9 research outputs found
Noise properties in the ideal Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise secure communication system
In this paper we determine the noise properties needed for unconditional
security for the ideal Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key
distribution system using simple statistical analysis. It has already been
shown using physical laws that resistors and Johnson-like noise sources provide
unconditional security. However real implementations use artificial noise
generators, therefore it is a question if other kind of noise sources and
resistor values could be used as well. We answer this question and in the same
time we provide a theoretical basis to analyze real systems as well
Current and voltage based bit errors and their combined mitigation for the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise secure key exchange
We classify and analyze bit errors in the current measurement mode of the
Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) key distribution. The error probability
decays exponentially with increasing bit exchange period and fixed bandwidth,
which is similar to the error probability decay in the voltage measurement
mode. We also analyze the combination of voltage and current modes for error
removal. In this combination method, the error probability is still an
exponential function that decays with the duration of the bit exchange period,
but it has superior fidelity to the former schemes.Comment: 9 pages, accepted for publication in Journal of Computational
Electronic
Resource requirements and speed versus geometry of unconditionally secure physical key exchanges
The imperative need for unconditional secure key exchange is expounded by the
increasing connectivity of networks and by the increasing number and level of
sophistication of cyberattacks. Two concepts that are information theoretically
secure are quantum key distribution (QKD) and Kirchoff-law-Johnson-noise
(KLJN). However, these concepts require a dedicated connection between hosts in
peer-to-peer (P2P) networks which can be impractical and or cost prohibitive. A
practical and cost effective method is to have each host share their respective
cable(s) with other hosts such that two remote hosts can realize a secure key
exchange without the need of an additional cable or key exchanger. In this
article we analyze the cost complexities of cable, key exchangers, and time
required in the star network. We mentioned the reliability of the star network
and compare it with other network geometries. We also conceived a protocol and
equation for the number of secure bit exchange periods needed in a star
network. We then outline other network geometries and trade-off possibilities
that seem interesting to explore.Comment: 13 pages, 7 figures, MDPI Entrop
Critical analysis of the Bennett-Riedel attack on secure cryptographic key distributions via the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise scheme
Recently, Bennett and Riedel (BR) (http://arxiv.org/abs/1303.7435v1) argued that thermodynamics is not essential in the Kirchhoff-law鈥揓ohnson-noise (KLJN) classical physical cryptographic exchange method in an effort to disprove the security of the KLJN scheme. They attempted to demonstrate this by introducing a dissipation-free deterministic key exchange method with two batteries and two switches. In the present paper, we first show that BR's scheme is unphysical and that some elements of its assumptions violate basic protocols of secure communication. All our analyses are based on a technically unlimited Eve with infinitely accurate and fast measurements limited only by the laws of physics and statistics. For non-ideal situations and at active (invasive) attacks, the uncertainly principle between measurement duration and statistical errors makes it impossible for Eve to extract the key regardless of the accuracy or speed of her measurements. To show that thermodynamics and noise are essential for the security, we crack the BR system with 100% success via passive attacks, in ten different ways, and demonstrate that the same cracking methods do not function for the KLJN scheme that employs Johnson noise to provide security underpinned by the Second Law of Thermodynamics. We also present a critical analysis of some other claims by BR; for example, we prove that their equations for describing zero security do not apply to the KLJN scheme. Finally we give mathematical security proofs for each BR-attack against the KLJN scheme and conclude that the information theoretic (unconditional) security of the KLJN method has not been successfully challenged.Laszlo B. Kish, Derek Abbott, Claes G. Granqvis
Critical analysis of the Bennett-Riedel attack on secure cryptographic key distributions via the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise scheme. PLoS One 2013
Abstract Recently, Bennett and Riedel (BR) (http://arxiv.org/abs/1303.7435v1) argued that thermodynamics is not essential in the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) classical physical cryptographic exchange method in an effort to disprove the security of the KLJN scheme. They attempted to demonstrate this by introducing a dissipation-free deterministic key exchange method with two batteries and two switches. In the present paper, we first show that BR's scheme is unphysical and that some elements of its assumptions violate basic protocols of secure communication. All our analyses are based on a technically unlimited Eve with infinitely accurate and fast measurements limited only by the laws of physics and statistics. For non-ideal situations and at active (invasive) attacks, the uncertainly principle between measurement duration and statistical errors makes it impossible for Eve to extract the key regardless of the accuracy or speed of her measurements. To show that thermodynamics and noise are essential for the security, we crack the BR system with 100% success via passive attacks, in ten different ways, and demonstrate that the same cracking methods do not function for the KLJN scheme that employs Johnson noise to provide security underpinned by the Second Law of Thermodynamics. We also present a critical analysis of some other claims by BR; for example, we prove that their equations for describing zero security do not apply to the KLJN scheme. Finally we give mathematical security proofs for each BR-attack against the KLJN scheme and conclude that the information theoretic (unconditional) security of the KLJN method has not been successfully challenged