3,240 research outputs found
Price of Competition and Dueling Games
We study competition in a general framework introduced by Immorlica et al.
and answer their main open question. Immorlica et al. considered classic
optimization problems in terms of competition and introduced a general class of
games called dueling games. They model this competition as a zero-sum game,
where two players are competing for a user's satisfaction. In their main and
most natural game, the ranking duel, a user requests a webpage by submitting a
query and players output an ordering over all possible webpages based on the
submitted query. The user tends to choose the ordering which displays her
requested webpage in a higher rank. The goal of both players is to maximize the
probability that her ordering beats that of her opponent and gets the user's
attention. Immorlica et al. show this game directs both players to provide
suboptimal search results. However, they leave the following as their main open
question: "does competition between algorithms improve or degrade expected
performance?" In this paper, we resolve this question for the ranking duel and
a more general class of dueling games.
More precisely, we study the quality of orderings in a competition between
two players. This game is a zero-sum game, and thus any Nash equilibrium of the
game can be described by minimax strategies. Let the value of the user for an
ordering be a function of the position of her requested item in the
corresponding ordering, and the social welfare for an ordering be the expected
value of the corresponding ordering for the user. We propose the price of
competition which is the ratio of the social welfare for the worst minimax
strategy to the social welfare obtained by a social planner. We use this
criterion for analyzing the quality of orderings in the ranking duel. We prove
the quality of minimax results is surprisingly close to that of the optimum
solution
Dueling Jackpots: Are Competing Lotto Games Complements or Substitutes?
This paper considers the relationship that exists between two lottery products offered simultaneously in the same state, a smaller lottery game run by the individual state and a larger multi-state game run in coordination with other states. The primary issue is whether the two different products should be considered substitutes or complements for one another. The question is considered from two different perspectives that lead to a conclusion that while the two products do tend to be complements to one another, overall the individually run state lottery games experience a reduction in sales from the presence of the multi-state game.lotto, lottery, public finance, gambling
On the Efficiency of An Election Game of Two or More Parties: How Bad Can It Be?
We extend our previous work on two-party election competition [Lin, Lu & Chen
2021] to the setting of three or more parties. An election campaign among two
or more parties is viewed as a game of two or more players. Each of them has
its own candidates as the pure strategies to play. People, as voters, comprise
supporters for each party, and a candidate brings utility for the the
supporters of each party. Each player nominates exactly one of its candidates
to compete against the other party's. A candidate is assumed to win the
election with higher odds if it brings more utility for all the people. The
payoff of each player is the expected utility its supporters get. The game is
egoistic if every candidate benefits her party's supporters more than any
candidate from the competing party does. In this work, we first argue that the
election game always has a pure Nash equilibrium when the winner is chosen by
the hardmax function, while there exist game instances in the three-party
election game such that no pure Nash equilibrium exists even the game is
egoistic. Next, we propose two sufficient conditions for the egoistic election
game to have a pure Nash equilibrium. Based on these conditions, we propose a
fixed-parameter tractable algorithm to compute a pure Nash equilibrium of the
egoistic election game. Finally, perhaps surprisingly, we show that the price
of anarchy of the egoistic election game is upper bounded by the number of
parties. Our findings suggest that the election becomes unpredictable when more
than two parties are involved and, moreover, the social welfare deteriorates
with the number of participating parties in terms of possibly increasing price
of anarchy. This work alternatively explains why the two-party system is
prevalent in democratic countries
Spectacular Tropes: Representations of the Roman Arena
This paper will focus on the construction of representational tropes depicting the ancient Roman arenas and those involved with them, particularly within the spectacles of gladiatorial battles. The conceptions of representation within the arena influenced how differing Roman social groups perceived one another through social ideals and identities. I will analyze this by looking at three major methods of representation from the ancient Roman world: (1) literary sources, (2) epigraphical materials (inscriptions and graffiti), and (3) visual sources (mosaics and reliefs). These sources reflect the different characteristics of the Roman arenas and are defined by various social contexts, displaying how different ideals relating to the arena and its performers were valued within greater Roman society. I will examine these ancient ideals on representation by relating them to anthropological and sociological concepts related to the representation and public perceptions of athletes and sports. This includes representations of the body, masculine ideals, social status, and others
Dueling for honor and identity economics
Dueling is one of the best indicators of political transition from anarchy to order. This paper explores the dynamics of dueling for honor as a social institution in England, France, and Germany. It identifies major differences regarding the frequency, duration, and nature of dueling. Although dueling for honor emerged as a self-organizing and self-regulatory collective action of the aristocracy in crisis, it transformed into a middle class institution in France and Germany. However, this institution suddenly ended in England around 1850. In this study, we will follow a cognitive version of identity economics to explain the emergence of this institution, and its divergent trajectories in these countries in terms of identity choice. We will argue that while dueling is an identity investment, it might have different values according to its diverse social meanings. We will show that different social meanings that were attached to dueling in England, France and Germany gave rise to different values in identity investment, and led to different results in enhancing social identities
Application of deep reinforcement learning in stock trading strategies and stock forecasting
The role of the stock market across the overall financial market is indispensable. The way to acquire practical trading signals in the transaction process to maximize the benefits is a problem that has been studied for a long time. This paper put forward a theory of deep reinforcement learning in the stock trading decisions and stock price prediction, the reliability and availability of the model are proved by experimental data, and the model is compared with the traditional model to prove its advantages. From the point of view of stock market forecasting and intelligent decision-making mechanism, this paper proves the feasibility of deep reinforcement learning in financial markets and the credibility and advantages of strategic decision-making
Spartan Daily, November 9, 1961
Volume 49, Issue 32https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/spartandaily/4219/thumbnail.jp
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