Nonmonotonic Probabilistic Logics between Model-Theoretic Probabilistic Logic and Probabilistic Logic under Coherence

Recently, it has been shown that probabilistic entailment under coherence is weaker than model-theoretic probabilistic entailment. Moreover, probabilistic entailment under coherence is a generalization of default entailment in System P. In this paper, we continue this line of research by presenting probabilistic generalizations of more sophisticated notions of classical default entailment that lie between model-theoretic probabilistic entailment and probabilistic entailment under coherence. That is, the new formalisms properly generalize their counterparts in classical default reasoning, they are weaker than model-theoretic probabilistic entailment, and they are stronger than probabilistic entailment under coherence. The new formalisms are useful especially for handling probabilistic inconsistencies related to conditioning on zero events. They can also be applied for probabilistic belief revision. More generally, in the same spirit as a similar previous paper, this paper sheds light on exciting new formalisms for probabilistic reasoning beyond the well-known standard ones.Comment: 10 pages; in Proceedings of the 9th International Workshop on Non-Monotonic Reasoning (NMR-2002), Special Session on Uncertainty Frameworks in Nonmonotonic Reasoning, pages 265-274, Toulouse, France, April 200

Probabilistic entailment in the setting of coherence: The role of quasi conjunction and inclusion relation

In this paper, by adopting a coherence-based probabilistic approach to default reasoning, we focus the study on the logical operation of quasi conjunction and the Goodman-Nguyen inclusion relation for conditional events. We recall that quasi conjunction is a basic notion for defining consistency of conditional knowledge bases. By deepening some results given in a previous paper we show that, given any finite family of conditional events F and any nonempty subset S of F, the family F p-entails the quasi conjunction C(S); then, given any conditional event E|H, we analyze the equivalence between p-entailment of E|H from F and p-entailment of E|H from C(S), where S is some nonempty subset of F. We also illustrate some alternative theorems related with p-consistency and p-entailment. Finally, we deepen the study of the connections between the notions of p-entailment and inclusion relation by introducing for a pair (F,E|H) the (possibly empty) class K of the subsets S of F such that C(S) implies E|H. We show that the class K satisfies many properties; in particular K is additive and has a greatest element which can be determined by applying a suitable algorithm

Probabilistic entailment and iterated conditionals

In this paper we exploit the notions of conjoined and iterated conditionals, which are defined in the setting of coherence by means of suitable conditional random quantities with values in the interval $[0,1]$. We examine the iterated conditional $(B|K)|(A|H)$, by showing that $A|H$ p-entails $B|K$ if and only if $(B|K)|(A|H) = 1$. Then, we show that a p-consistent family $\mathcal{F}=\{E_1|H_1,E_2|H_2\}$ p-entails a conditional event $E_3|H_3$ if and only if $E_3|H_3=1$, or $(E_3|H_3)|QC(\mathcal{S})=1$ for some nonempty subset $\mathcal{S}$ of $\mathcal{F}$, where $QC(\mathcal{S})$ is the quasi conjunction of the conditional events in $\mathcal{S}$. Then, we examine the inference rules $And$, $Cut$, $Cautious$ $Monotonicity$, and $Or$ of System~P and other well known inference rules ($Modus$ $Ponens$, $Modus$ $Tollens$, $Bayes$). We also show that $QC(\mathcal{F})|\mathcal{C}(\mathcal{F})=1$, where $\mathcal{C}(\mathcal{F})$ is the conjunction of the conditional events in $\mathcal{F}$. We characterize p-entailment by showing that $\mathcal{F}$ p-entails $E_3|H_3$ if and only if $(E_3|H_3)|\mathcal{C}(\mathcal{F})=1$. Finally, we examine \emph{Denial of the antecedent} and \emph{Affirmation of the consequent}, where the p-entailment of $(E_3|H_3)$ from $\mathcal{F}$ does not hold, by showing that $(E_3|H_3)|\mathcal{C}(\mathcal{F})\neq1.

Connexive Logic, Probabilistic Default Reasoning, and Compound Conditionals

We present two approaches to investigate the validity of connexive principles and related formulas and properties within coherence-based probability logic. Connexive logic emerged from the intuition that conditionals of the form if not-A, then A, should not hold, since the conditional’s antecedent not-A contradicts its consequent A. Our approaches cover this intuition by observing that the only coherent probability assessment on the conditional event A | not-A is p(A | not-A) = 0. In the first approach we investigate connexive principles within coherence-based probabilistic default reasoning, by interpreting defaults and negated defaults in terms of suitable probabilistic constraints on conditional events. In the second approach we study connexivity within the coherence framework of compound conditionals, by interpreting connexive principles in terms of suitable conditional random quantities. After developing notions of validity in each approach, we analyze the following connexive principles: Aristotle’s theses, Aristotle’s Second Thesis, Abelard’s First Principle, and Boethius’ theses. We also deepen and generalize some principles and investigate further properties related to connexive logic (like non-symmetry). Both approaches satisfy minimal requirements for a connexive logic. Finally, we compare both approaches conceptually

A process model of the understanding of uncertain conditionals

To build a process model of the understanding of conditionals we extract a common core of three semantics of if-then sentences: (a) the conditional event interpretation in the coherencebased probability logic, (b) the discourse processingtheory of Hans Kamp, and (c) the game-theoretical approach of Jaakko Hintikka. The empirical part reports three experiments in which each participant assessed the probability of 52 if-then sentencesin a truth table task. Each experiment included a second task: An n-back task relating the interpretation of conditionals to working memory, a Bayesian bookbag and poker chip task relating the interpretation of conditionals to probability updating, and a probabilistic modus ponens task relating the interpretation of conditionals to a classical inference task. Data analysis shows that the way in which the conditionals are interpreted correlates with each of the supplementary tasks. The results are discussed within the process model proposed in the introduction