Regulatory oversight of nuclear safety in Finland : Annual report 2019

Introduction This report is a report on regulatory oversight in the field of nuclear energy provided by the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment once a year as required by Section 121 of the Nuclear Energy Decree. The report will also be provided to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, the Ministry of the Environment, the Finnish Environment Institute and to the environmental authorities of the nuclear facility municipalities. The report is a summary of regulatory oversight of safety in the use of nuclear energy performed by STUK and of the related results in 2019. The regulatory oversight concerned the design, construction and operation of nuclear facilities, decommissioning planning, nuclear waste management and nuclear safeguards. In addition to actual regulatory oversight of safety, the report describes, among other things, the development and implementation of the regulations concerning the use of nuclear energy during the year and the main characteristics of the safety research programmes pertaining to nuclear safety and nuclear waste management in Finland. The annexes to the report contain significant events at the nuclear power plants and inspection summaries of STUK’s inspection programmes. In addition, a summary of the licences accordant with the Nuclear Energy Act granted by STUK in 2019, as required by the Nuclear Energy Decree, is appended to the report. STUK’s Financial Statements and Annual Report 2019 includes an assessment of meeting the performance targets under the performance agreement between the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health and STUK also in view of regulatory oversight in the use of nuclear energy

Regulatory oversight of nuclear safety in Finland : Annual report 2020

Introduction This report is an account on regulatory oversight in the field of nuclear energy provided by the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment (TEM) once a year as required by Section 121 of the Nuclear Energy Decree (161/1988). The report will also be provided to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, the Ministry of the Environment, the Finnish Environment Institute and to the environmental authorities of the nuclear facility municipalities. The report is a summary of regulatory oversight of safety in the use of nuclear energy performed by STUK and of the related results in 2020. STUK’s nuclear safety regulation, as presented in the report, covers the essential oversight data related to the design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning of nuclear facilities. In addition, the report covers similar data on other uses of nuclear energy, including nuclear waste management and nuclear materials. In addition to actual oversight of safety, the report describes, among other things, the development and implementation of the regulations concerning the use of nuclear energy during the year and the main characteristics of the safety research programmes pertaining to nuclear safety and nuclear waste management in Finland. The report appendices contain significant events at the nuclear power plants and inspection summaries of STUK’s inspection programmes. In addition, a summary of the licences accordant with the Nuclear Energy Act granted by STUK in 2020, as required by the Nuclear Energy Decree, is appended to the report. STUK’s Financial Statements and Annual Report 2020 includes an assessment of meeting the performance targets under the performance agreement between the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health and STUK also in view of regulatory oversight in the use of nuclear energy

Technical Letter Report: Evaluation and Analysis of a Few International Periodic Safety Review Summary Reports

At the request of the United States (U.S.) government, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) assembled a team of 20 senior safety experts to review the regulatory framework for the safety of operating nuclear power plants in the United States. This review focused on the effectiveness of the regulatory functions implemented by the NRC and on its commitment to nuclear safety and continuous improvement. One suggestion resulting from that review was that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) incorporate lessons learned from periodic safety reviews (PSRs) performed in other countries as an input to the NRC’s assessment processes. In the U.S., commercial nuclear power plants (NPPs) are granted an initial 40-year operating license, which may be renewed for additional 20-year periods, subject to complying with regulatory requirements. The NRC has established a framework through its inspection, and operational experience processes to ensure the safe operation of licensed nuclear facilities on an ongoing basis. In contrast, most other countries do not impose a specific time limit on the operating licenses for NPPs, they instead require that the utility operating the plant perform PSRs, typically at approximately 10-year intervals, to assure continued safe operation until the next assessment. The staff contracted with Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne) to perform a pilot review of selected translated PSR assessment reports and related documentation from foreign nuclear regulatory authorities to identify any potential new regulatory insights regarding license renewal-related topics and NPP operating experience (OpE). A total of 14 PSR assessment documents from 9 countries were reviewed. For all of the countries except France, individual reports were provided for each of the plants reviewed. In the case of France, three reports were provided that reviewed the performance assessment of thirty-four 900-MWe reactors of similar design commissioned between 1978 and 1988. All of the reports reviewed were the regulator’s assessment of the PSR findings rather than the original PSR report, and all but one were English translations from the original language. In these reviews, it was found that most of the countries base their regulatory guidance to some extent (and often to a large extent) on U.S. design codes and standards, NRC regulatory guidance, and U.S. industry guidance. In addition, many of the observed operational technical issues and OpE events reported for U.S. reactors are also cited in the PSR reports. The PSR reports also identified a number of potential technical material/component performance issues and OpE events that are not commonly reported for U.S. plants

Finnish report on nuclear safety : Finnish 8th national report as referred to in Article 5 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety

Executive summary Finland signed the Convention on Nuclear Safety on 20 September 1994 and it was adopted on 17 June 1994 in the Vienna Diplomatic Conference. The Convention was ratified on 5 January 1996, and it came into force in Finland on 24 October 1996. This report is the Finnish National Report for the Eighth Review Meeting in March/April 2020. There are two operating nuclear power plants in Finland: the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants. The Loviisa plant comprises of two PWR units (pressurised water reactors of VVER type), operated by Fortum Power and Heat Oy (Fortum), and the Olkiluoto plant two BWR units (boiling water reactors), operated by Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO). In addition, a new nuclear power plant unit (PWR) at the Olkiluoto site was granted operating license in March 2019 and is expected to start operation later in 2019. At both sites there are interim storages for spent fuel as well as final disposal facilities for low and intermediate level nuclear wastes. Posiva, a joint company of Fortum and TVO, submitted a construction licence application for the spent nuclear fuel encapsulation plant and disposal facility in the end of 2012. The Government granted the construction licence to Posiva in November 2015. Finland is currently reviewing a construction licence application for Fennovoima Hanhikivi unit 1 (VVER type design) in Pyhäjoki. Since the review is underway, Hanhikivi unit 1 is discussed in this report mainly with regard to the licensing process,organisatorial matters and siting (see Articles 7, 10, 11 and 17 and Annex 5). Furthermore, there is a Triga Mark II research reactor, FiR 1 in Espoo operated by VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland Ltd (VTT). The reactor was permanently shut down in the end of June 2015. VTT applied for a license for the decommissioning in June 2017. Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) gave its statement on VTT’s application to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment in April 2019. After this the first license application for decommissioning phase in Finland will proceed to the Government for the decision making process. In this report, the latest development in the various topics of the Convention on Nuclear Safety is described. Major safety reviews and plant modernisations are explained including safety assessment methods and key results. Safety performance of the Finnish nuclear power plants is also presented by using representative indicators. Finnish regulatory practices in licensing, provision of regulatory guidance, safety assessment, inspection and enforcement are also covered. Major developments in Finland since the Seventh Review Meeting are as follows: updating of legislative and regulatory framework, granting operating license for Olkiluoto 3, renewing the operating license of Olkiluoto 1&2 nuclear power units in 2018 including Periodic Safety Review (PSR). Furthermore, STUK completed its safety assessment of the operating license for decommissioining for the FiR 1 research reactor. Latest development in the various topics of the Convention on Nuclear Safety is described in the relevant articles. Most of the Fukushima Dai-ichi-related safety improvements presented in the Finnish national action plan have already been implemented. A few ongoing measures will be completed in 2019. Further information related to the actions taken in Finland following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant are described in more detail under Articles 16, 17, 18, 19 and Annexes 2, 3 and 4. Finland continues to host and to participate in the international peer reviews. The following missions have been performed or are planned for the period of 2017–2022: • Olkiluoto 1&2 OSART mission. The mission was conducted from 27 February to 16 March 2017 • Loviisa NPP OSART mission. The mission took place in March 2018. • Pre-Operational OSART mission for Olkiluoto 3. The mission took place in March 2018. • WANO follow-up review at Loviisa NPP in 2017. • WANO peer review at Olkiluoto NPP in October 2016 with follow-up in 2018 • IPPAS mission will be performed in 2020. • ARTEMIS mission has been requested for 2022. • IRRS mission will be requested for 2022. In the report, the implementation of each of the Articles 6 to 19 of the Convention is separately evaluated. Based on the evaluation, the following features emphasising Finnish safety management practices in the field of nuclear safety can be concluded: • During the recent years Finnish legislation and regulatory guidance have been further developed, to take into account updates in international requirements, e.g. the Council Directive 2014/87/Euratom amending Directive 2009/71/Euratom, the amendment (2014/52/EU) of Directive 2011/92/EU, and the radiation safety directive (2013/59/Euratom). No deviation from the Convention obligations has been identified in the Finnish regulatory infrastructure including nuclear and radiation safety regulations. • Due to the aforementioned updates of the legislation, and due the fact that since the renewal of YVL Guides in 2013 nearly all IAEA Safety Requirements have been revised, and updated WENRA reference levels have been published, STUK started to update the YVL Guides anew in 2017. Until now (June 2019) 22 updated YVL Guides out of 47 are already published. Rest of the updated guides will be published later in 2019. The revised guides are applied as such for new nuclear facilities. Separate facility specific implementation decisions are made for the existing facilities and facilities under construction. Regular update and implementation of regulatory guides, particularly with regard to nuclear power plants in operation, are unique measures in the international perspective. • The licensees have shown good safety performance in carrying out their safety related responsibilities in the operation and modernisation of existing NPPs. During recent years, only minor operational events (INES 1 and below) were reported and no major safety problems have occurred. After reorganising its activities in 2015, TVO experienced a decline in personnel job satisfaction that resulted in increased personnel turnover which challenged TVO’s management to retain organisational conditions for a good safety performance. Since then TVO has carried out various development actions to correct the situation and STUK has been able to verify proof of the positive effects of the measures taken by TVO. The licensees’ practices are considered to comply with the Convention obligations. • Safety assessment is a continuous process and living full scope levels 1 and 2 probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) practices are effectively used for the further development of safety. Periodic safety review of the Loviisa plant was carried out in 2015–2016, and the periodic safety review of the Olkiluoto plant was carried out in 2016–2018 in the connection of the operating license renewal. Several plant modifications have been carried out at the operating NPPs during the recent years to further improve the safety. Some of these modifications are originating from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident lessons learned. • The resources of STUK have been increased to meet the needs to oversee the construction of the new nuclear facilities in Finland. VTT supports effectively the regulatory body in the safety assessment work by performing safety analyses and providing safety analysis capabilities and tools. The national research programmes SAFIR and KYT develop and maintain the competencies in nuclear safety and waste management to enable STUK to take measures in unexpected events at Finnish plants or elsewhere, and to support decision making for the benefits of society and the environment. • STUK published a new strategy in 2018 covering the period of 2018–2022. The strategy is comprised of nine targets categorizied in three groups and supported by four core values as presented in Figure 1. The implementation of the strategy is underway. FIGURE 1. STUK’s strategy for 2018–2022. Challenges identified by the Seventh Review Meeting The Seventh Review Meeting in 2017 identified some challenges and suggestions to improve nuclear safety in Finland. These issues are included and addressed in this report. The issues were as follows: • To manage simultaneously the oversight of many on-going activities in different life-cycle phases of nuclear facilities. This is a situation that STUK has never dealt with before. - Provisions for plant ageing; I&C and other system modernisations carried out at the existing NPPs (incl. safety improvements); ageing management programmes are in place and re-reviewed in PSRs; - Commissioning of Olkiluoto unit 3, review of the operating licence application, commissioning tests, and start of operation; - Regulatory review of construction license application of Hanhikivi unit 1; - Decommissioning of the FiR 1 research reactor. • To finalise STUK strategic communication plan for raising public awareness and knowledge in risks related to radiation and nuclear utilization. Concerning the first challenge, the mentioned oversight activities are discussed specially in the context of Articles 14 and 19 and in Appendices 4 and 5. The review of the Olkiluoto 3 operating license application, as well as the review of the FiR decommissioning license application have been completed. On the other hand, the review of the CL application of Hanhikivi-1 has been delayed because some of the required application material has not been yet submitted to STUK. Concerning ageing management, STUK completed the assessment of the periodic safety review of Loviisa NPP in 2017, and of Olkiluoto 1&2 in 2018. The ageing management programmes were evaluated as a part of the assessment. The large I&C modernisation project (ELSA) at the Loviisa NPP was completed in the original timetable in 2018. STUK also participated in the Topical Peer Review under the Nuclear Safety Directive 2014/87/EURATOM, completed in 2017. As the main the oversight tasks are known well in advance, STUK is able to consider them in resource planning and knowledge management and in the use of technical support organisations. STUK’s resources and the amount of oversight are discussed in more detail in Article 8. Interest in nuclear power in Finland is increasing, due to on-going new-build projects and public debate about future prospects of so-called SMRs (Small Modular Reactors). With this in mind, communication and information sharing with media and the general public on nuclear and radiation safety has become an increasingly important success factor for STUK, relevant ministries and utilities. Regulatory processes and decisions have to be clear and understandable by the general public. Risks related to radiation should be communicated realistically. Due to this challenge, STUK has carried out a number of development measures to improve its strategic communications and the use of modern communication tools. In particular, STUK has focused on the communication capacity of its personnel. STUK applies the principle that all STUK’s employees have both the right and duty to communicate with public and the media concerning their own area of expertise. For example, STUK’s personnel is encouraged to represent STUK in the social media. STUK has also developed key messages to communicate radiation and nuclear risks, and continued to develop its crisis communication capabilities. Furthermore, STUK has defined strategic goals for communication, and measures – not only the outputs but particularly the outcomes – how communication changes opinions, attitudes and change of behaviour. In addition, in the Seventh Review Meeting, some common major issues were identified based on the Country Group discussions. It was recommended that these issues are taken into account when preparing the national reports. Out of these issues, ageing management and safety culture were chosen to be discussed in the Eighth Review Meeting. The nine common major issues are listed below with reference to the Articles (in brackets) in which the issues are addressed. Summaries related to ageing management and safety culture are given below, more detailed discussion can be found in Articles 14 (ageing management) and 10 (safety culture). • Safety culture (Article 10) • International peer reviews (Annex 6) • Legal framework and independence of regulatory body (Article 7, Article 8) • Financial and human resources (Article 8, Article 11) • Knowledge management (Article 8, Article 11) • Supply chain (Article 13, Article 14) • Managing of safety of ageing nuclear facilities and plant life extensions (Article 14) • Emergency preparedness (Article 16) • Stakeholder consultation & communication (Article 7, Article 8, Annex 6). Ageing management STUK published in 2013 a YVL guide dedicated to ageing management. Up to 2013, the requirements for ageing management were covered by several different guides. In the guide published in 2013, some new requirements were introduced, mainly concerning the scope and content of the ageing management program, annual reporting and management of spare parts for long-lasting accidents. The guide has been updated since then, the latest version was published in February 2019. The implementation of the updated ageing management requirements is underway. The utilities have encountered some challenges in complying with the new requirements. For example, inspections performed after publishing the new guide in 2013 revealed that the amount of spare parts can be inadequate for keeping the plant in a safe state also during prolonged transients and accidents, and that some of the spare parts in the storage have either aged or became obsolete. Another challenge had to do with knowledge and resources allocated for ensuring appropriate ageing management programme at NPPs. An additional challenge is to conduct relevant research to both educate personnel and to identify new ageing mechanisms to develop new inspection or monitoring technologies to detect degradation early enough. During recent years significant progress has taken place in the spare part management. Organisational arrangements have been made and a dedicated database (Proactive Obsolescence Management System) has been introduced in both Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs. Dedicated groups consisting of necessary disciplines such as maintenance, quality control and procurement have taken charge of spare parts in terms of necessary availability and conditions. A generic lesson learned is that the closer the nuclear power plants come to the end of their licensed operation, especially due to the low market price of electricity, the more challenging it is for the licensees to initiate modernisations or other major activities to improve the safety of the NPPs. Instead of renewing a system or a component, modernisation may be rejected or a partial modification is planned resulting in ageing issues in the remaining parts. Finland has successfully applied periodic safety reviews (PSR) for the operating NPPs. The practice has been that the licensee is obliged to demonstrate that the safety of the operations can be ensured and improved also during the next 10 years. In order to do that the licensee has to commit to making safety improvements including necessary major modernisations to address the ageing of structures, systems and components (SSC). An expert group dedicated to ageing management has been established in STUK to oversee how the licensees perform their duties in the ageing management of SSCs. The group, consisting of mechanical, electrical, I&C, civil structure, and human resource experts as well as resident inspectors, plans and coordinates STUK’s regulatory duties pertaining to the ageing of nuclear facility systems, equipment and structures. If any shortcomings are found, for example in the condition monitoring or maintenance, the group contacts the licensee for clarifications or corrective actions. The group also follows up findings from other countries and evaluates their possible applicability to the ageing management of the Finnish nuclear power plants. Finland participated in the Topical Peer Review (TPR) “Ageing Management” under the Nuclear Safety Directive 2014/87/EURATOM, carried out in 2017–18. The overall conclusion was that the ageing management has been satisfactory. However, some challenges and areas for improvement, as well as good practices, were identified and Finland is establishing a national action plan to address the findings. The results of the TPR are discussed under Article 14. Safety Culture The STUK Regulation sets a binding requirement for the licensees to maintain a good safety culture where safety is the priority. STUK revised the Guide YVL A.3 setting requirements for leadership and management for safety based on the IAEA GSR Part 2. STUK carries out safety culture oversight by collecting and analysing observations from resident inspectors, documents, events and from other interactions with the licensee. STUK has implemented a tool for recording the observations. STUK also conducts specific inspections focusing on Leadership and Safety culture. STUK also follows the licensees’ safety culture self-assessments (e.g. results, possible changes in the methodology, actions decided based on the results). Furthermore, STUK has utilised VTT to carry out independent safety culture assessments in the licensee organisations. Independent safety culture assessments were done at Olkiluoto 1 and 2 (2016) and Olkiluoto 3 (2017) to support STUK in the Licence Renewal of Olkiluoto 1 and 2 and Operating Licence process of Olkiluoto 3. VTT also carried out an independent safety culture assessment for Fennovoima and its plant supplier and main contractor organisation in 2017. The utilities employ several different means for maintaining good safety culture. Priority of safety is emphasised in the safety or company policies. In addition to high level policy, the licensees have safety culture programmes, road maps or development plans for implementing the measures for maintaining good safety culture. The licensees monitor the safety culture by regular surveys and in-depth assessments. They also have in their organisations groups or functions independent of the line organisation to oversee and discuss safety and safety culture matters. Corrective action groups or functions exist. Training – including safety culture topics – is given to all newcomers and usually also to contractors. The safety significant contractors are required to familiarise their workforce with safety culture principles which is one of the topics of licensees’s audits on contractors and suppliers. However, some challenges have appeard during the recent years.TVO reorganised its activities in 2015 resulting also in personnel reductions. These changes led to a decline in personnel job satisfaction and working climate. To ensure that these conditions would not affect the safety culture and safe operation, TVO has during the period 2016–2018 carried out various development actions to correct the situation. The effective corrective actions and monitoring their effectiveness were required by STUK. In 2018 and 2019, an improvement in the job satisfaction can be seen in TVO’s personnel surveys. Concerning Fennovoima, an independent safety culture assessment in 2017 revealed some deficiencies. The assessment covered also the plant supplier and the main contractor. The conclusion was that the safety culture at Fennovoima was at an acceptable level. However, several areas required improvements. These included e.g. the responsibilities for handling safety related issues, nuclear specific competencies, control of the supply chain and climate for raising concerns.The safety culture assessment also concluded that the safety culture at the plant supplier and at the main contractor need significant further development. At STUK, safety is emphasised in the Management System. In 2013, all the departments made a self-assessment of their safety culture. The results were used in updating STUK’s safety and quality policy. In 2016 a safety culture survey was performed. In 2018 a comprehensive assessment of STUK’s safety culture was performed by external experts. The safety culture at STUK was considered to be at a good level and especially safety was considered to be a true value in STUK’s organization. Experts also identified several areas for improvement (e.g. learning from events and near misses, risk management, monitoring of safety culture), and these are addressed in a safety culture program which is under preparation. As a part of the preparation, a safety culture event was organised for STUK in April 2019 to discuss safety culture and particularly the risk management and learning from events and experience. To better understand the ingrained conventions in the Finnish culture and their possible positive and/or negative impacts on safety culture, STUK has continued to explore the sociological factors influencing safety culture in the Finnish nuclear community within the Finnish nuclear research program SAFIR 2018. Furthermore, in March 2019 STUK hosted the OECD NEA and WANO managed Country-Specific Safety Culture Forum in Helsinki where personnel from the Finnish nuclear utilities and STUK discussed the country-specific culture traits and their possible influences on the nuclear safety culture. Report is being prepared by the NEA. Challenges and good practices identified by Finland Finland has identified the following challenges: • Implementation of STUK’s strategic objective related to the implementation of more risk-informed and performance-based regulation and oversight, and highlighting licensee’s responsibility for s

Nuclear Power

The world of the twenty first century is an energy consuming society. Due to increasing population and living standards, each year the world requires more energy and new efficient systems for delivering it. Furthermore, the new systems must be inherently safe and environmentally benign. These realities of today's world are among the reasons that lead to serious interest in deploying nuclear power as a sustainable energy source. Today's nuclear reactors are safe and highly efficient energy systems that offer electricity and a multitude of co-generation energy products ranging from potable water to heat for industrial applications. The goal of the book is to show the current state-of-the-art in the covered technical areas as well as to demonstrate how general engineering principles and methods can be applied to nuclear power systems