Proportionality and the Limits of Welfarism

We study two influential voting rules proposed in the 1890s by Phragm\'en and Thiele, which elect a committee or parliament of k candidates which proportionally represents the voters. Voters provide their preferences by approving an arbitrary number of candidates. Previous work has proposed proportionality axioms satisfied by Thiele's rule (now known as Proportional Approval Voting, PAV) but not by Phragm\'en's rule. By proposing two new proportionality axioms (laminar proportionality and priceability) satisfied by Phragm\'en but not Thiele, we show that the two rules achieve two distinct forms of proportional representation. Phragm\'en's rule ensures that all voters have a similar amount of influence on the committee, and Thiele's rule ensures a fair utility distribution. Thiele's rule is a welfarist voting rule (one that maximizes a function of voter utilities). We show that no welfarist rule can satisfy our new axioms, and we prove that no such rule can satisfy the core. Conversely, some welfarist fairness properties cannot be guaranteed by Phragm\'en-type rules. This formalizes the difference between the two types of proportionality. We then introduce an attractive committee rule which satisfies a property intermediate between the core and extended justified representation (EJR). It satisfies laminar proportionality, priceability, and is computable in polynomial time. We show that our new rule provides a logarithmic approximation to the core. On the other hand, PAV provides a factor-2 approximation to the core, and this factor is optimal for rules that are fair in the sense of the Pigou--Dalton principle.Comment: 33 page

The use of ASBOs against young people in England and Wales: lessons from Scotland

The Anti-Social Behaviour Order (ASBO) is one of the best known measures used to tackle anti-social behaviour. In keeping with the popular conception, the order is frequently used against young people. Of all ASBOs issued in England and Wales up to the end of 2005, roughly 40% were imposed on under-18s. This paper begins with a brief outline of the three principles at the heart of the celebrated Scottish children’s hearings system. With reference to these principles, and to the provisions which govern the use of the order against 12–15 year olds north of the border, the paper then discusses five areas of concern about the use of ASBOs against young people in England and Wales: the readiness to resort to ASBOs; the forum for ASBO applications; the terms of ASBOs; publicising the details of ASBOs; and custodial net-widening. The paper ends by suggesting reforms to the ASBO regime in England and Wales insofar as it is used against young people.<br/

The regulation of a project of the deregulation: UBER in Brazil and the European Union

Purpose – This paper focuses on the regulation of Uber at regional level (Sao Paulo and Brasilia), national level (European Member States) and supranational level (The European Commission initiative), which are often too restrictive. Methodology/approach/design – This article analyses standards and literature on regulation, as well as the role of competition. Attention was specially drawn to the market failure theory for justifying regulation, advocated by Breyer, Ogus and Baldwin & Cave. Due to the fact that there will be an evaluation of the regulations in place, consequentialism, welfarism and Pareto are briefly mentioned. Findings – None of the current regulatory responses, at the exception to Sao Paulo and the initiative by the European Commission that are not based exclusively on market failure theory, are working. Indeed, Uber is still banned in various cities. In others, the regulatory burden is so high that it takes away any incentives that Uber created. Regulation is not the only exit to market failure, competition must play a role. Uber is based on deregulation of the market and to try to regulate such concept with conventional theories will only lead to failures and restrictions. Practical implications – This article discusses the possible improvements to the already existing regulations. Originality/value – This paper correlates the regulation of Uber in Brazil and in Europe, explaining the difficulties these regulations are creating for Uber

The use of ASBOs against young people in England and Wales: lessons from Scotland

The Anti-Social Behaviour Order (ASBO) is one of the best known measures used to tackle anti-social behaviour. In keeping with the popular conception, the order is frequently used against young people. Of all ASBOs issued in England and Wales up to the end of 2005, roughly 40% were imposed on under-18s. This article begins with a brief outline of the three principles at the heart of the celebrated Scottish children’s hearings system. With reference to these principles, and to the provisions which govern the use of the order against 12–15 year olds north of the border, the article then discusses five areas of concern about the use of ASBOs against young people in England and Wales: the readiness to resort to ASBOs; the forum for ASBO applications; the terms of ASBOs; publicising the details of ASBOs; and custodial net-widening. The article ends by suggesting reforms to the ASBO regime in England and Wales insofar as it is used against young people

Welfare Polls: A Synthesis

Welfare polls are survey instruments that seek to quantify the determinants of human well-being. Currently, three welfare polling formats are dominant: contingent valuation (CV) surveys, quality-adjusted life year (QALY) surveys, and happiness surveys. Each format has generated a large, specialized, scholarly literature, but no comprehensive discussion of welfare polling as a general enterprise exists.This Article seeks to fill that gap. Part I describes the trio of existing formats. Part II discusses the current and potential uses of welfare polls in governmental decisionmaking. Part III analyzes in detail the obstacles that welfare polls must overcome to provide useful well-being information, and concludes that they can be genuinely informative. Part IV synthesizes the case for welfare polls, arguing against two types of challenges: the revealed-preference tradition in economics, which insists on using behavior rather than surveys to learn about well-being; and the civic republican tradition in political theory, which accepts surveys but insists that respondents should be asked to take a citizen rather than consumer perspective. Part V suggests new directions for welfare polls

A contingent value? The changing role of autonomy in law and policy on AIDS

This essay examines the changing role of the ethical value of autonomy in law and policy relating to AIDS in a number of European jurisdictions. In the early years of the epidemic the autonomy of infected and at-risk persons, and of social groups was promoted as a means of reducing the spread of HIV in the general population. Accordingly autonomy was deemed worthy of respect for instrumental reasons. This means-end calculation was premised on the lack of medical therapies, as well as the need to avoid discrimination in order to prevent at-risk persons from going underground as far as health care systems were concerned. In law this instrumentalisation of autonomy was reflected in a specific application of the proportionality test, i.e. to impose coercive or discriminatory measures would be disproportionate, or even inimical, to the end of reducing the spread of HIV. This was a contingent analysis, strongly informed by the state of medical knowledge at the time, as well as by the relative power of professionals, health bureaucrats and lay activists. With the introduction of effective therapies such as Highly Active Retroviral Therapy (HAART) and Zidovudine (AZT) the terms of the proportionality analysis have changed decisively. As a result, it is now more likely than before that coercive measures will be implemented. --

Which Inequalities Matter?

Why does equality across persons matter morally? An equal split can be instrumentally useful, for example, when a parent is dividing treats among hawk-eyed children, who will squawk at unequal distribution. Does equality of some sort matter morally and noninstrumentally, for its own sake? If so, which sort? If so, on what grounds? The claim this essay shall explore is that the equality that matters morally in itself or for its own sake is equality in the lifetime well-being enjoyed by persons. Every term in this seemingly bland formulation contains a land mine that can explode into controversy. Stepping carefully around controversy, I for the most part limit myself to highlighting some issues that would need to be settled in order to arrive at a reasoned verdict on this claim. I defend the claim mainly by trying to show that some objections that might appear to be decisive against it are targeting particular stances on one or another of these issues that need clarification, and that some clarifications do not require commitment to the stance that prompts the apparently decisive objection. In other words, I pursue an evasive strategy of ducking and weaving. Readers will have to judge whether ducking some objections in this way leaves the doctrine under review still vulnerable to fatally damaging blows. The strategy pursued here of defending an initially controversial assertion by making concessions to critics with a view to showing what is left as a residue to be a promising and plausible view worth further inquiry risks another kind of failure, that of suffering death by a thousand qualifications. The worry is that after the concessions there does not remain a sufficiently substantive and interesting claim to be worth further discussion. I try to guard against this disappointing upshot by indicating that the egalitarianism I defend is one that many thoughtful people deplore, especially if it is advanced, as I do, as a morally legitimate basis for state action