Pseudorandomness from Shrinkage

One powerful theme in complexity theory and pseudorandomness in the past few decades has been the use lower bounds to give pseudorandom generators (PRGs). However, the general results using this hardness vs. randomness paradigm suffer a quantitative loss in parameters, and hence do not give nontrivial implications for models where we don’t know super-polynomial lower bounds but do know lower bounds of a fixed polynomial. We show that when such lower bounds are proved using random restrictions, we can construct PRGs which are essentially best possible without in turn improving the lower bounds. More specifically, say that a circuit family has shrinkage exponent Γ if a random restriction leaving a p fraction of variables unset shrinks the size of any circuit in the family by a factor of pΓ+o(1). Our PRG uses a seed of length s1/(Γ+1)+o(1) to fool circuits in the family of size s. By using this generic construction, we get PRGs with polynomially small error for the following classes of circuits of size s and with the following seed lengths: 1. For de Morgan formulas, seed length s1/3+o(1); 2. For formulas over an arbitrary basis, seed length s1/2+o(1); 3. For read-once de Morgan formulas, seed length s.234...; 4. For branching programs of size s, seed length s1/2+o(1). The previous best PRGs known for these classes used seeds of length bigger than n/2 to output n bits, and worked only when the size s = O(n) [BPW11]

Algebraic and Combinatorial Methods in Computational Complexity

At its core, much of Computational Complexity is concerned with combinatorial objects and structures. But it has often proven true that the best way to prove things about these combinatorial objects is by establishing a connection (perhaps approximate) to a more well-behaved algebraic setting. Indeed, many of the deepest and most powerful results in Computational Complexity rely on algebraic proof techniques. The PCP characterization of NP and the Agrawal-Kayal-Saxena polynomial-time primality test are two prominent examples. Recently, there have been some works going in the opposite direction, giving alternative combinatorial proofs for results that were originally proved algebraically. These alternative proofs can yield important improvements because they are closer to the underlying problems and avoid the losses in passing to the algebraic setting. A prominent example is Dinur's proof of the PCP Theorem via gap amplification which yielded short PCPs with only a polylogarithmic length blowup (which had been the focus of significant research effort up to that point). We see here (and in a number of recent works) an exciting interplay between algebraic and combinatorial techniques. This seminar aims to capitalize on recent progress and bring together researchers who are using a diverse array of algebraic and combinatorial methods in a variety of settings

Super-Linear Gate and Super-Quadratic Wire Lower Bounds for Depth-Two and Depth-Three Threshold Circuits

In order to formally understand the power of neural computing, we first need to crack the frontier of threshold circuits with two and three layers, a regime that has been surprisingly intractable to analyze. We prove the first super-linear gate lower bounds and the first super-quadratic wire lower bounds for depth-two linear threshold circuits with arbitrary weights, and depth-three majority circuits computing an explicit function. $\bullet$ We prove that for all $\epsilon\gg \sqrt{\log(n)/n}$, the linear-time computable Andreev's function cannot be computed on a $(1/2+\epsilon)$-fraction of $n$-bit inputs by depth-two linear threshold circuits of $o(\epsilon^3 n^{3/2}/\log^3 n)$ gates, nor can it be computed with $o(\epsilon^{3} n^{5/2}/\log^{7/2} n)$ wires. This establishes an average-case ``size hierarchy'' for threshold circuits, as Andreev's function is computable by uniform depth-two circuits of $o(n^3)$ linear threshold gates, and by uniform depth-three circuits of $O(n)$ majority gates. $\bullet$ We present a new function in $P$ based on small-biased sets, which we prove cannot be computed by a majority vote of depth-two linear threshold circuits with $o(n^{3/2}/\log^3 n)$ gates, nor with $o(n^{5/2}/\log^{7/2}n)$ wires. $\bullet$ We give tight average-case (gate and wire) complexity results for computing PARITY with depth-two threshold circuits; the answer turns out to be the same as for depth-two majority circuits. The key is a new random restriction lemma for linear threshold functions. Our main analytical tool is the Littlewood-Offord Lemma from additive combinatorics

Pseudorandomness for Regular Branching Programs via Fourier Analysis

We present an explicit pseudorandom generator for oblivious, read-once, permutation branching programs of constant width that can read their input bits in any order. The seed length is $O(\log^2 n)$, where $n$ is the length of the branching program. The previous best seed length known for this model was $n^{1/2+o(1)}$, which follows as a special case of a generator due to Impagliazzo, Meka, and Zuckerman (FOCS 2012) (which gives a seed length of $s^{1/2+o(1)}$ for arbitrary branching programs of size $s$). Our techniques also give seed length $n^{1/2+o(1)}$ for general oblivious, read-once branching programs of width $2^{n^{o(1)}}$, which is incomparable to the results of Impagliazzo et al.Our pseudorandom generator is similar to the one used by Gopalan et al. (FOCS 2012) for read-once CNFs, but the analysis is quite different; ours is based on Fourier analysis of branching programs. In particular, we show that an oblivious, read-once, regular branching program of width $w$ has Fourier mass at most $(2w^2)^k$ at level $k$, independent of the length of the program.Comment: RANDOM 201

Non-Malleable Codes for Small-Depth Circuits

We construct efficient, unconditional non-malleable codes that are secure against tampering functions computed by small-depth circuits. For constant-depth circuits of polynomial size (i.e. $\mathsf{AC^0}$ tampering functions), our codes have codeword length $n = k^{1+o(1)}$ for a $k$-bit message. This is an exponential improvement of the previous best construction due to Chattopadhyay and Li (STOC 2017), which had codeword length $2^{O(\sqrt{k})}$. Our construction remains efficient for circuit depths as large as $\Theta(\log(n)/\log\log(n))$ (indeed, our codeword length remains $n\leq k^{1+\epsilon})$, and extending our result beyond this would require separating $\mathsf{P}$ from $\mathsf{NC^1}$. We obtain our codes via a new efficient non-malleable reduction from small-depth tampering to split-state tampering. A novel aspect of our work is the incorporation of techniques from unconditional derandomization into the framework of non-malleable reductions. In particular, a key ingredient in our analysis is a recent pseudorandom switching lemma of Trevisan and Xue (CCC 2013), a derandomization of the influential switching lemma from circuit complexity; the randomness-efficiency of this switching lemma translates into the rate-efficiency of our codes via our non-malleable reduction.Comment: 26 pages, 4 figure

Pseudorandom Bits for Oblivious Branching Programs

We construct a pseudorandom generator that fools known-order read-k oblivious branching programs and, more generally, any linear length oblivious branching program. For polynomial width branching programs, the seed lengths in our constructions are O(n^(1−1/2^(k−1))) (for the read-k case) and O(n/log log n) (for the linear length case). Previously, the best construction for these models required seed length (1 − Ω(1))n