Sensation and perception

One of the oldest and most difficult questions in science is how we are able to develop an awareness of the world around us from our senses. Topics covered under the title of, 'Sensation and perception' address this very question. Sensation encompasses the processes by which our sense organs (e.g. eyes, ears etc.) receive information from our environment, whereas perception refers to the processes through which the brain selects, integrates, organises and interprets those sensations. The sorts of questions dealt with by psychologists interested in this area include: 'how does visual information get processed by the brain?', 'how is it that I am able to recognise one face out of many many thousands?', and 'what causes visual illusions to occur?: Within New Zealand there are a number of researchers studying visual perception specifically and their research interests range from understanding the biologica

The Strange Nature of Quantum Perception: To See a Photon, One Must _Be_ a Photon

This paper takes as its point of departure recent research into the possibility that human beings can perceive single photons. In order to appreciate what quantum perception may entail, we first explore several of the leading interpretations of quantum mechanics, then consider an alternative view based on the ontological phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Martin Heidegger. Next, the philosophical analysis is brought into sharper focus by employing a perceptual model, the Necker cube, augmented by the topology of the Klein bottle. This paves the way for addressing in greater depth the paper’s central question: Just what would it take to observe the quantum reality of the photon? In formulating an answer, we examine the nature of scientific objectivity itself, along with the paradoxical properties of light. The conclusion reached is that quantum perception requires a new kind of observation, one in which the observer of the photon adopts a concretely self-reflexive observational posture that brings her into close ontological relationship with the observed

Cognitive penetration and the perceptual representation of high-level properties

In recent years, two of the most popular debates in the philosophy of perception have been about whether there’s cognitive penetration and whether high-level properties are represented in our perceptual experiences. My dissertation concerns both of those debates. In the first paper, I argue that the debates about cognitive penetration and the perceptual representation of high-level properties are related. Namely, there has to be cognitive penetration for it to be plausible that our perceptual experiences represent high-level properties. In the second paper, I add to the literature challenging the alleged empirical evidence for cognitive penetration. I focus, in particular, on studies purportedly finding that (direct) influence from subjects cognitive states had altered their perceptual experiences over time. I argue those studies provide empirical evidence of perceptual adaptation, not cognitive penetration. In the third paper, I argue the view that our visual experiences represent high-level properties is unmotivated and I argue the explanation for how we come to perceptually represent high-level properties is implausiblePhilosoph

Do we see with microscopes?

The role of a family of instruments, microscopes, in our quest for reliable knowledge is compared with that of visual systems. Similarities and dissimilarities in accounts of their epistemic contributions are assessed. Several possible lines of argument for denying that we see with microscopes are reviewed. Arguments that exploit differences in the relations that hold between the distal stimulus and either the retinal or the microscope image are briefly presented and discussed. Arguments that concentrate on differences in the relations that hold between the image and the end-product of the process are then considered. The discussion focusses on whether, once it is granted that the main purpose of both (advanced) visual perception and microscope observation is to inform us on distal spatial layouts, there remain fundamental enough differences as to the means employed for reaching this goal to justify denying that we see with microscopes

The Philosophy of Perception: An explanation of Realism, Idealism and the Nature of Reality

This paper investigates the nature of reality by looking at the philosophical debate between realism and idealism and at scientific investigations in quantum physics and at recent studies of animal senses, neurology and cognitive psychology. The concept of perceptual relativity is examined and this involves looking at sense perception in other animals and various examples of perceptual relativity in science. It will be concluded that the universe is observer dependent and that there is no reality independent of the observer, which is knowable to the observer. The paper concludes by an investigation of what an observer dependent universe would be like and that recognition of an observer dependent world would lead to a more open minded and tolerant world

What horses and humans see: a comparative review

Adaptations of the mammalian eye have tailored each to its own particular ecological niche. On the one hand, it would appear that the horse is best served by a system that can keep "half an eye" on everything, while the human benefits from focussing on more specific aspects of the visual array. By adapting a range of techniques, originally used to assess human visual ability, it has been possible to compare the human visual experience with that of the horse. In general, the results of the majority of these comparative studies indicate that the visual capabilities of the horse are broadly inferior to the human equivalents in acuity, accommodation, and colour vision. However, both the horse and human abilities to judge distance and depth perception may be quite comparable while equine vision is certainly superior to that of human's under scotopic conditions. Individual variation in visual ability, which is routinely taken for granted in humans, is also likely to occur in the horse. Such variation would undoubtedly affect equine performance, particularly in terms of expectation of athletic competitive outcomes in modern equitation

Human factors workplace considerations

Computer workstations assume many different forms and play different functions today. In order for them to assume the effective interface role which they should play they must be properly designed to take into account the ubiguitous human factor. In addition, the entire workplace in which they are used should be properly configured so as to enhance the operational features of the individual workstation where possible. A number of general human factors workplace considerations are presented. This ongoing series of notes covers such topics as achieving comfort and good screen visibility, hardware issues (e.g., mouse maintenance), screen symbology features (e.g., labels, cursors, prompts), and various miscellaneous subjects. These notes are presented here in order to: (1) illustrate how one's workstation can be used to support telescience activities of many other people working within an organization, and (2) provide a single complete set of considerations for future reference

Telepresence and the Role of the Senses

The telepresence experience can be evoked in a number of ways. A well-known example is a player of videogames who reports about a telepresence experience, a subjective experience of being in one place or environment, even when physically situated in another place. In this paper we set the phenomenon of telepresence into a theoretical framework. As people react subjectively to stimuli from telepresence, empirical studies can give more evidence about the phenomenon. Thus, our contribution is to bridge the theoretical with the empirical. We discuss theories of perception with an emphasis on Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Gibson, the role of the senses and the Spinozian belief procedure. The aim is to contribute to our understanding of this phenomenon. A telepresence-study that included the affordance concept is used to empirically study how players report sense-reactions to virtual sightseeing in two cities. We investigate and explore the interplay of the philosophical and the empirical. The findings indicate that it is not only the visual sense that plays a role in this experience, but all senses

The knowing ear : an Australian test of universal claims about the semantic structure of sensory verbs and their extension into the domain of cognition

In this paper we test previous claims concerning the universality of patterns of polysemy and semantic change in perception verbs. Implicit in such claims are two elements: firstly, that the sharing of two related senses A and B by a given form is cross-linguistically widespread, and matched by a complementary lack of some rival polysemy, and secondly that the explanation for the ubiquity of a given pattern of polysemy is ultimately rooted in our shared human cognitive make-up. However, in comparison to the vigorous testing of claimed universals that has occurred in phonology, syntax and even basic lexical meaning, there has been little attempt to test proposed universals of semantic extension against a detailed areal study of non-European languages. To address this problem we examine a broad range of Australian languages to evaluate two hypothesized universals: one by Viberg (1984), concerning patterns of semantic extension across sensory modalities within the domain of perception verbs (i .e. intra-field extensions), and the other by Sweetser (1990), concerning the mapping of perception to cognition (i.e. trans-field extensions). Testing against the Australian data allows one claimed universal to survive, but demolishes the other, even though both assign primacy to vision among the senses