15 research outputs found
Pseudo Flawed-Smudging Generators and Their Application to Indistinguishability Obfuscation
We introduce Pseudo Flawed-smudging Generators (PFGs). A PFG is an expanding function whose outputs satisfy a weak form of pseudo-randomness. Roughly speaking, for some polynomial bound , and every distribution over -bounded noise vectors, it guarantees that the distribution of is indistinguishable from that of , where is a random sample from , and is another independent sample from conditioned on agreeing with at a few, , coordinates. In other words, hides at all but a few coordinates. We show that assuming LWE and the existence of constant-locality Pseudo-Random Generators (PRGs), there is a construction of IO from 1) a PFG that has polynomial stretch and polynomially bounded outputs, and 2) a Functional Encryption (FE) scheme able to compute this PFG. Such FE can be built from degree multilinear map if the PFG is computable by a degree polynomial.
Toward basing IO on bilinear maps, inspired by [Ananth et. al. Eprint 2018], we further consider PFGs with partial pubic input --- they have the form and satisfy the aforementioned pseudo flawed-smudging property even when is public. When using such PFGs, it suffices to replace FE with a weaker notion of partially hiding FE (PHFE) whose decryption reveals the public input in addition to the output of the computation. We construct PHFE for polynomials that are quadratic in the private input , but have up to polynomial degree in the public input , subject to certain size constraints, from the SXDH assumption over bilinear map groups.
Regarding candidates of PFGs with partial public input, we note that the family of cubic polynomials proposed by Ananth et. al. can serve as candidate PFGs, and can be evaluated by our PHFE from bilinear maps. Toward having more candidates, we present a transformation for converting the private input of a constant-degree PFG into a public input, by hiding as noises in LWE samples, provided that is sampled from a LWE noise distribution and satisfies a stronger security property
Indistinguishability Obfuscation Without Multilinear Maps: New Paradigms via Low Degree Weak Pseudorandomness and Security Amplification
The existence of secure indistinguishability obfuscators (iO) has far-reaching implications, significantly expanding the scope of problems amenable to cryptographic study. All known approaches to constructing iO rely on -linear maps.
While secure bilinear maps are well established in cryptographic literature, the security of candidates for is poorly understood. We propose a new approach to constructing iO for general circuits. Unlike all previously known realizations of iO, we avoid the use of -linear maps of degree .
At the heart of our approach is the assumption that a new weak pseudorandom object exists. We consider two related variants of these objects, which we call perturbation resilient generator (RG) and pseudo flawed-smudging generator (PFG), respectively. At a high level, both objects are polynomially expanding functions whose outputs partially hide (or smudge) small noise vectors when added to them. We further require that they are computable by a family of degree-3 polynomials over . We show how they can be used to construct functional encryption schemes with weak security guarantees. Finally, we use novel amplification techniques to obtain full security.
As a result, we obtain iO for general circuits assuming:
- Subexponentially secure LWE
- Bilinear Maps
- -secure 3-block-local PRGs
- RGs or PFG
Sum-of-Squares Meets Program Obfuscation, Revisited
We develop attacks on the security of variants of pseudo-random generators computed by quadratic polynomials. In particular we give a general condition for breaking the one-way property of mappings where every output is a quadratic polynomial (over the reals) of the input. As a corollary, we break the degree-2 candidates for security assumptions recently proposed for constructing indistinguishability obfuscation by Ananth, Jain and Sahai (ePrint 2018) and Agrawal (ePrint 2018). We present conjectures that would imply our attacks extend to a wider variety of instances, and in particular offer experimental evidence that they break assumption of Lin-Matt (ePrint 2018).
Our algorithms use semidefinite programming, and in particular, results on low-rank recovery (Recht, Fazel, Parrilo 2007) and matrix completion (Gross 2009)
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Complexity Theory
Computational Complexity Theory is the mathematical study of the intrinsic power and limitations of computational resources like time, space, or randomness. The current workshop focused on recent developments in various sub-areas including arithmetic complexity, Boolean complexity, communication complexity, cryptography, probabilistic proof systems, pseudorandomness, and quantum computation. Many of the developments are related to diverse mathematical fields such as algebraic geometry, combinatorial number theory, probability theory, representation theory, and the theory of error-correcting codes
New Methods for Indistinguishability Obfuscation: Bootstrapping and Instantiation
Constructing indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) [BGI+01] is a central open question in cryptography. We provide new methods to make progress towards this goal. Our contributions may be summarized as follows:
1. {\textbf Bootstrapping}. In a recent work, Lin and Tessaro [LT17] (LT) show that iO may be constructed using i) Functional Encryption (FE) for polynomials of degree , ii) Pseudorandom Generators (PRG) with blockwise locality and polynomial expansion, and iii) Learning With Errors (LWE). Since there exist constructions of FE for quadratic polynomials from standard assumptions on bilinear maps [Lin17, BCFG17], the ideal scenario would be to set , yielding iO from widely believed assumptions.
Unfortunately, it was shown soon after [LV17,BBKK17] that PRG with block locality and the expansion factor required by the LT construction, concretely , where is the input length and is the block length, do not exist. In the worst case, these lower bounds rule out 2-block local PRG with stretch . While [LV17,BBKK17] provided strong negative evidence for constructing iO based on bilinear maps, they could not rule out the possibility completely; a tantalizing gap has remained. Given the current state of lower bounds, the existence of 2 block local PRG with expansion factor remains open, although this stretch does not suffice for the LT bootstrapping, and is hence unclear to be relevant for iO.
In this work, we improve the state of affairs as follows.
(a) Weakening requirements on PRGs: In this work, we show that the narrow window of expansion factors left open by lower bounds do suffice for iO. We show a new method to construct FE for from i) FE for degree L polynomials, ii) PRGs of block locality and expansion factor , and iii) LWE (or RLWE). Our method of bootstrapping is completely different from all known methods and does not go via randomizing polynomials. This re-opens the possibility of realizing iO from block local PRG, SXDH on Bilinear maps and LWE.
(b) Broadening class of sufficient PRGs: Our bootstrapping theorem may be instantiated with a broader class of pseudorandom generators than hitherto considered for iO, and may circumvent lower bounds known for the arithmetic degree of iO -sufficient PRGs [LV17,BBKK17]; in particular, these may admit instantiations with arithmetic degree , yielding iO with the additional assumptions of SXDH on Bilinear maps and LWE. In more detail, we may use the following two classes of PRG:
i) Non-Boolean PRGs: We may use pseudorandom generators whose inputs and outputs need not be Boolean but may be integers restricted to a small (polynomial) range. Additionally, the outputs are not required to be pseudorandom but must only satisfy a milder indistinguishability property. We tentatively propose initializing these PRGs using the multivariate quadratic assumption (MQ) which has been widely studied in the literature [MI88,Wol05,DY09] and against the general case of which, no efficient attacks are known.
We note that our notion of non Boolean PRGs is qualitatively equivalent to the notion of RGs defined in the concurrent work of Ananth, Jain, Khurana and Sahai [AJKS18] except that RG are weaker, in that they allow the adversary to win the game with probability whereas we require that the adversary only wins with standard negligible probability. By relying on the security amplification theorem of [AJKS18] in a black box way, our construction can also make do with the weaker notion of security considered by [AJKS18].
ii) Correlated Noise Generators: We introduce an even weaker class of pseudorandom generators, which we call correlated noise generators (CNG) which may not only be non-Boolean but are required to satisfy an even milder (seeming) indistinguishability property.
(c) Assumptions and Efficiency. Our bootstrapping theorems can be based on the hardness of the Learning With Errors problem (LWE) or its ring variant (RLWE) and can compile FE for degree polynomials directly to FE for . Previous work compiles FE for degree polynomials to FE for to FE for to iO [LV16,Lin17,AS17,GGHRSW13].
2. Instantiating Primitives. In this work, we provide the first direct candidate of FE for constant degree polynomials from new assumptions on lattices. Our construction is new and does not go via multilinear maps or graded encoding schemes as all previous constructions. In more detail, let be the class of circuits with depth and output length . Then, for any , our scheme achieves , and {\sf Time({encrypt})} =O(|\vecx|\cdot 2^d \cdot \poly(\kappa)) where is the security parameter. This suffices to instantiate the bootstrapping step above. Our construction is based on the ring learning with errors assumption (RLWE) as well as new untested assumptions on NTRU rings.
We provide a detailed security analysis and discuss why previously known attacks in the context of multilinear maps, especially zeroizing attacks and annihilation attacks, do not appear to apply to our setting. We caution that the assumptions underlying our construction must be subject to rigorous cryptanalysis before any confidence can be gained in their security. However, their significant departure from known multilinear map based constructions make them, we feel, a potentially fruitful new direction to explore. Additionally, being based entirely on lattices, we believe that security against classical attacks will likely imply security against quantum attacks. Note that this feature is not enjoyed by instantiations that make any use of bilinear maps even if secure instances of weak PRGs, as defined by the present work, the follow-up by Lin and Matt [LM18] and the independent work by Ananth, Jain, Khurana and Sahai [AJKS18] are found
On the Invalidity of LV16/Lin17 Obfuscation Schemes
Indistinguishability obfuscation (IO) is at the frontier of cryptography research for several years. LV16/Lin17 obfuscation schemes are famous progresses towards simplifying obfuscation mechanism. In fact, these two schemes only constructed two compact functional encryption (CFE) algorithms, while other things were taken to AJ15 IO frame or BV15 IO frame. That is, CFE algorithms are inserted into AJ15 IO frame or BV15 IO frame to form a complete IO scheme. The basic structure of two CFE algorithms can be described in the following way. The polynomial-time-computable Boolean function is transformed into a group of low-degree low-locality component functions by using randomized encoding, while some public combination of values of component functions is the value of original Boolean function. The encryptor uses constant-degree multilinear maps (rather than polynomial-degree multilinear maps) to encrypt independent variables of component functions. The decryptor uses zero-testing tool of multilinear maps to obtain values of component functions (rather than to obtain values of independent variables), and then uses public combination to obtain the value of original Boolean function.
In this paper we restrict IO to be a real white box (RWB). Under such restriction we point out that LV16/Lin17 CFE algorithms being inserted into AJ15 IO frame are invalid. More detailedly, such insertion makes the adversary gradually learn the shape of the function, therefore the scheme is not secure. In other words, such scheme is not a real IO scheme, but rather a garbling scheme. It needs to be said that RWB restriction is reasonable, which means the essential contribution of IO for cryptography research
Concurrent-Secure Two-Party Computation in Two Rounds from Subexponential LWE
Very recently, two works were able to construct two-round secure multi-party computation (MPC) protocols in the plain model, without setup, relying on the superpolynomial simulation framework of Pass [Pas03]. The first work [ABG+21] achieves this relying on subexponential non-interactive witness indistinguishable arguments, the subexponential SXDH assumption, and the existence of a special type of non-interactive non-malleable commitment. The second work [FJK21] additionally achieves concurrent security, and relies on subexponential quantum hardness of the learning-with-errors (LWE) problem, subexponential classical hardness of SXDH, the existence of a subexponentially-secure (classically-hard) indistinguishablity obfuscation (iO) scheme, and time-lock puzzles.
This paper focuses on the assumptions necessary to construct secure computation protocols in two rounds without setup, focusing on the subcase of two-party functionalities. In this particular case, we show how to build a two-round, concurrent-secure, two-party computation (2PC) protocol based on a single, standard, post-quantum assumption, namely subexponential hardness of the learning-with-errors (LWE) problem.
We note that our protocol is the first two-round concurrent-secure 2PC protocol that does not require the existence of a one-round non-malleable commitment (NMC). Instead, we are able to use the two-round NMCs of [KS17a], which is instantiable from subexponential LWE
Indistinguishability Obfuscation from LPN over F_p, DLIN, and PRGs in NC^0
In this work, we study what minimal sets of assumptions suffice for constructing indistinguishability obfuscation (). We prove:
{\bf Theorem}(Informal): Assume sub-exponential security of the following assumptions:
- the Learning Parity with Noise () assumption over general prime fields with
polynomially many samples and error rate , where is the dimension of the secret, and is any constant;
- the existence of a Boolean Pseudo-Random Generator () in with stretch , where is the length of the seed, and is any constant;
- the Decision Linear () assumption on symmetric bilinear groups of prime order.
Then, (subexponentially secure) indistinguishability obfuscation for all polynomial-size circuits exists. Further, assuming only polynomial security of the aforementioned assumptions, there exists collusion resistant public-key functional encryption for all polynomial-size circuits.}
This removes the reliance on the Learning With Errors (LWE) assumption from the recent work of [Jain, Lin, Sahai STOC\u2721]. As a consequence, we obtain the first fully homomorphic encryption scheme that does not rely on any lattice-based hardness assumption.
Our techniques feature a new notion of randomized encoding called Preprocessing Randomized Encoding (PRE) that, essentially, can be computed in the exponent of pairing groups. When combined with other new techniques, PRE gives a much more streamlined construction of \iO while still maintaining reliance only on well-studied assumptions
Indistinguishability Obfuscation Without Multilinear Maps: iO from LWE, Bilinear Maps, and Weak Pseudorandomness
The existence of secure indistinguishability obfuscators (iO) has far-reaching implications, significantly expanding the scope of problems amenable to cryptographic study. All known approaches to
constructing iO rely on -linear maps which allow the encoding of elements from a large domain, evaluating degree polynomials on them, and testing if the output is zero. While secure bilinear maps are well established in cryptographic literature, the security of candidates for is poorly understood.
We propose a new approach to constructing iO for general circuits. Unlike all previously known realizations of iO, we avoid the use of -linear maps of degree .
At the heart of our approach is the assumption that a new weak pseudorandom object exists, that we call a perturbation resilient generator (). Informally, a maps integers to integers, and has the property that for any sufficiently short vector , all efficient adversaries must fail to distinguish the distributions and (), with at least some probability that is inverse polynomial in the security parameter. s have further implementability requirements; most notably they must be computable by a family of degree-3 polynomials over . We use techniques building upon the Dense Model Theorem to deal with adversaries that have nontrivial but non-overwhelming distinguishing advantage. In particular, we obtain a new security amplification theorem for functional encryption.
As a result, we obtain iO for general circuits assuming:
\begin{itemize}
\item Subexponentially secure LWE
\item Bilinear Maps
\item \poly(\lambda)-secure 3-block-local PRGs
\item (1-1/\poly(\lambda))-secure s
\end{itemize
From FE Combiners to Secure MPC and Back
Functional encryption (FE) has incredible applications towards computing on encrypted data. However, constructing the most general form of this primitive has remained elusive. Although some candidate constructions exist, they rely on nonstandard assumptions, and thus, their security has been questioned. An FE combiner attempts to make use of these candidates while minimizing the trust placed on any individual FE candidate. Informally, an FE combiner takes in a set of FE candidates and outputs a secure FE scheme if at least one of the candidates is secure.
Another fundamental area in cryptography is secure multi-party computation (MPC), which has been extensively studied for several decades. In this work, we initiate a formal study of the relationship between functional encryption (FE) combiners and secure multi-party computation (MPC). In particular, we show implications in both directions between these primitives. As a consequence of these implications, we obtain the following main results.
1) A two round semi-honest MPC protocol in the plain model secure against up to (n-1) corruptions with communication complexity proportional only to the depth of the circuit being computed assuming LWE. Prior two round protocols that achieved this communication complexity required a common reference string.
2) A functional encryption combiner based on pseudorandom generators (PRGs) in NC^1. Such PRGs can be instantiated from assumptions such as DDH and LWE. Previous constructions of FE combiners were known only from the learning with errors assumption. Using this result, we build a universal construction of functional encryption: an explicit construction of functional encryption based only on the assumptions that functional encryption exists and PRGs in NC^1