Price of Competition and Dueling Games

We study competition in a general framework introduced by Immorlica et al. and answer their main open question. Immorlica et al. considered classic optimization problems in terms of competition and introduced a general class of games called dueling games. They model this competition as a zero-sum game, where two players are competing for a user's satisfaction. In their main and most natural game, the ranking duel, a user requests a webpage by submitting a query and players output an ordering over all possible webpages based on the submitted query. The user tends to choose the ordering which displays her requested webpage in a higher rank. The goal of both players is to maximize the probability that her ordering beats that of her opponent and gets the user's attention. Immorlica et al. show this game directs both players to provide suboptimal search results. However, they leave the following as their main open question: "does competition between algorithms improve or degrade expected performance?" In this paper, we resolve this question for the ranking duel and a more general class of dueling games. More precisely, we study the quality of orderings in a competition between two players. This game is a zero-sum game, and thus any Nash equilibrium of the game can be described by minimax strategies. Let the value of the user for an ordering be a function of the position of her requested item in the corresponding ordering, and the social welfare for an ordering be the expected value of the corresponding ordering for the user. We propose the price of competition which is the ratio of the social welfare for the worst minimax strategy to the social welfare obtained by a social planner. We use this criterion for analyzing the quality of orderings in the ranking duel. We prove the quality of minimax results is surprisingly close to that of the optimum solution

Dueling Jackpots: Are Competing Lotto Games Complements or Substitutes?

This paper considers the relationship that exists between two lottery products offered simultaneously in the same state, a smaller lottery game run by the individual state and a larger multi-state game run in coordination with other states. The primary issue is whether the two different products should be considered substitutes or complements for one another. The question is considered from two different perspectives that lead to a conclusion that while the two products do tend to be complements to one another, overall the individually run state lottery games experience a reduction in sales from the presence of the multi-state game.lotto, lottery, public finance, gambling

On the Efficiency of An Election Game of Two or More Parties: How Bad Can It Be?

We extend our previous work on two-party election competition [Lin, Lu & Chen 2021] to the setting of three or more parties. An election campaign among two or more parties is viewed as a game of two or more players. Each of them has its own candidates as the pure strategies to play. People, as voters, comprise supporters for each party, and a candidate brings utility for the the supporters of each party. Each player nominates exactly one of its candidates to compete against the other party's. A candidate is assumed to win the election with higher odds if it brings more utility for all the people. The payoff of each player is the expected utility its supporters get. The game is egoistic if every candidate benefits her party's supporters more than any candidate from the competing party does. In this work, we first argue that the election game always has a pure Nash equilibrium when the winner is chosen by the hardmax function, while there exist game instances in the three-party election game such that no pure Nash equilibrium exists even the game is egoistic. Next, we propose two sufficient conditions for the egoistic election game to have a pure Nash equilibrium. Based on these conditions, we propose a fixed-parameter tractable algorithm to compute a pure Nash equilibrium of the egoistic election game. Finally, perhaps surprisingly, we show that the price of anarchy of the egoistic election game is upper bounded by the number of parties. Our findings suggest that the election becomes unpredictable when more than two parties are involved and, moreover, the social welfare deteriorates with the number of participating parties in terms of possibly increasing price of anarchy. This work alternatively explains why the two-party system is prevalent in democratic countries

Spectacular Tropes: Representations of the Roman Arena

This paper will focus on the construction of representational tropes depicting the ancient Roman arenas and those involved with them, particularly within the spectacles of gladiatorial battles. The conceptions of representation within the arena influenced how differing Roman social groups perceived one another through social ideals and identities. I will analyze this by looking at three major methods of representation from the ancient Roman world: (1) literary sources, (2) epigraphical materials (inscriptions and graffiti), and (3) visual sources (mosaics and reliefs). These sources reflect the different characteristics of the Roman arenas and are defined by various social contexts, displaying how different ideals relating to the arena and its performers were valued within greater Roman society. I will examine these ancient ideals on representation by relating them to anthropological and sociological concepts related to the representation and public perceptions of athletes and sports. This includes representations of the body, masculine ideals, social status, and others

Dueling for honor and identity economics

Dueling is one of the best indicators of political transition from anarchy to order. This paper explores the dynamics of dueling for honor as a social institution in England, France, and Germany. It identifies major differences regarding the frequency, duration, and nature of dueling. Although dueling for honor emerged as a self-organizing and self-regulatory collective action of the aristocracy in crisis, it transformed into a middle class institution in France and Germany. However, this institution suddenly ended in England around 1850. In this study, we will follow a cognitive version of identity economics to explain the emergence of this institution, and its divergent trajectories in these countries in terms of identity choice. We will argue that while dueling is an identity investment, it might have different values according to its diverse social meanings. We will show that different social meanings that were attached to dueling in England, France and Germany gave rise to different values in identity investment, and led to different results in enhancing social identities

Application of deep reinforcement learning in stock trading strategies and stock forecasting

The role of the stock market across the overall financial market is indispensable. The way to acquire practical trading signals in the transaction process to maximize the benefits is a problem that has been studied for a long time. This paper put forward a theory of deep reinforcement learning in the stock trading decisions and stock price prediction, the reliability and availability of the model are proved by experimental data, and the model is compared with the traditional model to prove its advantages. From the point of view of stock market forecasting and intelligent decision-making mechanism, this paper proves the feasibility of deep reinforcement learning in financial markets and the credibility and advantages of strategic decision-making

Spartan Daily, November 9, 1961

Volume 49, Issue 32https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/spartandaily/4219/thumbnail.jp