Price Controls, Non-Price Quality Competition, and the Nonexistence of Competitive Equilibrium

We investigate how price ceilings and floors affect outcomes in continuous time, double auction markets with discrete goods and multiple qualities. When price controls exist, the existence of competitive equilibria is no longer guaranteed; hence, we investigate the nature of non-price competition and how markets might evolve in its presence. We develop a quality competition model based on matching theory. Equilibria of the quality competition model always exist in such price-constrained markets; moreover, they naturally correspond to competitive equilibria when competitive equilibria exist. Additionally, we characterize the set of equilibria of the quality competition model in the presence of price restrictions. In a series of experiments, we find that market outcomes closely conform to the predictions of the model. In particular, price controls induce non-price competition between agents both in theory and in the experimental environment; market behaviors result in allocations close to the predictions of the model

The Pricing War Continues: On Competitive Multi-Item Pricing

We study a game with \emph{strategic} vendors who own multiple items and a single buyer with a submodular valuation function. The goal of the vendors is to maximize their revenue via pricing of the items, given that the buyer will buy the set of items that maximizes his net payoff. We show this game may not always have a pure Nash equilibrium, in contrast to previous results for the special case where each vendor owns a single item. We do so by relating our game to an intermediate, discrete game in which the vendors only choose the available items, and their prices are set exogenously afterwards. We further make use of the intermediate game to provide tight bounds on the price of anarchy for the subset games that have pure Nash equilibria; we find that the optimal PoA reached in the previous special cases does not hold, but only a logarithmic one. Finally, we show that for a special case of submodular functions, efficient pure Nash equilibria always exist

Proposed solutions in inflation-effective and ineffective

Inflation (Finance)

Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?

In the ongoing debate on state competition over corporate charters, supporters of state competition have long claimed that the empirical evidence clearly supports their view. This paper suggests that the body of empirical evidence on which supporters of state competition have relied does not warrant this claim. The paper first demonstrates that reported findings of a positive correlation between incorporation in Delaware and increased shareholder wealth are not robust and, furthermore, do not establish causation. The paper then shows that, even if Delaware incorporation were found to cause an increase in shareholder value, this finding would not imply that state competition is working well; benefits to incorporating in the dominant state would likely exist in a race-toward-the bottom' equilibrium in which state competition provided undesirable incentives. Third, the analysis shows that empirical claims that state competition rewards moderation in the provision of antitakeover protections are not well grounded. Finally, we endorse a new approach to the empirical study of the subject that is based on analyzing the determinants of companies' choices of state of incorporation. Recent work based on this approach indicates that, contrary to the beliefs of state competition supporters, states that amass antitakeover statutes are more successful in the incorporation market.

The Role of Auctions in Allocating Public Resources

This paper provides an economic framework within which to consider the effectiveness and limitations of auction markets. The paper looks at the use of auctions as a policy instrument and the effects of auction design on consumer interests, the efficient allocation of resources, and industry competitiveness.Australia; Research; Ascending-bid auction; Auctions; Bidders; Conservation funds; Descending-bid auction; Dutch auction; English auction; Environmental Management; First-price sealed-bid auction; Infrastructure; Markets; Oral auction; Outcry auction; Pollutant emission permits; Power supply contracts; Public resources; Radio- spectrum; Second-price sealed-bid auction Spectrum licences; Vickrey auction; Water rights;

Production Networks Linkages, Innovation Processes and Social Management Technologies. A Methodological Approach Applied to the Volkswagen case in Argentina

The purpose of this paper -as a part of a wider research project - is to analyze the concept of production network from a methodological and theoretical viewpoint based on a three-plane perspective. These dimensions are the linkages among agents, the innovation activities, and the social management technology, including work process organization and the social agreement generation model in force. It is an experimentally methodological approach that tries to go from a theoretical conceptualization of the phenomenon to its empirical evaluation. The questions guiding this research are as follows: What are the variables and dimensions to be observed in the analysis of a group of interconnected firms in order to define a production network? Is it a unique definition or, on the contrary, does it involve a range of alternatives? What are the externalities generated by the agents who belong to one network? What is the relationship between the network’s firms’ technological behavior and their organizational counterpart? How are learning processes in the business firms linked to their own training systems? Has the social management technology some differential role in the learning process and in the development of skills? How do knowledge transmission processes manifest themselves within the “network”? What indicators are useful for the empirical identification of the different means of manifestation of the network according to the theoretical viewpoint adopted? How can those indicators be articulated in order to elaborate typologies intended for the identification of “hybrid” models? How can a complex indicator be built in order to show the different levels of circulation of intangible assets, development of learning processes and work process organization? In the first section, the conceptualization of the production “network” used in this paper is discussed. In the second section, most relevant variables and indicators are presented in order to feature the business firms and the network in terms of: a) type, quantity and quality of tangible and intangible exchanges among the agents; b) innovative capacity and learning; c) social management technology. Then we elaborate a typology of networks based on the consideration of the previous parameters. Lastly, in the fourth section, we discuss how the three dimensions interact in the case of Volkswagen and his forty main local suppliers.Innovation, production process, case study

Effects of celebrity endorsement on firms’ competition: from industrial organisation perspective

Product endorsement is employed by many firms and most studies have proceeded based on management perspectives and ignored the strategic effects (or indirect effects). However, as a non-price competition, product endorsement behaviour’s strategic effects are valuable to be considered and convenient to be captured by industrial organisation perspective. So, this paper’s purpose is to reveal the strategic effects of product endorsement by industrial organisation perspective. First, the results of this paper show that celebrity endorsement decreases the rival’s benefits. Second, under a unique endorser, the lower efficiency (measured by marginal production cost) firm’s celebrity endorsement improves price difference and dispersion, which are direct effects of product endorsement. The higher efficiency firm’s endorsement promotes the producer surplus, consumer surplus and social welfare, which are called indirect effects. Finally, celebrity endorsement has trigger effects. If one firm launches celebrity endorsement, the rational reaction for its rivals is also to engage in a similar behaviour. This paper expands the celebrity endorsement issue from management to economics perspective

Bertrand competition in markets with network effects and switching costs

We analyze Bertrand duopoly competition in markets with network effects and consumer switching costs. Depending on the ratio of switching costs to network effects, our modelerates four different market patterns: monopolization and market sharing which can be either monotone or alternating. A critical mass effect, where one firm becomes the monopolist for sure only occurs for intermediate values of the ratio, whereas for large switching costs market sharing is the unique equilibrium. For large network effcts both monopoly and market sharing equilibria exist. Our welfare analysis reveals a fundamental conflict between maximization of consumer surplus and social welfare when network effects are large. We also analyze firms' incentives for compatibility and we examine how market outcomes are affected by the switching costs, market expansion, and cost asymmetries. Finally, in a dynamic extension of our model, we show how competition depends on agents' discount factors. --Network Effects,Switching Costs,Bertrand Competition