16,750 research outputs found
Public Congestion Network Situations, and Related Games
This paper analyzes congestion effects on network situations from a cooperative game theoretic perspective. In network situations players have to connect themselves to a source. Since we consider publicly available networks any group of players is allowed to use the entire network to establish their connection. We deal with the problem of finding an optimal network, the main focus of this paper is however to discuss the arising cost allocation problem. For this we introduce two different transferable utility cost games. For concave cost functions we use the direct cost game, where coalition costs are based on what a coalition can do in absence of other players. This paper however mainly discusses network situations with convex cost functions, which are analyzed by the use of the marginal cost game. In this game the cost of a coalition is defined as the additional cost it induces when it joins the complementary group of players. We prove that this game is concave. Furthermore, we define a cost allocation by means of three egalitarian principles, and show that this allocation is an element of the core of the marginal cost game. These results are extended to a class of continuous network situations and associated games.Congestion;network situations;cooperative games;public
Public Congestion Network Situations, and Related Games
This paper analyzes congestion effects on network situations from a cooperative game theoretic perspective. In network situations players have to connect themselves to a source. Since we consider publicly available networks any group of players is allowed to use the entire network to establish their connection. We deal with the problem of finding an optimal network, the main focus of this paper is however to discuss the arising cost allocation problem. For this we introduce two different transferable utility cost games. For concave cost functions we use the direct cost game, where coalition costs are based on what a coalition can do in absence of other players. This paper however mainly discusses network situations with convex cost functions, which are analyzed by the use of the marginal cost game. In this game the cost of a coalition is defined as the additional cost it induces when it joins the complementary group of players. We prove that this game is concave. Furthermore, we define a cost allocation by means of three egalitarian principles, and show that this allocation is an element of the core of the marginal cost game. These results are extended to a class of continuous network situations and associated games.
DxNAT - Deep Neural Networks for Explaining Non-Recurring Traffic Congestion
Non-recurring traffic congestion is caused by temporary disruptions, such as
accidents, sports games, adverse weather, etc. We use data related to real-time
traffic speed, jam factors (a traffic congestion indicator), and events
collected over a year from Nashville, TN to train a multi-layered deep neural
network. The traffic dataset contains over 900 million data records. The
network is thereafter used to classify the real-time data and identify
anomalous operations. Compared with traditional approaches of using statistical
or machine learning techniques, our model reaches an accuracy of 98.73 percent
when identifying traffic congestion caused by football games. Our approach
first encodes the traffic across a region as a scaled image. After that the
image data from different timestamps is fused with event- and time-related
data. Then a crossover operator is used as a data augmentation method to
generate training datasets with more balanced classes. Finally, we use the
receiver operating characteristic (ROC) analysis to tune the sensitivity of the
classifier. We present the analysis of the training time and the inference time
separately
Learning an Unknown Network State in Routing Games
We study learning dynamics induced by myopic travelers who repeatedly play a
routing game on a transportation network with an unknown state. The state
impacts cost functions of one or more edges of the network. In each stage,
travelers choose their routes according to Wardrop equilibrium based on public
belief of the state. This belief is broadcast by an information system that
observes the edge loads and realized costs on the used edges, and performs a
Bayesian update to the prior stage's belief. We show that the sequence of
public beliefs and edge load vectors generated by the repeated play converge
almost surely. In any rest point, travelers have no incentive to deviate from
the chosen routes and accurately learn the true costs on the used edges.
However, the costs on edges that are not used may not be accurately learned.
Thus, learning can be incomplete in that the edge load vectors at rest point
and complete information equilibrium can be different. We present some
conditions for complete learning and illustrate situations when such an outcome
is not guaranteed
Statics and dynamics of selfish interactions in distributed service systems
We study a class of games which model the competition among agents to access
some service provided by distributed service units and which exhibit congestion
and frustration phenomena when service units have limited capacity. We propose
a technique, based on the cavity method of statistical physics, to characterize
the full spectrum of Nash equilibria of the game. The analysis reveals a large
variety of equilibria, with very different statistical properties. Natural
selfish dynamics, such as best-response, usually tend to large-utility
equilibria, even though those of smaller utility are exponentially more
numerous. Interestingly, the latter actually can be reached by selecting the
initial conditions of the best-response dynamics close to the saturation limit
of the service unit capacities. We also study a more realistic stochastic
variant of the game by means of a simple and effective approximation of the
average over the random parameters, showing that the properties of the
average-case Nash equilibria are qualitatively similar to the deterministic
ones.Comment: 30 pages, 10 figure
Mean-Field-Type Games in Engineering
A mean-field-type game is a game in which the instantaneous payoffs and/or
the state dynamics functions involve not only the state and the action profile
but also the joint distributions of state-action pairs. This article presents
some engineering applications of mean-field-type games including road traffic
networks, multi-level building evacuation, millimeter wave wireless
communications, distributed power networks, virus spread over networks, virtual
machine resource management in cloud networks, synchronization of oscillators,
energy-efficient buildings, online meeting and mobile crowdsensing.Comment: 84 pages, 24 figures, 183 references. to appear in AIMS 201
Group formation: The interaction of increasing returns and preferences' diversity
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 focuses on competition in a simple economy under increasing returns to scale and heterogeneous consumers. The concept of sustainable oligopoly is discussed and analyzed. Section 3 studies in a more general and abstract set up competition among groups in the absence of spillovers. Whereas Section 3 develops some insights of Section 2, it can be read first. Finally Section 4 analyzes public decisions in a simple public good economy through the previous approach, and addresses the interaction between free mobility and free entry under negative externalities.group formation
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