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Risk trading in capacity equilibrium models
We present a set of power investment models, the class of risky capacity equilibrium problems, reflecting different assumptions of perfect and imperfect markets. The models are structured in a unified stochastic Nash game framework. Each model is the concatenation of a model of the short-term market operations (perfect competition or Cournot), with a long-term model of investment behavior (risk neutral and risk averse behavior under different assumptions of risk trading). The models can all be formulated as complementarity problems, some of them having an optimization equivalent. We prove existence of solutions and report numerical results to illustrate the relevance of market imperfections on welfare and investment behavior. The models are constructed and discussed as two stage problems but we show that the extension to multistage is achieved by a change of notation and a standard assumption on multistage risk functions. We also treat a large multistage industrial model to illustrate the computational feasibility of the approach
The Question of Generation Adequacy in Liberalised Electricity Markets
This paper presents an overview of the reasons why unregulated markets for the production of electricity cannot be expected to invest sufficiently in generation capacity on a continuous basis. Although it can be shown that periodic price spikes should provide generation companies with sufficient investment incentives in theory, there are a number of probable causes of market failure. A likely result is the development of investment cycles that may affect the adequacy of capacity. The experience in California shows the great social costs associated with an episode of scarce generation capacity. Another disadvantage is that generation companies can manipulate price spikes. This would result in large transfers of income from consumers to producers and reduce the operational reliability of electricity supply during these price spikes. We end this paper by outlining several methods that have been proposed to stabilise the market, which provide better incentives to generation companies and consumers alike.Generation adequacy, Liberalised electricity market
Policy announcements and welfare
In the presence of idiosyncratic risk, the public revelation of information about uncertain aggregate outcomes such as policy choices can be detrimental to social welfare. By announcing informative signals on non-insurable aggregate risk, the policy maker distorts agentsÂż insurance incentives and increases the riskiness of the optimal allocation that is feasible in self-enforceable arrangements. As an application, we consider a monetary authority that may reveal changes in the inflation target, and document that the negative effect of distorted insurance incentives can very well dominate conventional effects in favor for the release of better information.social value of information, policy announcements, monetary policy, transparency
Robust Market Equilibria under Uncertain Cost
This work studies equilibrium problems under uncertainty where firms maximize
their profits in a robust way when selling their output. Robust optimization
plays an increasingly important role when best guaranteed objective values are
to be determined, independently of the specific distributional assumptions
regarding uncertainty. In particular, solutions are to be determined that are
feasible regardless of how the uncertainty manifests itself within some
predefined uncertainty set. Our mathematical analysis adopts the robust
optimization perspective in the context of equilibrium problems. First, we
present structural insights for a single-stage, nonadjustable robust setting.
We then go one step further and study the more complex two-stage or adjustable
case where a part of the variables can adjust to the realization of the
uncertainty. We compare equilibrium outcomes with the corresponding centralized
robust optimization problem where thesum of all profits are maximized. As we
find, the market equilibrium for the perfectly competitive firms differs from
the solution of the robust central planner, which is in stark contrast to
classical results regarding the efficiency of market equilibria with perfectly
competitive firms. For the different scenarios considered, we furthermore are
able to determine the resulting price of anarchy. In the case of non-adjustable
robustness, for fixed demand in every time step the price of anarchy is bounded
whereas it is unbounded if the buyers are modeled by elastic demand functions.
For the two-stage adjustable setting, we show how to compute subsidies for the
firms that lead to robust welfareoptimal equilibria.Comment: 26 page
Real Options under Choquet-Brownian Ambiguitys
Real options models characterized by the presence of âambiguityâ (or âKnightian uncertaintyâ) have been recently proposed. But based on recursive multiple-priors preferences, they typically describe ambiguity through a range of Geometric Brownian motions and solve it by application of a maxmin expected utility criterion among them (worst case). This reduces acceptable individual preferences to the single case of an extreme form of pessimism. In contrast, by relying on dynamically consistent âChoquet-Brownianâ motions to represent the ambiguous cash flows expected from a project, we show that a much broader spectrum of attitudes towards ambiguity may be accounted for, improving the explanatory and application potentials of these appealing expanded real options models. In the case of a perpetual real option to invest, ambiguity aversion may delay the moment of exercise of the option, while the opposite holds true for an ambiguity seeking decision maker. Furthermore, an intricate relationship between risk and ambiguity appears strikingly in our model.
Russian gas imports in Europe: how does Gazprom reliability change the game?.
Europeâs dependence on Russian gas imports has been the subject of increasing political concern after gas conflicts between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 and 2009. This paper assesses the potential impact of Russian unreliability on the European gas market, and how it affects European gas import strategy. We also study to what extent Europe should invest in strategic gas storage capacity to mitigate the effects of possible Russian unreliability. The European gas import market is described by differentiated competition between Russia and a â more reliable â competitive fringe of other exporters. The results show that Russian contract volumes and prices decline significantly as a function of unreliability, so that not only Europe but also Russia suffers if Russiaâs unreliability increases. For Europe, buying gas from more reliable suppliers at a price premium turns out to be generally more attractive than building strategic gas storage capacity.
PERSPECTIVES ON COMPETITIVE BIDDING: RETIREMENT OF ENVIRONMENTALLY SENSITIVE FARMLAND
The USDA has used bidding to enroll land into the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) and may use similar mechanisms to implement other policy instruments in which some or all agricultural land cropping rights are acquired to protect or increase environmental amenities. Experience with the CRP suggests that current enrollees are being compensated in excess of the lowest payment they would be willing to accept in exchange for loss of cropping rights. While it may be prohibitively expensive to estimate such reservation prices on all potential CRP parcels, it is likewise difficult to design a bidding mechanism that induces landowners to reveal these values. While the competitive bidding and contingent valuation literatures provide some guidance, the problem of designing a cost effective bidding mechanism for land retirement does not conform precisely to situations in which theoretical, experimental or case study results have been reported. Despite this, realistic incremental changes in the CRP's current bidding mechanism that induce competitive behavior among bidders appear to portend significant savings in government outlays.Land Economics/Use,
A survey on electricity market design: Insights from theory and real-world implementations of capacity remuneration mechanisms
In recent years, electricity markets have been characterized by a growing share of fluctuating renewable energies, which has increased concerns about the security of electricity supply. As a consequence, existing market designs are adapted, and new capacity remuneration mechanisms are introduced. However, these mechanisms entail new challenges, and it is disputed whether they are indeed needed. In this article, an overview of the current debate on the necessity of capacity remuneration mechanisms is provided. Furthermore, initial experiences of real-world implementations are discussed, and common findings in the literature, categorized by their economic implications, are derived. Finally, shortcomings in existing research and open questions that need to be addressed in future works are pointed out
Investor behaviour, financial markets and the international economy
This dissertation focuses on analysing investor behaviour and price processes in asset markets. It consists of four self-contained essays in the areas of market microstructure, risk attitude of boundedly rational investors, and international finance. Chapter 2 provides a review of the existing literature on the informational aspects of price processes. A common feature of these models is that prices reflect information that is dispersed among many traders. Dynamic models can explain crashes and illustrate a rationale for technical/chart analysis. The second emphasis of this survey is on herding models. In Chapter 3, I have developed a multi-period trading-game that analyses the impact of information leakage. I find that a trader who receives a signal about a future public announcement can exploit this information twice. First, when he receives his signal, and second, at the time of the public announcement. Furthermore, I show that the investor trades very aggressively on the rumour in order to manipulate the price. This enhances his informational advantage after the correct information is made public. He also trades for speculative reasons, i.e. he buys stocks that he plans to sell after the public announcement. Chapter 4 provides a theoretical rationale for experimental results such as loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity. A decision maker is considered to be boundedly rational if he can not find his new optimal consumption bundle with certainty when he is faced with a new income level. This makes him more risk averse at his current reference income level. It also makes him less risk averse for a range of incomes below his reference income level. Chapter 5 considers a two country economy similar to that in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995). We find that conclusions about whether monetary shocks lead to exchange rate overshooting and spillovers on foreign production and consumption depend crucially on the form of price stickiness.' Sticky retail prices not only allow for a profitable âBeggar Thy Neighbour Policyâ but also lead to exchange rate overshooting. This is not the case under sticky wholesale prices and sticky wages
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