Reputational Privacy and the Internet: A Matter for Law?

Reputation - we all have one. We do not completely comprehend its workings and are mostly unaware of its import until it is gone. When we lose it, our traditional laws of defamation, privacy, and breach of confidence rarely deliver the vindication and respite we seek due, primarily, to legal systems that cobble new media methods of personal injury onto pre-Internet laws. This dissertation conducts an exploratory study of the relevance of law to loss of individual reputation perpetuated on the Internet. It deals with three interrelated concepts: reputation, privacy, and memory. They are related in that the increasing lack of privacy involved in our online activities has had particularly powerful reputational effects, heightened by the Internet’s duplicative memory. The study is framed within three research questions: 1) how well do existing legal mechanisms address loss of reputation and informational privacy in the new media environment; 2) can new legal or extra-legal solutions fill any gaps; and 3) how is the role of law pertaining to reputation affected by the human-computer interoperability emerging as the Internet of Things? Through a review of international and domestic legislation, case law, and policy initiatives, this dissertation explores the extent of control held by the individual over her reputational privacy. Two emerging regulatory models are studied for improvements they offer over current legal responses: the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation, and American Do Not Track policies. Underscoring this inquiry are the challenges posed by the Internet’s unique architecture and the fact that the trove of references to reputation in international treaties is not making its way into domestic jurisprudence or daily life. This dissertation examines whether online communications might be developing a new form of digital speech requiring new legal responses and new gradients of personal harm; it also proposes extra-legal solutions to the paradox that our reputational needs demand an overt sociality while our desire for privacy has us shunning the limelight. As we embark on the Web 3.0 era of human-machine interoperability and the Internet of Things, our expectations of the role of law become increasingly important

Privacy and the Internet of Things: Why Changing Expectations Demand Heightened Standards

Entertainment consoles, wearable monitors, and security systems. For better or worse, internet-connected devices are revolutionizing the consumer products industry. Referred to broadly as the Internet of Things (IoT), this ‘smart’ technology is drastically increasing the means, scope, and frequency by which individuals communicate their personal information. This Note explores the disruptive impact of IoT consumer devices on the U.S.’s patchwork system of privacy protections. After presenting a high-level survey of several key regulatory issues, this Note argues that the proliferation of IoT devices exposes a fundamental flaw in the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” standard. As individual expectations of privacy rapidly and inevitably deteriorate, societal norms will follow suit, resulting in a Fourth Amendment standard, which is incompatible and outdated in this new, interconnected reality

Little Things and Big Challenges: Information Privacy and the Internet of Things

The Internet of Things (loT), the wireless connection of devices to ourselves, each other, and the Internet, has transformed our lives and our society in unimaginable ways. Today, billions of electronic devices and sensors collect, store, and analyze personal information from how fast we drive, to how fast our hearts beat, to how much and what we watch on TV. Even children provide billions of bits of personal information to the cloud through smart toys that capture images, recognize voices, and more. The unprecedented and unbridled new information flow generated from the little things of the loT is creating big challenges for privacy regulators. Traditional regulators are armed with conventional tools not fully capable of handling the privacy challenges of the loT. A critical review of recent Federal Trade Commission (FTC) enforcement decisions sheds light on a recommended path for the future regulation of the loT. This Article first examines the pervasiveness of the loT and the data it collects in order to clarify the challenges facing regulators. It also highlights traditional privacy laws, principles, and regulations and explains why those rules do not fit the novel challenges and issues resulting from the loT. Then it presents an in-depth analysis of four key FTC enforcement decisions to highlight how the FTC has and can regulate the loT without undermining the innovation and benefits that this technology-and the data it providesbrings to our society. Specifically, the Article describes how the FTC, faced with the privacy challenge that accompanies the interconnected world of the loT, has managed to apply traditional standards of unfairness and deceptive practices to protect private information. The FTC has been flexible and nimble with its interpretations of such standards and, in its most recent loT case, FTC v. VIZIO, established a new tool in its toolkit for regulating loT devices: an unfair tracking standard. As the de facto data protection authority in the United States, the FTC can use this new tool to work toward standardizing its treatment of loT privacy issues instead of trying to fit those concerns neatly under the deception authority of section 5 of the FFC Act. However, this new tool also means that the FTC has the opportunity-and responsibility-to provide guidance on how it will wield that authority. To assure that innovation is not stifled and that this new rule is fairly applied (whether by the FFC or other agencies that may follow suit), it is imperative that the FFC diligently address concerns about the scope of this new rule and communicate that guidance to businesses, other regulators, and consumers alike. The new FTC administration should, as the primary regulator of information privacy and the loT, continue the strong practice established by the previous administration, which is to provide guidance to businesses, consumers, and other regulators navigating the big challenges caused by the little things in the loT

Privacy and the internet : differences in perspectives

xii, 112 leaves ; 28 cm.This study examined results of a World Wide Web survey that used the framework of domain theory of moral development to examine attitudes of Internet users assuming perspectives of victims, aggressors and bystanders toward privacy issues. The effect of a monetary incentive was tested on two perspectives; effects of three moderating variables, employment status, newsgroup/mailing list membership and culture, were also tested. In the process of examing interactions, an evaluation determined if changes in attitudes indicated movement along a morality continuum. Results show that victims are more concerned than aggressors, and bystanders take a moralizing stance regardless of domain. Results of the monetary incentive test suggest that privacy is for sale. Employed respondents are more concerned than non-employed respondents; membership has little effect. Effects of culture do not support the hypotheses. Implications are that moral judgements are a function of perspective and domain, allowing flexibility along a morality continuum due to situational deviations

These Walls Can Talk! Securing Digital Privacy in the Smart Home Under the Fourth Amendment

Privacy law in the United States has not kept pace with the realities of technological development, nor the growing reliance on the Internet of Things (IoT). As of now, the law has not adequately secured the “smart” home from intrusion by the state, and the Supreme Court further eroded digital privacy by conflating the common law concepts of trespass and exclusion in United States v. Jones. This article argues that the Court must correct this misstep by explicitly recognizing the method by which the Founding Fathers sought to “secure” houses and effects under the Fourth Amendment. Namely, the Court must reject its overly narrow trespass approach in lieu of the more appropriate right to exclude. This will better account for twenty-first century surveillance capabilities and properly constrain the state. Moreover, an exclusion framework will bolster the reasonable expectation of digital privacy by presuming an objective unreasonableness in any warrantless penetration by the state into the smart home