Practical product proofs for lattice commitments

We construct a practical lattice-based zero-knowledge argument for proving multiplicative relations between committed values. The underlying commitment scheme that we use is the currently most efficient one of Baum et al. (SCN 2018), and the size of our multiplicative proof (9 KB) is only slightly larger than the 7 KB required for just proving knowledge of the committed values. We additionally expand on the work of Lyubashevsky and Seiler (Eurocrypt 2018) by showing that the above-mentioned result can also apply when working over rings Zq[X]/(Xd+1) where Xd+1 splits into low-degree factors, which is a desirable property for many applications (e.g. range proofs, multiplications over

Lattice-Based proof of a shuffle

In this paper we present the first fully post-quantum proof of a shuffle for RLWE encryption schemes. Shuffles are commonly used to construct mixing networks (mix-nets), a key element to ensure anonymity in many applications such as electronic voting systems. They should preserve anonymity even against an attack using quantum computers in order to guarantee long-term privacy. The proof presented in this paper is built over RLWE commitments which are perfectly binding and computationally hiding under the RLWE assumption, thus achieving security in a post-quantum scenario. Furthermore we provide a new definition for a secure mixing node (mix-node) and prove that our construction satisfies this definition.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

On the efficiency of revocation in RSA-based anonymous systems

© 2016 IEEEThe problem of revocation in anonymous authentication systems is subtle and has motivated a lot of work. One of the preferable solutions consists in maintaining either a whitelist L-W of non-revoked users or a blacklist L-B of revoked users, and then requiring users to additionally prove, when authenticating themselves, that they are in L-W (membership proof) or that they are not in L-B (non-membership proof). Of course, these additional proofs must not break the anonymity properties of the system, so they must be zero-knowledge proofs, revealing nothing about the identity of the users. In this paper, we focus on the RSA-based setting, and we consider the case of non-membership proofs to blacklists L = L-B. The existing solutions for this setting rely on the use of universal dynamic accumulators; the underlying zero-knowledge proofs are bit complicated, and thus their efficiency; although being independent from the size of the blacklist L, seems to be improvable. Peng and Bao already tried to propose simpler and more efficient zero-knowledge proofs for this setting, but we prove in this paper that their protocol is not secure. We fix the problem by designing a new protocol, and formally proving its security properties. We then compare the efficiency of the new zero-knowledge non-membership protocol with that of the protocol, when they are integrated with anonymous authentication systems based on RSA (notably, the IBM product Idemix for anonymous credentials). We discuss for which values of the size k of the blacklist L, one protocol is preferable to the other one, and we propose different ways to combine and implement the two protocols.Postprint (author's final draft

Towards Realising Post-Quantum Secure ElectionGuard

ElectionGuard is a toolkit used to enable end-to-end verification of elections. Since ElectionGuard uses exponential ElGamal, it is vulnerable to later vote decryption when faced with quantum adversaries. Therefore, to avoid influences on voter behaviour, a post-quantum adaption of ElectionGuard is needed to make the toolkits usage secure for the foreseeable future. In this work, we present cryptographic components that can be used to construct a post-quantum version of ElectionGuard. We use the homomorphic encryption scheme BGV and the commitment scheme BDLOP in a lattice setting. Applying existing and new zero knowledge proofs, we construct the elements needed to show that votes are well-formed and later aggregated correctly. As a final step, we show how to verifiably decrypt the resulting tally. In this paper, we lay the foundation for realising post-quantum secure ElectionGuard. We provide the components for post-quantum vote encryption, aggregation, tallying and verifiable decryption. Our work can be extended by distributed key generation and the components for end-to-end verification

Quantum Cryptography Beyond Quantum Key Distribution

Quantum cryptography is the art and science of exploiting quantum mechanical effects in order to perform cryptographic tasks. While the most well-known example of this discipline is quantum key distribution (QKD), there exist many other applications such as quantum money, randomness generation, secure two- and multi-party computation and delegated quantum computation. Quantum cryptography also studies the limitations and challenges resulting from quantum adversaries---including the impossibility of quantum bit commitment, the difficulty of quantum rewinding and the definition of quantum security models for classical primitives. In this review article, aimed primarily at cryptographers unfamiliar with the quantum world, we survey the area of theoretical quantum cryptography, with an emphasis on the constructions and limitations beyond the realm of QKD.Comment: 45 pages, over 245 reference

Quantum Lightning Never Strikes the Same State Twice

Public key quantum money can be seen as a version of the quantum no-cloning theorem that holds even when the quantum states can be verified by the adversary. In this work, investigate quantum lightning, a formalization of "collision-free quantum money" defined by Lutomirski et al. [ICS'10], where no-cloning holds even when the adversary herself generates the quantum state to be cloned. We then study quantum money and quantum lightning, showing the following results: - We demonstrate the usefulness of quantum lightning by showing several potential applications, such as generating random strings with a proof of entropy, to completely decentralized cryptocurrency without a block-chain, where transactions is instant and local. - We give win-win results for quantum money/lightning, showing that either signatures/hash functions/commitment schemes meet very strong recently proposed notions of security, or they yield quantum money or lightning. - We construct quantum lightning under the assumed multi-collision resistance of random degree-2 systems of polynomials. - We show that instantiating the quantum money scheme of Aaronson and Christiano [STOC'12] with indistinguishability obfuscation that is secure against quantum computers yields a secure quantum money schem

Computational Indistinguishability between Quantum States and Its Cryptographic Application

We introduce a computational problem of distinguishing between two specific quantum states as a new cryptographic problem to design a quantum cryptographic scheme that is "secure" against any polynomial-time quantum adversary. Our problem, QSCDff, is to distinguish between two types of random coset states with a hidden permutation over the symmetric group of finite degree. This naturally generalizes the commonly-used distinction problem between two probability distributions in computational cryptography. As our major contribution, we show that QSCDff has three properties of cryptographic interest: (i) QSCDff has a trapdoor; (ii) the average-case hardness of QSCDff coincides with its worst-case hardness; and (iii) QSCDff is computationally at least as hard as the graph automorphism problem in the worst case. These cryptographic properties enable us to construct a quantum public-key cryptosystem, which is likely to withstand any chosen plaintext attack of a polynomial-time quantum adversary. We further discuss a generalization of QSCDff, called QSCDcyc, and introduce a multi-bit encryption scheme that relies on similar cryptographic properties of QSCDcyc.Comment: 24 pages, 2 figures. We improved presentation, and added more detail proofs and follow-up of recent wor