Reasoning about Minimal Belief and Negation as Failure

We investigate the problem of reasoning in the propositional fragment of MBNF, the logic of minimal belief and negation as failure introduced by Lifschitz, which can be considered as a unifying framework for several nonmonotonic formalisms, including default logic, autoepistemic logic, circumscription, epistemic queries, and logic programming. We characterize the complexity and provide algorithms for reasoning in propositional MBNF. In particular, we show that entailment in propositional MBNF lies at the third level of the polynomial hierarchy, hence it is harder than reasoning in all the above mentioned propositional formalisms for nonmonotonic reasoning. We also prove the exact correspondence between negation as failure in MBNF and negative introspection in Moore's autoepistemic logic

SAT-Based Decision Procedures for Automated Reasoning: a Unifying Perspective

Propositional reasoning (SAT) is an essential part of many reasoning tasks. Many problems in computer science can be compiled to SAT and then effectively decided using state-of-the-art solvers. Alternatively, if reduction to SAT is not feasible, the ideas and technology of state-of-the-art SAT solvers can be useful in deciding the propositional component of the reasoning task being considered. This last approach has been used in different contexts by different authors, many times by authors of this paper. Because of the essential role played by the SAT solver, these decision procedures have been called "SAT-based". SAT-based decision procedures have been proposed for various logics, but also in other areas such as planning. In this paper we present a unifying perspective on the various SAT-based approaches to these different reasoning tasks

The Complexity of Reasoning for Fragments of Default Logic

Default logic was introduced by Reiter in 1980. In 1992, Gottlob classified the complexity of the extension existence problem for propositional default logic as \SigmaPtwo-complete, and the complexity of the credulous and skeptical reasoning problem as SigmaP2-complete, resp. PiP2-complete. Additionally, he investigated restrictions on the default rules, i.e., semi-normal default rules. Selman made in 1992 a similar approach with disjunction-free and unary default rules. In this paper we systematically restrict the set of allowed propositional connectives. We give a complete complexity classification for all sets of Boolean functions in the meaning of Post's lattice for all three common decision problems for propositional default logic. We show that the complexity is a hexachotomy (SigmaP2-, DeltaP2-, NP-, P-, NL-complete, trivial) for the extension existence problem, while for the credulous and skeptical reasoning problem we obtain similar classifications without trivial cases.Comment: Corrected versio

Characterizing and Reasoning about Probabilistic and Non-Probabilistic Expectation

Expectation is a central notion in probability theory. The notion of expectation also makes sense for other notions of uncertainty. We introduce a propositional logic for reasoning about expectation, where the semantics depends on the underlying representation of uncertainty. We give sound and complete axiomatizations for the logic in the case that the underlying representation is (a) probability, (b) sets of probability measures, (c) belief functions, and (d) possibility measures. We show that this logic is more expressive than the corresponding logic for reasoning about likelihood in the case of sets of probability measures, but equi-expressive in the case of probability, belief, and possibility. Finally, we show that satisfiability for these logics is NP-complete, no harder than satisfiability for propositional logic.Comment: To appear in Journal of the AC