1,078,799 research outputs found
Polar Media for Dimming Devices
An optical device, comprising: a first set of one or more electrodes; a second set of one or more electrodes electrode distinct and separate from the first set of one or more electrodes; and medium including one or more ionic liquids, the medium located between the first set of one or more electrodes and the second set of one or more electrodes
Advancing transcriptome platforms
During the last decade of years, remarkable technological innovations have emerged that allow the direct or indirect determination of the transcriptome at unprecedented scale and speed. Studies using these methods have already altered our view of the extent and complexity of transcript profiling, which has advanced from one-gene-at-a-time to a holistic view of the genome. Here, we outline the major technical advances in transcriptome characterization, including the most popular used hybridization-based platform, the well accepted tag-based sequencing platform, and the recently developed RNA-Seq (RNA sequencing) based platform. Importantly, these next-generation technologies revolutionize assessing the entire transcriptome via the recent RNA-Seq technology
Platform Standards, Collusion and Quality Incentives
This paper examines how quality incentives are related to the interoperability of competing platforms. Platforms choose whether to operate standardised or exclusively, prior to quality and subsequent price competition. We find that platforms choose a common standard if they can coordinate their quality provision. The actual investment then depends on the cost of quality provision: If rather high, platforms refrain from investment; if rather low, platforms maintain vertically differentiated platforms. The latter case is socially more desirable than exclusivity where platforms do not invest. Nevertheless, quality competition of standardised platforms induces the highest investment and maximum welfare
Complementary platforms.
We introduce an analytical framework close to the canonical model of platform competition investigated by Rochet and Tirole (2006) to study pricing decisions in two-sided markets when two or more platforms are needed simultaneously for the successful completion of a transaction. The model developed is a natural extension of the Cournot-Ellet theory of complementary monopoly featuring clear cut asymmetric single- and multihoming patterns across the market. The results indicate that the so-called anticommons problem generalizes to two-sided markets because individual platforms do not take into account the negative pricing externality they exert on the other platforms. As a result, mergers between such platforms may be welfare enhancing, but involve redistribution of surplus from one side of the market to the other. Moreover, the limit of an atomistic allocation of property rights however is not monopoly pricing, indicating that there also exist differences with the received theory of complementarity.Competition; Industries; Industry;
Divergent Platforms
A robust feature of models of electoral competition between two opportunistic, purely office-motivated parties is that both parties become indistinguishable in equilibrium. I this short note, I show that this strong connection between the office motivation of parties and their equilibrium choice of identical platforms depends on the following two - possibly counterfactual - assumptions: 1. Issue spaces are uni-dimensional and 2. Parties are unitary actors whose preferences can be represented by expected utility functions. The main goal here is to provide an example of a two-party model in which parties offer substantially different platforms in equilibrium even though no exogenous asymmetries are assumed. In this example, some voters’ preferences over the 2-dimensional issue space are assumed to exhibit non-convexities and parties evaluate their actions with respect to a set of beliefs on the electorate.Downs model, Games with Incomplete Preferences, Knightian Uncertainty, Uncertainty Aversion, Platform Divergence
Complementary platforms
We introduce an analytical framework close to the canonical model of platform competition investigated by Rochet and Tirole (2006) to study pricing decisions in two-sided markets when two or more platforms are needed simultaneously for the successful completion of a transaction. The model developed is a natural extension of the Cournot-Ellet theory of complementary monopoly featuring clear cut asymmetric single- and multihoming patterns across the market. The results indicate that the so-called anticommons problem generalizes to two-sided markets because individual platforms do not take into account the negative pricing externality they exert on the other platforms. As a result, mergers between such platforms may be welfare enhancing, but involve redistribution of surplus from one side of the market to the other. Moreover, the limit of an atomistic allocation of property rights however is not monopoly pricing, indicating that there also exist differences with the received theory of complementarity.Two-Sided Markets · Complements · The Anticommons Problem
For-Profit Search Platforms
We consider optimal pricing by a profit-maximizing platform running a dynamic search
and matching market. Buyers and sellers enter in cohorts over time, meet and bargain
under private information. The optimal centralized mechanism, which involves posting a
bid-ask spread, can be decentralized through participation fees charged by the intermediary
to both sides. The sum of buyers’ and sellers’ fees equals the sum of inverse hazard rates
of the marginal types and their ratio equals the ratio of buyers’ and sellers’ bargaining
weights. We also show that a monopolistic intermediary in a search market may be welfare
enhancing
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