Using Natural Language as Knowledge Representation in an Intelligent Tutoring System

Knowledge used in an intelligent tutoring system to teach students is usually acquired from authors who are experts in the domain. A problem is that they cannot directly add and update knowledge if they don’t learn formal language used in the system. Using natural language to represent knowledge can allow authors to update knowledge easily. This thesis presents a new approach to use unconstrained natural language as knowledge representation for a physics tutoring system so that non-programmers can add knowledge without learning a new knowledge representation. This approach allows domain experts to add not only problem statements, but also background knowledge such as commonsense and domain knowledge including principles in natural language. Rather than translating into a formal language, natural language representation is directly used in inference so that domain experts can understand the internal process, detect knowledge bugs, and revise the knowledgebase easily. In authoring task studies with the new system based on this approach, it was shown that the size of added knowledge was small enough for a domain expert to add, and converged to near zero as more problems were added in one mental model test. After entering the no-new-knowledge state in the test, 5 out of 13 problems (38 percent) were automatically solved by the system without adding new knowledge

Neural-Symbolic Learning and Reasoning: Contributions and Challenges

The goal of neural-symbolic computation is to integrate robust connectionist learning and sound symbolic reasoning. With the recent advances in connectionist learning, in particular deep neural networks, forms of representation learning have emerged. However, such representations have not become useful for reasoning. Results from neural-symbolic computation have shown to offer powerful alternatives for knowledge representation, learning and reasoning in neural computation. This paper recalls the main contributions and discusses key challenges for neural-symbolic integration which have been identified at a recent Dagstuhl seminar

Memories for Life: A Review of the Science and Technology

This paper discusses scientific, social and technological aspects of memory. Recent developments in our understanding of memory processes and mechanisms, and their digital implementation, have placed the encoding, storage, management and retrieval of information at the forefront of several fields of research. At the same time, the divisions between the biological, physical and the digital worlds seem to be dissolving. Hence opportunities for interdisciplinary research into memory are being created, between the life sciences, social sciences and physical sciences. Such research may benefit from immediate application into information management technology as a testbed. The paper describes one initiative, Memories for Life, as a potential common problem space for the various interested disciplines

Barry Smith an sich

Festschrift in Honor of Barry Smith on the occasion of his 65th Birthday. Published as issue 4:4 of the journal Cosmos + Taxis: Studies in Emergent Order and Organization. Includes contributions by Wolfgang Grassl, Nicola Guarino, John T. Kearns, Rudolf Lüthe, Luc Schneider, Peter Simons, Wojciech Żełaniec, and Jan Woleński

Lack of Universality of a Psychological Problem : Epistemological Implications on Psychological Problems

The article claims that psychological problems cannot be defined by universally meaningful psychological or philosophical scientific terminology, which leads one to consider the actual reality of psychological problems from the universal epistemological viewpoint of ordinary people. In other words, can we as laypeople or professionals reasonably claim our reality and justifiable epistemic beliefs based on the notion of a psychological problem? If psychological problems cannot be universally real beyond an idiosyncratic sense, this has important implications on how to reflect upon resolving them. Universally grounded epistemological solutions provide a sound basis to reflect upon resolving psychological problems without formal training, and the unary notion of psychological problem as such, without universal descriptive intentions, is considered with regard to (a) its common sense linguistic value as a proto-epistemic concept in the context of psychologic as a theory and (b) its promising psychological and philosophical Gegenstand functional value as a notion to reflect against.Peer reviewe

A Computational Theory of the Use-Mention Distinction in Natural Language

To understand the language we use, we sometimes must turn language on itself, and we do this through an understanding of the use-mention distinction. In particular, we are able to recognize mentioned language: that is, tokens (e.g., words, phrases, sentences, letters, symbols, sounds) produced to draw attention to linguistic properties that they possess. Evidence suggests that humans frequently employ the use-mention distinction, and we would be severely handicapped without it; mentioned language frequently occurs for the introduction of new words, attribution of statements, explanation of meaning, and assignment of names. Moreover, just as we benefit from mutual recognition of the use-mention distinction, the potential exists for us to benefit from language technologies that recognize it as well. With a better understanding of the use-mention distinction, applications can be built to extract valuable information from mentioned language, leading to better language learning materials, precise dictionary building tools, and highly adaptive computer dialogue systems. This dissertation presents the first computational study of how the use-mention distinction occurs in natural language, with a focus on occurrences of mentioned language. Three specific contributions are made. The first is a framework for identifying and analyzing instances of mentioned language, in an effort to reconcile elements of previous theoretical work for practical use. Definitions for mentioned language, metalanguage, and quotation have been formulated, and a procedural rubric has been constructed for labeling instances of mentioned language. The second is a sequence of three labeled corpora of mentioned language, containing delineated instances of the phenomenon. The corpora illustrate the variety of mentioned language, and they enable analysis of how the phenomenon relates to sentence structure. Using these corpora, inter-annotator agreement studies have quantified the concurrence of human readers in labeling the phenomenon. The third contribution is a method for identifying common forms of mentioned language in text, using patterns in metalanguage and sentence structure. Although the full breadth of the phenomenon is likely to elude computational tools for the foreseeable future, some specific, common rules for detecting and delineating mentioned language have been shown to perform well

The Reflective Epistemic Renegade

Philosophers often find themselves in disagreement with contemporary philosophers they know full well to be their epistemic superiors on the topics relevant to the disagreement. This looks epistemically irresponsible. I offer a detailed investigation of this problem of the reflective epistemic renegade. I argue that although in some cases the renegade is not epistemically blameworthy, and the renegade situation is significantly less common than most would think, in a troublesome number of cases in which the situation arises the renegade is blameworthy in her disagreement with recognized epistemic superiors. I also offer some thoughts on what it would mean for philosophical practice for us to refrain from being renegades. Finally, I show how a new kind of radical skepticism emerges from modest theses regarding the renegade

Misreading Skepticism in the Long Eighteenth Century: Studies in the Rhetoric of Assent

“Misreading Skepticism in the Long Eighteenth Century: Studies in the Rhetoric of Assent” revisits the intellectual historical conditions that contributed to the widespread internalization of skepticism as an error-reduction strategy during the Enlightenment. To do so, it abandons a longstanding emphasis the special philosophical tradition of epistemological skepticism associated with the Scottish philosopher David Hume and pursues an alternative intellectual history of Enlightenment skepticism centered on the Anglophone tradition of “constructive skepticism” that informed not only Hume’s skeptical habits but those of other influential Anglophone Enlightenment thinkers more often set in opposition to Hume. “Misreading Skepticism” draws on this tradition of constructive skepticism to generate a much different picture of the character of Enlightenment skepticism than the one extrapolated from radical Humean skepticism: one that is not anxious but assured, not theoretical but pragmatic, not preoccupied with the threat of “radical uncertainty” but resolved to attaining “moral certainty” sufficient to justify belief and action despite irreducible uncertainty. Readings of the philosophy of John Locke, Thomas Reid, David Hume, Samuel Johnson, and Dugald Stewart recover the broader Enlightenment project of practical rationality that encouraged the widespread internalization and instrumentalization of constructive skepticism. Readings of eighteenth-century rhetorical and legal treatises trace how this constructive skeptical ethos was disseminated beyond epistemology and embraced within a generalized theory of assent. “Misreading Skepticism” approaches this broader “misreading” in the modern intellectual history of skepticism through the special lens of Romantic literary studies, where scholars have traditionally framed the rise of British Romanticism as a response to a supposed epistemological “crisis” posed by Humean skepticism. “Misreading Skepticism” argues that, to understand the Romantic literary reaction to Enlightenment skepticism, we need to approach the intellectual history of British Romanticism not through Humean skepticism but through constructive skepticism. Readings of Romantic works by William Godwin, William Wordsworth, Mary Shelley, and other authors demonstrate how these Romantic writers use literary form to interrogate the confident embrace of constructive skepticism within the Enlightenment as a means for managing uncertainty, often by dramatizing or thematizing elements of subjectivity and error that skepticism fails to detect or discipline. Drawing insight from the constructive skeptical tradition as well as Romantic literary critiques of that tradition, “Misreading Skepticism” develops a revisionary account of skepticism that attends to the rhetorical and social dimensions that complicate any epistemological account of skepticism.PHDEnglish Language & LiteratureUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/144175/1/adsneed_1.pd