Cooperating Distributed Grammar Systems of Finite Index Working in Hybrid Modes

We study cooperating distributed grammar systems working in hybrid modes in connection with the finite index restriction in two different ways: firstly, we investigate cooperating distributed grammar systems working in hybrid modes which characterize programmed grammars with the finite index restriction; looking at the number of components of such systems, we obtain surprisingly rich lattice structures for the inclusion relations between the corresponding language families. Secondly, we impose the finite index restriction on cooperating distributed grammar systems working in hybrid modes themselves, which leads us to new characterizations of programmed grammars of finite index.Comment: In Proceedings AFL 2014, arXiv:1405.527

Introducing the Concept of Activation and Blocking of Rules in the General Framework for Regulated Rewriting in Sequential Grammars

We introduce new possibilities to control the application of rules based on the preceding application of rules which can be de ned for a general model of sequential grammars and we show some similarities to other control mechanisms as graph-controlled grammars and matrix grammars with and without applicability checking as well as gram- mars with random context conditions and ordered grammars. Using both activation and blocking of rules, in the string and in the multiset case we can show computational com- pleteness of context-free grammars equipped with the control mechanism of activation and blocking of rules even when using only two nonterminal symbols

Review of Wittgenstein And Psychology- A Practical Guide by Harre and Tissaw (2005)(review revised 2019)

A major flaw of the book is its failure to note Wittgenstein’s role in destroying the mechanical or reductionist or computationalist view of mind. These continue to dominate cognitive science and philosophy, in spite of the fact that they were powerfully countered by W and later by Searle and others. There is much talk of W’s use of terms like “grammar”, “rules” etc. but never a clear mention that they mean our Evolved Psychology or our genetically programmed innate behavior. There are references to Baker and Hacker's works and to Malcolm Budd, but none to many standard W refs such as ter Hark, Johnston, and especially to the searchable Intelex CDROM and online sites of his complete works, nor to Searle, and none to the vast literature of evolutionary psychology. Many sections of the book are reasonably successful in describing W’s work but there is much aimless wandering and many mistakes and confusions. These will hopefully be obvious to those who read the above and my other reviews as I cannot recount more than a few of the hundreds of critical comments I made in my two readings of this book. A major flaw, common to most writing in the behavioral sciences, is the lack of awareness of the S1/S2 two selves or two systems of thought mode of describing personality that W pioneered (though nobody noticed) and a failure to be clear about nature/nuture issues. The fast, automatic perceptions, ‘rules’ and behaviors of S1 are mushed together with the slow conscious dispositional thinking, believing and rule following of S2 and neither are clearly or consistently distinguished from arbitrary cultural behaviors. Like all authors until very recently, they fail to give Wittgenstein’s last work “On Certainty” the prominent position it deserves, and likewise fail to take advantage of the powerful dual systems of thought framework. Nor have they adopted the useful extensions of Wittgenstein’s work made by John Searle. So, I first lay out a framework for intentionality (behavior) and then provide some detailed comments. This book is a reasonable first attempt to bring W’s pioneering work on higher order thought to the attention of psychology but it has many failings and needs a thorough rewrite. Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019

A Master Wittgensteinian Surveys Human Nature -A Review of Human Nature-the Categorial Framework by PMS Hacker (2010) (review revised 2019)

Materialism, reductionism, behaviorism, functionalism, dynamic systems theory and computationalism are popular views, but they were shown by Wittgenstein and more recently by Searle to be incoherent. The study of behavior encompasses all of human life but behavior is largely automatic and unconscious and even the conscious part, mostly expressed in language (which Wittgenstein equates with the mind), is not perspicuous, so it is critical to have a framework which Searle calls the Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR) and I call the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT). After summarizing the framework worked out by Wittgenstein and Searle, as extended by myself and by modern reasoning research, I comment on this first book in a trilogy on Human Nature by P.M.S. Hacker, the leading authority on Wittgenstein and one of the best modern philosophers. Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019

A grammatical specification of human-computer dialogue

The Seeheim Model of human-computer interaction partitions an interactive application into a user-interface, a dialogue controller and the application itself. One of the formal techniques of implementing the dialogue controller is based on context-free grammars and automata. In this work, we modify an off-the-shelf compiler generator (YACC) to generate the dialogue controller. The dialogue controller is then integrated into the popular X-window system, to create an interactive-application generator. The actions of the user drive the automaton, which in turn controls the application