34 research outputs found
Perfect Structure on the Edge of Chaos
We construct trapdoor permutations based on (sub-exponential) indistinguishability obfuscation and one-way functions, thereby providing the first candidate that is not based on the hardness of factoring.
Our construction shows that even highly structured primitives, such as trapdoor permutations, can be potentially based on hardness assumptions with noisy structures such as those used in candidate constructions of indistinguishability obfuscation. It also suggest a possible way to construct trapdoor permutations that resist quantum attacks, and that their hardness may be based on problems outside the complexity class SZK - indeed, while factoring-based candidates do not possess such security, future constructions of indistinguishability obfuscation might.
As a corollary, we eliminate the need to assume trapdoor permutations and injective one-way function in many recent constructions based on indistinguishability obfuscation
Proofs of Quantumness from Trapdoor Permutations
Assume that Alice can do only classical probabilistic polynomial-time computing while Bob can do quantum polynomial-time computing. Alice and Bob communicate over only classical channels, and finally Bob gets a state with some bit strings and . Is it possible that Alice can know but Bob cannot? Such a task, called {\it remote state preparations}, is indeed possible under some complexity assumptions, and is bases of many quantum cryptographic primitives such as proofs of quantumness, (classical-client) blind quantum computing, (classical) verifications of quantum computing, and quantum money. A typical technique to realize remote state preparations is to use 2-to-1 trapdoor collision resistant hash functions: Alice sends a 2-to-1 trapdoor collision resistant hash function to Bob, and Bob evaluates it coherently, i.e., Bob generates . Bob measures the second register to get the measurement result , and sends to Alice. Bob\u27s post-measurement state is , where . With the trapdoor, Alice can learn from , but due to the collision resistance, Bob cannot. This Alice\u27s advantage can be leveraged to realize the quantum cryptographic primitives listed above. It seems that the collision resistance is essential here. In this paper, surprisingly, we show that the collision resistance is not necessary for a restricted case: we show that (non-verifiable) remote state preparations of secure against {\it classical} probabilistic polynomial-time Bob can be constructed from classically-secure (full-domain) trapdoor permutations. Trapdoor permutations are not likely to imply the collision resistance, because black-box reductions from collision-resistant hash functions to trapdoor permutations are known to be impossible. As an application of our result, we construct proofs of quantumness from classically-secure (full-domain) trapdoor permutations
Correlation-Intractable Hash Functions via Shift-Hiding
A hash function family is correlation intractable for a -input relation if, given a random function chosen from , it is hard to find such that is true. Among other applications, such hash functions are a crucial tool for instantiating the Fiat-Shamir heuristic in the plain model, including the only known NIZK for NP based on the learning with errors (LWE) problem (Peikert and Shiehian, CRYPTO 2019).
We give a conceptually simple and generic construction of single-input CI hash functions from shift-hiding shiftable functions (Peikert and Shiehian, PKC 2018) satisfying an additional one-wayness property. This results in a clean abstract framework for instantiating CI, and also shows that a previously existing function family (PKC 2018) was already CI under the LWE assumption.
In addition, our framework transparently generalizes to other settings, yielding new results:
- We show how to instantiate certain forms of multi-input CI under the LWE assumption. Prior constructions either relied on a very strong ``brute-force-is-best\u27\u27 type of hardness assumption (Holmgren and Lombardi, FOCS 2018) or were restricted to ``output-only\u27\u27 relations (Zhandry, CRYPTO 2016).
- We construct single-input CI hash functions from indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) and one-way permutations. Prior constructions relied essentially on variants of fully homomorphic encryption that are impossible to construct from such primitives. This result also generalizes to more expressive variants of multi-input CI under iO and additional standard assumptions
Dual-Mode NIZKs from Obfuscation
Two standard security properties of a non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK)
scheme are soundness and zero-knowledge. But while standard NIZK systems can
only provide one of those properties against unbounded adversaries,
dual-mode NIZK systems allow to choose dynamically and adaptively which
of these properties holds unconditionally. The only known dual-mode NIZK
systems are Groth-Sahai proofs (which have proved extremely useful in a variety
of applications), and the
FHE-based NIZK constructions of Canetti et al. and Peikert et al,
which are concurrent and independent to this work.
However, all these constructions rely on specific algebraic settings.
Here, we provide a generic construction of dual-mode NIZK systems for all
of NP. The public parameters of our scheme can be set up in one of two
indistinguishable ways. One way provides unconditional soundness, while the
other provides unconditional zero-knowledge. Our scheme relies on
subexponentially secure indistinguishability obfuscation and subexponentially
secure one-way functions, but otherwise only on comparatively mild and generic
computational assumptions. These generic assumptions can be instantiated under
any one of the DDH, k-LIN, DCR, or QR assumptions.
As an application, we reduce the required assumptions necessary for several
recent obfuscation-based constructions of multilinear maps. Combined with
previous work, our scheme can be used to construct multilinear maps from
obfuscation and a group in which the strong Diffie-Hellman assumption holds. We
also believe that our work adds to the understanding of the construction of
NIZK systems, as it provides a conceptually new way to achieve dual-mode
properties
A Note on Black-Box Separations for Indistinguishability Obfuscation
Mahmoody et al. (TCC 2016-A) showed that basing indistinguishability obfuscation (IO) on a wide range of primitives in a black-box way is \emph{as hard as} basing public-key cryptography on one-way functions. The list included any primitive that could be realized relative to random trapdoor permutation or degree- graded encoding oracle models in a secure way against computationally unbounded polynomial-query attackers.
In this work, relying on the recent result of Brakerski, Brzuska, and Fleischhacker (ePrint 2016/226) in which they ruled out statistically secure approximately correct IO, we show that there is no fully black-box constructions of IO from any of the primitives listed above, assuming the existence of one-way functions and .
At a technical level, we provide an alternative lemma to the Borel-Cantelli lemma that is useful for deriving black-box separations. In particular, using this lemma we show that attacks in idealized models that succeed with only a \emph{constant} advantage over the trivial bound are indeed sufficient for deriving fully black-box separations from primitives that exist in such idealized models unconditionally
On Constructing One-Way Permutations from Indistinguishability Obfuscation
We prove that there is no black-box construction of a one-way permutation family from a one-way function and an indistinguishability obfuscator for the class of all oracle-aided circuits, where the construction is domain invariant (i.e., where each permutation may have its own domain, but these domains are independent of the underlying building blocks).
Following the framework of Asharov and Segev (FOCS \u2715), by considering indistinguishability obfuscation for oracle-aided circuits we capture the common techniques that have been used so far in constructions based on indistinguishability obfuscation. These include, in particular, non-black-box techniques such as the punctured programming approach of Sahai and Waters (STOC \u2714) and its variants, as well as sub-exponential security assumptions. For example, we fully capture the construction of a trapdoor permutation family from a one-way function and an indistinguishability obfuscator due to Bitansky, Paneth and Wichs (TCC \u2716). Their construction is not domain invariant and our result shows that this, somewhat undesirable property, is unavoidable using the common techniques.
In fact, we observe that constructions which are not domain invariant circumvent all known negative results for constructing one-way permutations based on one-way functions, starting with Rudich\u27s seminal work (PhD thesis \u2788). We revisit this classic and fundamental problem, and resolve this somewhat surprising gap by ruling out all such black-box constructions -- even those that are not domain invariant
Foundations and applications of program obfuscation
Code is said to be obfuscated if it is intentionally difficult for humans to understand.
Obfuscating a program conceals its sensitive implementation details and
protects it from reverse engineering and hacking. Beyond software protection, obfuscation
is also a powerful cryptographic tool, enabling a variety of advanced applications.
Ideally, an obfuscated program would hide any information about the original
program that cannot be obtained by simply executing it. However, Barak et al.
[CRYPTO 01] proved that for some programs, such ideal obfuscation is impossible.
Nevertheless, Garg et al. [FOCS 13] recently suggested a candidate general-purpose
obfuscator which is conjectured to satisfy a weaker notion of security called indistinguishability
obfuscation.
In this thesis, we study the feasibility and applicability of secure obfuscation:
- What notions of secure obfuscation are possible and under what assumptions?
- How useful are weak notions like indistinguishability obfuscation?
Our first result shows that the applications of indistinguishability obfuscation go
well beyond cryptography. We study the tractability of computing a Nash equilibrium
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of a game { a central problem in algorithmic game theory and complexity theory.
Based on indistinguishability obfuscation, we construct explicit games where a Nash
equilibrium cannot be found efficiently.
We also prove the following results on the feasibility of obfuscation. Our starting
point is the Garg at el. obfuscator that is based on a new algebraic encoding scheme
known as multilinear maps [Garg et al. EUROCRYPT 13].
1. Building on the work of Brakerski and Rothblum [TCC 14], we provide the first
rigorous security analysis for obfuscation. We give a variant of the Garg at el.
obfuscator and reduce its security to that of the multilinear maps. Specifically,
modeling the multilinear encodings as ideal boxes with perfect security, we prove
ideal security for our obfuscator. Our reduction shows that the obfuscator resists
all generic attacks that only use the encodings' permitted interface and do not
exploit their algebraic representation.
2. Going beyond generic attacks, we study the notion of virtual-gray-box obfusca-
tion [Bitansky et al. CRYPTO 10]. This relaxation of ideal security is stronger
than indistinguishability obfuscation and has several important applications
such as obfuscating password protected programs. We formulate a security
requirement for multilinear maps which is sufficient, as well as necessary for
virtual-gray-box obfuscation.
3. Motivated by the question of basing obfuscation on ideal objects that are simpler
than multilinear maps, we give a negative result showing that ideal obfuscation
is impossible, even in the random oracle model, where the obfuscator is given access
to an ideal random function. This is the first negative result for obfuscation
in a non-trivial idealized model
Injective Trapdoor Functions via Derandomization: How Strong is Rudich’s Black-Box Barrier?
We present a cryptographic primitive satisfying the following properties:
-- Rudich\u27s seminal impossibility result (PhD thesis \u2788) shows that cannot be used in a black-box manner to construct an injective one-way function.
-- can be used in a non-black-box manner to construct an injective one-way function assuming the existence of a hitting-set generator that fools deterministic circuits (such a generator is known to exist based on the worst-case assumption that \mbox{E} = \mbox{DTIME}(2^{O(n)}) has a function of deterministic circuit complexity ).
-- Augmenting with a trapdoor algorithm enables a non-black-box construction of an injective trapdoor function (once again, assuming the existence of a hitting-set generator that fools deterministic circuits), while Rudich\u27s impossibility result still holds.
The primitive and its augmented variant can be constructed based on any injective one-way function and on any injective trapdoor function, respectively, and they are thus unconditionally essential for the existence of such functions. Moreover, can also be constructed based on various known primitives that are secure against related-key attacks, thus enabling to base the strong structural guarantees of injective one-way functions on the strong security guarantees of such primitives.
Our application of derandomization techniques is inspired mainly by the work of Barak, Ong and Vadhan (CRYPTO \u2703), which on one hand relies on any one-way function, but on the other hand only results in a non-interactive perfectly-binding commitment scheme (offering significantly weaker structural guarantees compared to injective one-way functions), and does not seem to enable an extension to public-key primitives.
The key observation underlying our approach is that Rudich\u27s impossibility result applies not only to one-way functions as the underlying primitive, but in fact to a variety of unstructured\u27\u27 primitives. We put forward a condition for identifying such primitives, and then subtly tailor the properties of our primitives such that they are both sufficiently unstructured in order to satisfy this condition, and sufficiently structured in order to yield injective one-way and trapdoor functions. This circumvents the basic approach underlying Rudich\u27s long-standing evidence for the difficulty of constructing injective one-way functions (and, in particular, injective trapdoor functions) based on seemingly weaker or unstructured assumptions
Limits on the Power of Indistinguishability Obfuscation and Functional Encryption
Recent breakthroughs in cryptography have positioned indistinguishability obfuscation as a ``central hub\u27\u27 for almost all known cryptographic tasks, and as an extremely powerful building block for new cryptographic tasks resolving long-standing and foundational open problems. However, constructions based on indistinguishability obfuscation almost always rely on non-black-box techniques, and thus the extent to which it can be used as a building block has been completely unexplored so far.
We present a framework for proving meaningful negative results on the power of indistinguishability obfuscation. By considering indistinguishability obfuscation for oracle-aided circuits, we capture the common techniques that have been used so far in constructions based on indistinguishability obfuscation. These include, in particular, non-black-box techniques such as the punctured programming approach of Sahai and Waters (STOC \u2714) and its variants, as well as sub-exponential security assumptions.
Within our framework we prove the first negative results on the power of indistinguishability obfuscation and of the tightly related notion of functional encryption. Our results are as follows:
-- There is no fully black-box construction of a collision-resistant function family from an indistinguishability obfuscator for oracle-aided circuits.
-- There is no fully black-box construction of a key-agreement protocol with perfect completeness from a private-key functional encryption scheme for oracle-aided circuits.
Specifically, we prove that any such potential constructions must suffer from an exponential security loss, and thus our results cannot be circumvented using sub-exponential security assumptions. Our framework captures constructions that may rely on a wide variety of primitives in a non-black-box manner (e.g., obfuscating or generating a functional key for a function that uses the evaluation circuit of a puncturable pseudorandom function), and we only assume that the underlying indistinguishability obfuscator or functional encryption scheme themselves are used in a black-box manner
Exploding Obfuscation: A Framework for Building Applications of Obfuscation From Polynomial Hardness
There is some evidence that indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) requires either exponentially many assumptions or (sub)exponentially hard assumptions, and indeed, all known ways of building obfuscation suffer one of these two limitations. As such, any application built from iO suffers from these limitations as well. However, for most applications, such limitations do not appear to be inherent to the application, just the approach using iO. Indeed, several recent works have shown how to base applications of iO instead on functional encryption (FE), which can in turn be based on the polynomial hardness of just a few assumptions. However, these constructions are quite complicated and recycle a lot of similar techniques.
In this work, we unify the results of previous works in the form of a weakened notion of obfuscation, called Exploding iO. We show (1) how to build exploding iO from functional encryption, and (2) how to build a variety of applications from exploding iO, including all of the applications already known from FE. The construction in (1) hides most of the difficult techniques in the prior work, whereas the constructions in (2) are much closer to the comparatively simple constructions from iO. As such, exploding iO represents a convenient new platform for obtaining more applications from polynomial hardness