On Putting Knowledge 'First'

There is a New Idea in epistemology. It goes by the name of ‘knowledge first,’ and it is particularly associated with Timothy Williamson’s book Knowledge and Its Limits. In slogan form, to put knowledge first is to treat knowledge as basic or fundamental, and to explain other states—belief, justification, maybe even content itself—in terms of knowledge, instead of vice versa. The idea has proven enormously interesting, and equally controversial. But deep foundational questions about its actual content remain relatively unexplored. We think that a wide variety of views travel under the banner of ‘knowledge first’ (and that the slogan doesn’t help much with differentiating them). Furthermore, we think it is far from straightforward to draw connections between certain of these views; they are more independent than they are often assumed to be. Our project here is exploratory and clarificatory. We mean to tease apart various ‘knowledge first’ claims, and explore what connections they do or do not have with one another. Our taxonomy is offered in §2, and connections are explored in §3. The result, we hope, will be a clearer understanding of just what the knowledge first theses are. We conclude, in §4, with some brief suggestions as to how we think the various theses might be evaluated

Petitio principii: the case for non-fallaciousness

This paper presents a case for the non-fallaciousness of petitio principii in the context where the only evidence which can confirm the conclusion of an argument has a content which is identical to the content of the conclusion. The more usual rhetorical and dialectical frameworks for the analysis off allacies are challenged for what I describe as their proscriptive stance. As an alternative to proscription, I recommend an analysis of the context in which petitio arguments occur. Such an analysis, I argue, suggests the relaxation of a priority condition described by Waiton (1985) and the relevance to the present case of Sorensen's (1991) analysis ofthe non-circularity of certain 'P, therefore, P' arguments

The "MIND" Scalable PIM Architecture

MIND (Memory, Intelligence, and Network Device) is an advanced parallel computer architecture for high performance computing and scalable embedded processing. It is a Processor-in-Memory (PIM) architecture integrating both DRAM bit cells and CMOS logic devices on the same silicon die. MIND is multicore with multiple memory/processor nodes on each chip and supports global shared memory across systems of MIND components. MIND is distinguished from other PIM architectures in that it incorporates mechanisms for efficient support of a global parallel execution model based on the semantics of message-driven multithreaded split-transaction processing. MIND is designed to operate either in conjunction with other conventional microprocessors or in standalone arrays of like devices. It also incorporates mechanisms for fault tolerance, real time execution, and active power management. This paper describes the major elements and operational methods of the MIND architecture

Reasoning under uncertainty: the role of two informal fallacies in an emerging scientific inquiry

It is now commonplace in fallacy inquiry for many of the traditional informal fallacies to be viewed as reasonable or non-fallacious modes of argument. Central to this evaluative shift has been the attempt to examine traditional fallacies within their wider contexts of use. However, this pragmatic turn in fallacy evaluation is still in its infancy. The true potential of a contextual approach in the evaluation of the fallacies is yet to be explored. I examine how, in the context of scientific inquiry, certain traditional fallacies function by conferring epistemic gains upon inquiry. Specifically, I argue that these fallacies facilitate the progression of inquiry, particularly in the initial stages of inquiry when the epistemic context is one of uncertainty. The conception of these fallacies that emerges is that of heuristics of reasoning in contexts of epistemic uncertainty

Age-Based Preferences in Paired Kidney Exchange

We consider a model of Paired Kidney Exchange (PKE) with feasibility constraints on the number of patient-donor pairs involved in exchanges. Patients' preferences are restricted so that patients prefer kidneys from compatible younger donors to kidneys from older donors. In this framework, patients with compatible donors may enroll on PKE programs to receive an organ with higher expected graft survival than that of their intended donor. PKE rules that satisfy individual rationality, eciency, and strategy-proofness necessarily select pairwise exchanges. Such rules maximize the number of transplantations among pairs with the youngest donors, and sequentially among pairs with donors of dierent age group