Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited

We consider general allocation problems with indivisibilities where agents' preferences possibly exhibit externalities. In such contexts many different core notions were proposed. One is the gamma-core whereby blocking is only allowed via allocations where the non-blocking agents receive their endowment. We show that if there exists an allocation rule satisfying ‘individual rationality’, ‘efficiency’, and ‘strategy-proofness’, then for any problem for which the gamma-core is non-empty, the allocation rule must choose a gamma-core allocation and all agents are indifferent between all allocations in the gamma-core. We apply our result to housing markets, coalition formation and networks

Upper-contour strategy-proofness in the random assignment problem

학위논문 (석사)-- 서울대학교 대학원 : 사회과학대학 경제학부, 2018. 2. 전영섭.Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) showed that the mechanism that satisfies sd-efficiency and equal treatment of equals cannot be sd-strategy-proof. Also, Mennle and Seuken (2017) showed a decomposition result of strategy-proofness and presented partial strategy-proofness, which is a weak notion of strategy-proofness used by Mennle and Seuken's paper. In this paper, we show other strategy-proofness notion under the random assignment problem. In this paper, we present a weakened notion of strategy-proofness which is related to the upper-contour set, upper-contour strategy-proofness. Our main result is even though sd-strategy-proofness is weakened to upper-contour strategy-proofness, we end up with impossibility results.Chapter 1. Introduction 1 Chapter 2. The model 3 Chapter 3. Main results 5 Chapter 4. Discussion 24 Reference 32 Abstract in Korean 34Maste