Cultural robotics : The culture of robotics and robotics in culture

Copyright 2013 Samani et al.; licensee InTech. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly citedIn this paper, we have investigated the concept of "Cultural Robotics" with regard to the evolution o social into cultural robots in the 21st Century. By defining the concept of culture, the potential development of culture between humans and robots is explored. Based on the cultural values of the robotics developers, and the learning ability of current robots, cultural attributes in this regard are in the process of being formed, which would define the new concept of cultural robotics. According to the importance of the embodiment of robots in the sense of presence, the influence of robots in communication culture is anticipated. The sustainability of robotics culture based on diversity for cultural communities for various acceptance modalities is explored in order to anticipate the creation of different attributes of culture between robot and humans in the futurePeer reviewe

Designing People to Serve

I argue that, contrary to intuition, it would be both possible and permissible to design people - whether artificial or organic - who by their nature desire to do tasks we find unpleasant

Some remarks on the concepts of Preferences and Freedom of choice.

No abstract available.

Does the Tax Code Favor Robots?

In recent months, a number of scholars and commentators have articulated versions of the following argument: (1) U.S. tax law favors capital over labor;1 (2) Robots are capital; 2 (3) Therefore, U.S. tax law favors robots over labor. 3 Three implications tend to be drawn from this syllogism: (a) that U.S. tax law leads to inefficient investments in automation;4 (b) that automation—because it is capital-intensive and capital is tax-favored—will result in a reduction in tax revenues;5 and (c) that policymakers should respond to the automation trend either by imposing explicit taxes on robots or by raising taxes on all capital.6 This short essay seeks to illustrate why the line of argument above is misguided. First, the claim that U.S. tax law is biased toward capital rests entirely on an unstated (and uncertain) normative premise: that the United States should tax income rather than consumption. If an income tax is the baseline, then U.S. tax law exhibits a pro-capital bias; if a consumption tax is the baseline, then U.S. tax law exhibits an anti-capital bias. Which baseline we choose depends on normative choices that claims of capital-favoritism tend to occlude. Second, robots do not only (or even primarily) represent “capital”; they also embed the labor of engineers and others. The labor of robot makers is often taxed at unfavorable rates relative to the labor of the workers whom automation threatens to displace. Third, the idea that U.S. tax law incentivizes firms to replace human workers with robots rests on doubtful logic, and the claim that automation will erode the tax base finds little support either. This essay is not an argument against capital income taxation or a defense of the current Code, which does tax capital income but not all that much. I believe, though, that the case for capital income taxation will be stronger if it is based on firm foundations rather than on dubious claims of robot favoritism. The essay also is not a full treatment of the arguments for and against taxing capital. Its objective is to evaluate one such argument and to show why it is unpersuasive. Part I of the essay examines the claim that the U.S. tax system favors capital over labor. Part II turns to the question of whether robots represent capital or embedded labor. Part III considers the case for explicit taxation of robots or broader taxation of capital once illusions about the tax code’s pro-robot bias are cleared away

Tactile feedback display with spatial and temporal resolutions.

We report the electronic recording of the touch contact and pressure using an active matrix pressure sensor array made of transparent zinc oxide thin-film transistors and tactile feedback display using an array of diaphragm actuators made of an interpenetrating polymer elastomer network. Digital replay, editing and manipulation of the recorded touch events were demonstrated with both spatial and temporal resolutions. Analog reproduction of the force is also shown possible using the polymer actuators, despite of the high driving voltage. The ability to record, store, edit, and replay touch information adds an additional dimension to digital technologies and extends the capabilities of modern information exchange with the potential to revolutionize physical learning, social networking, e-commerce, robotics, gaming, medical and military applications

Equal Rights for Zombies?: Phenomenal Consciousness and Responsible Agency

Intuitively, moral responsibility requires conscious awareness of what one is doing, and why one is doing it, but what kind of awareness is at issue? Neil Levy argues that phenomenal consciousness—the qualitative feel of conscious sensations—is entirely unnecessary for moral responsibility. He claims that only access consciousness—the state in which information (e.g., from perception or memory) is available to an array of mental systems (e.g., such that an agent can deliberate and act upon that information)—is relevant to moral responsibility. I argue that numerous ethical, epistemic, and neuroscientific considerations entail that the capacity for phenomenal consciousness is necessary for moral responsibility. I focus in particular on considerations inspired by P. F. Strawson, who puts a range of qualitative moral emotions—the reactive attitudes—front and center in the analysis of moral responsibility

Cognitive Approaches to Phenomenal Consciousness

The most promising approaches to understanding phenomenal consciousness are what I’ll call cognitive approaches, the most notable exemplars of which are the theories of consciousness articulated by David Rosenthal and Daniel Dennett. The aim of the present contribution is to review the core similarities and differences of these exemplars, as well as to outline the main strengths and remaining challenges to this general sort of approach

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