Computational Social Science

A field is emerging that leverages the capacity to collect and analyze data at a scale that may reveal patterns of individual and group behaviors.Governmen

Minimum Stable Cut and Treewidth

A stable or locally-optimal cut of a graph is a cut whose weight cannot be increased by changing the side of a single vertex. Equivalently, a cut is stable if all vertices have the (weighted) majority of their neighbors on the other side. Finding a stable cut is a prototypical PLS-complete problem that has been studied in the context of local search and of algorithmic game theory. In this paper we study Min Stable Cut, the problem of finding a stable cut of minimum weight, which is closely related to the Price of Anarchy of the Max Cut game. Since this problem is NP-hard, we study its complexity on graphs of low treewidth, low degree, or both. We begin by showing that the problem remains weakly NP-hard on severely restricted trees, so bounding treewidth alone cannot make it tractable. We match this hardness with a pseudo-polynomial DP algorithm solving the problem in time (?? W)^{O(tw)}n^{O(1)}, where tw is the treewidth, ? the maximum degree, and W the maximum weight. On the other hand, bounding ? is also not enough, as the problem is NP-hard for unweighted graphs of bounded degree. We therefore parameterize Min Stable Cut by both tw and ? and obtain an FPT algorithm running in time 2^{O(?tw)}(n+log W)^{O(1)}. Our main result for the weighted problem is to provide a reduction showing that both aforementioned algorithms are essentially optimal, even if we replace treewidth by pathwidth: if there exists an algorithm running in (nW)^{o(pw)} or 2^{o(?pw)}(n+log W)^{O(1)}, then the ETH is false. Complementing this, we show that we can, however, obtain an FPT approximation scheme parameterized by treewidth, if we consider almost-stable solutions, that is, solutions where no single vertex can unilaterally increase the weight of its incident cut edges by more than a factor of (1+?). Motivated by these mostly negative results, we consider Unweighted Min Stable Cut. Here our results already imply a much faster exact algorithm running in time ?^{O(tw)}n^{O(1)}. We show that this is also probably essentially optimal: an algorithm running in n^{o(pw)} would contradict the ETH

Multicast Network Design Game on a Ring

In this paper we study quality measures of different solution concepts for the multicast network design game on a ring topology. We recall from the literature a lower bound of 4/3 and prove a matching upper bound for the price of stability, which is the ratio of the social costs of a best Nash equilibrium and of a general optimum. Therefore, we answer an open question posed by Fanelli et al. in [12]. We prove an upper bound of 2 for the ratio of the costs of a potential optimizer and of an optimum, provide a construction of a lower bound, and give a computer-assisted argument that it reaches $2$ for any precision. We then turn our attention to players arriving one by one and playing myopically their best response. We provide matching lower and upper bounds of 2 for the myopic sequential price of anarchy (achieved for a worst-case order of the arrival of the players). We then initiate the study of myopic sequential price of stability and for the multicast game on the ring we construct a lower bound of 4/3, and provide an upper bound of 26/19. To the end, we conjecture and argue that the right answer is 4/3.Comment: 12 pages, 4 figure

A Field Guide to Genetic Programming

xiv, 233 p. : il. ; 23 cm.Libro ElectrónicoA Field Guide to Genetic Programming (ISBN 978-1-4092-0073-4) is an introduction to genetic programming (GP). GP is a systematic, domain-independent method for getting computers to solve problems automatically starting from a high-level statement of what needs to be done. Using ideas from natural evolution, GP starts from an ooze of random computer programs, and progressively refines them through processes of mutation and sexual recombination, until solutions emerge. All this without the user having to know or specify the form or structure of solutions in advance. GP has generated a plethora of human-competitive results and applications, including novel scientific discoveries and patentable inventions. The authorsIntroduction -- Representation, initialisation and operators in Tree-based GP -- Getting ready to run genetic programming -- Example genetic programming run -- Alternative initialisations and operators in Tree-based GP -- Modular, grammatical and developmental Tree-based GP -- Linear and graph genetic programming -- Probalistic genetic programming -- Multi-objective genetic programming -- Fast and distributed genetic programming -- GP theory and its applications -- Applications -- Troubleshooting GP -- Conclusions.Contents xi 1 Introduction 1.1 Genetic Programming in a Nutshell 1.2 Getting Started 1.3 Prerequisites 1.4 Overview of this Field Guide I Basics 2 Representation, Initialisation and GP 2.1 Representation 2.2 Initialising the Population 2.3 Selection 2.4 Recombination and Mutation Operators in Tree-based 3 Getting Ready to Run Genetic Programming 19 3.1 Step 1: Terminal Set 19 3.2 Step 2: Function Set 20 3.2.1 Closure 21 3.2.2 Sufficiency 23 3.2.3 Evolving Structures other than Programs 23 3.3 Step 3: Fitness Function 24 3.4 Step 4: GP Parameters 26 3.5 Step 5: Termination and solution designation 27 4 Example Genetic Programming Run 4.1 Preparatory Steps 29 4.2 Step-by-Step Sample Run 31 4.2.1 Initialisation 31 4.2.2 Fitness Evaluation Selection, Crossover and Mutation Termination and Solution Designation Advanced Genetic Programming 5 Alternative Initialisations and Operators in 5.1 Constructing the Initial Population 5.1.1 Uniform Initialisation 5.1.2 Initialisation may Affect Bloat 5.1.3 Seeding 5.2 GP Mutation 5.2.1 Is Mutation Necessary? 5.2.2 Mutation Cookbook 5.3 GP Crossover 5.4 Other Techniques 32 5.5 Tree-based GP 39 6 Modular, Grammatical and Developmental Tree-based GP 47 6.1 Evolving Modular and Hierarchical Structures 47 6.1.1 Automatically Defined Functions 48 6.1.2 Program Architecture and Architecture-Altering 50 6.2 Constraining Structures 51 6.2.1 Enforcing Particular Structures 52 6.2.2 Strongly Typed GP 52 6.2.3 Grammar-based Constraints 53 6.2.4 Constraints and Bias 55 6.3 Developmental Genetic Programming 57 6.4 Strongly Typed Autoconstructive GP with PushGP 59 7 Linear and Graph Genetic Programming 61 7.1 Linear Genetic Programming 61 7.1.1 Motivations 61 7.1.2 Linear GP Representations 62 7.1.3 Linear GP Operators 64 7.2 Graph-Based Genetic Programming 65 7.2.1 Parallel Distributed GP (PDGP) 65 7.2.2 PADO 67 7.2.3 Cartesian GP 67 7.2.4 Evolving Parallel Programs using Indirect Encodings 68 8 Probabilistic Genetic Programming 8.1 Estimation of Distribution Algorithms 69 8.2 Pure EDA GP 71 8.3 Mixing Grammars and Probabilities 74 9 Multi-objective Genetic Programming 75 9.1 Combining Multiple Objectives into a Scalar Fitness Function 75 9.2 Keeping the Objectives Separate 76 9.2.1 Multi-objective Bloat and Complexity Control 77 9.2.2 Other Objectives 78 9.2.3 Non-Pareto Criteria 80 9.3 Multiple Objectives via Dynamic and Staged Fitness Functions 80 9.4 Multi-objective Optimisation via Operator Bias 81 10 Fast and Distributed Genetic Programming 83 10.1 Reducing Fitness Evaluations/Increasing their Effectiveness 83 10.2 Reducing Cost of Fitness with Caches 86 10.3 Parallel and Distributed GP are Not Equivalent 88 10.4 Running GP on Parallel Hardware 89 10.4.1 Master–slave GP 89 10.4.2 GP Running on GPUs 90 10.4.3 GP on FPGAs 92 10.4.4 Sub-machine-code GP 93 10.5 Geographically Distributed GP 93 11 GP Theory and its Applications 97 11.1 Mathematical Models 98 11.2 Search Spaces 99 11.3 Bloat 101 11.3.1 Bloat in Theory 101 11.3.2 Bloat Control in Practice 104 III Practical Genetic Programming 12 Applications 12.1 Where GP has Done Well 12.2 Curve Fitting, Data Modelling and Symbolic Regression 12.3 Human Competitive Results – the Humies 12.4 Image and Signal Processing 12.5 Financial Trading, Time Series, and Economic Modelling 12.6 Industrial Process Control 12.7 Medicine, Biology and Bioinformatics 12.8 GP to Create Searchers and Solvers – Hyper-heuristics xiii 12.9 Entertainment and Computer Games 127 12.10The Arts 127 12.11Compression 128 13 Troubleshooting GP 13.1 Is there a Bug in the Code? 13.2 Can you Trust your Results? 13.3 There are No Silver Bullets 13.4 Small Changes can have Big Effects 13.5 Big Changes can have No Effect 13.6 Study your Populations 13.7 Encourage Diversity 13.8 Embrace Approximation 13.9 Control Bloat 13.10 Checkpoint Results 13.11 Report Well 13.12 Convince your Customers 14 Conclusions Tricks of the Trade A Resources A.1 Key Books A.2 Key Journals A.3 Key International Meetings A.4 GP Implementations A.5 On-Line Resources 145 B TinyGP 151 B.1 Overview of TinyGP 151 B.2 Input Data Files for TinyGP 153 B.3 Source Code 154 B.4 Compiling and Running TinyGP 162 Bibliography 167 Inde

Pacing Equilibrium in First-Price Auction Markets

In the isolated auction of a single item, second price often dominates first price in properties of theoretical interest. But, single items are rarely sold in true isolation, so considering the broader context is critical when adopting a pricing strategy. In this paper, we study a model centrally relevant to Internet advertising and show that when items (ad impressions) are individually auctioned within the context of a larger system that is managing budgets, theory offers surprising endorsement for using a first price auction to sell each individual item. In particular, first price auctions offer theoretical guarantees of equilibrium uniqueness, monotonicity, and other desirable properties, as well as efficient computability as the solution to the well-studied Eisenberg-Gale convex program. We also use simulations to demonstrate that a bidder's incentive to deviate vanishes in thick markets

Stability and Efficiency of Personalised Cultural Markets

This work is concerned with the dynamics of online cultural markets, namely, attention allocation of many users on a set of digital goods with infinite supply. Such dynamic is important in shaping processes and outcomes in society, from trending items in entertainment, collective knowledge creation, to election outcomes. The outcomes of online cultural markets are susceptible to intricate social influence dynamics, particularly so when the community comprises consumers with heterogeneous interests. This has made formal analysis of these markets improbable. In this paper, we remedy this by establishing robust connections between influence dynamics and optimization processes, in trial-offer markets where the consumer preferences are modelled by multinomial logit. Among other results, we show that the proportional-response-esque influence dynamic is equivalent to stochastic mirror descent on a convex objective function, thus leading to a stable and predictable outcome. When all consumers are homogeneous, the objective function has a natural interpretation as a weighted sum of efficiency and diversity of the culture market. In simulations driven by real-world preferences collected from a large-scale recommender system, we observe that ranking strategies aligned with the underlying heterogeneous preferences are more stable, and achieves higher efficiency and diversity. In simulations driven by real-world preferences collected from a large-scale recommender system, we observe that ranking strategies aligned with the underlying heterogeneous preferences are more stable, and achieves higher efficiency and diversity