Privacy-Enhancing First-Price Auctions Using Rational Cryptography

We consider enhancing a sealed-bid single-item auction with \emph{privacy} concerns, our assumption being that bidders primarily care about monetary payoff and secondarily worry about exposing information about their type to other players and learning information about other players\u27 types. To treat privacy explicitly within the game theoretic context, we put forward a novel \emph{hybrid utility} model that considers both fiscal and privacy components in the players\u27 payoffs. We show how to use rational cryptography to approximately implement a given \emph{ex interim} individually strictly rational equilibrium of such an auction (or any game with a winner) without a trusted mediator through a cryptographic protocol that uses only point-to-point authenticated channels between the players. By ``ex interim individually strictly rational\u27\u27 we mean that, given its type and before making its move, each player has a strictly positive expected utility, i.e., it becomes the winner of the auction with positive probability. By ``approximately implement\u27\u27 we mean that, under cryptographic assumptions, running the protocol is a computational Nash equilibrium with a payoff profile negligibly close to the original equilibrium. In addition the protocol has the stronger property that no collusion, of any size, can obtain more by deviating in the implementation than by deviating in the ideal mediated setting which the mechanism was designed in. Also, despite the non-symmetric payoffs profile, the protocol always correctly terminates

Cooperative AI via Decentralized Commitment Devices

Credible commitment devices have been a popular approach for robust multi-agent coordination. However, existing commitment mechanisms face limitations like privacy, integrity, and susceptibility to mediator or user strategic behavior. It is unclear if the cooperative AI techniques we study are robust to real-world incentives and attack vectors. However, decentralized commitment devices that utilize cryptography have been deployed in the wild, and numerous studies have shown their ability to coordinate algorithmic agents facing adversarial opponents with significant economic incentives, currently in the order of several million to billions of dollars. In this paper, we use examples in the decentralization and, in particular, Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) (arXiv:1904.05234) literature to illustrate the potential security issues in cooperative AI. We call for expanded research into decentralized commitments to advance cooperative AI capabilities for secure coordination in open environments and empirical testing frameworks to evaluate multi-agent coordination ability given real-world commitment constraints.Comment: NeurIPS 2023- Multi-Agent Security Worksho

Computational Challenges in E-Commerce

Economic and social sciences will drive Internet protocols and services into the future.Engineering and Applied Science

Still Wrong Use of Pairings in Cryptography

Several pairing-based cryptographic protocols are recently proposed with a wide variety of new novel applications including the ones in emerging technologies like cloud computing, internet of things (IoT), e-health systems and wearable technologies. There have been however a wide range of incorrect use of these primitives. The paper of Galbraith, Paterson, and Smart (2006) pointed out most of the issues related to the incorrect use of pairing-based cryptography. However, we noticed that some recently proposed applications still do not use these primitives correctly. This leads to unrealizable, insecure or too inefficient designs of pairing-based protocols. We observed that one reason is not being aware of the recent advancements on solving the discrete logarithm problems in some groups. The main purpose of this article is to give an understandable, informative, and the most up-to-date criteria for the correct use of pairing-based cryptography. We thereby deliberately avoid most of the technical details and rather give special emphasis on the importance of the correct use of bilinear maps by realizing secure cryptographic protocols. We list a collection of some recent papers having wrong security assumptions or realizability/efficiency issues. Finally, we give a compact and an up-to-date recipe of the correct use of pairings.Comment: 25 page