181 research outputs found
Pareto Optimality and Strategy Proofness in Group Argument Evaluation (Extended Version)
An inconsistent knowledge base can be abstracted as a set of arguments and a
defeat relation among them. There can be more than one consistent way to
evaluate such an argumentation graph. Collective argument evaluation is the
problem of aggregating the opinions of multiple agents on how a given set of
arguments should be evaluated. It is crucial not only to ensure that the
outcome is logically consistent, but also satisfies measures of social
optimality and immunity to strategic manipulation. This is because agents have
their individual preferences about what the outcome ought to be. In the current
paper, we analyze three previously introduced argument-based aggregation
operators with respect to Pareto optimality and strategy proofness under
different general classes of agent preferences. We highlight fundamental
trade-offs between strategic manipulability and social optimality on one hand,
and classical logical criteria on the other. Our results motivate further
investigation into the relationship between social choice and argumentation
theory. The results are also relevant for choosing an appropriate aggregation
operator given the criteria that are considered more important, as well as the
nature of agents' preferences
Manipulation in group argument evaluation.
Given an argumentation framework and a group of agents, the individuals may have divergent opinions on the status of the arguments. If the group needs to reach a common po- sition on the argumentation framework, the question is how the individual evaluations can be mapped into a collective one. This problem has been recently investigated in [1]. In this paper, we study under which conditions these operators are Pareto optimal and whether they are manipulable.Collective decision making; Argumentation; Judgment aggregation; Social choice theory;
Manipulation in Group Argument Evaluation.
Given an argumentation framework and a group of agents, the individuals may have divergent opinions on the status of the arguments. If the group needsto reach a common position on the argumentation framework, the question is how the individual evaluations can be mapped into a collective one. Thisproblem has been recently investigated by Caminada and Pigozzi. In this paper, we investigate the behaviour of two of such operators from a socialchoice-theoretic point of view. In particular, we study under which conditions these operators are Pareto optimal and whether they are manipulable.Social choice theory; Judgment aggregation; Argumentation; Collective decision making;
Agenda manipulation-proofness, stalemates, and redundant elicitation in preference aggregation. Exposing the bright side of Arrow's theorem
This paper provides a general framework to explore the possibility of agenda
manipulation-proof and proper consensus-based preference aggregation rules, so
powerfully called in doubt by a disputable if widely shared understanding of
Arrow's `general possibility theorem'. We consider two alternative versions of
agenda manipulation-proofness for social welfare functions, that are
distinguished by `parallel' vs. `sequential' execution of agenda formation and
preference elicitation, respectively. Under the `parallel' version, it is shown
that a large class of anonymous and idempotent social welfare functions that
satisfy both agenda manipulation-proofness and strategy-proofness on a natural
domain of single-peaked `meta-preferences' induced by arbitrary total
preference preorders are indeed available. It is only under the second,
`sequential' version that agenda manipulation-proofness on the same natural
domain of single-peaked `meta-preferences' is in fact shown to be tightly
related to the classic Arrowian `independence of irrelevant alternatives' (IIA)
for social welfare functions. In particular, it is shown that using IIA to
secure such `sequential' version of agenda manipulation-proofness and combining
it with a very minimal requirement of distributed responsiveness results in a
characterization of the `global stalemate' social welfare function, the
constant function which invariably selects universal social indifference. It is
also argued that, altogether, the foregoing results provide new significant
insights concerning the actual content and the constructive implications of
Arrow's `general possibility theorem' from a mechanism-design perspective
The Core of the Participatory Budgeting Problem
In participatory budgeting, communities collectively decide on the allocation
of public tax dollars for local public projects. In this work, we consider the
question of fairly aggregating the preferences of community members to
determine an allocation of funds to projects. This problem is different from
standard fair resource allocation because of public goods: The allocated goods
benefit all users simultaneously. Fairness is crucial in participatory decision
making, since generating equitable outcomes is an important goal of these
processes. We argue that the classic game theoretic notion of core captures
fairness in the setting. To compute the core, we first develop a novel
characterization of a public goods market equilibrium called the Lindahl
equilibrium, which is always a core solution. We then provide the first (to our
knowledge) polynomial time algorithm for computing such an equilibrium for a
broad set of utility functions; our algorithm also generalizes (in a
non-trivial way) the well-known concept of proportional fairness. We use our
theoretical insights to perform experiments on real participatory budgeting
voting data. We empirically show that the core can be efficiently computed for
utility functions that naturally model our practical setting, and examine the
relation of the core with the familiar welfare objective. Finally, we address
concerns of incentives and mechanism design by developing a randomized
approximately dominant-strategy truthful mechanism building on the exponential
mechanism from differential privacy
Contributing or Free-Riding? A Theory of Endogenous Lobby Formation
We consider a two-stage public goods provision game: In the first stage, players simultaneously decide if they will join a contribution group or not. In the second stage, players in the contribution group simultaneously offer contribution schemes in order to influence the government’s choice on the level of provision of public goods. Using perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston, 1987 JET), we show that the set of equilibrium outcomes is equivalent to an "intuitive" hybrid solution concept, the free-riding-proof core, which is always nonempty but does not necessarily achieve global efficiency. It is not necessarily true that an equilibrium lobby group is formed by the players with highest willingness-to-pay, nor is it a consecutive group with respect to their willingnesses-to-pay. We also show that the equilibrium level of public goods provision shrinks to zero as the economy is replicated.Common Agency, Public Good, Free Rider, Core, Lobby, Coalition Formation, Coalition-proof Nash Equilibrium
A dialectical approach for argument-based judgment aggregation
The current paper provides a dialectical interpretation of the argumentation-based judgment aggregation operators of Caminada and Pigozzi. In particular, we define discussion-based proof procedures for the foundational concepts of down-admissible and up-complete. We then show how these proof procedures can be used as the basis of dialectical proof procedures for the sceptical, credulous and super credulous judgment aggregation operators
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