331 research outputs found

    Channel Management and differentiation strategies: A case study from the market for fresh produce

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    The paper analyses the current differentiation strategies in the market for fresh produce. First a short review of the literature on channel structure and product differentiation is presented, in order to identify, on a theoretical grounding the incentives for differentiation strategies. Second, a case study is drawn of a UK channel intermediary organisation carrying out differentiation policies in the fresh produce category (on behalf of UK multiple retailer customers) supplied by a dedicated Italian grower. Results show that in the fresh produce industry there is room for product differentiation, but with contradictory welfare effects.fresh produce, product differentiation, channel structure and management, Agribusiness, Marketing,

    Pricing Strategies in Dual-channel for Small and Medium-Sized Manufacturers

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    For the Small and Medium-Sized Manufacturers who are in the weak position in dual-channel marketing, they are often faced with channel price conflict. Therefore, it is necessary for the Small and Medium-Sized Manufacturers to formulate effective pricing strategies. This paper modeled pricing strategies for two scenarios, which involved the manufacturer and retailer make decisions individually and a retailer Stackelberg game. Then we investigated the impacts of digital attribute of product and power structure on the optimal pricing strategies. Besides, we considered the change both of manufacturer and retailer’s profits when the digital attribute of product is heterogeneous and the power structure is difference using computational studies. Our analyses show that, the non-dominant manufacturer decides online direct price according to the dominant retailer’s pricing strategy is a win-win strategy, both manufacturer and retailer are better off, and the dual-channel’s total profits also improve

    Market Share and Price Setting Behavior For Private Labels and National Brands

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    In this paper, we develop a framework for estimating market share and price reaction equations in an attempt to understand the nature of competitive interaction in the market for private label and branded grocery products. Specifically, we employ a Linear Approximate Almost Ideal Demand System (LA/AIDS, Deaton and Muellbauer 1980a), and specify the price reaction equations derived under the LA/AIDS demand specification. This enables us to consistently estimate shareprice relationships, accounting for demand-side and competitive reactions simultaneously. The incorporation of LA/AIDS demands into a structural equation framework represents an important departure from previous demand specifications in competitive analysis. In addition to its rigorous foundation in utility theory, LA/AIDS demands are especially flexible for demand-side estimation, provide consistent reaction functions on the supply side, and have particularly nice aggregation properties. In order to test the relative contribution of employing a flexible LA/AIDS functional form on the demand-side, and in a preliminary attempt to assess manufacturer-retailer interaction on the supply side, we compare our general framework (LA/AIDS demands with retailers following a proportional markup rule) to two alternative models of manufacturer-retailer interaction: Chois (1991) Manufacturer-Stackelberg (M-S) model under linear demands, as well as Shubik demands under Stackelberg conduct (Raju, Sethuraman and Dhar 1995a, 1995b). We first apply the proposed LA/AIDS framework to a sample pooled across 125 categories and 54 geographic markets in an attempt to produce result that generalize across the entire sample. We then estimate all three models using data on seven individual categories: bread, milk, pasta, yogurt, instant coffee, butter and margarine. We conclude that the LA/AIDS demand specification is preferred to the alternative linear demand specifications. Further, the empirical findings support our premise that consumer response to price and promotion decisions (demand) and the factors influencing firm pricing behavior (supply) jointly determine observed market prices and market shares. Most importantly, our specification with LA/AIDS demands produced excellent overall fits, as well as reasonable demand and price response elasticities.competition, competitive strategy, private labels, pricing, Demand and Price Analysis, Industrial Organization,

    Canadian Chicken Industry: Consumer Preferences, Industry Structure and Producer Benefits from Investment in Research and Advertising

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    The Canadian chicken industry has operated under supply management since the mid-1970s. Canadian consumer preferences for chicken have grown dramatically since then possibly in response to concerns about health and the levels of fat and cholesterol in red meats. However Canadian consumers are also looking for convenience with their food purchases. Canadians are buying their chicken in frozen further processed forms, fresh by cut without skin and bone and in a variety of other different ways reflecting their unique willingness to pay for various attributes. There is also an increasing trend for retailers and processors to brand the fresh chicken product sold through grocery stores (for example, Maple Leaf Prime). The preferences Canadian consumer have for various chicken products, the prices they are comfortable paying and the strategies followed by processors/retailers can directly affect the outcomes of industry wide strategies such as investment in generic advertising and research or the impact of international market changes such as border closures. This research is an initial attempt to quantify Canadian consumer preferences – for fresh product by type – for product by level of processing – for chicken product by cut - for fresh chicken by brand - to examine the impact of substitutability on a variety of market shocks. The various different disaggregations of Canadian chicken consumption are used in a number of simulation models to illustrate how important preferences are to producer returns when there are market shocks. If Canadians found all chicken products available in the grocery store to be perfectly substitutable then previous policy analysis assuming chicken is one homogeneous product would be sufficient for industry policy analysis purposes. If Canadians view all the different chicken products as imperfectly substitutable and given that various chicken products are produced in relatively fixed proportions (white and dark meat, for example) further understanding of how consumers make their purchase decisions could enhance the industries ability to predict outcomes. For example, border closing to Canadian exports ( as a result of an Avian influenza outbreak, for example) would result in a significant increase in the dark meat products available for sale through Canadian grocery stores. The results presented in this research could provide a clue as to how much dark meat prices might decline while white meat prices might remain unaffected. The results reported suggest that at the consumer level, chicken fresh and frozen products are not perceived to be perfect substitutes, within a narrow category such as fresh chicken breasts, they are not perceived as even close substitutes, within the fresh category branded products such as those developed by Lilydale and Maple Leaf are not perceived as perfect substitutes. As well, an initial look at the demand for individual chicken products by household suggests that there is far from a common buying pattern across Canadian households, even within a single province. The results also suggest that health and convenience attributes are driving Canadian consumer preferences. Simulation results highlight the fact that pricing strategies followed by major processors/retailers within Canada can influence the returns to generic advertising and research. Further research could provide additional robust estimates of the chicken product substitutability existing in the Canadian market and an increased understanding of the market characteristics currently operating. The results presented here suggest that further work in this area is important for the chicken industry to pursue.consumer behaviour, chicken consumption, differentiated products, Consumer/Household Economics, Demand and Price Analysis, Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety, Marketing, D12, Q11, Q18,

    Nash Game Model for Optimizing Market Strategies, Configuration of Platform Products in a Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) Supply Chain for a Product Family

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    This paper discusses how a manufacturer and its retailers interact with each other to optimize their product marketing strategies, platform product configuration and inventory policies in a VMI (Vendor Managed Inventory) supply chain. The manufacturer procures raw materials from multiple suppliers to produce a family of products sold to multiple retailers. Multiple types of products are substitutable each other to end customers. The manufacturer makes its decision on raw materials’ procurement, platform product configuration, product replenishment policies to retailers with VMI, price discount rate, and advertising investment to maximize its profit. Retailers in turn consider the optimal local advertising and retail price to maximize their profits. This problem is modeled as a dual simultaneous non-cooperative game (as a Nash game) model with two sub-games. One is between the retailers serving in competing retail markets and the other is between the manufacturer and the retailers. This paper combines analytical, iterative and GA (genetic algorithm) methods to develop a game solution algorithm to find the Nash equilibrium. A numerical example is conducted to test the proposed model and algorithm, and gain managerial implications.supply chain management;nash game model;vendor managed inventory

    Strategic Vertical Pricing in the U.S. Butter Market

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    This article develops a methodology for empirically analyzing vertically strategic interactions in a multi-level supply channel. The model is used to analyze the vertical channel for U.S. butter manufacturing and retailing. Aggregating products to the firm level and using a nonlinear AIDS demand system under alternative strategic pricing assumptions is estimated using full information maximum likelihood (FIML) for seven geographic markets from 1998-2002. The market demand for butter was found to very price elastic. Furthermore, cross price elasticities between private labels and the two large national brands were also very elastic. The selected market structure was one indicating category profit maximization of national brands (separate from private label) at the retail level, Vertical Nash competition in the vertical channel, and Bretrand competition at the manufacturing level. Our results strongly suggest that the retail market for food products is impacted by the underlying vertical structure. The study provides useful measures of imperfect competition in the retail manufacturing sector.Vertical interaction, market structure, strategic pricing, market power, AIDS model, butter., Agribusiness, Agricultural and Food Policy, Consumer/Household Economics, Demand and Price Analysis, Industrial Organization, L13, L22, L66,

    Empirical Analysis of Competitive Interaction in Food Product Categories

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    This paper provides an overview of recent research on estimating competitive interaction in food product categories. In particular, the focus of this review is on research using scanner data conducted at the disaggregate (e.g., store, chain or local market) level, including empirical studies of vertical (i.e., within-channel) conduct. Studies addressing the competitive interaction on price, as well as non-price variables (e.g., in-store display and feature advertising) are considered. The author first describes the methodologies available for measuring the competitive interaction between firms and then briefly summarizes recent empirical developments. Given the complexity of the interactions that take place in practice, it is argued that much of the richness of actual competitive behavior is lost in aggregate analysis. Competitive interaction is the result of a complex set of variables and influences-demand side factors, market and industry structure, firm "personality", and category characteristics all interact in a complex fashion to determine strategic behavior of retailers and manufacturers.competition, competitive strategy, channel behavior, Agribusiness, Demand and Price Analysis, Industrial Organization,

    Construction of Equilibria in Strategic Stackelberg Games in Multi-Period Supply Chain Contracts

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    Almost every supplier faces uncertain and time-varying demand. E-commerce and online shopping have given suppliers unprecedented access to data on customers’ behavior, which sheds light on demand uncertainty. The main purpose of this research project is to provide an analytic tool for decentralized supply channel members to devise optimal long-term (multi-period) supply, pricing, and timing strategies while catering to stochastic demand in a diverse set of market scenarios. Despite its ubiquity in potential applications, the time-dependent channel optimization problem in its general form has received limited attention in the literature due to its complexity and the highly nested structure of its ensuing equilibrium problems. However, there are many scenarios where a single-period channel optimization solution may turn out to be myopic as it does not consider the after-effects of current pricing on future demand. To remedy this typical shortcoming, using general memory functions, we include the strategic customers’ cognitive bias toward pricing history in the supply channel equilibrium problem. In the form of two constructive theorems, we provide explicit solution algorithms for the ensuing Nash–Stackelberg equilibrium problems. In particular, we prove that our recursive solution algorithm can find equilibria in the multi-periodic variation of many standard supply channel contracts such as wholesale, buyback, and revenue-sharing contracts.publishedVersio
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