ROLE OF INDRIYA IN COGNITION AS EXPLAINED IN AYURVEDA WITH REFERENCE TO RECEPTORS

Cognitive impairments is a silent issue which is imparting a lot of burden over society now-a-days. Intellectual and emotional dysfunctions are another story which are displayed by the virtue of poor dietary regimen where the concept of – Tan mana bhunjita is neglected. The Sharir and Indriya are feed with adultered things with an extensive variety of distractions today. This altogether is misleading the cell signaling mechanics of body affecting the perception through by – Asatmyendriyarthasamyoga. Ayurveda has deep roots in the process of learning or cognition which mainly depends on the Indriyarthasannikarsha. Indriya, for the sense of objective understanding, here are justified with variety of receptors in terms of their functional capacities. The concept of Indriya and knowledge learning process is much more beyond the present concept of receptors and neural biochemistry. Specificity of receptors within the body with various morphological and functional responsibilities can be graded to understand the intellectual concepts of Indriya from gross to subtle level, such as- Sukshma, Sukshmatara and Sukshmatama. Indriyapanchapanchak is one such concept in Ayurveda where the specificity of receptors, its respective pathways and neural centers for perception of knowledge are easily understood and efforts for the same are highlighted through this topic

The Concept of the Supreme Soul in Shrimad Bhagawad Geeta and in the View of Brahma Kumaris

The identity of God, in the mind of most theists and believers is vague. Most people consider the mystery about God as insoluble. Even the sages in the ancient past, who spent most of their time in the search of metaphysical truth, have said that God is beyond the reach of human understanding. beyond human perception, unknowable Not this Not this. These are some of the words they have been using to express the inability of human mind to comprehend God. God cannot be subjected to investigation by human senses or the scientific instruments as the material objects of the phenomenal world, it is not beyond the ability of a human being to get a reasonably accurate idea and an enjoyable and fair experience of divine virtues, attributes and acts of God. It would be proper to add here that the metaphysical habit of considering God to be infinite in size is in itself based on misconception and yet, those, who theorise that God is beyond human comprehension, are not prepared to accept their this corollary when they are told that they too have not properly comprehended.The word ‘God’ is now-a-days used in several meanings but we consider it etymologically, it means: One who is extremely good. In the word ‘God’, ‘G’, for the Greatest, ‘O’ for ‘Only One’ and ‘D’, for Dazzling Divinity’, in other words ‘G’ stands for one who is Self-Existent, ‘O’ signifies the Perfect One and ‘D’ denotes its brilliancy or its self-luminous nature. Hence, the word ‘God’ means a Person who is Self-existent and is Eternal and of the nature of Light. So This article helps to realize the real identity of Supreme Soul, the real truth abut the Supreme Soul which is in Shrimad Bhagawad Gita and The Brahma Kumaris used for Meditation which is real one

How the Body Narrows the Interaction with the Environment

Embodiment matters to perception and action. Beyond the triviality that, under normal circumstances, we need a body in order to perceive the world and act in it, our particular embodiment, right here, right now, both enables and constrains our perception of possibilities for action. In this chapter, we provide empirical support for the idea that the structural and morphological features of the body can narrow the set of our possible interactions with the environment by shaping the way we perceive the possibilities for action provided. We argue that this narrowing holds true in the perception of what we call strongly embodied affordances, that is, relevant micro-affordances that have a genuinely demanding characteristic, as well as in the perception of actions performed by others. In particular, we show that perceptual contents are shaped by fine-grained morphological features of the body, such as specific hand-shapes, and that they change according to our possibility to act upon them with this body, in this situation, at this moment. We argue that these considerations provide insight into distinguishing a variety of experienced affordance relations that can aid us in better understanding the relevance of embodiment for perception and experience

What Do Animals See? Intentionality, Objects and Kantian Nonconceptualism

This article addresses three questions concerning Kant’s views on non-rational animals: do they intuit spatio-temporal particulars, do they perceive objects, and do they have intentional states? My aim is to explore the relationship between these questions and to clarify certain pervasive ambiguities in how they have been understood. I first disambiguate various nonequivalent notions of objecthood and intentionality: I then look closely at several models of objectivity present in Kant’s work, and at recent discussions of representational and relational theories of intentionality. I argue ultimately that, given the relevant disambiguations, the answers to all three questions will likely be positive. These results both support what has become known as the nonconceptualist reading of Kant, and make clearer the price the conceptualist must pay to sustain her positio

The Backside of Habit: Notes on Embodied Agency and the Functional Opacity of the Medium

In this chapter what I call the “backside” of habit is explored. I am interested in the philosophical implications of the physical and physiological processes that mediate, and which allow for what comes to appear as almost magic; namely the various sensorimotor associations and integrations that allows us to replay our past experiences, and to in a certain sense perceive potential futures, and to act and bring about anticipated outcomes – without quite knowing how. Thus, the term “backside” is meant to refer both the actual mediation and the epistemic opacity of these backstage intermediaries that allow for the front stage magic. The question is if the epistemic complexities around sensorimotor mediation gives us valuable insights into the nature of human agency and further how it might begin to show us new ways to think of the mind as truly embodied yet not reducible to any finite body-as-object

A Role for the prefrontal cortex in supporting singular demonstrative reference

One of the most pressing questions concerning singular demonstrative mental contents is what makes their content singular: that is to say, what makes it the case that individual objects are the representata of these mental states. Many philosophers have required sophisticated intellectual capacities for singular content to be possible, such as the possession of an elaborate scheme of space and time. A more recent reaction to this strategy proposes to account for singular content solely on the basis of empirical models of visual processing. We believe both sides make good points, and offer an intermediate way of looking into singular content. Our suggestion is that singular content may be traced to psychological capacities to form flexible, abstract representations in the prefrontal cortex. This allows them to be sustained for increasingly longer periods of time and extrapolated beyond the context of perception, thus going beyond lowlevel sensory representations while also falling short of more sophisticated intellectual abilities

Going Beyond the Kantian Philosophy: On McDowell's Hegelian Critique of Kant

The Kant-Hegel relation has a continuing fascination for commentators on Hegel, and understandbly so: for, taking this route into the Hegelian jungle can promise many advantages. First, it can set Hegel's thought against a background with which we are fairly familiar, and in a way that makes its relevance clearly apparent; second, it can help us locate Hegel in the broader philisophical tradition, making us see that the traditional "analytic jump from Kant to Frege leaves out a crucial period in post-Kantian thought, third, it can show Hegel in a progressive light, as attempting to take that tradition further forward; fourth, it can help us locate familiar philisophical issues in Hegelian thought that other-wise can appear whooly sui generis; and finally, and perhaps most importantly of all, focusing on this relation can help raise and crystalise some of the fascinating ambiguties concerning Hegel's outlook, regarding whether Hegel's response to Kant shows him to have been a reactionary, Romantic, pre-critical thinker, who sought to turn the philosophical clock back to a time before Kant had written, or a modernist, Enlightented and essentially critical one, who remained true to the spirit if not the letter of Kant's philosophy

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Not Its Own Meaning: A Hermeneutic of the World

The contemporary cultural mindset posits that the world has no intrinsic semantic value. The meaning we see in it is supposedly projected onto the world by ourselves. Underpinning this view is the mainstream physicalist ontology, according to which mind is an emergent property or epiphenomenon of brains. As such, since the world beyond brains isn’t mental, it cannot a priori evoke anything beyond itself. But a consistent series of recent experimental results suggests strongly that the world may in fact be mental in nature, a hypothesis openly discussed in the field of foundations of physics. In this essay, these experimental results are reviewed and their hermeneutic implications discussed. If the world is mental, it points to something beyond its face-value appearances and is amenable to interpretation, just as ordinary dreams. In this case, the project of a Hermeneutic of Everything is metaphysically justifiable