Loyalty discounts

This paper considers the use of loyalty inducing discounts in vertical supply chains. An upstream manufacturer and a competitive fringe sell differentiated products to a retailer who has private information about the level of stochastic demand. We provide a comparison of market outcomes when the manufacturer uses two-part tariffs (2PT), all-unit quantity discounts (AU), and market share discounts (MS). We show that retailer's risk attitude affects manufacturer's preferences over these three pricing schemes. When the retailer is risk-neutral, it bears all the risk and all three schemes lead to the same outcome. When the retailer is risk-averse, 2PT performs the worst from manufacturer s perspective but it leads to the highest total surplus. For a wide range of parameter values (but not for all) the manufacturer prefers MS to AU. By limiting the retailer's product substitution possibilities MS makes the demand for manufacturer s product more inelastic. This reduces the amount (share of total profits) the manufacturer needs to leave to the retailer for the latter to participate in the scheme.This study is funded from the Valencian Economic Research Institute (IVIE) and the European Commission

Inventory Model with Seasonal Demand: A Specific Application to Haute Couture

In the stochastic multiperiod inventory problem, a vast majority of the literature deals with demand volume uncertainty. Other dimensions of uncertainty have generally been overlooked. In this paper, we develop a newsboy formulation for the aggregate multiperiod inventory problem intended for products of short sales season and without replenishments. A distinguishing characteristic of our formulation is that it takes a time dimension of demand uncertainty into account. The proposed model is particularly suitable for applications in haute couture, i.e., high fashion industry. The model determines the time of switching primary sales effort from one season to the next as well as optimal order quantity for each season with the objective of maximizing expected profit over the planning horizon. We also derive the optimality conditions for the time of switching primary sales effort and order quantity. Furthermore, we show that if time uncertainty and volume uncertainty are independent, order quantity becomes the main decision over the interval of the primary selling season. Finally, we demonstrate that the results from the two-season case can be directly extended to the multi-season case and the limited resource multiple-item case

Supplier selection under disaster uncertainty with joint procurement

Master of ScienceDepartment of Industrial & Manufacturing Systems EngineeringJessica L. Heier StammHealth care organizations must have enough supplies and equipment on hand to adequately respond to events such as terrorist attacks, infectious disease outbreaks, and natural disasters. This is achieved through a robust supply chain system. Nationwide, states are assessing their current supply chains to identify gaps that may present issues during disaster preparedness and response. During an assessment of the Kansas health care supply chain, a number of vulnerabilities were identified, one of which being supplier consolidation. Through mergers and acquisitions, the number of suppliers within the health care field has been decreasing over the years. This can pose problems during disaster response when there is a surge in demand and multiple organizations are relying on the same suppliers to provide equipment and supplies. This thesis explores the potential for joint procurement agreements to encourage supplier diversity by splitting purchasing among multiple suppliers. In joint procurement, two or more customers combine their purchases into one large order so that they can receive quantity discounts from a supplier. This research makes three important contributions to supplier selection under disaster uncertainty. The first of these is the development of a scenario-based supplier selection model under uncertainty with joint procurement. This optimization model can be used to observe customer purchasing decisions in various scenarios while considering the probability of disaster occurrence. Second, the model is applied to a set of experiments to analyze the results when supplier diversity is increased and when joint procurement is introduced. This leads to the third and final contribution: a set of recommendations for health care organization decision makers regarding ways to increase supplier diversity and decrease the risk of disruption associated with disaster occurrence

Bidding in an electricity pay-as-bid auction

One of the main elements of the current reform of electricty trading in the UK is the change from a uniform price auction in the wholesale market to discriminatory pricing. We analyse this change under two polar market structures (perfectly competitive and monopolistic supply), with demand uncertainty. We find that under perfect competition there is a trade-off between efficiency and average prices between the two auction rules. We also establish that a move from uniform to discriminatory pricing under monopoly conditions has a negative impact on profits and output (weakly), and ambiguous implications for prices and welfare.Multi-Unit Auctions; Price discrimination; Electricity

Auction Design for Standard Offer Service

During the transition to a competitive electricity market, when a consumer does not select an electricity provider, who provides service to the customer and at what price? An auction for this "standard offer service" is a market-based way to assign the service responsibility and to determine its price. We explore the design issues in establishing rules for such an auction.Auctions; Pricing; Electric Utilities

Strategic Behavior and Underpricing in Uniform Price Auctions

We study uniform price auctions using a dataset which includes individual bidders' demand schedules in Finnish Treasury auctions during the period 1992-99. Average underpricing amounts to .041% of face value. Theory suggests that underpricing may result from monopsonistic market power. We develop and test robust implications from this theory and ¯nd that it has little support in the data. For example, bidders' individual demand functions do not respond to increased competition in the manner predicted by the theory. We also present evidence that the Finnish Treasury acts strategically, taking into account the fact that the auctions are part of a repeated game between the Treasury and the primary dealers. Empirically, the main driver behind bidder behavior and underpricing is the volatility of bond returns. Since there is no evidence that bidders are risk averse, this suggests that private information and the winner's curse may play an important role in these auctions.Multiunit auctions, uniform price auctions, treasury auctions, market power, demand functions, underpricing, supply uncertainty, seller behavior

Quality Uncertainty and Grain Merchandising Risk: Vomitoxin in Spring Wheat

Marketing, Risk and Uncertainty,

Understanding inter-organizational decision coordination

This article develops a theoretical framework to investigate the interaction and coordination of decision-making processes in a supply chain with multiple and inter-dependent suppliers and customers. Design/Methodology/Approach: Three longitudinal case studies on the decision coordination processes between a European toy supplier and three retailers. Findings: The case studies found different mental models, decision-making behaviours, coordination behaviours and ordering behaviours even though the toy supplier and the three retailers observed quite the same material flow behaviours. The study found explanations for these diverse behaviours by analyzing the mental models and decision-making behaviours of each involved party. Originality/value: The findings explain the conditions which lead to undesirable mental models and decision-making behaviours which affect the coordination of decisions among supply chain members