been known as the most powerful and durable Chinese political philosophy inherited from Confucius (K'ung-fu-tzu) (551-479 B.C.) whose view was that nature was on the basis of moral order and that political affairs have to reflect that order, and whose ideas were humanistic and practical, emphasizing personal satisfaction and public well-being as well as on social responsibility (Ferguson and Mansbach, 1996:206). However, Confucianism has been frequently used for authoritarian rule, since Confucianism can be regarded as an ideal ideology for a hierarchical officialdom with an omnipotent emperor on top (Ferguson and Mansbach, 1996:214). Indeed, as 'Asian Values' developed in Confucianism shows, Confucian ethics can be understood as to stress the importance of filial piety and submission to state authority.<sup>796</sup> At this juncture, Confucianism can be acknowledged as incompatible with norms of democracy, since the former lays emphasis on

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<sup>796</sup> We should not forget the fact that Asian Values have been on and off used to justify authoritarian rules. See Ibrahim (2006:6).

hierarchical relationships, whereas the latter underscores horizontal relationships. Also, we can perceive that traditional Confucianism puts emphasis on the responsibility to society, and the obligations to family and community, as the very basis of the harmony and order of Chinese society, without considering individual rights as an independent right as an independent entity (Zhang, 1998:184). In fact, in terms of ‘individual rights,’ the concept of ‘rights’ ‘Quanli’ in Chinese, had been rarely used in Chinese history, and it just started being used in the nineteenth century (Zhang, 1998:184). Thus, individual rights themselves are rarely understood among Chinese people.

When considering the above reason, Confucianism can be misunderstood as incompatible with the essences of democracy, such as individual rights, liberty and equality. However, actually, we can notice the compatible relationships between Confucianism and democracy. For instance, Confucius himself did not advocate tyrannical dictatorships (Bell, 2003:64). As one of Confucianism influences, the emperor’s authority in Confucianism-imbedded China could be undermined if his own immorality led to his loss of the mandate of heaven (Fukuyama, 1995:27). That is, Confucianism itself does not advocate tyranny, but condemns it, although Confucianism itself puts stress on a hierarchical relationship. Such Confucianism’s anti-tyrannical tendency can be a contributor to a founding philosophy for modern democracy, not to mention compatibility between Confucianism and norms of democracy. In fact, the essences of Confucianism, like its emphasis on the primacy of the self and the importance of self-cultivation in realizing human potential and guarding against exploitation by the powers, should not be disregarded at all (Ibrahim, 2006: 6). Due to this, we can say that Confucianism does not support any kind of exploitative hierarchical relationship, in particular when considering ‘ren’

(humaneness) as the key value in Confucianism (Ackerly, 2005:552-561). Also, as Chan Sin Yee argues, Confucian criticizes social and political barriers to women's political participation and workplace opportunity, since those barriers can harm self-development or self-cultivation (Ackerly, 2005:567). These can clearly indicate that Confucianism is not incompatible with democracy. More, importantly, we should not forget the fact that Confucianism advocates pluralistic ways of life, not to mention tolerance, while providing fair mechanisms for dealing with conflicts and minimal government, and underscoring moral equality and human dignity. At this point, the parallel between Confucianism and democracy can be observed, and we can perceive that Confucianism is not a fundamental obstacle to the promotion of democracy but instead, Confucianism can indirectly or directly shape China's distinguishing path toward democracy.

As a matter of fact, the character of neo-Confucianism is even closer to norms of democracy than Confucianism. Neo-Confucianism strongly endorses the values that are consistent with the norms of liberal democracy (Bell, 2003:63). Neo-Confucianism began with Mencius's ideas (390-305 BC) (Bell, 2003:57-58). Mencius greatly stresses moral potential/equality and human dignity (Bloom, 1998:111). Mencius states: "all human beings have a mind that cannot bear to see the sufferings of others....all human beings have within themselves what is honorable" (Bloom, 1998:101, 106-107). This visibly displays that Confucianism is obviously embedded in human dignity and human equality, which can be comprehended as the foundation for democratic thought.

Also, importantly, Mencius' thought is closely linked with the concept of '*minben*' (Wang and Titunik, 2000:74-77). '*Min*' means people and '*Ben*' means root, and the word '*minben*' reflects the idea that "the people are the original source of

the political authority of a state.” (Wang and Titunik, 2000:74). That is, Mencius’ idea about government and people is deeply imbedded in the concept of *minben*, and this apparently demonstrates that Confucianism is not incompatible with the notion of democracy. However, I admit that the concept of *minben* and Mencius’ thought does not necessarily mean people’s participation in decision-making processes. Instead, they convey the ways to guarantee political legitimacy to govern people, especially when considering, for example, that Hitler’s government could not be legitimized even if it was elected via a decent democratic process (Wang and Titunik, 2000:83). All in all, Confucianism is not incompatible with the notion of democracy and it can have an effect on China’s path toward democracy. At this point, we can see that the success or the failure of democracy in China cannot be determined by Confucianism, but Confucianism can simply have an impact on China’s path toward democracy.

### **3. China’s political system and its path toward democracy**

There are many political issues as obstacles to China’s democratic development. First of all, the most fundamental obstacle to China’s democratization is China’s one party system which has made it difficult for China to become democratic. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was founded in 1921 (Hsu, 2000:12).<sup>797</sup> Since then, CCP itself alone in China has been given legitimacy, and China has adhered to a one-party authoritarian system until now, while strongly rebuffing pluralistic liberal democracy.<sup>798</sup> A one-party authoritarian system’s purpose

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<sup>797</sup> The May Fourth Movement in 1919 is hailed as the first genuine mass movement in modern Chinese history. On May 4, 1919, around 5,000 students in Peking held protest against the verdict of the Versailles Peace Conference on Shantung. It was an explosion of public anger, an outburst of nationalism, a deep disappointment in the West and a violent indictment of the deceitful warlord government in Peking. See, for more detail, Hsu (2000: 501-505).

<sup>798</sup> See “Communist Party of China.” *Wikipedia*. Available at the website: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist\\_Party\\_of\\_China#Role\\_within\\_the\\_People's\\_Republic\\_of\\_China](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist_Party_of_China#Role_within_the_People's_Republic_of_China)

has been primarily for political and social stability. However, the CCP has many problems, which cannot be seen in democratic government. First of all, under a one party system, we cannot expect modified government policy which can be seen in a two-party system or multi-party system (Schultz, 2001: 96). As Schultz put it, the momentous roles of a two-party system or multi-party system are to reduce the possibility of wars and to provide efficient information, as a check and balance mechanism against a potential danger of governmental dictatorship, which can be recognized as one of the fundamental values for democracy (Schultz, 2001:96). Due to China's one party system, however, we can hardly anticipate effective and organized democratic institutions to challenge the dominance of the CCP in China. In China, the direct opposition to the CCP has been hardly expected. For instance, though the authoritarian tendency of the CCP has facilitated the tendency of corruption and dictatorship, as a member of the CCP, Mr Zhou Wei's opposition to the CCP for its corruption and high-handedness ended up putting himself into a forced labor camp for re-education (Saich, 2001:188). This shows that how CCP domination can be a fundamental obstacle to China's democratic development.

However, it is not true to say that there is no possibility for China to become democratic. First of all, with regard to the CCP system, we can expect some change, in particular when considering that according to a survey of 80,000 people conducted by the Organization Department of the CCP in 2008, one-third of the Chinese populace was neither satisfied with the way CCP officials were selected, nor was one-third satisfied with the performance of the CCP's leadership (Li, 2010:12). When considering this, we cannot thoroughly discard the possibility that China's democracy based on a multi-party or two party system may be formed in the future. As a matter

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of fact, it is not accurate to say that at present, China has adopted a one party system, since China has had eight other informal political parties which can be put into the category of democratic parties.<sup>799</sup> According to Chen Dongxiao, eight political parties in China are composed of intellectuals and well-off Chinese, and they are recognized as policy consultants rather than politicians, since they do not have any desire to challenge and overthrow the CCP, but instead have been simply happy to just be policy-making advisors to the CCP.<sup>800</sup> However, we cannot repudiate the existence of eight political parties besides the CCP, in China's political arena, which can indirectly prevent the CCP from abusing its unilateral policy-making process, in particular when considering that as an opposition party, the China Democratic Party (CDP) focuses on grassroots election practices, encourages associations for peasants, workers, intellectuals, and private entrepreneurs, and CDP candidates to participate in elections, and work to carry out fair elections from the grass roots to higher political levels.<sup>801</sup>

In addition, when considering interior factions within the CCP, we can see many factions as an 'inner-party democracy,' which can bring about a check and balance system.<sup>802</sup> As a matter of fact, in China, the term 'inner-party democracy' is to describe the idea that the party must institutionalize checks and balances within

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<sup>799</sup> I had a chance to talk with Chen Dongxiao who is the director of Shanghai Institute for International Studies, at the Center for China-US Cooperation's Fourth Annual International Symposium from April, 28 to April 29, 2006. He has had a positive view on gradual political freedom in China.

<sup>800</sup> Ibid

<sup>801</sup> See "Fifteen Years After Tiananmen: Is Democracy in China's Future?" *Hearing before the Congressional-Executive Commission on China*. One Hundred Eighth Congress, June 3, 2004. The website is available at: <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108hrg94258/html/CHRG-108hrg94258.htm>

<sup>802</sup> Ibid

party leadership (Li, 2008:77). In China, this dynamic factional politics contributes to the growing transparency of diverse outlooks and stances in the decision-making process, which indicates the toleration of diversity as one of the significant elements for democracy (Li, 2008:89). Indeed, in September 2009, the Fourth Plenary Session of the 17<sup>th</sup> Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party called for promoting democracy within the Party and intensifying the anti-corruption drive within the leadership (Li, 2010:2). Importantly, at this juncture, the intra-party democracy can be regarded as a means for general democracy in the end (Li, 2010:7). Thus, in some sense, this can be recognized as China's possible path toward democracy (Li, 2008:92).

As an obstacle to China's democratic development, we can think of Chinese leadership. Chinese leaders fear instability, and such fear is one of the obstacles to China's democratic development. In other words, we should recognize that China's difficulty with democratization can draw from Chinese leadership and the CCP's pursuit of stability and national unity as the highest priority. Indeed, for Chinese leadership and the CCP, political legitimacy has been primarily derived from three major sources: economic development, stability and national unity (Zheng, 2004:51). Due to this, Chinese leadership has ruthlessly cracked down on any social movements, especially the organized ones that might seriously challenge the regime, initiating instability and division of unity, as exemplified by the crackdown on the pro-democracy movement in 1989 and the Falungong (FLG/ the wheel of life) movement (Zheng, 2004: 140). However, most Chinese intellectuals assume that the great threat to China's social stability is corruption rather than bourgeois liberal values (Chan, 2000: 216). Also, a long-term true social stability requires fundamental conditions, such as the protection of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law,

since order or stability without these conditions is simply social repression or control.<sup>803</sup> And so, it is not completely wrong to say that in the absence of those fundamental conditions, China may continuously suffer from enormous instability at the micro level, such as 300 riots every day, around 20 mining deaths each day, 300 traffic deaths every day, a major water-pollution incident every three days, unsafe food, ethnic conflicts in Tibet and Xinjiang, and failure to invest in social security – e.g. \$90 per worker of lifetime social security benefits -, private pensions, medical care – e.g. medical insurance: only \$30 a person for three years -, and unemployment insurance.<sup>804</sup> When considering all of these, Chinese leadership should adopt human rights and democracy as a long-term solution for stability and unity, let alone continuous economic development.

Indeed, some Chinese leaders have approved democratic development. For instance, today, Premier Wen Jiabao has been a consistent supporter of the universal value of democracy (Li, 2010:4). In 2006, when meeting a delegation from the Brookings Institution in Beijing, Premier Wen Jiabao argued that “institutional checks and balances, constitutionalism, freedom of the media, civil liberties, and political choice expressed through elections” are not proprietary elements of Western democracies, but are the vital and universal components of any democracy (Li, 2010:5). Also, importantly, the emerging fifth generation of Chinese leaders

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<sup>803</sup> Ibid

<sup>804</sup> Minxin Pei is a director of Keck Center For International and Strategic Studies, Claremont Mckenna College. He joined China 2025 Panel I: Challenges from Within: Emerging Domestic Challenges, at *Council on Foreign Relations*, on October 19, 2009. See Pei’s remarks, available at the website: <http://www.cfr.org/china/china-2025-panel-challenges-within-emerging-domestic-challenges/p20663>. Stephen S. Roach is chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia. On October 19, 2009, he made a speech concerning “China 2025: Keynote II: China’s Economic Future” at *Council on Foreign Relations*. See his remarks, available at the website: <http://www.cfr.org/china/china-2025-keynote-ii-chinas-economic-future/p20472>

brightens China's future of democratic development.<sup>805</sup> In terms of education, unlike the fourth generation leaders (any previous generation leader) most of whom almost completed only an undergraduate degree due to the Cultural Revolution, the fifth generation leaders received higher levels of education: 73% received postgraduate degrees; and 21% received PhD degrees (Li, 2008:70). Moreover, a majority of fifth generation leaders attended schools in Western democratic countries (Li, 2008:75). It means that the fifth generation has been exposed far more to Western ideas and values like human rights and democracy than any previous generation, and tends to have better understanding of Western values (Li, 2008:89). Though this does not necessarily mean that the fifth generation's outlook is thoroughly pro-West or pro-America, we can expect that this generation is more likely to be open and to be engaged in international society. More importantly, they are more pragmatic and less dogmatic than their predecessors because of their experience of ideological disillusionment during the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) (Li, 2008:88). This means that the ideological conflicts between the US and China is less important today than in the past. In other words, China does not have any hostile ideology against Western values, in particular American values such as human rights and democracy (Li, 2008:88). At this juncture, we can expect a positive picture of democratic development in China, when considering that the fifth generation will eventually govern China in the end.

As Larry Diamond puts it, importantly, Chinese citizens have gradually become more and more aware of their political rights beyond economic rights, and

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<sup>805</sup> The first and second generations are communist revolutionary veterans with backgrounds as peasants and soldiers. The third and fourth generations are engineers-turned-technocrats. As the fourth generation leaders, we can think of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao. See, for more detail, Cheng Li (2008).

they have become more assertive in defending their political rights (Diamond, 2000:xiii). Currently, Chinese citizens can criticize officials' misbehavior and inefficient government policies, which can be comprehended as an initial stage of Madison's check and balance system under one party's predominant rule. Furthermore, they have enjoyed the practice of fair election for officials at village levels. The election at a village level is very meaningful for China's democratic movement, in particular when considering that over 80 per cent of villages had elected their own chiefs and village committees and that there were around 900,000 villages in China housing approximately three-quarters of the country's 1.3 billion population (Youngs, 2000: 202, 242 fn. 52).<sup>806</sup> This is not only a political transformation at the local level, but also the spread of village democracy can be highly expected to bring about some level of political change in central China from the bottom up (Youngs, 2000:192).<sup>807</sup> Thus, we can say that this evidently replicates a sign of China's transformation toward 'democracy.' Indeed, China is slowly moving toward democracy.

To sum up, we can say that China has slowly become democratic and that democratic movement in China will be continuous, albeit it will take a long period for China to become a mature democracy, along with some fluctuation. As Xu Jian put it, in fact, Chinese leaders have been unmistakably aware of the fact that China will inevitably move toward democracy, although China has slowly adopted an

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<sup>806</sup> Also see "China's Grassroots Democracy." *The Economist*. November 2, 1996, pp. 27-28.

<sup>807</sup> This can be a similar way to Japanese democratic development. Japan's economic development produced strong citizen pressures on local authorities as powerful institutional actors to guarantee different societal interests and basic rights. These local authorities convey the pressures on the central authority, which brought out Japanese style of democracy. When considering this point, we should not disregard the fact that local village-level democratic development in China can have an impact on China's central government's policy-making process, which can contribute to democratic development. See Terry E. Macdougall (1989).

evolutionary process toward democracy rather than a radical revolutionary process toward democracy, because Chinese leaders fear instability and disorder in China, which might draw from the radical change toward political freedom,<sup>808</sup> and furthermore, tell the truth, because Chinese leaders are yet to figure out how to effectively implement democracy in the most populous state in the world, in the same way that they still have some difficulty in implementing human rights in China.<sup>809</sup> In short, Chinese leaders do not authentically reject the democratic movement in China, but instead, they have been very cautiously and slowly moving toward democracy on the precondition of China's stability and unity, along with economic development. Also, they realize that so many courageous Chinese – e.g. the Tiananmen Mothers, journalists, intellectuals, peasants, workers, students, internet activists, religious practitioners, lawyers, professors, artists and poets - continue to write, speak and organize mass demonstrations, to petition the government, and to appeal to international fora to promote human rights and democracy in China – e.g. China's Charter 08.<sup>810</sup> As for Chinese, all in all, as Cheng Li put it, political reform is not a choice but a necessity (Li, 2010:12). Nevertheless, Chinese leaders fear possible instability and disorder in China which can be derived from political reform, and so China is very cautiously and slowly moving toward democracy.

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<sup>808</sup> I had a good chance to talk with Xu Jian who is the deputy vice president at China Institute of International Studies(CIIS), at the Center for China-US Cooperation's Forth Annual International Symposium in Denver, from April, 28 to April, 29, 2006. He clearly mentions that it will take time to see China's mature democracy, even if China can hardly avoid the current big wave of democratic movement across international society. Chinese leaders are still struggling with how to implement democracy in China and with what the side-effect of political freedom is, which can be recognized as the fundamental obstacle against China's democratic development.

<sup>809</sup> Ibid

<sup>810</sup> See "Fifteen Years After Tiananmen: Is Democracy in China's Future?" *Hearing before the Congressional-Executive Commission on China*, One Hundred Eighth Congress, June 3, 2004. The website is available at: <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108hrg94258/html/CHRG-108hrg94258.htm>

#### 4. China's economy and its path toward democracy

China had been known as an agricultural society until 1978 when China started adopting a socialist market economic system. The Chinese economy had been literally isolated from the world economy, especially from the 1940s to 1970s, because the country had been able to feed itself without any massive external assistance. Nonetheless, China was still the most populous state in the world at that time.

However, at the Third Plenary Session of the 11<sup>th</sup> Central Committee of the CCP in December 1978, Deng Xiaoping emerged as a pre-eminent leader, persuading fellow leaders to adopt a fundamental change in direction for China's development – e.g. to radically transform the agricultural sector; to initiate market influences through the personal responsibility system; to open China's economy to the world; and to increase exports and foreign exchange earnings (Bottelier, 2007:239, Jacobson and Oksenberg, 1990:68). In other words, when he took power in China, Deng Xiaoping rejected Mao's insistence on class struggle and adopted a socialist market economy, in order to revive the ailing economy (Woodman, 1997: 253). Nonetheless, we can observe the fact that China's economic character has been steadily transformed into a capitalist market economy. To be precise, at the moment, a liberal market economy can be comprehended as a typical aspect of China's economic structure. Indeed, today, as for many scholars, CCP does not stand for the Communist Party of China, but for the 'Chinese Capitalist Party,' let alone that it does not have any ideas, or ideology.<sup>811</sup>

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<sup>811</sup> Minxin Pei is a director of Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies, Claremont McKenna College. He joined China 2025 Panel I: Challenges from Within: Emerging Domestic Challenges, at *Council on Foreign Relations*, on October 19, 2009. See Pei's remarks, available at the website: <http://www.cfr.org/china/china-2025-panel-challenges-within-emerging-domestic-challenges/p20663>

When considering China's liberal market economy, we can anticipate China's democratization as well. One of the essences of a market economic system is freedom of choice in the marketplace, which can be interpreted as 'individual freedom' in some sense (Nolan, 2004: 49). The economic freedom based on economic growth can lead to more political freedom in the end. In fact, we can say that economic freedom and political freedom are closely related to each other. Nolan points out the close relationship between economic freedom and political freedom. Nolan states:

Successful capitalist development has generally, after a certain point, witnessed mass demands, for democracy. Successful capitalist development brings an increased sense of individual self-worth, reinforced by a growing sense of membership of an interdependent national community, and by increasing levels of education and, eventually, leisure time in which the mass of the population is able to participate in democratic activities extending beyond the important right to choose periodically local or national rulers. Moreover, there is an international demonstration effect of political concepts spilling over from the advanced to the less developed economies (Nolan, 2004:49).

Also, Zheng states the close relationship between capitalism and democracy as well:

It is widely considered that capitalism and democracy are inseparable twins; that capitalism and economic wealth are conducive to the formation of a democratic government, and that democracy as a form of government is likely only in market or capitalist economies (Zheng, 1998:178).

The above conveys the clear message of the possibility that Chinese economic growth in a market economic system can bring out political freedom in the long run. When considering that economic growth in a market economic system initiates civil rights, political democracy, income growth, falls in infant mortality, and a rise in life expectancy (Nolan, 2004:109), we should not discount the possibility that democracy



can emerge in China as well. In China, to advocate capitalist economic activity requires 'social transformation' and 'sound political institutions,' that is, democratic institutions (Zheng, 2004: 57). In fact, China's case can demonstrate some connection between economic freedom and political freedom, since China's economic prosperity and widening process of marketization have continuously brought out the inexorable democratization of daily life, although China is still under the umbrella of one-party rule. Indeed, since Deng's adoption of a market economic system, China's excessive collectivism has been modified to take into account individual, local and immediate interests (He, 2000: 93). In particular, we can noticeably perceive the transformation of Chinese society, when recalling that in the past, Chinese society had been recognized as a mass society with an absence of individuality (He, 2000:93).

As an economic development policy, China initially chose four economic zones, like Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen as Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in 1979 to attract foreign investment and create windows on the outside world, and this program was expanded up to coastal zone developments by the late 1980s (Saich, 2001: 16, Bottelier, 2007:239). Such an economic development program has transformed China's economic appearance. For instance, as the first major zone, Shenzhen had transformed itself from a small sleepy village to Asia's newest metropolis with an urban centre full of towering skyscrapers rising from the former paddies, along with massive foreign investment of \$ 2.7 billion in 1999 (Saich, 2001:17). As a matter of fact, since Deng's economic reform, China had been recognized as the fastest growing economy in the world, in particular in the 1980s, and had attained one of the fastest growth rates of exports, with a real growth rate of around 12 percent per annum in the 1980s (Nolan, 2004:119). In 2005, China's economy grew an estimated 9.8 %, which is higher than the 9.5% growth seen in 2003

and 2004, while its GDP had reached 2.3 trillion US dollars.<sup>812</sup> Also, China's trade surplus with the United States is larger than Japan's (Nolan, 2004:152). In 2005, China's trade surplus from the US exceeded 200 billion dollars. Actually, in 2010, China started surpassing Japan to become the second-largest economy in the world. China's rapid rise is clearly challenging the predominant economic position of the OECD and the world hegemony of the United States (Nolan, 2004:144). China is highly expected to become more and more influential in the global economy. At this point, what is important is not simply the positive indicator for China's economic growth, but China's gradual change in its attitude in international society, along with China's possible, gradual transformation toward democracy. We can say that economic growth has ultimately modified China's hostility against norms of international society. In other words, as David Copeland points out, China's 'rapid economic growth' and its 'continuous economic stable and positive future,' can hardly bring about a revisionist position against international society, but instead they can make possible a status quo position in existing international society.<sup>813</sup> Due to this positive economic aspect, China has modified its language and behavior in international society, and furthermore China is highly anticipated to steadily adjust its behavior to the norms and values of international society, even such as human rights and democracy.

Also, as one result of China's dramatic economic growth on the basis of China's market economy, we can see China's integration into the international economy, which can encourage China's democratization. For instance, because of

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<sup>812</sup> See, for more detail, "China's economy soars 9.9 % in 2005, on track of balanced growth." *People's Daily*. January 26, 2006.

<sup>813</sup> See, for more information, Dale C. Copeland (1996).

the result of China's economic growth on the basis of China's market economy, China has been increasingly dependent on the foreign sources of raw materials and energy (Harvey, 2005:139). In 2003 China took 30 % of the world's coal production, 36 % of the world's steel and 55 % of the world's cement (Harvey, 2005:139). Also, it went from relative self-sufficiency in 1990 to being the second largest importer of oil after the US in 2003 (Harvey, 2005:139). This kind of gradual integration with the international economy on the basis of its adoption of a market economy should be recognized as significant. Such integration could lead to a growth of China's massive economic interests and an alteration of its manner in international society as well, which can help it become a full member of international society in the long run. In fact, China has been well aware of how significant its integration with the international economy is on the basis of its economic open door policy, encouragement of external investment and internal capitalism. Due to this, in 2001, China became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which has been known as one of the international organizations for the promotion and consolidation of democracy in international society. At this point, China's socialization on the basis of international economic integration in international society can gradually make China comply with common rules and norms of international society. On the whole, as Larry Diamond suggests, China's active economic engagement with the members of international society along with its rapid economic growth based on its market economy has greatly contributed to China's path toward democracy.

Another result of economic growth based on China's market economy is that Chinese citizens have been given more chances to be directly exposed to the world, enjoying economic freedom in various ways such as studying abroad and tourism. Nonetheless, only after 1978 when Deng Xiaoping began the educational open-door

policy, did a large number of Chinese students and scholars started travelling abroad to pursue academic studies (Li, 2008:74). For instance, more than 25,000 Chinese students leave the country annually to study abroad, and the total number of students has so far reached about 380,000 across around 103 countries, but especially in the US, the UK, Australia, Canada and Japan, and in point of fact, Chinese students have become the largest group of foreign students in the US and Japan.<sup>814</sup> In 2010, 56 million Chinese traveled abroad, around six times larger than 8.5 million in 1998.<sup>815</sup> This exposure to the world, particularly Western democratic countries, can help Chinese citizens, especially fifth generation leaders, understand political freedom, democracy, which indicates a positive sign for China's future democracy. Also, along with economic growth, an increasing number of Chinese have become internet users. As Ole Schell put it, "the more money Chinese got, the more things they would want to get and the more traveling they would want to do, the more they would turn to the internet."<sup>816</sup> In fact, in 2011, China has around 505 million internet users.<sup>817</sup> Importantly, as a new trend, thank to this, public sentiment can be spread and heightened through the internet that is less effectively subject to surveillance by the state (Feng, 2006:89). At times of crisis, thus, public opinion can even shape the political environment constraining the leadership's capacity to maneuver (Feng, 2006:89). Indeed, internet activists contend that "Beijing cannot win the fight

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<sup>814</sup> See "Culture & Science: China has Most Students Studying Abroad." February 5, 2002. The website available at <http://www.china.org.cn/english/26487.htm>

<sup>815</sup> See "China Travel Trends.com: 57 million Chinese tourists set to visit abroad in 2011." The website available at <http://www.chinatraveltrends.com/2011/01/57-million-chinese-tourists-set-to-visit-abroad-in-2011/>

<sup>816</sup> Ole Schell joined China 2025: Panel I: Challenges from Within: Emerging Domestic Challenges, at *Council on Foreign Relations*, October 19, 2009. See Ole Schell's remark, available at the website: <http://www.cfr.org/china/china-2025-panel-challenges-within-emerging-domestic-challenges/p20663>

<sup>817</sup> See "China's internet users breach half billion mark." *Reuters*. January 11, 2012.

between online activism and censorship.”<sup>818</sup> Moreover, some Chinese intellectuals even said “the internet has great potential to advance basic human rights and freedom for Chinese people.”<sup>819</sup> All of these imply Chinese direct exposure to each other and international society, and indicate the Chinese authoritarian government’s inability to control information flow as well as citizen’s lives. When considering the above, we can see that China cannot elude engagement in international society, which has increasingly stimulated China to accept norms and values of international society – e.g. human rights and democracy. All in all, China’s economic growth based on its market economy has ultimately pushed China toward democracy, though the process has been sluggish.

#### **5. China’s military power and its path toward democracy**

Realists, neo-conservativists, and some English School scholars such as Hedley Bull, intensely emphasize the role of material capability in international society. We can easily well perceive how significant the role of material capability is in international society. China cannot be exceptional in terms of the importance of material capability, which can determine the way that China complies with the norms and values of international society.

When considering China’s military power, it is apparently strong enough to defend itself from any Great Power’s use of force. Unlike Iraq, China is not weak enough for Great Powers to use their military forces in order to impose democracy on China’s soil.<sup>820</sup> Thus, the alternative way to the use of military force, that is, interests

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<sup>818</sup> See Kathrin Hile (2009).

<sup>819</sup> Ibid.

<sup>820</sup> Also, China is not an outlaw state, and it has a veto power in Security Council, which makes it hard for Great Powers to use their force in order to impose democracy on China.

on the basis of rational calculation and interest-oriented socialization should be adopted as the best option to promote democracy in China. Let us examine China's military power. China is the third largest nuclear power. Indeed, China is the only state in the world, whose nuclear missiles are aimed at the US, and further as military purpose, even its aerospace program is aimed against the US (Segal, 2004:15). It also has a 2.3 million-strong military, which is the world's largest standing force.<sup>821</sup> In January, 2007, China's successful test of anti-satellite weapons was a pretty disturbing development in China's military modernization, let alone its lack of transparency on the pace, scope and direction of China's military modernization.<sup>822</sup> China's military budget is currently the highest in Asia and its military expenditure is the world's second largest.<sup>823</sup> For instance, According to the US Secretary of Defense's 2008 report to Congress on PRC military power, "China's total defense related expenditure for 2007 could be \$97-137 billion."<sup>824</sup> On the whole, the above evidently shows that unlike Iraq, we cannot expect Great Powers' use of force to change China, like China's democratic development.

However, China's military power does not pose a global threat. China is not a concern as a global military power, although it can clearly be a major player at the regional level. China accounts for only 4.5 % of global defense spending and does not have any military projection capacity on the global level, even if China has one aircraft carrier, whereas the US makes up 33.9 % of global spending and has eleven

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<sup>821</sup> See David Lague (2008).

<sup>822</sup> See Thomas J. Christensen (2007).

<sup>823</sup> See Richard A. Bitzinger (2012).

<sup>824</sup> See Thomas Lum, Christopher M. Blanchard, Nicolas Cook, Kerry Dumbaugh, Susan B. Epstein, Shirley A. Kan, Michael F. Martin, Wayne M. Morrison, Dick K. Nanto, Jim Nichol, Jeremy M. Sharp, Mark P. Sullivan, Bruce Vaughn and Thomas Coipuram (2008:36).

aircraft carriers (Segal, 2004:14). And, China's weapons system still remains obsolete and limited, along with its poor power projection capability, although China has modernized its military capability (Li, 2004:35). When considering these, we can conclude that China is strong enough to defend itself from any external invasion of Great Powers, but is not strong enough to challenge or alter the existing international order which Great Powers have kept for their self-interest and for common interests of international society. Nonetheless, today, there are only few reasons for China to radically alter the characteristics of international society, and China has even been very sensitive to regional and international stability, which are vital to its enormous interests, in particular economic interests. Overall, China's democratization cannot be materialized by the use of force by Great Powers, but it can be materialized in an alternative way such as interests based on rational calculation and interest-oriented socialization.

## **6. China's foreign policy and its path toward democracy**

China's foreign policy has been influenced by China's 150 year history of shame and humiliation at the hand of foreigners after China's defeat in the Opium Wars. Because of this, anti-imperialism and anti-hegemony have been often found in China's foreign policy – e.g. the 1999 Sino-Russian summit in a joint communiqué for criticizing the US hegemony (Zhao, 2004: 264). Indeed, Chinese claim that China has advocated a world free of aggression and exploitation of capitalism, imperialism and colonialism, due to its post-Opium War humiliating experiences (Xinbo, 2004:61).

When looking into China's foreign policy, we can also notice that there are historic evolutionary steps in China's foreign policy. For instance, as Zhao put it, China had adopted a revisionist attitude until the early 1970s – e.g. Mao's China

fought against the United Nations forces during the Korean War, - but since the late 1970s, China's primary goal has been to sustain a peaceful and stable international environment for its economic interests, and its foreign policy has been practical rather than ideological – e.g. the 1979 diplomatic recognition between China and the US (Zhao, 2004: 258). In particular, in the post-Cold War era and the 21<sup>st</sup> century, China has gradually adopted the partnership as primary, with its emphasis on equality, friendly cooperation and lack of confrontation (Cheng and Wankun, 2004:180). Thus, when looking into the direction of evolution in China's foreign policy, it has been gradually cooperative, peaceful and constructive rather than revisionist, violent and destructive to international society. Such evolution of China's foreign policy toward the cooperative, peaceful and constructive direction can be interpreted as China's gradual tendency of pragmatism. Wu Xinbo claims that Chinese foreign policy is fundamentally based on the combination of principle and pragmatism. At this point, pragmatism can be understood as flexibility to maximize China's national interests. As an example of pragmatic foreign policy, we can think of China's open-door policy in 1979 and the cooperative tendency of foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. Also, when considering China's pragmatic foreign policy, as Avery Goldstein put it, we can even say that at present, China can be paralleled with Germany in the era of Otto Von Bismarck, which was a geopolitically crucial rising power, with a foreign policy of strategic flexibility (Goldstein, 2003:61).

Actually, in the current international society, China can get more benefits via the bandwagon than via the balance of power against the US global hyper-power. Thus, currently, in its building constructive partnership with the US, China repeatedly claims that it is not a potential adversary of the US, but instead, it wants to become a trustworthy partner for cooperation (Cheng and Wankun, 2004:180). Also, China



has cultivated its close economic and diplomatic relationship with Japan and South Korea, which seems to be in continuous blossom. In fact, today, China focuses more on its relationship with East Asian and OECD states than on its relationship with the third world, which can be China's big distinguishing posture from its attitude during the Cold War period (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 167). In addition, China has been actively engaged in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on the basis of mutual trust as well as partnership of cooperation. In July 2000, then Chinese Vice President Hu Jintao repeatedly assured ASEAN countries that the PRC government would adhere to its policy to sustain good neighborly and friendly relations with countries in the region, while affirming that China's development can't be achieved in isolation of Asia, and that Asia's prosperity cannot be achieved without China (Leong, 2004:298). Furthermore, as a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), in some sense, China has attempted to promote an inclusive type of cooperative security arrangement in the region with other member states (Leong, 2004:299). These examples imply that China has a great desire to establish and maintain friendly and cooperative relations with its neighboring countries and further all Asian countries. Nevertheless, besides the Taiwan issue, there are several major territorial issues, especially in the South China Sea, like the Paracel and Spratly island groups, which could be recognized as a big obstacle to China's friendly neighboring foreign policy. For instance, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia and the Philippines have claimed the oil and gas rich areas like the Paracel and Spratly island groups (Leong, 2004:300). However, we should not forget the fact that China's foreign policy has gradually evolved in a more cooperative and peaceful direction. This character of foreign policy indicates that China will gradually become a full member of international society, and will become one of the Great Powers that feel a

strong responsibility for the welfare of international society as well as the maintenance of international society. China is no longer a revisionist state which could be seen in the Mao's era, but it is a potential Great Power. Thus, we can ultimately say that that China can be highly expected to accept the norms and values of international society such as human rights and democracy in the end.

**B. South Korea's internal variables and its path toward democracy**

**1. South Korea's history and its path toward democracy.**

In this section, I will demonstrate how historical factors have had an impact on South Korea's democratic promotion and consolidation. Looking into the history of Korea, in particular, its traditional strategic position, such as a focal point for the conflicting interests of major powers, we can notice that the fate of Korea has been in a large part, determined by major powers, and also that, in turn, Korea has had the traditional policy of *sadae chuui* or reliance on big powers. For instance, from the late second century B.C. to the Sino-Japanese war (1894-95), Korea had been in one way or another, a satellite of China (Fisher, 1954:284, Kim, 1992a:53). And following the period of Chinese dominance, Japan started dominating Korea after Japan's victory in both the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05). Japan eventually annexed Korea as a subject territory in 1910 (Kim, 1992a:53). However, the victory of the Allied Powers in 1945 ended Japanese colonial rule, and the Japanese were expelled from Korea at the end of World War II (Kim, 1992a:53). The Soviet Union was responsible for receiving the Japanese surrender in the north of Korea, while the US undertook the corresponding task in the south (Fisher, 1954:291). Thus, South Korea came to belong to the US bloc that was capitalist and democratic, whereas North Korea came to belong to the Soviet bloc that was socialist and communist.

As we can see above, now that Korea has been historically subjected to strong external pressures, its freedom to make decisions concerning her own fate had been drastically limited (Chung, 1958:189). But, in fact, because South Korea had historically been heavily influenced by large regional hegemons, it has developed the ability to adjust itself to a world that such hegemonic powers created and maintained, such as its traditional policy of *sadae chuui*.<sup>825</sup> This might have helped South Korea gradually adopt human rights and democracy. At this juncture, we cannot say that all of the external pressures from major powers are bad, in particular when considering that external pressures from the U.S. have contributed to South Korea's promotion and consolidation of democracy.

Let us take a look at the role of the US in South Korea, which is almost parallel with the role of China before the Sino-Japanese war (1894-95), although unlike China, the US has never sought its domination over South Korea nor has the US ever requested any type of tributary relationship from South Korea. When considering the role of the US in South Korea, most importantly, we can think that the US contribution to South Korea's democracy is obviously undeniable. Indeed, since 1945, the US has had a great impact on South Korea in various issues, in particular urging South Korea to adopt a market economy, human rights and democracy, since the basic objective of the US policy with respect to South Korea was to create conditions under which political and economic democracy could flourish (Oh, 1969:164). For instance, the US Army Military Government in South Korea made an effort to teach Koreans the principles of democratic government (Fisher, 1946:268).

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<sup>825</sup> See "Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans, and the Making of a Democracy." *Wilson Center*. December 4, 2007. The website is available at: <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/nation-building-south-korea-koreans-americans-and-the-making-democracy>

Also, the US greatly contributed to ending President Syngman Rhee's dictatorship in 1960 – e.g. the US tactical control of the Korean army in order to hinder the Korean army from using live ammunition against civilian demonstrations (Kim, 1992a:45, Oh, 1969:168-169). And, when Park Jung Hee and his military junta controlled South Korea after toppling the civilian government in a coup, the US flatly turned down the military junta's request for \$25 million in economic aid, in order to underscore its determination to bring a constitutional government to South Korea (Oh, 1969:175). These examples indicate how the US led South Korea toward democracy in various ways. Nonetheless, it is important to mention that the US did not interfere frequently or tyrannically in the domestic affairs of South Korea, and also that South Koreans have not always slavishly followed the advice or bent to the pressures of the US (Oh, 1969:177). However, it must be admitted that South Korea's domestic and foreign policy have been influenced by US foreign policy.

In the ROK-US relationships, as implied above, I cannot say enough how vital the US has been to South Korea. For instance, in his early political career, former South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun had been widely acknowledged as anti-American, in particular when considering his opposition to US military presence in South Korea and his demand of revisions to the SOFA agreement (Lee, 2007a:485). Later, however, even Roh officially objected to a precipitous transformation or reduction of the US troops in South Korea (Lee, 2007a:485). In addition, during the May 2003 summit meeting with US President Bush, Roh expressed his friendly feelings toward the US and accepted Bush's critical viewpoints on North Korea, while sharing the common values such as human rights and democracy in international society (Lee, 2007a:485). Moreover, Roh appointed moderate experts and seasoned bureaucrats to key government positions that had regular interactions with

Washington (Lee, 2007a:485). All in all, this change in attitude indicates Roh's gradual realization of the importance of the US as a strong and vital ally to South Korea, though this might be, in some sense, derived from the legacy of Korea's *sadae chui*, especially when considering that South Korea would be undeniably vulnerable to North Korean nuclear blackmail, unless the ROK-US alliance remains strong (Lee, 2007a:486). This also explains the reason why 69 percent of the public in South Korea has hoped to strengthen the ROK-US alliance, and a majority of South Koreans have advocated a US military presence and opposed any abrupt withdrawal of US troops (Lee, 2007a:487). In fact, South Korea's intention to maintain its strong alliance with the US can be well noticed in South Korean government statements which urge its continuous strong alliance with the U.S. even after Korean Unification and the end of the North Korean threat (Cha, 2000a: 273). Currently, South Korean President Lee Myung Bak attempts to make the ROK-US alliance stronger than ever, on the basis of common values like human rights and democracy. This ultimately indicates that under the strong alliance between the ROK and the US, we can expect more easily a solidarist international society in which the US and South Korea have the shared common values of human rights and democracy.<sup>826</sup>

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## **2. South Korea's culture and its path toward democracy**

In the past, South Korea's culture could be branded primarily as Confucianism, Buddhism, and Shamanism. However, recently, Christianity has been increasingly adopted and has become steadily one of South Korea's dominant religions – i.e. 26% of South Korea's whole population, over 160 Protestant denominations, around

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<sup>826</sup> I explained more on the relationship between the ROK and the US, when I touched on Chapter IV (Great Powers).

60,000 churches, and 1,100 Catholic churches.<sup>827</sup> Indeed, South Korea started to be recognized as an emerging Christian state, even though in 1950, Christianity covered only one to three percent of the whole population (Huntington, 1996: 98). This has altered South Korea's cultural identity, which has greatly contributed to South Korea's democratic development.

However, we should keep in mind the fact that Christianity in South Korea has not overtaken the whole society, when considering Buddhist population (around 24 percent) and the unaffiliated population (around 48 percent). Indeed, in terms of Shamanism, there are around three million Koreans consulting modern-day shamans, and more than 600,000 fortune-tellers.<sup>828</sup> Regarding Confucianism, around 200,000 South Koreans identify Confucianism as their religion, along with some 200 Confucian shrines.<sup>829</sup> In terms of Buddhism in South Korea, there are more than 11,000 temples and over 26,000 monks, along with Buddhist-run media outlets like cable television, radio networks, and newspapers.<sup>830</sup> These diverse religions in South Korea reflect the co-existence of Christianity with other religions.

When considering the above religions and their relationship with democratic development in South Korea, we can manifestly observe that Christianity has been more compatible with democracy than Shamanism, Confucianism, or Buddhism. As a matter of fact, the close co-relationship between Western Christianity and democracy is very noticeable. In his work, "Democracy in America," Alexis De

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<sup>827</sup> See Kim Eungi, "Religion in Contemporary Korea: Change and Continuity." *Korea Focus*. The website is available at: [http://www.koreafocus.or.kr/design1/layout/content\\_print.asp?group\\_id=412](http://www.koreafocus.or.kr/design1/layout/content_print.asp?group_id=412)

<sup>828</sup> Ibid.

<sup>829</sup> Ibid.

<sup>830</sup> Ibid

Tocqueville was well aware of the significance of Catholicism for democratic development in America. Tocqueville states:

I think that the Catholic religion has erroneously been regarded as the natural enemy of democracy. Among the various sects of Christians, Catholicism seems to me, on the contrary, to be one of the most favorable to equality of condition among men. In the Catholic Church the religious community is composed of only two elements: the priest and the people. The priest alone rises above the rank of his flock, and all below him are equal (Tocqueville, 1945: 311).

Also, Huntington argues as well that we can't deny the fact that modern democracy has emerged and vigorously been developed in Christian states (Huntington 1991b). And, Huntington states "the expansion of Christianity encourages democratic development,"(1991b:73). Indeed, when looking into the relationship between Christianity and democracy in South Korea, we can easily notice that in South Korea, Christianity has greatly contributed to South Korea's democratic development. As civic institutions, both Catholic and Protestant Churches in South Korea have a history of criticizing authoritarian regimes, organizing anti-government societies, holding demonstrations and publishing critical statements (Kuo, 2006:7). In particular, Catholic leaders established themselves as fearless human rights advocates, standing up to the military regimes and distinguishing themselves not only as churchmen, but in the fields of politics (Clark, 2006:38). For instance, in early March 1986 Cardinal Su Hwan, Kim declared that "democratization is the best way to make peace with God" (Kim, 2007:56). Also, the National Catholic Priest's Corps for the Realization of Justice (NCPJR) contributed to the democratization of South Korea, in particular, with its demand for an investigation of the tragic death of a Seoul National University student, Pak Chong-chol when his torture during police

interrogation was revealed.<sup>831</sup> There are many other examples to demonstrate that Christianity has greatly contributed to South Korea's democratic development.

Taking a look at the relationship between other religions and democracy in South Korea, we can discern that Confucianism, Shamanism or Buddhism is less likely to advocate democracy than Christianity. Nonetheless, this does not necessarily mean that Confucianism, Shamanism or Buddhism is incompatible with democracy.<sup>832</sup> For instance, Korean Buddhists tend to be more conservative than Christians on all political issues ranging from the support for the ruling party to the evaluation of governmental reports and student movements for democracy.<sup>833</sup> However, this does not necessarily mean that Buddhism itself is a fundamental obstacle to democratic development in South Korea. For instance, a Buddhist kingdom, Bhutan had its first parliamentary election on March 24, 2008, which made Bhutan the world's newest democracy.<sup>834</sup> Also, in Myanmar/Burma, Buddhist monks fought against authoritarian dictatorship for democracy. More importantly, when considering the existence of Buddhist human rights activists, such as Jin-kwan who is a leader of the *Chogye* Buddhist order, Co-Chairman of the Buddhist Human Rights Committee and a regional Chairman of the National Alliance for Democracy and

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<sup>831</sup> Indeed, NCPCRJ revealed Chong-Chol Park, a Seoul National University student's death of torture during a police investigation, which Doo-Hwan Chun's regime had attempted to conceal. See, for more detail, Sun-hyuk Kim (2007: 57).

<sup>832</sup> I already touched on compatible relationship between Confucianism and democracy.

<sup>833</sup> Kim Eungi, "Religion in Contemporary Korea: Change and Continuity." *Korea Focus*. The website is available at: [http://www.koreafocus.or.kr/design1/layout/content\\_print.asp?group\\_id=412](http://www.koreafocus.or.kr/design1/layout/content_print.asp?group_id=412)

<sup>834</sup> On Dec. 18, 2005, King of Bhutan, Jigme Singye Wangchuck said that he would step down when the country holds its first national democratic elections in 2008. See, for more information, "Bhutan King announces abdication." *BBC News* on Dec. 18, 2005. On March 24, 2008, voters casted ballots to select a parliament and ended more than a century of absolute monarchy, which means that Bhutan is becoming the world's newest democracy. See "End in sight for monarchy of Bhutan," *International Herald Tribune*, March 25, 2008.



Unification of Korea (NADUK),<sup>835</sup> we cannot say that Buddhism is a fundamental obstacle to South Korea's democratic development, and we cannot completely deny some level of contribution of Buddhism to South Korea's democracy.

As for many people, Confucianism does not seem to support South Korea's democratic development. Instead, in terms of the relationship between Confucianism and South Korea's past authoritarian governments, someone might argue that Confucianism and authoritarianism are compatible, particularly when thinking of former President Park Jung Hee as Confucian. However, as mentioned earlier about the shared ground between Confucianism and democracy, in particular, liberal aspects of Confucianism, we cannot confirm that in South Korea, Confucianism itself has been a fundamental obstacle to South Korea's democratic development. Besides, we can notice that there is common ground between Confucianism and Christianity – e.g. objection against dishonesty, political corruption, moral depravity, the abuse of power by the elite and so on (Kim, 2000b:127). And, more interestingly, we should not forget the fusion of different religions, such as Confucian Christians' (Kim, 2000b:129). For instance, in South Korea, we can see that many people behave on the basis of Confucianism, like respect for elderly people, even though they are evangelical Christians, which can be marked as Confucian Christians, that is, fusion of different cultures. All of these can strengthen the comparability between Confucianism and democracy.

In general, when looking into the characteristic of Shamanism, we can see that Shamanism is less compatible with democracy than Christianity. But, this does

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<sup>835</sup> See "Arrest of Buddhist Human Rights Activist, Republic of Korea," *Amnesty International*, November 5, 1996.

not necessarily indicate that Shamanism poses an anti-democratic trend, especially when considering that Shamanism advocates political participation, with its rebuff to dictatorship (Kuo, 2006:12). Also, there are some shared grounds between Christianity and Shamanism in South Korea, like their emphasis on material blessings as well as physical health (Kim, 2000b:119-120). In particular, Shamanism's singular emphasis on material successes as the supreme goal of its belief can converge with certain aspects of capitalism such as the Protestant ethic or individualism.<sup>836</sup> When considering this, we cannot say at all that there is no compatibility between Shamanism and democracy. It also cannot be said that Shamanism is a fundamental obstacle to South Korea's democratic development. In summary, when considering that in South Korea, Christianity, Buddhism, Confucianism, and Shamanism co-exist, and that South Korea enjoys a mature democracy as a full member of international society, we can say that democracy does not recognize cultural boundaries, and also that the relatively different religions have their own different impacts on South Korea's path toward democracy.

### **3. South Korea's politics and its path toward democracy**

In this section, I will lay an emphasis on how civilians' suffering and fighting for democracy could ultimately formulate South Korea's full blossoming of liberal democracy. In other words, I will reveal that in South Korea, current political freedom, a mature liberal democracy could not be achieved without any civilian sacrifice and struggle.

In South Korea, under Park Jung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan's regimes, many young innocent lives were sacrificed for its democratic development – e.g. the

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<sup>836</sup> See Andrew Eungi Kim (2000a).

Kwangju massacre in 1980. Such sacrifice for democratic development in South Korea shows that South Korea's ultimate democratic achievement was more likely ignited by internal forces rather than external forces, and that it came from the bottom-up rather than the top-down. Nevertheless, except for a civilian uprising against Rhee's dictatorship in 1960, a democratic uprising had been rarely successful until the late 1980s.

However, civilian political protests against military regimes did not stop. And, each political protest against authoritarian regimes in South Korea has little by little pushed South Korea toward democratization. Specially, Chun's unilateral decision to refuse liberal reforms, such as a constitutional change that could make direct presidential election possible, brought out a series of massive demonstrations throughout May and June of 1987 (Kim, 1998:231). More precisely, in South Korea, then, diverse groups such as students, trade unions, opposition political parties and religious organizations were continuously mobilized into a militant pro-democracy alliance in their intense struggles against the authoritarian regime (Kim, 1997:1136), in pursuit of political goals which were primarily to investigate the Kwangju massacre, reform the authoritarian constitution, and bring down Chun Doo Hwan (Lee, 2000:188).

Eventually, the sky-rocketing numbers of political protests could have an impact on Chun Doo Hwan's perception and even the perception of the US government – unlike in 1980 when the US backed his military action, in 1987, the US became increasingly supportive of South Korea's democratization<sup>837</sup> -, which led to Chun Doo Hwan's surrender to the demands for democratization (Lee, 2000:194).

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<sup>837</sup> I touched on the US impact on South Korea's democratization in the earlier chapter (Great Powers).

On June 29, 1987, President Chun Doo Hwan, the leader of the ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP), issued an eight-point statement on democratic reform, accepting the opposition demands, which was the surrender of the ruling regime (Kim, 1997:1136). Students, intellectuals, religious leaders, and the middle class thought that the June 29th democratization package which included human rights, political freedom, and the electoral system, had substantially satisfied their major demands (Kim, 1997:1138). This was a turning point for South Korea to become a democratic country. Indeed, since the 1987 democratic transition in South Korea, protection of the rights to freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, other civil liberties and political freedom have considerably improved (Damron, 2004:8). In light of this democratic success, we can confirm that South Korea's democratization was not an elite protest-driven success, but a mass protest-driven success (Lee, 2000:195). Many civic organizations demonstrate this as well. In South Korea, there are many civic organizations that have steadily contributed to South Korea's mature democracy. For instance, we can think of the United People's Movement for Democracy and Unification (UMDU), the National Coalition for a Democratic Constitution (NCDC), the Coalition of the People's Movements for Democracy and Reunification (CPMDR), the Citizen's Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ or *Kyongsillyon*), the People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD or *Ch'amyoyondae*); Minbyun-Lawyers for a Democratic Society (Minbyun), the Association of Families of Political Prisoners (AFPP or *Min'gahyop*), Sarangbang Human Rights Group (Sarangbang) (Damron, 2004:9), the Korea Council of Professors for Democratization, the National Association for Democracy, Unification of Korea, and the Korea Confederation of Trade Unions. These kinds of civic groups have facilitated South Korea's promotion and consolidation of democracy.

At this juncture, we can confirm that South Korea's mature democracy cannot be materialized without its civilian contribution to democratic development. Also, this indicates how deeply South Koreans have been embedded in norms of human rights and democracy, and explains why and how South Korea came to belong to a solidarist international society rather than any other type of international society. It is another indication that South Korea's path toward democracy is different from Iraq's (the use of force) or China's (interest-oriented socialization).

#### **4. South Korea's economy and its path toward democracy**

South Korea's economy has, to a great extent, influenced its path toward democracy. In this section, I will examine how South Korea's economic growth can have an impact on its democratic development. South Korea had been an agrarian county and an underdeveloped state until the early 1960s. However, as South Korea's economic turning point, Park Chung-Hee's regime embarked on a series of five-year plans for economic development: the first five-year economic development plan (1962-66), the subsequent second (1967-71), third (1972-76), and fourth (1977-81).<sup>838</sup> These plans brought about successful outcomes, while providing the foundation for South Korea's rapid economic growth and industrialization – e.g. industrial production was steadily increased, for instance, from a mere 9 percent of the gross national product (GNP) in 1962, to 31 percent in 1985, whereas the share of agricultural production decreased from 43 percent to 15 percent (Koo, 1991:487).

When considering South Korea's economic development, we can say that South Korea's economic growth is dazzling. For instance, in 1950 Haiti was 36 percent richer than South Korea, but by 1998 South Korea was 16 times richer than

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<sup>838</sup>See "Economic Development." Available at the website: <http://countrystudies.us/south-korea/15.htm>

Haiti.<sup>839</sup> Indeed, currently, South Korea's economy is the 4th largest in Asia and the 12th largest in the world.<sup>840</sup> More importantly, the nation's GDP per capita has grown from only \$100 in 1963 to a record-breaking \$10,000 in 1995 in less than 40 years to a fully developed \$25,000 in 2007, which is called the 'Miracle on the Han River.'<sup>841</sup> According to the recent analysis report by Goldman Sachs in 2007, South Korea could become the world's 3<sup>rd</sup> richest country by 2025 with a GDP per capita of \$52,000, and 25 years later, may surpass all countries in the world except the U.S. to become the world's 2<sup>nd</sup> richest country, with a GDP per capita of \$81,000.<sup>842</sup> In fact, South Korea has been called one of the Four Asian Tigers and a newly industrialized country during its exponential growth periods in the late 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>843</sup> Furthermore, it has developed status since the 21<sup>st</sup> century and is currently defined as a High Income Nation according to the World Bank.<sup>844</sup>

From now on, let us take a look at how economic growth has had an impact on South Korea's promotion and consolidation of democracy. As mentioned earlier, we can see the positive relationship between economic growth and democracy. Looking into the impact of South Korea's economic growth, we should keep it in mind that South Korea's economic growth under its authoritarian rule had led to the formation of a self-conscious middle class whose demands became more political than socio-

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<sup>839</sup> See, for more information, Richard N. Cooper (2004:15).

<sup>840</sup> See "Economy of South Korea." *Wikipedia*. Available at the website: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy\\_of\\_South\\_Korea](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_South_Korea)

<sup>841</sup> Ibid

<sup>842</sup> Ibid

<sup>843</sup> Ibid

<sup>844</sup> Ibid

economic, which greatly contributed to South Korea's democratic development.<sup>845</sup> For instance, due to economic growth, between 1955 and 1985, the proportion of white-collar workers soared from 4.8 per cent to 17.1 percent (Koo, 1991:488-489). Also, in South Korea, the proportion of professional, managerial, and clerical workers (not including sales employees) increased from 6.7 percent to 16.6 percent during the two-decade period from 1963 to 1983 (Koo, 1991:485). And, industrial growth in South Korea also galvanized the small-business sector, bringing about a new breed of independent producers and small capitalists who could strengthen the middle class (Koo, 1991:490). This increasing portion of the middle class has tended to be engaged in political democratization, since the middle class could not be satisfied with economic prosperity alone anymore, and wanted political freedom (Kim, 1998:232). For instance, a Seoul National University survey in May 1987 revealed that 52.1% of the middle class preferred political freedom to economic development and that 85.7% of them wanted to protect human rights even at the cost of economic growth (Kim, 1998:232). All in all, we can see that the middle class derived from South Korea's economic growth has contributed to South Korea's democratic development.

As another outcome of economic development, we can notice that the standard of living and the education level in South Korea rose, which can contribute to South Korea's democratic development. Indeed, we can find the close positive relationship between economic growth, education, and democracy. Karen Pennar points this out, with Geri Smith, Rose Brady, Dave Lindorff and John Rossant, by saying:

As a small slice of the population in enriched, the rest of the

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<sup>845</sup> See Chung-in Moon, Youngjae Jin and Wook Kim. "Democracy Report for South Korea." The website is available at: [http://www.idea.int/publications/sod/upload/South\\_Korea.pdf](http://www.idea.int/publications/sod/upload/South_Korea.pdf) pp.16

citizens agitate for their fair shot at doing better, and such privilege is granted only in democracies. Then too, **rising incomes** at first go toward needed goods and investment, then later toward **higher education**. **A more educated population tends to demand political and civil rights, and so democratization begins** (Pennar, Smith, Brady, Lindorff, and Rossant, 1993:84).

South Korea shows the close positive relationship among economic growth, education and democracy. South Korea's Human Development Index (HDI) was rated at 'High' with 0.912 by the HDI in 2006, owning a 99% adult literacy rate.<sup>846</sup> This has contributed to South Korea's democratic development, and can explain how and why South Korea become a mature democratic regime, in particular when considering that mass illiteracy causes political docility.<sup>847</sup> At this point, we can confirm that the increased education based on the high level of wealth can be one of the essential factors for a basic requirement of democracy.<sup>848</sup>

As shown above, South Korea's economic growth has greatly contributed to South Korea's promotion and consolidation of democracy. However, we cannot say that there have been no problems with South Korea's economic structure. In other words, South Korea's economic structure was not a democratic economy until at least 1998 when it adjusted itself to an international standard just after experiencing a major financial crisis. South Korea's economic structure had been known as 'crony capitalism' and a clan-based economic system. 'Crony capitalism' can be defined as a certain type of capitalist economy in which business greatly relies on an extremely close relationships between businessman and the state institutions of politics and

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<sup>846</sup> See "Economy of South Korea." *Wikipedia*. Available at the website: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy\\_of\\_South\\_Korea](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_South_Korea)

<sup>847</sup> See John Kenneth Galbraith (1987).

<sup>848</sup> See, for more information, John Dewey (1916).



government, which can be somewhat distant from the free market, open competition, and economic liberalism, since it exhibits favoritism in the distribution of legal permits, government grants, special tax breaks and so forth.<sup>849</sup> For example, in crony capitalism, former President Park Chung Hee offered *Chaebols* state-sponsored loans and low interest rates, and in turn the *Chaebols* returned the favor with political funding, which can be called ‘a mutual hostage relationship’(Kang, 2002:9,121). However, though crony capitalism in South Korea was the primary source for South Korea’s rapid economic development that had pushed South Korea toward democracy, in 1997-1998, the economic structure of South Korea eventually revealed its vulnerability in international finance, while escalating the corruption and immorality – e.g. on January, 1997, Hanbo Steel company’s collapse of over \$1 billion, and government officials’ involvement in a \$6 billion bribe-for-loans scandal (Emery, 2001:6). Thus, since 1998, the South Korean economic structure has been gradually transformed into a decentralized democratic economic structure. Such an economic democracy eventually facilitates the full blossom of a mature democracy in South Korea, while reinforcing its consolidation of democracy.

##### **5. South Korea’s military power and its path toward democracy**

South Korea’s military power has been very significant to its security in order to maintain its sovereignty. However, we should recognize that military power is also important to its promotion and consolidation of democracy. The reason is the following: justice cannot be sustained long enough in the absence of order or security. In other words, the only guarantee of security in South Korea through its superiority in its military strength over the North’s military strength can make possible its

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<sup>849</sup> See “Crony Capitalism.” *Wikipedia*. Available at the website: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crony\\_capitalism](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crony_capitalism)

democratic promotion and consolidation. For example, the security guarantee for South Korea can even help ease the rigidity of the National Security Law which is often regarded as an obstacle to its democratic development.

During the Cold War era, North Korea's military strength posed a great threat to South Korea's security. In the early 1970s, North Korea was described as the most highly militarized society in the world (Eberstadt and Banister, 1991:1095). At the Fifth Party Congress in November 1970, Kim Il-Sung boasted that North Korea had finally completed war preparations (Choi, 1985:345). Moreover, two or three times, South Korea faced the uncertainty of security from the US – e.g. US President Richard Nixon's Guam doctrine on July 25, 1969,<sup>850</sup> the US withdrawal of 20,000 troops (the 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division) from South Korea in July of 1970, and the possibility of the withdrawal of the U.S. ground combat forces from South Korea by 1981 or 1982 as the Carter administration's initial plan in 1977 (Lee, 1981:859, Han, 1980:1078). In the above context concerning insecurity, South Korea had to put emphasis on stability over political freedom.

However, it was a matter of time for South Korea to catch up with the North's military strength, due to a South Korean population twice as large as the North's, its fast growing economy which allowed it to invest much in its weapon systems (Lee,1981:859) and North Korea's economic difficulties since the 1990s, which constrained the North from continuously building up its military strength.<sup>851</sup> Indeed, the South's military expenditure began to surpass the North's in 1972, and the gap has

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<sup>850</sup> See Sung-Bin Ko (2006).

<sup>851</sup> See Jinpyo Yoon, "A Study on the Armed Forces and Military Strategy for a Unified Korea." *세계지역연구논총*. Vol. 23, No. 2. The website is available at: <http://web.sungshin.ac.kr/~jpyoon/data/pub-k-6.pdf>

widened ever since, resulting in a cumulative difference of \$38.7 billion by 1990 (Suh, 2004:67). In 1991 Seoul spent \$7.8 billion on its military, more than three times Pyongyang's \$2 billion (Suh, 2004:67). Ten years later, Seoul's defense budget had grown to \$10 billion, almost eight times as much as Pyongyang's which shrank to \$1.3 billion (Suh, 2004:67). Eventually, in the last two decades, the military balance between the South and the North has gradually been reversed.<sup>852</sup> When considering, in particular the quality of the North's forces, the North's military strength has trailed behind the South's military might, which means that the North's military does not appear as menacing as it was in the past (Suh,2004:63). Even without U.S. military support, the South can stop and defeat a possible blitzkrieg attempt from the North (Suh, 2004:63-65).

Besides the fact that the South alone has enough military strength to deter the North's attack, if we add in the U.S. military capabilities in the Korean Peninsula (around 28,500 personnel) and the vicinity (48,000 personnel) including the Seven Fleet, we realize why "there has been no war since 1953: deterrence has been clear and unambiguous" (Suh, 2004:66).<sup>853</sup> The military superiority of the combined South Korean and US forces over the North Korean forces can make stability possible in the Korean Peninsula, Northeast Asia, and further international society as a whole, which can provide the foundation for democratic development in the Korean Peninsula, Northeast Asia, and further international society. All in all, when considering South Korea's military strength, we can be sure of the fact that South Korea's consolidation of democracy has been steadily guaranteed

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<sup>852</sup> See, for more information, William Gleysteen (2008).

<sup>853</sup> Also see David.C. Kang (2003: 304).

## **6. South Korea's foreign policy and its path toward democracy**

In a broad sense, South Korea's foreign policy has been based on several goals: security, economic development, legitimacy, stability, human rights and democracy, even though human rights and democracy emerge as South Korea's goals of foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. However, in general, national security has been a primary goal of South Korea's foreign policy. In the Cold War era, for national security, South Korea's foreign policy had a strong anti-communist posture – e.g. in the 1950s and the 1960s, the relations between South Korea and any communist country were rare (Koo, 1980:1154). There had been several reasons for South Korea's anti-communist sentiment: the bitter experience from the Korean War, a continuous hostile and confrontational relationship between the South and the North, the US global strategy of containing communism - the US influence on South Korea's foreign policy - and South Korea's deployment of 320,000 troops to South Vietnam during the Vietnam War -South Korea could be a target for communist attacks (Ahn 1980: 1099-1100).

However, under its foreign policy soaked in anti-communism, South Korea could hardly push itself toward human rights and political freedom. Indeed, anti-communism was often used as a tool to justify authoritarian rule at the expense of democratic values, such as the suppression of political opposition and the curtailment of civil liberties in South Korea under Rhee Syngman, Park Jung Hee – Yushin Constitution - and Chun Doo Hwan's regimes – the Kwangju massacre.<sup>854</sup> Also, during the Cold War era, democracy activists or people calling for better relations

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<sup>854</sup> See Chien-peng Chung (2003).

with the North had been easily labeled as pro-communist.<sup>855</sup> Under these circumstances, it was very hard to promote and consolidate democracy in South Korea.

For legitimacy as a goal of foreign policy, during the Cold War era, the South had competed with the North, claiming its exclusive legitimacy to represent the Korean nation and making its efforts to obtain exclusive recognition from the international community (Choo, 2006:4). Indeed, during the Cold War era, like North Korea, the South made normalization pacts that recognized the South as the only legitimate government, which is a Korean version of the *Hallstein* doctrine. Under this kind of struggle for exclusive legitimacy, South Korea could not at the time be expected to have any space to promote or consolidate democracy within its borders or beyond them.

However, even during the Cold War era, we occasionally could observe some change in international society such as the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations and the advent of détente – Richard Nixon’s trip to Beijing in February 1972. As a result, South Korea slowly reduced direct hostility and tension with communist countries. For instance, even Park Jung Hee briefly launched his campaign for peaceful coexistence between the South and the North with his speech on “A Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification” on June 23, 1973 (Kamiya, 1980:753) whose aims were to open diplomatic relations with any country regardless of political or social orientations, and to join international organizations with North Korea (Hong, 2005:2). This indicated that South Korea dropped its version of the *Hallstein* doctrine. Nonetheless, this was not enough to lessen the Cold War mentality in South Korea.

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<sup>855</sup> Ibid

However, on July 7, 1988 President Roh Tae Woo made an announcement of a *Nordpolitik*, or Northern Policy toward communist countries, which was a Korean version *Ostpolitik* that could weaken a strong Cold War ideology in South Koreans' mind (Hong, 2005:3). It was to approve external ties between South Korea's allies and North Korea; to abandon South-North diplomatic competition; and to support cross-recognition (Hong, 2005:4). Under the *Nordpolitik* policy, thus, South Korea established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1990 and with China in 1992 (Hong, 2005:4). Indeed, owing to *Nordpolitik*/ Northern policy, by the beginning of 1990, South Korea had ultimately established diplomatic relations with 133 countries and had 138 diplomatic missions, including representative offices and a consulate department in Moscow - today, South Korea maintains diplomatic relations with more than 170 countries, which has fortified South Korea's international legitimacy.<sup>856</sup> Meanwhile, North Korea only had diplomatic relations with 102 countries and 85 overseas missions.<sup>857</sup> All in all, we can see that South Korea became more engaged and more secure in international society, enjoying international legitimacy.

At this point, I have to say that South Korea's foreign policy, *Nordpolitik* strengthened the democratic environment in South Korea, at least, via the gradual dissipating of the Cold War mentality – *Nordpolitik* even made it possible for civilians to visit North Korea, such as a visit by the late South Korean business tycoon Chung

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<sup>856</sup> See "South Korea: Foreign Relations." *Infoplease*. The website is available at: <http://www.infoplease.com/country/profiles/south-korea.html>. Also see "Foreign Policy- Basic Goals and Accomplishment." *Country Studies*. Available at the website: <http://www.country-studies.com/south-korea/foreign-policy---basi>

<sup>857</sup> See "Foreign Policy- Basic Goals and Accomplishment." *Country Studies*. Available at the website: <http://www.country-studies.com/south-korea/foreign-policy---basi>

Ju-yung.<sup>858</sup> In other words, under the above foreign policy, like *Nordpolitik*, anti-communist authoritarianism gradually faded away, which overtime moved South Korea toward the values of human rights and democracy.

In the Post-Cold War era, we can rarely find anti-communist sentiment in South Korea's foreign policy. We can confirm this in Kim Dae Jung's 'Sunshine' policy and Roh Moo Hyun's 'Peace and Prosperity' policy, which greatly reduced the Cold War mentality in many South Koreans' minds, which led to more democratic environment in South Korea. The 'Sunshine' policy greatly deconstructed South Koreans' image of North Korea as a monstrous enemy through North Korea's engagement in dialogue and exchange, and through South Korea's patience and its accommodating stance toward North Korea.<sup>859</sup> In terms of inter-Korean relations, the 'Sunshine' policy resulted in the Kaesong Industrial Complex, tourism to Mt. Geumgang, and a 2000 summit meeting between the two leaders, Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Il. Like the 'Sunshine' policy, the 'Peace and Prosperity' policy attempted to help alter the image of North Korea as an enemy into a partner on the basis of reconciliation and cooperation through various projects like a South-North cross-border railway connection, emphasizing peace and prosperity in the Korean Peninsula. Thus, the "Sunshine" policy and "Peace and Prosperity" policy ultimately reduced the tension and antagonism between the South and the North, while making a Cold War ideology dissipate in many South Koreans' minds. This ultimately facilitated a more open and more democratic environment within South Korean society so as to help South Korea's consolidation of democracy – e.g. lessening a rigid application of the

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<sup>858</sup> See Chien-peng Chung (2003).

<sup>859</sup> Ibid.

National Security Law. Nonetheless, the tension between the South and the North did not completely disappear, in particular when considering the North's nuclear program. The 'Sunshine' policy and the 'Peace and Prosperity' policy were not enough to rapidly alter North Korea's revisionist attitude against international society not to mention South Korea, in particular when considering the principle under the 'Sunshine' and under the 'Peace and Prosperity' policies that South Korea would not intervene in North Korea's domestic issues, in particular North Korea's severe violation of human rights.

Since 1987, South Korea has gradually emerged as a mature democratic state, not to mention its respect of human rights, and also since 1987, South Korea has gradually become an ardent supporter of human rights and democracy across international society. In other words, South Korea's foreign policy has been increasingly embedded in human rights and democracy as norms of international society. As its significant goal of foreign policy, in the post-Cold War era, South Korea has advocated human rights and democracy across international society. For instance, South Korea has advocated for positive change in developing countries, like its participation in bringing democracy to East Timor.<sup>860</sup> In fact, the Presidents of South Korea have greatly emphasized the promotion of human right and democracy in international society as foreign policy. For instance, Kim Dae Jung showed his interest in Myanmar, and his forum of democratic leaders made statements calling for the Myanmar authorities to stop the oppression of democratic forces, make a constructive dialogue with the National League for Democracy (NLD) and release all

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<sup>860</sup> See former US Ambassador to the Republic of Korea, Alexander Vershbow's speech on the U.S.-Korea Alliance: A History of Cooperation, at Korean Veterans Association Building, Seoul, on March 22, 2006. The website is available at: [http://kmaaa.or.kr/board\\_02/view.asp?bnum=182&page=13](http://kmaaa.or.kr/board_02/view.asp?bnum=182&page=13)



political prisoners, requesting the Myanmar authorities to respect the right to freedom of assembly, speech and political participation.<sup>861</sup> In addition, Kim Dae Jung founded the Kim Dae Jung Peace Foundation in 1994 to promote democratic change in Asia and world peace, not to mention Korean reunification.<sup>862</sup> Under the Roh Moo Hyun regime, South Korea's about 3,000 combat and non-combat troop deployment (Zaytun unit) in Northern Iraq might be for a strong ROK-US alliance, and also for some benefits from Iraqi reconstruction project and oil production. However, we should not forget the fact that more importantly, it has ultimately contributed to stability and democratization in Iraq and in the Middle East.<sup>863</sup> As a matter of fact, the promotion of human rights and democracy in international society as a goal of South Korea's foreign policy was confirmed by former President Roh Moo-hyun's meeting of the former US President George W. Bush on November 17, 2005.<sup>864</sup> In the meeting, the two leaders agreed that the alliance between the South and the U.S. should not only stand against threats, but also for the promotion of common values, such as human rights, democracy, and a market economy across international society.<sup>865</sup> Also, current President, Lee Myung Bak, emphasizes human rights and democracy as foreign policy. For instance, the Myung Bak (MB) doctrine -a guideline of foreign policy - puts weight on the values of democracy as foreign policy. At the meeting

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<sup>861</sup> See "Republic of Korea: Foreign Policy and Human Rights." *Amnesty International*. September 1, 1998. The website is available at: [http://asiapacific.amnesty.org/library/pdf/ASA250311998ENGLISH/\\$File/ASA2503198.pdf](http://asiapacific.amnesty.org/library/pdf/ASA250311998ENGLISH/$File/ASA2503198.pdf)

<sup>862</sup> See Chien-peng Chung (2003).

<sup>863</sup> See "South Korea's Democracy and Diplomacy." *The Brookings Institution: Center For Northeast Asian Policy Studies*. March 23, 2004.

<sup>864</sup> See "U.S.-South Korean Alliance Mutually Beneficial, Presidents Say." *International Information Programs:USINFO.STATE.GOV*. Available at the website: <http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive/2005/Nov/17-779005.html>

<sup>865</sup> Ibid

with the former US President George W. Bush in Camp David, Maryland on April 20, 2008, President Lee Myung Bak mentioned that under the strong alliance between the ROK and the US, South Korea would contribute more to US-led efforts to spread the market economy and democracy across international society.<sup>866</sup>

All in all, South Korea's foreign policy, in particular in the late Cold War era and in the Post-Cold War era, has had an impact on South Korea's promotion and consolidation of democracy, while facilitating a more open and democratic environment in South Korea. Moreover, in a broad sense, when considering that the ROK, the US and Japan's foreign policies share human rights, democracy and market economy as common values, we can not only expect a more solid democratic community, but also a more consolidated democracy in each country.

### **C. *Iraq's internal variables and its path toward democracy***

#### **1. Iraq's history and its path toward democracy**

Looking into Iraq's history, we can notice that Iraq endured a cycle of illiberal foreign occupation, rebellion, dictatorship, and violence, which was a primary barrier against Iraq's democratic development. However, we can also find some positive ingredients for its democracy, and so we cannot flatly say that in Iraq's history, there had been no single positive element for Iraqi democracy. Nonetheless, those ingredients were not enough to realize Iraq's democracy. In this section, I will detail Iraq's historical cycle of illiberal foreign occupation, rebellion, and dictatorship as a holdup to Iraqi democratic development, and I will demonstrate why the US-led coalition forces' invasion of Iraq and their presence in Iraq were necessary to alter Iraq's historical entrenched cycle of illiberal foreign occupation, rebellion/coups, violence and dictatorship into its new cycle of peace, prosperity and democracy.

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<sup>866</sup> See Sang-yeon Choi and Ha-won Jung (2008).

When looking into Iraq's history, we can easily find several foreign invasions and occupations, in particular, illiberal foreign invasions and occupations. For instance, the Arabs conquered Iraq in AD 637, and for a century, the Orthodox and the Umayyad caliph controlled Iraq as a province of the Islamic Empire.<sup>867</sup> But the Mongols invaded in the early 13<sup>th</sup> century, and in 1258, Genghis Khan's grandson Hulagu ransacked Baghdad.<sup>868</sup> Nonetheless, the Mongol's occupation of Iraq was replaced by Timur's conquest of Iraq in 1393.<sup>869</sup> In 1534, the Ottoman Turks conquered Baghdad, and, barring a short period of Persian control in the 17<sup>th</sup> century, Iraq was a province of the Ottoman Empire, as Iraq (Mesopotamia) falling to the Ottoman Turks made Iraq pass under direct Ottoman administration in the 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>870</sup> However, in October 1918, Britain was ultimately in *de facto* occupation of the whole of Iraq, and after the Turkish administrators' and the Turkish armies' retreat from Iraq, it began to construct a civil administration for Iraq (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1983:496). In the late 1920, the Treaty of Sevre established Iraq as a mandate of the League of Nations under British administration. Under Britain's tutelage on the basis of the mandate, in 1921, Iraq became a new state headed by Faisal I as an imported monarchy (Hashim, 2003:30-31),<sup>871</sup> and the British renamed

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<sup>867</sup> See "Iraq: History," *Encyclopedia of the Nations: Asia and Oceania: Iraq*. Available at the website: <http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Asia-and-Oceania/Iraq-History.html>

<sup>868</sup> Ibid

<sup>869</sup> Ibid

<sup>870</sup> Ibid. Also see "Early History through British Influence." *History*. Available at the website: <http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/world/A0858896.html>

<sup>871</sup> In 1921, in Cairo conference, Faisal who was a son of the Hashim family head, Sharif Hussein ibn Ali (the official leader of the revolt against the Turks), was nominated to the Iraqi throne, and on August 23, 1921, he became formally crowned. The fact that he could trace his descent from the family of the Prophet; his ancestors held political authority in Mecca and Medina since the tenth century; and he could claim the leadership of Arab emancipation movement thanks to his role in the 1916 revolt against the Turks, could make his post as a head of Iraq legitimate. See "Syria, Lebanon

the arena of Mesopotamia Iraq and recognized it as a kingdom in 1922.<sup>872</sup> All in all, Iraq got through various invasions and occupations in its history, which brought out Iraqis' xenophobia in some sense.

Indeed, such illiberal foreign occupations were not welcomed by Iraqis. For instance, many Iraqis wanted a free and independent Iraq that should be ruled by Iraqis, when Britain's occupation replaced the Ottoman Empire's occupation (Simon, 1974:314). Thus, Iraqis concentrated their efforts on anti-British propaganda, disruption of British communications, and provocation of the tribes of the Euphrates (Simon, 1974:314-315). In fact, in Iraq, the Sunnis (urban population) the Shias (peasants), and the Kurds demanded Iraqi independence, launching the revolt against British presence and rule, and the revolt ultimately came to take place across Iraq (Galvani, 1972:5).

Eventually, amid the fading of Britain's influence, on July 14, 1958, the Iraqi army led by Gen. Abdul Karim Qasim and Colonel Abd-al-Salam Arif, launched a successful military coup d'état, and decreed a republic on the basis of nationalist principles, abolishing the Iraqi monarchy with the killing of King Faisal, most of the royal family like Crown Prince of Abd al-Ilah, and Nuri al-Said who dominated Iraqi politics.<sup>873</sup> Qasim remained in power for four and a half years.<sup>874</sup> However, during

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and Iraq, to 1930." *Macro-history and World Report*. Available at the website: <http://www.fsmitha.com/h2/ch09me.htm>; "Arabic & Islamic Studies essay – Social and Political History of Iraq." *Sound Affects*. Available at the website: <http://soundaffects.wordpress.com/2008/05/20/arabic-islamic-studies-essay-social-and-political-history-of-iraq>; and "Early History through British Influence." *History*. Available at the website: <http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/world/A0858896.html>

<sup>872</sup> See "Iraq: History, Geography, Government and Culture," *infoplease*, available at the website: <http://print.infoplease.com/ipa/A0107644.html>

<sup>873</sup> See "Early History through British Influence." *History*. Available at the website: <http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/world/A0858896.html> Also see Charles R.H.Tripp, "The Middle East Online, Series 2: Iraq, 1914-1974." Available at the website: <http://www.galeuk.com/iraq/pdfs/Introductory%20Essay.pdf>

Qasim's rule from 1958 to 1963, the republican regime of Qasim purged some 2000 competent, but politically suspect officers from the 8,000 members in the armed forces (Hashim, 2003:34). As this kind of purge implies, the republican regime was not even close to a decent liberal democratic regime, but rather an authoritarian dictatorship.

However, we cannot deny the fact that during Qasim's rule, there were some ingredients for political liberalization in Iraq. For instance, in 1958, Qasim's regime permitted the relicensing of formerly prohibited political parties, and he even announced that free and fair elections would be held within a year, even if they never really happened (Anderson and Stansfield, 2004: 34). Also, according to the new 1958 constitution, Islam was declared the religion of the state, but religious freedom for non-Muslim was guaranteed under article 12 (Khadduri, 1969: 65). And article 9 provided for equality before the law, and it prohibited any discrimination due to race, nationality, language, religion, or belief (Khadduri, 1969: 65). Nevertheless, the 1958 constitution could not have a permanent constitutional framework (Khadduri, 1969:66). As another important example for Iraqis' attempt for democracy, in Iraq there were some moderate politicians like 'Chadirchi,' 'Hadid,' 'Abd al-Fattah Ibrahim' and 'Abd al-Rahman al-Bazzaz,' and some political parties like 'the National Democratic Party' and 'the National Progressive Party' that were in pursuit of democracy. Chadirchi's great desire for Iraq's democracy is worth reading. The leader of the National Democratic Party, Chadirchi said:

Now the question is no longer whether the National  
Democratic Party is represented or is not represented in the

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<sup>874</sup> See "Iraq: History," *Encyclopedia of the Nations: Asia and Oceania: Iraq.* Available at the website: <http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Asia-and-Oceania/Iraq-History.html>

Cabinet. The question is rather whether the party can act independently or not, and this is part of the struggle for democratic freedoms. This in turn requires that all members of the party should possess certain qualities the most important of which is the democratic spirit combined with the necessary moral courage to oppose any kind of violence from whatever source it ensures. They should be able to tolerate the opinion of others and feel free to discuss it. They should oppose tyranny and coercion, and recognize no other than the rule of law and accept no judgment save that based on justice....Thus, democratic freedoms would be enjoyed equally by all, regardless of their differing political views and methods (Khadduri, 1969:134).

Chardirchi also recognized well the significance of the role of political parties to sustain democratic form of government. He claimed that “political parties were absolutely essential in building up a democratic system, and that the trend toward a one party system was inconsistent with parliamentary democracy”(Khadduri, 1969: 228). All in all, we can see that during Qasim’s rule, some Iraqi people had great desire for liberal democracy as an ideal form of government, which indicates that democracy itself is not totally new to all Iraqis.<sup>875</sup>

However, in Iraq, the ingredients for democracy were not enough to bring out a fruitful outcome. For instance, though at the early stage, Qasim’s regime and moderate politicians were authentically interested in establishing a truly democratic system, Qasim himself gradually became a tyrant, while using his influence to constrain any political activity unfriendly to himself and his personal interests, and making several transfers of personnel whenever in conflict, in order to establish his firm control over the military hierarchy (Khadduri, 1969:72, 147). Also, political

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<sup>875</sup> In 2003, many scholars vigorously claimed that Iraq’s democracy would not work due to various reasons. One of reasons was that Iraqis did not have any single experience of democracy. Nonetheless, looking into its history, we can often find some ingredients for Iraq’s democracy. Fortunately, now, more scholars become optimistic in Iraqi success of democracy.

parties were increasingly crippled and even banned by authorities (Khadduri, 1969:147). Therefore, overall, during Qasim's rule, all attempts at democracy faded away.

On February 9, 1963, Qasim's dictatorship was put to its end, as Qasim was expelled via a nationalist coup by the Iraqi Arab Baath Party (Hashim, 2003:32). As a coup leader, Colonel. Abd al-Salam Aref executed Qasim, and all of Qasim's top aides.<sup>876</sup> Abd al-Salam Aref became the new president, and Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr became prime minister.<sup>877</sup> Like Qasim's regime, a pan-Arabist, Abd al-Salam Aref's regime transformed into a dictatorship.<sup>878</sup> But on April 13, 1966, President Abd al-Salam Aref was killed in a helicopter crash, and so Aref's brother, Gen. Abd al-Rahman Aref took office.<sup>879</sup>

During Aref's rule, there were also some ingredients for Iraq's democracy. For instance, there were many protests in the city streets, demanding free elections.<sup>880</sup> Also, Deputy Premier al-Bazzaz, under Aref's regime made a great effort to establish and cultivate norms of democracy in Iraqi soil a half century ago. For example, he strongly emphasized the rule of law and an end to the erratic behavior of military officers dominating Iraq's politics.<sup>881</sup> He made an effort to increasingly civilianize

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<sup>876</sup> See "Early History through British Influence." *History*. Available at the website: <http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/world/A0858896.html>

<sup>877</sup> See "Iraq." *Spartacus Educational*. Available at the website: <http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWIraq.htm>

<sup>878</sup> See Barry Rubin (2005).

<sup>879</sup> See "Early History through British Influence." *History*. Available at the website: <http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/world/A0858896.html>

<sup>880</sup> Ibid

<sup>881</sup> See "Abd al-Rahman al-Bazzaz" *Answers: Mideast and N.Africa Encyclopedia*. The website is available at: <http://www.answers.com/topic/abd-al-rahman-al-bazzaz>

Iraqi government and open Iraq's political system.<sup>882</sup> In 1966, the Iraqi people protested against Deputy Premier, Bazzaz's resignation, in Baghdad, since for many Iraqis he had been seen as a symbol of democracy (Khadduri, 1969:252-283). When considering all of these, we can be sure of the fact that, as noted previously, in Iraq's history, democracy is not completely new to Iraqi people. Nevertheless, Iraq's history demonstrates as well that Iraq did not have enough ingredients to achieve a decent, stable, and prosperous democracy, and had to constantly face the fatal failure of democracy to take root.<sup>883</sup>

On July 17, 1968, Abd al-Rahman Aref's regime was overthrown by a bloodless coup that was led by Maj. Gen. Ahmad Hussan al-Bakr as the head of the Ba'ath party, along with Arif's own assistants and members of the Ba'ath Party.<sup>884</sup> Ahmad Hussan al-Bakr became president, and appointed Saddam Hussein, his Tikriti cousin, as his vice president.<sup>885</sup> Just after he took the power, al-Bakr started a purge of opponents, and in 1969 more than 50 persons were executed after an espionage trial.<sup>886</sup> Also, the Ba'ath Party government ruthlessly suppressed any opposition.<sup>887</sup> Also, in July 1978, al-Bakr's regime passed a decree which made all non-Ba'thist

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<sup>882</sup> Ibid

<sup>883</sup> Though I will touch later, I want to say that now (in 2010) Iraq has enough ingredients for its democracy, when considering internal desire for democracy and external assistance for democracy in Iraq's soil – a majority of Iraqis' desire for a stable and prosperous democracy, no dictatorship, no longer Sunni's dominance, Great Powers' massive assistance for Iraq's democracy, no Ba'ath party, separation between military and politics, security and so on.

<sup>884</sup> See "Abdul Rahman Arif," *Wikipedia*, available at the website: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdul\\_Rahman\\_Arif](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdul_Rahman_Arif)

<sup>885</sup> See "General Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr." *Wikipedia*. Available at the website: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ahmed\\_Hassan\\_al-Bakr](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ahmed_Hassan_al-Bakr)

<sup>886</sup> See "Early History through British Influence." *History*. Available at the website: <http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/world/A0858896.html>

<sup>887</sup> See "Iraq." *Spartacus Educational*. Available at the website: <http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWIraq.htm>



political activity illegal and membership in any other political party punishable by death.<sup>888</sup> All in all, Al-Bakr's regime was no less than dictatorship itself, and it was also a prologue to the worst monstrous monolithic dictatorship in Iraq's history, 'the regime of Saddam Hussein.'

In 1976, Saddam took the title of general in the Ba'ath party's Popular Army, and he gradually became the de-facto leader of Iraq.<sup>889</sup> On July 16, 1979, the 65-year-old President al-Bakr resigned, and Saddam Hussein eventually became Iraq's President.<sup>890</sup> This means that the most dreadful dictatorship in Iraq's history started. Shortly after he became president, Saddam started executing top members of the Ba'ath party and others under various claims like espionage. Until it was toppled in 2003, Saddam's regime itself was nothing more than a monolithic monster which greatly threatened not only Iraqi people, but also the region (further even international society as a whole). Saddam's ruthless dictatorship does not need any further explanation now, even though I will touch on Saddam's brutal dictatorship in detail, when I deal with Iraq's politics.

All in all, when looking into Iraq's history, we can depict Iraq's history as a cycle of illiberal foreign occupation, dictatorships, revolts/coups and so on. Under this historical circumstance, we cannot expect Iraq to become a democratic country by itself. In fact, thanks to this historical trend, it has been widely accepted that 'Iraq has never experienced democracy' and it had been often said that 'Iraqi people do not

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<sup>888</sup> See "General Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr." *Wikipedia*. Available at the website: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ahmed\\_Hassan\\_al-Bakr](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ahmed_Hassan_al-Bakr)

<sup>889</sup> Ibid

<sup>890</sup> Ibid

know democracy at all.’ Nevertheless, while Iraq had had some ingredients for democracy, they had never been enough to reach a mature and prosperous democracy. Thus, when considering such a historical cycle, Iraq needed a shot in the arm in order to break its historical implacable circle and to kick off a new cycle heading toward a mature prosperous democracy. The US-led coalition forces’ invasion of Iraq in 2003 could be in part seen as a strong stimulus to mold a new cycle that could initiate Iraq’s distinguishing path toward a mature and prosperous democracy as a full member of international society. As a matter of fact, since Saddam’s regime was toppled, with its new constitution, a new Iraq has gradually grasped a new identity and character quite different from Saddam’s Iraq, while taking large strides on a new cycle based on cooperation, basic rights (civic and political rights), a multi-party system, rule of law, transparency and fair elections, which will eventually induce a mature, stable and prosperous democracy in Iraq. Thus, the US-led coalition forces’ invasion of Iraq in 2003 can be seen as the catalyst for Iraq to adopt democracy. Also, unlike its past, today’s Iraq seems to have enough ingredients for a stable, prosperous and mature democracy. This might be almost impossible, if the US-led coalition forces did not invade Saddam’s Iraq and did not topple Saddam’s regime.

## **2. Iraq’s culture and its path toward democracy**

Iraq is located in the Middle East, which has been well known as a bulwark against democracy and human rights.<sup>891</sup> Most governments in the Middle East such as Syria, let alone Saddam’s Iraq, have been recognized as authoritarian or dictatorships, along with their chronic violation of civil and human rights, the resistance of political liberalization and mere lip service to their respective

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<sup>891</sup> There are several reasons why the Middle East has been recognized as a bulwark against democracy and human rights. See, for example, Fred Halliday (2005:299).

constitutions (Kubba, 2003:28). Due to this, some scholars tend to identify Islamic culture as one of primary reasons for ‘the severe violation of human rights’ and ‘the lack of democracy’ in the Middle East, while also identifying it as the background cause of the turmoil in the Middle East (Fukuyama, 2004:94). However, in this section, I will investigate Islamic culture, and attempt to reveal the compatible relationship between Islamic culture and democracy, in order to demonstrate that Islamic culture is not a fundamental and determinant factor against Iraq’s democratic development.

In general, Islamic culture has been widely recognized as anti-western, anti-human rights or anti-democratic, while Western culture has been known for individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, and the separation of church and state (Huntington, 1993b: 40). This recognition might be derived from some Islamic characteristics. For instance, in Islamic culture, community has been given priority over the individual. Also, in Islamic culture, there is no separation between private life and public life, and between religion and society since the Islamic religion itself can be understood as the constitutional law of society in some sense. Because of this, Islamic culture can be interpreted as even a totalitarian tendency. Furthermore, some rules of Muslim law are controversial. For instance, the law of sharia has been known to discriminate against women, though Islamic fundamentalists strongly deny such allegations (Charfi, 2005:39). And, according to sharia, a man has the right to be married to four women at once, which went unchallenged for thirteen centuries, and during the first thirteen centuries of the Hegira, sharia law gave a man the right to buy as many slaves as his means permitted and to have sexual relations with all his female slaves (Charfi, 2005:41). In addition, Islamic culture might be compatible

with authoritarian dictatorship rather than democracy, when considering that unlike the Christian Church in the 1980s and 1990s in South Korea, Islamic mosques have never been vigorously in opposition to authoritarian regimes, let alone the success of Saddam Hussein's brutal dictatorship during over two decades. All in all, in considering all of the above points, Islamic culture might be perceived as incompatible with democracy, and so we might easily conclude that the promotion of democracy in the Middle East, particularly Iraq, would not be easy, especially if democracy is assumed to be a Western norm which cannot be harmoniously fused into Islamic culture. In short, Islamic culture might be a fundamental obstacle to the promotion and consolidation of democracy in the Middle East, in particular Iraq's democratic development.

However, we should recognize that the above explanation on the conflicting natures of different cultures, Western culture vs. Islamic culture, is too much exaggerated, and that democracy in Islamic culture can be materialized, especially when considering the Arab Spring in 2010 and 2011. Let us take a look at several sentences in the Holy Quran in order to find the close connection between Islamic culture and liberal democracy.

1. Freedom of choice. People are free to choose and without prejudice. We have shown him the right path, whether he be grateful or ungrateful. (Verse 3, Sura 76, Holy Quran). For man is a free being, accountable to Allah and society for his preferences. 2. Equality. All people are the creation of Allah and are equal, regardless of their inclinations, origins or the language they speak. Men, we have created you from a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes that you may get to know one another. The noblest of you in Allah's sight is the most righteous... (Verse 14, Sura 49, Holy Quran). 3. Justice. A basic principle put forward in Islam to counter oppression. Do not allow your hatred for other men to turn you away from justice. Deal justly; justice is nearer to true piety (Verse 8.

Sura, Holy Quran).<sup>892</sup>

1. The sovereignty of the umma. Islam considers the umma to be the rightful authority to determine its own methods of legislation and policy implementation. This “right” stem from: First, the principle of vicegerency granted to man by the Lord. Allah has made man responsible for the leadership and progress of the world in which he lives. On this basis is centered the theory of the “people rule.” When your lord said to the angels: I am placing on the earth one that shall be my deputy...(Verse 31, Sura, 2, Holy Quran). Second, the mutual consent principle (shura). Every individual enjoys the ability to join in political activities and contribute to the formation of a society on the basis of mutual consent (Verse 38, Sura 42, Holy Quran). Take counsel with them in the conduct of your affairs...(Verse 159, Sura 3, Holy Quran). And third, the right to differ. The right to differ in ideas, positions and method is acknowledged so that one does not deprive others of their convictions. Had your lord pleased, he would have made mankind a single nation. (Verse 118, Sura 11, Holy Quran). There was a time when men were one nation. They disagreed among themselves....(Verse 19, Sura 10, Holy Quran).<sup>893</sup>

The above values in Quran are obviously opposed to dictatorship and tyranny on the basis of a single party or a single family such as Saddam’s regime, while advocating pluralism, justice and individual rights (Uloom, 1994:28). Also, these values in the Quran demonstrate that Islamic culture cannot be a fundamental obstacle to the promotion and consolidation of liberal democracy in Iraq.

As a matter of fact, when focusing on Islamic common values such as ‘*adl*’ (Justice), ‘*Shura*,’ (Consultation), and ‘*al maslaha*’ (public interests) as the pillars of Islamic liberalism, we can notice that Islam is not incompatible with norms of democracy (Masmoudi, 2003:258-262, Barber, 1996:209). Indeed, we can recognize that Islamic values like *Shura*/Consultation and *adl*/Justice can be regarded as even

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<sup>892</sup> I quote this from Syed Mohammad Bahrul Uloom (1994:25).

<sup>893</sup> Ibid, pp.26.

core elements of liberal democracy. Also, according to some decent Islamic liberals, Islam, properly interpreted, gives equal rights to men and women, while attributing the limitation on gender equality to local culture rather than Muslim religion (Tessler, Moaddel, and Inglehart, 2006:44). Moreover, when considering that in Quran, there is no single verse that non-Muslims such as Christian and Jews should be fought against or be killed, and that in Iraqi society, Christians have even been able to adopt Western norms and customs, we can grasp some level of toleration and pluralism in Islamic culture, not to mention the fusion of different cultures (Sick 1994:32, Piscatori 2003:284).<sup>894</sup> In fact, Sultan Qabus of Oman claimed, in his interview with a Dutch paper, the following, which demonstrated close relationship between democracy and Islamic culture:

Islam, in essence, is democratic. We believe in equal chances. We believe that our leaders, spiritual as well as secular, have to prove themselves to God and to the people. We believe that civilians must be able to express their opinions freely. This is the spirit of Islam, in its purest form (Sick, 1994: 32).

Also, Anwar Ibrahim claims that crucial elements of constitutional democracy, such as freedom of consciousness, freedom of expression, and the sanctity of life and property are moral imperatives in Islam (Ibrahim, 2006:7). And, Muhammad Baqir as-Sadr emphasized the Islamic premise that “the human being is free and that no other human being or class or human group has dominion over him” which conspicuously reflects some level of democratic norm (Batatu, 1982:8). When considering the above, we cannot say that Islam itself is completely against the values and norms of democracy. Instead, Islam has many features that are compatible with

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<sup>894</sup> At this juncture, the concept of “fighting” does not include the concept of “killing.” “fight” can be understood as persuasion rather than be literally interpreted as physical fighting. We have to recognize that the meaning of “fight” can be interpreted as various ways. See Piscatori (2003:284).

modern democratic values, like unitarianism, toleration, individualism, egalitarianism, republicanism, and rule-based governance (Kuo, 2006:15-16). Also, many liberal Muslim intellectuals have attempted to ground democracy in the text of the Quran and the context of the practice of the Prophet and his Caliphs, or political progeny, and they have claimed that Islam might even be no less democratic than either Christianity or Judaism (Sadri, 1994: 122). And, surprisingly enough, a growing number of Arab scholars and intellectuals are speaking up very eloquently not only for human rights in general but also for the need for democracy as a basic condition of good governance.<sup>895</sup> All in all, we can see that Islamic culture is not incompatible with democracy, and we can certainly say that Islamic culture cannot be a fundamental obstacle to Iraq's democratic development.<sup>896</sup>

### **3. Iraq's politics and its path toward democracy**

In this section, I will attempt to reveal the fact that Sunni dominance, Saddam's dictatorship, Baath Party's role, and close relationship between military and politics had been primary political obstacles to Iraq's democratic development. In the process, I will emphasize the necessity of the external factor, the US led-coalition forces' invasion of Iraq to remove the primary obstacles, which can facilitate Iraq's democratic development. First of all, let us examine the Sunni dominance as Iraq's distinguishing political feature. Iraq is a diverse state rather than a homogeneous state, since Iraq has a population of 25 million people who are ethnically and religiously diverse – e.g. the Turkomans, the Assyrians, Armentians, Christians,

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<sup>895</sup> See Larry Diamond's remark on "Universal Democracy? Prospects for a World Transformed" at Carnegie Council on February 26, 2004. Available at the website: <http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/studio/transcripts/4398.html>

<sup>896</sup> See Iraq's Charter – Iraq's new constitutional draft- (Article 2). Available at the website: [http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/files/20704/11332732681iraqi\\_constitution\\_en.pdf/iraqi\\_constitution\\_en.pdf](http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/files/20704/11332732681iraqi_constitution_en.pdf/iraqi_constitution_en.pdf)

Yazidis, the Sunni Arabs, the Shia Arabs and the Kurds (Luizard and Stork, 1995:18). However, at this juncture, the problem is not diverse religious and ethnical population, but various hierarchical relationships ethnically and religiously, which can be recognized as an obstacle to Iraq's democratic development. For instance, we can think of a hierarchy of sectarian groups, that is Sunnis above Shia, even though about 17% of the Arab Iraqis are Sunni, and around 60% of the Arab Iraqis are Shia.<sup>897</sup> Such hierarchy was derived from Sunni continuous dominance and Shia's systemic exclusion under Ottoman rule, British rule, the monarchy's rule, and Saddam's rule. As the hierarchical relationship between Shia and Sunni, the division between a ruling Sunni minority and a deprived Shia majority can be seen as the key to understanding the political dynamics of Iraqi society (Stork, 1981:6). Nonetheless, this distinguishing aspect of Iraqi politics was one of the hindrances for Iraq's democratic development.

The Sunni Arabs made up the majority of the urban population (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1991:1413). And, schools and opportunities for non-religious education were located almost exclusively in large towns like Baghdad (Stork, 1981:6). Due to these factors, Sunnis got many opportunities to be educated, and they could be tracked into teaching, administrative and military careers as well as politically dominant positions (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1991:1413, Stork, 1981:6). By contrast, the Shia Arabs were poorly educated and they were mainly engaged in commerce or theology (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1991:1413, Stork, 1981:6). For instance, during the Ottomans' rule, Sunnis were predominantly chosen

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<sup>897</sup> See "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction," *The Assessment of the British Government*, available at the website:

[http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/1/shared/spl/hi/middle\\_east/02/uk\\_dossier\\_on\\_iraq/pdf/iraqdossier.pdf](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/1/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/02/uk_dossier_on_iraq/pdf/iraqdossier.pdf)



for positions of administration and governance.<sup>898</sup> Indeed, the Ottoman empire could be recognized even as a Sunni institution (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1991:1413). During British occupation, Sunnis dominated various significant administrative positions beyond social and intellectual positions, whereas, in contrast to Sunnis, Iraqi Shias were principally excluded from governmental positions, from the military to even government-sponsored education institutions. And, Iraqi King Faisal had to choose the experienced administrators, Sunnis, and in 1933, Faisal even openly admitted that “Iraq is a kingdom ruled by an Arab Sunni government”(Mallat, 1988:723).<sup>899</sup> Indeed, between 1921 and 1947, not one single Iraqi prime minister was a Shia (Chalabi, 1991:25). And, out of the total of the fifty-three members of the top command leading the Baath party from November 1963 to 1970, 84.9 percent were Sunni Arabs, 5.7 percent Shia Arabs, and 7.5 percent Kurds (Mallat, 1988:724). Moreover, in 1968, all the members of the highest political bodies, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) and the Regional Leadership (RL) came from the Sunni Arab triangle between Baghdad, Mosul, and the Syrian border (Baram, 1989:447). This trend did not radically change, and lasted until Saddam’s regime was toppled in 2003, when considering that Saddam himself was from a Sunni tribe and his government institutions were largely staffed by Sunnis (Anderson and Stansfield, 2004:147). The Iraqi exclusive hierarchical political structure needed a shot in the arm so as to ultimately achieve democracy. The US-led coalition forces’ invasion of Iraq in 2003 might be regarded as the catalyst to overhaul Iraq’s systemic repressive and aggressive regime on the basis of Sunni domination and systemic exclusion of the

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<sup>898</sup> See “Arabic & Islamic Studies essay – Social and Political History of Iraq,” *Sound Affects*, available at the website: <http://soundaffects.wordpress.com/2008/05/20/arabic-islamic-studies-essay-social-and-political-history-of-iraq/>

<sup>899</sup> Also, see Abd ar-Razzaq al-Hasani (1953:291).

Shia. In fact, the systemic hierarchical exclusion has been steadily repaired under a new Iraqi government and under a new Iraqi constitution, since in 2003 the US-led coalition forces toppled Saddam's regime.

As for Iraq's second political distinguishing aspect, we can point out Saddam's dictatorship. Saddam Hussein could be characterized into a class of war criminals, violating most of the Nuremberg Principles with 'his crimes against peace'(the invasion of Iran and Kuwait), 'war crimes'(the ill-treatment of the civilian population in occupied territories, let alone the plunder and destruction of private property as well as the taking of hostages) and 'crimes against humanity'(murder, deportation and inhuman acts or prosecution) (Finkelstein, 1991:43-48). Indeed, Amnesty International 1990 report made a good summary on massive crimes against humanity in Iraq under Saddam's rule, with the following:

Thousands of political prisoners, among them prisoners of conscience, continued to be detained without charge or trial or imprisoned after trials which reportedly did not satisfy international fair trial standards. Torture of political prisoners remained widespread. Disappearances were reported and the government did not clarify the fate and whereabouts of thousands who disappeared in previous years. Many of 'the disappeared' were believed to have been killed. Executions were also reported. Some of those executed apparently had sought from the authorities benefits announced under official amnesties. In most case it was unclear whether they had received any form of trial (Finkelstein, 1991:48).

Besides, as a horrible atrocity, during Saddam's rule, anyone found guilty of slandering President Saddam Hussein had his/her tongue removed.<sup>900</sup> And, any opposition to Saddam's rule could be cruelly executed, no matter who he/ she was.

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<sup>900</sup> See "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction." *The Assessment of the British Government*, available at the website:

[http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/01/shared/spl/hi/middle\\_east/02/uk\\_dossier\\_on\\_iraq/pdf/iraqdossier.pdf](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/01/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/02/uk_dossier_on_iraq/pdf/iraqdossier.pdf)

For instance, former Minister of Health, Riyadh Ibrahim Hussein was executed for his suggestion that Saddam Hussein should step down in favor of former President Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr (Farouk-Sluglett, Sluglett and Stork, 1984:25). Moreover, there was nothing in Hussein's past behavior to insinuate that he was concerned about the suffering inflicted on his people or that he was motivated to settle disputes via non-violent means (Goertzel, 1991:780). That is why it was possible that on Friday, March 17th 1988, Iraqi forces cracked down on a Kurdish rebellion in Halabja, with conventional and even chemical weapons, killing around 100,000 people of whom the immense majority were civilians (including women and children) as very shocking, which was called the Anfal campaign as Saddam's long-term program of persecution of the Iraqi Kurds (Bellamy, 2004:138). This cruelty flatly demonstrates how Saddam could manage to maintain the Iraqi civilian population under his tight control.

All in all, Saddam's dictatorship, in particular the dire violation of human rights should warrant the external military intervention, which was seen in Kosovo and East Timor. As Tony Blair, George W. Bush and John Howard argued, Saddam Hussein's record of awful human rights abuse alone was enough to warrant the use of force so as to rectify Iraq's repressive and despotic regime into a decent democratic regime as a full member of international society (Bellamy, 2004:137). In Iraq's case, a liberal anti-pluralist international society can be strongly felt, and Gerry Simpson's remark "when Great Powers meet outlaw states, the rules of the equal sovereignty regime are suspended" is echoed (Simpson, 2004:348).<sup>901</sup> Overall, as Great Power's responsibility, the UK and the US's invasion of Saddam's Iraq and their imposition of democracy on Iraq was a right and necessary thing to do, in particular when

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<sup>901</sup> The role of Great Powers was dealt with in Chapter IV in which I demonstrated the role of Great Powers such as the US and UK, to promote and consolidate democracy across international society.

considering that sovereignty should belong to Iraqi people rather than Saddam Hussein who had tortured and killed many Iraqi people under his dictatorial rule for more than twenty years.<sup>902</sup>

As Iraq's third distinguishing political aspect, it is worth examining the role of the Baath Party. The Arab Socialist Baath Party originally stood for pan-Arabism such as the establishment of a single Arab state; freedom from foreign rule; and socialism as social justice for the poor and underprivileged (Devlin, 1991:1396-1397). And, when it came to power in Iraq in July 1968, the Baath Party announced that it was against religious sectarianism, racism and tribalism, defining all of three as the remnants of colonialism (Baram, 1997:1). However, the above characteristics of the Baath Party were altered. The Baath Party could increasingly function as Saddam's vehicle to carry out his personal ambition (Anderson and Stansfield, 2004:32). As a matter of fact, during the 1968–1988 period, Baathist ideology and vision became whatever Saddam said, and it was very hard to think of any discernable content independent of Saddam (Anderson and Stansfield, 2004:78). Indeed, the Baath Party became simply the veneer which covered Hussein's terror (Chalabi, 1991:20) and Iraqi Ba'thism' had been transformed into a simple tool to consolidate Saddam's rule, even fostering a huge personality cult around the person of Saddam Hussein himself, whereas its traditional rhetoric such as Arab unity and Arab socialism were gradually jettisoned (Farouk-Sluglett, Sluglett and Stork, 1984:24). Also, the Baath Party had served as an instrument of social monitoring and control rather than a decent political

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<sup>902</sup> Here, I put the US into the category of Great Powers. However, the US should be regarded as more than just Great Power, that is, Superpower or Hyper-power. Barry Buzan introduces the concepts of Regional power, Great power, Superpower and Hyper-power. Nonetheless, I follow Hedley Bull's categorization of Great Power in some sense. See, for more detail, Bull (1977) and Buzan (2004b).

party.<sup>903</sup> In other words, the Baath party was used for a modern totalitarian mechanism in which all aspects of society came under the scrutiny of the party. Indeed, the cellular structure of the Baath could make the party infiltrate and control all aspects of Iraqi life (Anderson and Stansfield, 2004:8). Therefore, through its infiltration and control of Iraq's people, the Baath Party could become one mechanism to discipline the population to dictator's orders.<sup>904</sup> All in all, the Baath Party in one-party dominant system became a pivotal part of an Iraqi despotic monolith. Because of the above roles of the Baath Party, any challenge against Saddam's dictatorship could not be possible. Due to this, the de-Ba'athification has been carried out since the US-led coalition forces removed Saddam's despotic regime, which facilitates Iraq's democratic development.

As Iraq's fourth distinguishing political aspect, Iraq did not have any strong mechanism to separate the military from politics, which can be usually witnessed in non-democratic states. The Iraqi state's key supporters were not located in a client merchant and industrial class, but in the army and the bureaucracy, which revealed the close connection between politics and the military (Chaudhry, 1991:21). Indeed, there was the dependence of the Baath Party on the military for the attainment of power and the Baath Party's great impacts on the military (Galvani, 1972:16). And, importantly, we should not forget the fact that the Iraqi military was a primary tool for Saddam's despotic rule. At this juncture, the problem is that due to this close relationship between the military and politics, Iraqi political life provided the military officers with ample opportunity to intervene in the political process as several coups

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<sup>903</sup> See, for more information, James Dobbins, John G. McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel Swanger and Anga Timilsina (2003: 167-221).

<sup>904</sup> Ibid, pp.189.

in Iraq's history demonstrated (Hashim, 2003:31). Indeed, the Iraqi army had been a destabilizing political force throughout most of Iraq's history (Foote, Block, Crane and Gray, 2004:55). Therefore, Iraq demonstrates that it was very difficult to build up a democratic state, without clear separation between the military and politics. In the new Iraq, its military becomes a de-politicized military force under civilian control, which defends its territorial integrity and secures Iraqi civilians rather than represses them, and no longer threatens Iraq's neighbors.<sup>905</sup> Now, the Iraqi military is not expected to intervene in the political process, which is one significant step toward democracy (Hashim, 2003:43). This indicates that the US-led coalition forces' invasion of Iraq in 2003 is a right and necessary decision for Iraq's democratic development.

To sum up, when looking into Iraq's past political aspects, we can see Iraq's distinguishing political facades, such as Sunni dominance, Saddam's cruel dictatorship based on torture and execution, the roles of the Baath Party, and the close relationship between military and politics. As a result, it was not strange that until the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, there had emerged not even a single serious Iraqi opposition leader ready to challenge Saddam's dictatorship. Also, Iraq's political facades can help understand why Iraq could not be democratic by itself. However, this could help justify the necessity of the US-led coalition forces' invasion of Iraq in 2003 as liberation of the Iraqi people from Saddam's systemic repressive and aggressive dictatorship, which will bring more benefits than losses, to Iraqis, the region and international society as a whole in the long run. In particular when considering that today Iraq is on the right track toward democracy and it slowly

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<sup>905</sup> See Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker, Keith Crane, Richard R. Brennan, Jr., Heather S. Gregg, Thomas Sullivan, and Andrew Rathmell (2008:36).

becomes a stable, prosperous and democratic state, the US-led coalition forces' invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a right and necessary decision. Furthermore, we can even say that the regime change might be a strategic victory in the long run, as Iraq becomes a showcase for democracy in the Middle East. Recently all data concerning the new Iraq, like fair elections, transparency, the rule of law, guarantee of minority rights, gradually improved security, and steadily increased revenue, verify this, let alone Iraq's new direction toward democracy.<sup>906</sup>

#### **4. Iraq's economy and its path toward democracy**

In the Middle East, in general, many states have been known to suffer from a weak economy, along with other problems such as burgeoning populations, a dysfunctional education system, illiteracy, political disaffection from the regimes, aggression and so on (Buzan and Waeber, 2003:203).<sup>907</sup> In the past, Iraq could not be exceptional when looking into an overall Iraqi economy, even if it enjoyed an economic prosperity for a short period just before its war with Iran (1980-1988). Such economic condition could not positively contribute to Iraq's democratic development.

In this section, I will examine how Iraq's economy based mostly on oil could have a negative impact on Iraq's democracy, pointing out aggression, poverty, illiteracy, and a weak middle class, which were derived from Iraq's poor economy. Ultimately, as Lipset put it, I will underscore the premise that there is a close

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<sup>906</sup> Iraq still has security issues. However, in 2008 Iraqi troops' big achievements in Basra, Mosul, Baghdad and Sadr city demonstrate that Iraq becomes gradually a stable and secured state, which can strengthen its democracy.

<sup>907</sup> The Middle East has been known to have many various problems, such as violence, lack of political freedom, violence of human rights, illiteracy, poverty and so on. However, though in the region, literacy rates were known as 50 per cent as opposed to over 90 percent in South-East Asia, I have to say that once, Iraqi illiteracy rate was lower than in any country in the Arab world.

relationship between economic factors and democratic development, which can help understand why Iraq had not become a democratic state until Saddam's fall in 2003.<sup>908</sup>

Iraq's economy was called 'Arab Socialism,' which can be depicted as "a middle way between the Capitalist West and the Communist East, and as a modern expression of traditional values."<sup>909</sup> Iraq's economy has been based primarily on oil – e.g. crude oil accounted for around 98 percent of Iraqi total exports in 1975 (Stork, 1981, 15). Now that Iraq has had the world's second largest oil reserve and it was the fourth largest oil producer in the Arab/Persian Gulf, once Iraq's economy seemed to become thriving and enviable (Galvani, 1972:10). As a matter of fact, just before Iraq launched the war against Iran, Iraq's economy looked promising. At least, Iraq was not poor at all, before it waged wars: the eight-year war with Iran (1980-1988) and war with the US-led coalition forces (1991). Indeed, even on July 16, 1979 when Saddam became president, Iraq did not have any serious economic problem along with no long-term foreign debt, and Iraq had cash reserves of \$36 billion (Alexander and Rowat, 2003:33). Importantly, this indicates that Iraq had some possibility to become a democratic state, in particular when considering economic prosperity as a significant element for democratic success, and when considering the growth of the Iraqi middle class and the increase of the Iraqi literacy rate/education - Iraqi educational standard had been ahead when compared with those of its neighboring states in the Middle East - as vital conditions for democratic development, which were derived from economic growth based on oil. However, such hope was completely ruined, as Iraq became engaged in a series of wars – e.g. 1980 and 1991.

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<sup>908</sup> Lipset emphasizes the close relationship among social structure, democratic development, economic development and education. See Seymour Martin Lipset (1959).

<sup>909</sup> See "Arab Socialism." *Wikipedia*. Available at the website: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab\\_socialism](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_socialism)



The Iraq-Iran war had a destabilizing and deteriorating effect on Iraq's national economy. In other words, Iraq's economic meltdown began with the onset of its war with Iran in September 1980 (Foote, Block, Crane and Gray, 2004:49). Within days of the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, both countries put each other's oil-exporting capabilities out of operation, including loading facilities, pumping states, refineries, terminals and pipelines (Alnasrawi, 1986:873). As a result, Iraqi oil output declined, for instance, from 3.4 million barrels per day in August 1980 to 140,000 in October 1980 and to 0.9 MBD in 1981, which ultimately meant the collapse of Iraq's oil revenue from \$ 26 billion in 1980 to \$10 billion in 1981 (Alnasrawi, 1986:873, 2001:206). And, between 1981 and 1985, oil revenues were a mere \$48.3 billion, but military expenditures were two and half times higher at \$120 billion (Alexander and Rowat, 2003:33). Indeed, military expenditure per capita doubled from 30% of GDP in the period 1975-79 to 60% of GDP in the period 1980-86 (Alnasrawi, 1992:344). And, as a result of the war, Iraq's \$35 billion of foreign exchange reserves on the eve of the Iraq-Iran war were, by the first quarter of 1987, transformed into accumulated debts of between \$50 and \$ 80 billion (Mofid, 1990:54).<sup>910</sup> Eventually, as the Iran-Iraq war continued, the Iraqi economy could no longer be shielded from the erosive effects of inflation nor could it shake off the effects of the rise in import prices or the withdrawal of foreign labor from major industrial sites (Alnasrawi, 1986:875).

Though there were some attempts to reverse the Iraqi deteriorating economic trend, like 'economic liberalization/privatization' and 'increase of oil price,' the Iraqi

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<sup>910</sup> Even now (July 2008), a new Iraq still has debt of \$ 60 billion, although a new Iraq asks for a debt relief since the debt belongs to Saddam's regime.

bad economy could not be recovered.<sup>911</sup> Furthermore, after its failure to reverse the economic deterioration: privatization/liberalization and high oil prices,<sup>912</sup> Iraq suffered severely from its dire and exacerbated economic crisis, such as its widespread unemployment and it reportedly reached 50 percent inflation (Lalor, 1991:11). As a matter of fact, by 1990 the Iraqi economy reached a dead end from which there was no prospect for recovery (Alnasrawi, 1992:344). Iraq did not have many options; it had almost no option, except for its invasion of Kuwait as a panacea to its economic problem, or at least as a short-cut solution to its economic crisis and the regime's failure to improve living standards (Alnasrawi, 2001:208). For certainty, Iraq's economic recovery and even its economic growth could have been achieved if Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait was successful (Alnasrawi, 1992:344).

However, such expectation turned out to be simply an illusion. By contrast, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait plunged Iraq into deeper economic turmoil – i.e. the Security Council's series of tight sanctions and total destruction by the US-led coalition forces (Alnasrawi, 1992:344). For instance, the impacts of sanctions can be summarized with the following:

the loss of more than two-thirds of the country's GDP, the persistence of exorbitant prices, collapse of private incomes, soaring unemployment, large-scale depletion of personal assets, massive school drop-out rates as children were forced to beg or work to add to family income, and the phenomenal rise in the number of skilled workers and professionals leaving the country as economic refugees in search of better economic condition (Alnasrawi, 2001:214).

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<sup>911</sup> Saddam's economic liberalization was not capitalist market economy, even if it had some aspects of a capitalist market economy in Iraq. It was not enough to materialize an open capitalist market economy.

<sup>912</sup> High oil price could not be materialized, since some oil producing countries like Kuwait did not want to reduce their oil production in order to raise the price of oil.

Also, the US-led coalition forces' military attacks in January 1991 brought a complete halt to Iraqi oil output as the tip of the iceberg (Foote, Block, Crane and Gray, 2004:49). This seemed severe enough to Iraq when considering that the Iraqi economy heavily depended on its oil sales. And, the coalition forces bombed and destroyed Iraq's various assets, such as military bases, civilian infrastructure and industrial structure, including power stations, transport, telecommunications networks, fertilizer plants, oil facilities, iron and steel plants, factories, bridges, schools, hospitals, storage facilities, industrial plants and civilian buildings, let alone between 50,000 and 120,000 Iraqi soldier deaths and between 5000-15,000 Iraqi civilian deaths (Alnasrawi, 1992:345, 2001:209). This vast scale of destruction relegated a highly urbanized and mechanized Iraqi society to a pre-industrial age or 19<sup>th</sup> century status (Alnasrawi, 2001:209). As for Iraq, therefore, the Gulf War of 1991 was far worse than the eight-year war with Iran. As a matter of fact, Iraq's living standard had descended to Sub-Saharan level (Anderson and Stansfield, 2004:93). Under this situation, Iraq's democracy could not be expected. For instance, the middle class itself in Iraq was ultimately wiped out by its devastating economy after sanctions and a series of wars (Anderson and Stansfield, 2004:99). And, Iraq's literacy rate had radically decreased due to economic hardship which stemmed from sanctions and wars. Indeed, due to Iraq's dreadful economy, Iraqi children no longer had even basic education. Instead of education, many children had to become breadwinners and even some children were forced into street crime, let alone child begging (Halliday, 1999:32). All of these made it difficult for Iraq to become democracy.

However, though sanctions and wars (Iraq-Iran war and Gulf War in 1991) initially seemed to work, their impacts on Saddam's regime itself had been gradually

doubted. In other words, Saddam's regime itself had been intact until the US and UK invasion of Iraq in 2003, since the Iraqi regime managed to generate income outside UN control in the form of hard currency or barter goods, and these illicit funds were used for building new palaces, purchasing luxury goods, maintaining armed forces, developing military equipment and so on.<sup>913</sup> Indeed, though the original intention of the economic sanctions was to influence the leadership of Iraq, the result was the dire situation from which the Iraqi civilians alone severely suffered – e.g. 1.5 million people died (Halliday, 1999:30). This indicated that the regime change via the use of force should be adopted as a right and necessary option. In other words, we have to consider the resort to force as a last resort and a suitable method to satisfy the just cause, when economic sanctions did not serve the just cause and simply proves disproportionately expensive (Bellamy, 2004:136). And so, the use of force to topple Saddam's regime in 2003 was a necessary and right decision.

Since June 2003 when Saddam's regime was overturned by the US-led coalition forces, a new Iraq has attempted to rebuild its economic structure based on strict free market principles (Medani, 2004:28-29). But, under the US auspices, Iraq's current government does not appear to repeat its past failed economic liberalization reforms which Saddam Hussein implemented in the late 1980s (Medani, 2004:33).<sup>914</sup> Instead, Iraq's transformation into an open capitalist market economy is not only expected to bring about Iraq's prosperity, but also to facilitate its transformation into a liberal democratic beacon to steer the Arab world away from

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<sup>913</sup> See "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of The British Government." Available at the website: <http://www.archive2.official-documents.co.uk/document/reps/iraq/iraqdossier.pdf pp.32>.

<sup>914</sup> After the fall of Saddam's regime, the US appointed American private-sector executives ran the economy along with their attempt to impose free market policies on Baghdad. See Medani (2004: 28-29).

Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism and authoritarianism (Medani, 2004:29). Obviously, Iraq has become one of the leading candidates among the Arab countries to develop its vibrant economy, which can accelerate Iraq's democratizing process, especially when considering that today, Iraq has a more and more skilled labor force, talented technocrats and scientists as well as important manufacturing and agricultural bases, not to mention vast oil wealth and gradually increased oil revenue – e.g. the world's second largest oil reserve and Iraq's oil-fueled surplus for 2008 between \$38 and \$50 billion (Medani, 2004:30-31).<sup>915</sup>

##### **5. Iraq's military power and its path toward democracy**

The Iraqi army, which was originally created by Great Britain even before the establishment of the Iraqi state, was not strong, since it was created to maintain Britain's rule within Iraq rather than to defend Iraq from external invasion (Chalabi, 1991:22-23). Indeed, the Iraqi army was too poor to even manage internal security campaigns against recalcitrant Kurdish tribesmen in the north (Hashim, 2003:35). This brought about Iraqi military officers' disdain for the monarchy's subordination to the British, along with their contempt of the existence of political corruption and cronyism (Hashim, 2003:33). This in large part came to lead to the overthrow of the monarchy. Also, due to the same reason, when he came to power, Saddam sought Iraq's military transformation from an instrument of internal security into a modern and well-armed force, which was critical to Saddam's vision of a powerful Iraq (Hashim, 2003:35). Iraq had the aim of achieving, at least military parity with Israel and strategic superiority over Iran, as a minimum so as to preclude any aggression

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<sup>915</sup> In fact, since 2003, Iraqi economy has been getting better and better. For example, Iraq's surplus for 2008 was expected to run between \$38 billion and \$50 billion. Due to this, even some US politicians such as Levin, a Michigan Democrat argued that Iraq should be responsible for its reconstruction, since Iraq has enough oil revenue to fund its own reconstruction. See "Iraq's oil-fueled surplus could hit \$80 billion, report says." *CNN*. August 5, 2008. Also, see "US says Iraq may drop short-term oil deals." *Financial Times*. August 17, 2008.

from any regional power (Chaudhry, 1991:18). Therefore, Iraq started putting massive resources into its military expenditures, and a major portion of Iraq's income was increasingly absorbed by military expenditure. Iraqi military expenditures had continuously increased without any interruption; for instance, from \$800 million in 1972 to over \$5 billion in 1979 and to around \$12.5 billion in 1983 (Alnasrawi, 1986:882). As a result, the size of Iraq's armed forces grew considerably during the eight-year war with Iran, from 242,000 in 1980 to around one million in 1988 (Hippler, 1991:28). And so, Iraq came to have the fourth largest army in the world. All in all, we can say that Iraq came to have the largest and the most experienced army in the Middle East, and it even learned to use its chemical weapons during the Iraq-Iran war (Myloie, 1989:89). Besides a conventional military force, Saddam's Iraq had continuously produced chemical and biological weapons, and it had endlessly developed a nuclear program for a military purpose, nuclear bombs, not to mention its pursuit of ballistic missiles, since Saddam believed that Iraq's political weight in the Middle East would fade away, if Iraq's military strength rested only on its conventional military forces.<sup>916</sup> Thus, when considering all of these, in terms of military strength, Iraq appeared to be a potential regional hegemonic power.

Iraq's military strength had been getting strong enough to become a potential regional hegemonic power in the Middle East. However, unfortunately, it alerted many world leaders to the threat to peace and security in the region and whole international society. Nevertheless, there might have been no problem with Iraqi possession of strong military strength or even WMDs, if Iraq was a decent democratic

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<sup>916</sup> See "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government." Available at the website: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/1/shared/spl/hi/middle\\_east/02/uk\\_dossier\\_on\\_iraq/pdf/iraqdossier.pdf](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/1/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/02/uk_dossier_on_iraq/pdf/iraqdossier.pdf) pp.18.

state as a full member of international society.<sup>917</sup> But, the problem with Iraq was that it was domestically and internationally a very aggressive and despotic outlaw state – e.g. its invasions of Iran and Kuwait and its severe violation of human rights such as its use of chemical weapons against Kurds as well as Iranians, let alone deportation, torture, execution and rape. This regime could not be accepted or included in international society, and needed to be changed even by the use of force by Great Powers as necessary, which can be seen in a liberal anti-pluralist international society. All in all, Saddam’s Iraq had to be disarmed and its character had to be altered from a repressive and aggressive outlaw state to a decent and democratic state as a full member of international society. Due to this, Iraq had faced around sixteen UN sanctions and two Gulf Wars (1991 and 2003).

The 1991 Gulf war could be recognized as a turning point for the Iraqi military strength because in a broad sense, Iraq’s military strength had been steadily declining since the beginning of the fighting in the Gulf War in 1991, in particular when considering that its strength had been abated by military defeat, by the impact of UN inspections, by underfunding and by a decade in the absence of important arms imports (Cordesman, 2001:2). However, it was not enough. Despite the 1991 Gulf war and sanctions that led to massive destruction – e.g. loss of 60% of Iraqi major combat equipment via the war (Cordesman 2001:3) and more than one and a half million casualties via sanctions - Saddam’s regime was still intact, which brought about some criticism against George H. W. Bush’s policy to reject any occupation of Iraq for regime change. More accurately, until March 2003 when the US-led

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<sup>917</sup> We know that North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons reveals a fundamentally different milieu from Canada’s or Japan’s possession of nuclear weapons. One is a despotic and repressive outlaw state. The other is a decent democratic full member of international society.

coalition forces invaded Iraq to eventually topple Saddam's regime, Iraq still had the most powerful conventional forces in the Gulf region, along with Iraq's strong elite Republican Guard and its possession of some unconventional weapons (Cordesman, 2001:2). Thus, Iraq's military strength was still pretty lethal, when considering that even after the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq had the largest military power in the Gulf in terms of sheer numbers, and when considering that Iran had only around half the size of Iraq's major equipment strength, the Saudi army and air force capabilities had declined since 1995 due to mismanagement and underfunding, and Kuwait had a limited military strength of about 15,000 men (Cordesman, 2001:5). All in all, this indicates that without the US and Britain, Iraq could still militarily dominate the Gulf, let alone its posing a great threat to the regional security (Cordesman, 2001:5).

All in all, when considering the above circumstances, we can reach one option, which is the necessity of the use of force so as to stop Saddam's regime's pursuit of WMDs and a missile program, and in the end, so as to change the regime from an aggressive outlaw state to a decent democratic state as a full member of international society. As former US President George W Bush put it, we can say that the decision of the 2003 Gulf War to change Saddam's regime was a right and necessary thing to do, since Saddam's Iraq could not be changed without it. Indeed, it was almost impossible to expect Saddam's Iraq to voluntarily adopt democracy without the US-led coalition forces' invasion of Saddam's Iraq. In 2003, a new Iraq was eventually put on a path toward a prosperous and stable democratic country by the US-led coalition forces. Now, its democratic future seems pretty rosy. Nonetheless, I have to admit that Iraq still has some problems concerning security, especially when considering that Iraqi people are often killed by car bombs. More outstandingly, as one slice of a whole democratic picture, new Iraqi security forces have a new identity



and character to serve and secure Iraqi citizens rather than to repress them as a simple tool for cruel dictatorship, and they are no longer engaged in politics, which can be normally seen in decent and prosperous democratic states. This is clearly a positive sign for Iraq's democracy. In fact, we can say that Iraq is on the right track toward a prosperous and stable democracy.<sup>918</sup>

## **6. Iraq's foreign policy and its path toward democracy**

Iraq shares frontiers with six countries, making for thousands of miles of land borders, while being bounded by Turkey, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and the Persian Gulf.<sup>919</sup> Iraq had competed with its rivals like Iran for a hegemonic position in the region. As a matter of fact, on and off, Iraq appeared to take leadership in the Arab world, claiming pan-Arabism as well as anti-imperialism. Nevertheless, amid Iraqi pursuit of hegemonic power in the region, Iraq often seemed

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<sup>918</sup> During Saddam's rule, Iraqi army was used as a simple tool for Saddam's brutal dictatorship. Due to this, it was disbanded and dissolved in May 2003. Nonetheless, some people argued that disbanding the former army was a controversial and ill-advised Coalition Provisional Authority's(CPA) decision – e.g. disbanding military might lead to increasing unemployment, growing insurgency, nationalism, humiliated pride, nostalgia and attack on Iraqi identity, and later, some veterans of Saddam Hussein's military are put into a new Iraqi army. For instance, in August, 2008, about 80 percent of the Iraqi army's officers and 50 percent of its rank and file are veterans of Saddam Hussein's military. But more important, a new Iraqi army was created with its different identity and character from its past ones. Unlike its past identity as a tool of oppression and aggression, the new Iraqi army is primarily to serve Iraqi civilians via securing them from internal and external threat. Also, we can think of Iraqi new Defense Ministry which advocates the change in identity and character. A new Defense Ministry is civilian controlled, transparent, professional, merit-based, and broadly representative of the Iraqi people. Moreover, there is a balanced ethnic, religious, and regional makeup in Iraqi army rather than greatly favored Arab Sunni's dominance: for example, 60 percent were Shi'ites, 25 percent Sunnis, 10 percent Kurds, and 5 percent from other minority groups. Also, according to polling conducted by the U.S.-led coalition, the percentage of Iraqis who did not believe that the Iraqi army was sectarian has gradually increased, for example, from 30 percent in June 2007 to 54 percent in June 2008. Now, Iraqi security forces have some 566,000 personnel (May 2008), and they are expected to be strong enough soon to defend Iraq from internal and external threat, which was confirmed by their successful military operations in Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, Sadr City, Amarah and so on (2008). See "US to end Iraq combat next year" *Aljazeera*, July 10, 2008. Also, see Stephen Biddle, Michael E. O'Hanlon, and Kenneth M. Pollack (2008). Moreover, see Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker, Keith Crane, Richard R. Brennan, Jr., Heather S. Gregg, Thomas Sullivan, and Andrew Rathmell (2008:138-142).

<sup>919</sup> See Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker, Keith Crane, Richard R. Brennan, Jr., Heather S. Gregg, Thomas Sullivan, and Andrew Rathmell (2008: 135).

to put the region into conflict rather than to keep away from aggression, like Iraq's invasion of Iran (1980) and of Kuwait (1990). This proclivity had not changed until 2003 when Saddam's regime was overthrown by the US-led coalition forces, and we can verify it in Iraq's past foreign policy. In the past, Iraq's foreign policy was embedded in anti-imperialism, pan-Arabism and a quest for hegemony, which were closely related to a repressive, aggressive, despotic outlaw state, but which were far away from human rights and democracy.

Let us start examining Iraq's anti-imperialism as one of the primary aspects for Iraq's foreign policy. As mentioned earlier, Iraq experienced several foreign occupations as well as foreign interventions, let alone foreign influence. This led to Iraq's anti-imperialism, not to mention dislike and suspicion of foreign interference and so Iraq became hostile to the West, in particular Britain and the US (Myroie, 1989:89).<sup>920</sup> For instance, Qasim withdrew Iraq from the pro-Western Baghdad Pact, while abolishing Iraq's various treaties with Britain, and also he withdrew Iraq from an agreement with the US, regarding military hardware (Abdi, 2008:12). Also, Qasim signed economic and military aid agreements with the Soviet Union as a counter force against the Western influence (Galvani, 1972:8). Moreover, thanks to the Baath's anti-imperialist posture, Iraq supported the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (socialist country) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (a Marxist and Arab nationalist revolutionary organization) and the Arab Gulf PFLAG as anti-imperialist forces (Galvani, 1972:19). However, as Iraq's foreign policy based on anti-imperialism, its proclivity toward Marxist and socialist countries against the West did not help facilitate Iraq's democratic development. Also, today, Iraq's anti-

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<sup>920</sup> As a matter of fact, I have to mention that once the relationship between Iraq and West was briefly good, in particular during the Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988).

imperialism can be interpreted as xenophobia. Such xenophobia is expected to be rectified, as a new Iraq gradually becomes a stable, mature, prosperous democratic state in the long run.

Second, as Iraq's distinguishing aspect of foreign policy, pan-Arabism is worth examining. Pan-Arabism can be depicted as Arab cultural unity and political solidarity, while positing the existence of one Arab nation and calling for the unity of all Arabs.<sup>921</sup> However, due to this feature, the voices of dissent from minorities became silent, which reveals an anti-democratic trend (Abdi, 2008:6). Indeed, within Iraq, pan-Arabism indicated a conflicting division rather than a harmonious unity, in particular when considering that Iraq itself has been recognized as a multi-ethnic nation, and that most of Shias and Kurds have been averse to pan-Arabism.<sup>922</sup> Also, in Iraq, pan-Arabism had been used to justify Iraqi Sunni's dominance, though it has alienated Shias and Kurds, as Sunnis searched to transcend their minority situation in Iraq by relying on the rest of the Arab world, which happened to be mostly Sunnis (Abdi, 2008:10, Luizard and Stork, 1995:19). This clearly indicates that pan-Arabism was a barrier to Iraq's democratization. Also, pan-Arabism can facilitate unlimited aggression, when considering that Israel's total destruction has been a key goal of pan-Arabism.<sup>923</sup> Indeed, Iraq's amicable and hostile relations with other states, including wars with non-Arab states such as Iran and Israel, were often attributed to pan-Arabism. Saddam adopted pan-Arabism for the Iran-Iraq war. Saddam Hussein aggravated pan-Arab nationalism, with portraying the Iraq-Iran war

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<sup>921</sup> See "Pan-Arabism – Bibliography." Available at the website: <http://science.jrank.org/pages/7944/Pan-Arabism.html>

<sup>922</sup> See, for more information, Amir Taheri (2003).

<sup>923</sup> See, for more information, Charles Paul Freund (2003) and Amir Taheri (2003).

as a sacred Arab cause, ‘Saddam’s Qadissiyat,’ referring to the 7<sup>th</sup> century Arab victory over the Persian Sassanian empire (Parasiliti, 2003:158). Also, pan-Arabism empowered Saddam’s megalomaniacal orientation, in particular when considering that pan-Arabism itself tended to legitimize the notion of a single great Arab leader, speaking for and acting on behalf of all Arabs.<sup>924</sup> In short, as Nasser’s pan-Arabism in Egypt demonstrated, pan-Arabism ultimately facilitated Saddam’s unrestrained ambition and aggression, let alone tyranny.<sup>925</sup> All in all, the fall of Saddam and his Baath regime in 2003 means not only the end of a grim era (the Republic of Fear) but also liberalism’s gradual arriving which can assist Iraq’s democracy (Abdi, 2008:4).<sup>926</sup> In other words, the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime is not only a strategic defeat for pan-Arabism, but also a starting point of Iraq’s young democracy.<sup>927</sup>

Third, Iraq’s quest for hegemony could be seen as a primary aspect of Iraq’s foreign policy, which was very conspicuous, in particular during Saddam’s regime. As a matter of fact, Iraq’s quest for hegemony reflected Saddam’s character and ambition, along with his unconstrained aggression, in particular when considering Iraq’s totalitarian system in which the leader (Saddam) himself became the embodiment of the party, the ideology and the country (Abdi, 2008:22-23).<sup>928</sup> The prime objective of Saddam’s Iraq was to get rid of major rivals in the Middle East, bringing all Arab states into its stance. Therefore, Saddam’s Iraq tried to grasp its

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<sup>924</sup> See Charles Paul Freund (2003).

<sup>925</sup> Ibid. Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasir (Nasser) of Egypt not only led Egypt to catastrophe in his delusional 1967 war against Israel, but took the whole Arab world with him.

<sup>926</sup> Also see Charles Paul Freund (2003).

<sup>927</sup> See Amir Taheri (2003).

<sup>928</sup> For example, in Iraq, Saddam’s image adorned every house, office, shop, street, and square. Also school textbooks, bank notes, stamps, and T-shirts carried Saddam’s image.

hegemony by bringing the states of the Middle East under its sphere of influence or its umbrella (Mylroie, 1989:89). Nonetheless, Iraq's quest for hegemony under Saddam's rule was more likely to bring about tensions and even wars than stability and peace in the Middle East.

Let us examine the mutual positive relationship between Saddam's character, ambition and unconstrained aggression, and Iraq's pursuit of hegemony. Looking into Iraq's pursuit of a hegemonic power in the region (and possibly international society), we can easily find that such Iraq's policy was deeply embedded in Saddam's strong paranoid orientation, his blind ambition, and his unconstrained aggression. For instance, Iraq's hostility against Iran, Israel and the US could be seen as coming from Saddam's belief in a conspiracy of Iran, Israel and the US to eliminate him (Ghadban, 1992:784). Without any specific reason, Saddam often felt that he was surrounded by his enemies, and so he was always ready for retaliation, adopting unlimited aggression (Post, 1991:285). When considering Saddam's paranoid orientation, we cannot say that it had nothing to do with Iraq's invasion of Iran.

Also, Saddam's blind ambition was closely related with Iraq's pursuit of regional hegemonic power (maybe further a hegemonic power in international society as a whole), along with his willingness to use whatever weapons were necessary and available, including weapons of mass destruction. For example, Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Iran, in the consensus view, was the outcome of his ambition to play a preeminent role in Gulf security by taking out the revolutionary government in Iran, in the process securing and legitimizing his own rule in Iraq (Parasiliti, 2003:152). Indeed, as for Saddam, the Iraq-Iran war could be used to solidify his base and enhance his legitimacy, and it was also regarded as the ladder to raise him to leadership in the Arab world (Farouk-Sluglett, Sluglett and Stork: 1984:30). In

addition, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait can explain the close relationship between Saddam's blind ambition and Iraq's pursuit of regional hegemony. Kuwait appeared to be a forward step in Saddam's ambitions for Iraq's regional hegemony (Parasiliti, 2003:152). More precisely, Iraq's possession of tiny Kuwait could have healed Saddam's declining Iraq and served Saddam's ambition for Iraq's greater role in the Gulf and Arab political affairs with Kuwait's money and oil (Parasiliti, 2003: 160). Furthermore, because of Saddam Hussein's blind desire for Iraq's regional hegemonic power, if Iraq's occupation of Kuwait had not been challenged, Saddam would not only have controlled the huge oil reserves of Iraq and Kuwait, but also he would have used military force again to invade Iraq's neighboring chief rival, Saudi Arabia that has the large oil reserves.<sup>929</sup>

Saddam's strong paranoid orientation and endless blind ambition along with his unlimited aggression were dangers to Iraq's civilians, to the region and to international society as a whole. In fact, this proved how threatening Saddam's Iraq would have been to the region and further international society as a whole, in particular if Saddam possessed nuclear weapons. Moreover, this ultimately demonstrated why Iraq's regime change in 2003 was the most appropriate option to avoid the repetition of 'the destruction of civilization' which Nazi Germany committed more than a half century ago. Saddam's Iraq as 'rogue state,' 'state of concern' (Madeleine Albright), 'axis of evil' (George W. Bush), or 'an outlaw state' could not be changed, unless Saddam would step down forsaking the succession of power to his sons. Nevertheless, more terrible, barring the regime change by the external forces, there was almost no possibility for the Iraqi oppositions to overthrow

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<sup>929</sup> See "Using Our Power to Secure the Peace." Available at the website: <http://cdd.stanford.edu/docs/2003/btp2003-nic1.pdf>

Saddam via their revolt, or via massive civil protests for democracy like those seen in South Korea in 1987. All in all, the US and UK's invasion of Saddam's Iraq and their imposition of democracy in Iraq were necessary and right things to do for long-term peace, stability and prosperity in the Middle East.

To sum up, in the past, Iraq's foreign policy had been deeply embedded in anti-imperialism, pan-Arabism and regional hegemony. However, those facades in foreign policy had hardly been helpful in Iraq's democratic promotion, in particular when considering that they simply reflected xenophobic, anti-liberal, anti-democratic, and unconstrained aggressive trends. In Iraq, those could not be expected to be altered, at least unless Iraq's regime had been radically changed toward democracy. Therefore, along with the fall of Saddam's regime in 2003, Iraq has been given a new identity and a new character which necessitate new facades of foreign policy. As Iraq becomes a stable, prosperous and democratic state, the new character of foreign policy is most likely not only to comply with human rights and democracy as universal norms of international society, but also to even promote those norms in the Middle East in the long run. This is flatly expected to bring about peace and prosperity in the Middle East, rather than to pose great threat to the region.

## **Conclusion**

Like external variables, internal variables – history, culture, politics, economy, military and foreign policy - cannot be disregarded in the promotion and consolidation of democracy. We should recognize that along with external variables, internal variables can influence paths toward democracy. In this appendix, I attempted to demonstrate how internal variables can have an impact on paths toward democracy. I tried to show that each country's internal variables, along with external variables, can lead to relatively different paths toward democracy. Three cases, China, South

Korea and Iraq can help us understand that relatively different internal variables bring about relatively different paths toward democracy – i.e. China (interest-oriented socialization), South Korea (legitimacy) and Iraq (external force). In China's history, China's humiliating experiences and its brief period of democratic experience can influence China's path toward democracy. For instance, nationalism derived from its past humiliating experience can lead China toward democracy, as Chinese increasingly believe that democracy can make China a strong nation and a Great Power, though as for Chinese, democracy is an instrumental tool in order to elevate China into the category of Great Powers (He 2000: 92 and Zhao 2000:46-47). In terms of Chinese culture, we can see the compatibility between Confucianism and democracy, in particular when considering that some aspects of Confucianism are democratic norms and values, such as pluralistic life, moral equality and human dignity. With regard to Chinese politics, we can find the fact that China's eight democratic political parties and its intra-party democracy have contributed to China's democratization, even indirectly preventing the CCP's dictatorship in the policy-making process. However, we can see that China's democratization has to be slowly evolutionary rather than radically revolutionary. Regarding China's economy, we can find that China's economic growth based on its embracing the market economy can extend its political freedom, because democratic political institutions alone can ultimately satisfy the condition of economic growth on account of capitalist market economy. In the military arena, China's military power is strong enough to evade any Great Power's military attempt to change China toward democracy, although it cannot pose any threat against entire international society and it cannot even directly confront a Great Power, the U.S. This ascertains that China's democratization can be materialized by interests on account of rational calculation and interest-oriented



socialization rather than the use of force. In terms of China's foreign policy, I emphasized the fact that China's foreign policy has been gradually pragmatic rather than ideological. Due to this, China is highly likely to adjust itself to norms of international society.

With respect to South Korea's history, I showed that South Korea's traditional strategic location in Northeast Asia, habitual influences of big powers, and *saddae chui* (reliance on a big power) could ultimately put South Korea on a road toward democracy. In South Korea's culture, I made it clear that Christianity has greatly contributed to South Korea's promotion and consolidation of democracy. Also, I tried to make it known that the fusion among different religions, Christianity, Buddhism, Shamanism and Confucianism have been more likely to lead South Korea toward democracy, and that under diverse religions, South Korea's mature democracy demonstrates that cultural factors are not the fundamental barriers to the promotion and consolidation of democracy, even though each culture might have a relatively different impact on South Korea's path toward democracy. As to South Korea's politics, I underscored the fact that South Korean civilians have been deeply embedded in common values, human rights and democracy, and their democratic movement led to the surrender of authoritarian regimes in South Korea in the end. In regard to South Korea's economy, I exposed a close co-relationship between economic and democratic development, emphasizing that strong middle class and high education as well as high living standard, which was derived from economic development, had directly or indirectly goaded South Korea toward a mature democracy. Also, I showed that since 1998, South Korea's economic reforms have brought about economic democracy, which has underpinned South Korea's consolidation of democracy. In terms of South Korea's military power, I accentuated

the idea that order and security are the necessary elements for democratic development, since justice cannot be obtained unless order and security are guaranteed. In other words, South Korea's military superiority over North Korea's military strength has guaranteed positive surroundings for South Korea's democratic development. Regarding South Korea's foreign policy, I attempted to put emphasis on the fact that in the late Cold War era and post-Cold War era, South Korea's foreign policy has reduced anti-communist sentiments among its citizens through various procedures such as Roh Tae Woo's 'Northern' policy, Kim Dae Jung's 'Sunshine' policy, and Roh Moo Hyun's 'Peace and Prosperity' policy, which could, in due course, bring about a more open and more democratic environment in South Korea. Also, in the post-Cold War era, human rights and democracy themselves have become the goals of South Korea's foreign policy, and South Korea become an ardent supporter of spreading human rights and democracy in international society.

As to Iraq's history, I attempted to reveal Iraq's cycle of dictatorship, ill-liberal foreign occupation and rebellion/coups as a barrier to Iraq's democratic development, which can help justify the use of force by the US-led coalition forces in 2003 so as to initiate a new cycle of cooperation, democracy, peace and prosperity in Iraq. With respect to Iraq's culture, I demonstrated that Islamic culture can be compatible with democracy, which rejects the wrong assumption that Iraq cannot be democratic due to its Islamic culture. Regarding Iraq's politics, I argued that Sunni's dominance, Saddam's dictatorship, Baath Party's role and close relationship between military and politics were obstacles to Iraq's democratic development, and that those factors can help to justify the US-led coalition forces' invasion of Iraq in 2003 as a necessary and right decision, which led to a radical change in Iraqi political system. In terms of Iraq's economy, I revealed that Iraq's economic failure via sanctions and wars brought

about anti-democratic environment, such as poor education, high illiteracy rate and the absence of middle class. With regard to Iraq's military, I emphasized the fact that Saddam's strong military power could not help Iraq's democratic development as long as Saddam's Iraq was an outlaw state which posed an existential threat to its region and international society. In Iraq's foreign policy, I demonstrated that Iraq's foreign policy based on anti-imperialism, pan-Arabism and regional hegemony was not compatible with Iraq's democratic development. To sum up, due to each country's relatively different internal variables, each country has a relatively different path toward democracy – e.g. China (interest), South Korea (legitimacy), and Iraq (force).

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