The Failure of Corporate Governance in State Owned Enterprises and the Need for Restructured Governance in Fully and Partially Privatized Enterprises: The Case of Kenya

This Article argues that the initiatives adopted in order to make parastatals more efficient are inadequate and will not realize the intended objectives unless the chief executives of parastatals are hired on a competitive basis, given more autonomy and the government is committed not only to designing performance contracts that set realistic standards, but also enforcing them strictly. It also contends that there is a need to streamline the multiple regulations that govern parastatals and reform the corporate regulatory framework of the private sector in order to raise standards of corporate governance and, as a result, ensure that the privatized services are managed prudently

Grain marketing parastatals in Asia

Using case studies from six Asian countries, this paper (a) assesses the relevance of underlying rationales for public intervention in foodgrain markets, (b) documents the existing policies and regulations that support operation of grain parastatals, (c) provides estimates of benefits and costs of parastatals, and (d) compares experiences of countries that liberalized (or reduced intervention) with the ones that continue to have significant presence of parastatals. Our results suggest that conditions in the region have improved significantly over the past thirty years; and none of the four commonly agreed rationales—that is, poorly integrated domestic markets, thin and volatile world market, promoting modern technology and the scarcity of foreign exchange reserves—for public intervention in foodgrain markets are now persuasive. Domestic foodgrain markets are integrated, international markets for both wheat and rice are significantly more robust than they were thirty years ago, High-Yielding Varieties (HYV) now cover practically all of the high potential area sown to wheat and rice; and foreign currency reserves have increased dramatically in all countries in recent years. However, although rationales have lost their significance, many countries continue to practice old policies and provide regulatory supports to parastatals, including monopoly control over international trade, preferential access to transportation, restrictions on movement of foodgrains, and cheap or interest-free credit. Relative to the private sector, the costs of the grain parastatals have been high and are increasing, as special interests and rent- seeking are increasingly dictating their operation. This is being manifested in various forms, such as excessive public stocks in India, vacillating import policies in Indonesia and Pakistan, questionable government foodgrain import decisions in the Philippines, and politically-determined ceiling and floor prices in India. On the other hand, the experiences of Bangladesh and Vietnam, both of which have implemented extensive reforms over the last fifteen years, suggest that reduced government intervention can promote competition in the domestic markets, reduce subsidies, and release funds for development and anti-poverty programs without jeopardizing price stability. The paper concludes that reforms are overdue and the delay in changing the old ways of doing price stabilization will be increasingly wasteful.

From parastatals to private trade: Lessons from Asian agriculture

"Governments in Asia used grain price stabilization as a major policy instrument when they began to promote the Green Revolution in the 1960s. In the process, they created parastatal agencies, which were quasi-governmental in nature, to undertake public marketing activities in basic staples such as rice and wheat. These operations often meant providing a support price to farmers, procuring staples on government account, holding public stocks, and distributing these stocks through public distribution systems or open market operations to hold the price line for consumers. This led to a sizeable degree of government intervention in most of these countries' grain markets, which continues to a large extent today." from TextPrice stabilization, Green Revolution, Parastatals, Agricultural policies, Production risk, Consumer vulnerability, Government commitment, Incentives, Institutions, Investments, Private sector,

Constitutional Impediments to Decentralization in the World\u27s Largest Federal Country

Decentralization is often advocated as a means of improving local democracy and enhancing what economists call allocative efficiency. In federal countries, where power is already divided between national and state governments, decentralization involves the devolution of power from state to local governments. The world’s largest federal country, India, took an unusual step to advance decentralization: it passed the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act to confer constitutional status on municipalities. However, India’s efforts to promote the devolution of power through a national urban renewal scheme have not succeeded for three reasons. The first is that India’s decentralization process is incomplete. Political decentralization has been stymied by the language of the constitutional amendment itself; administrative decentralization has been hampered by the comparative advantage of entrenched state-level institutions; and fiscal decentralization has not occurred because financial responsibility—but not significant revenue—has been devolved. The second reason is that decentralization has been undertaken in a top-down manner, which has exacerbated Center-state relations and mitigated the goal of allocative efficiency. Third is the relative weakness of local governance structures, which has created a Catch-22 situation: as long as the local governments lack significant capacity, the states are reluctant to devolve power to them. Additional effort needs to be directed towards an effective model of cooperative federalism. With Prime Minister Narendra Modi poised to create “smart cities” and promote urban renewal, it is critical to understand why India’s prior decentralization efforts have largely failed. The lessons learned over the past decade are an important guide to the future of cities in India as well as in other federal countrie

Price stabilization for raw jute in Bangladesh

Fluctuating prices for raw jute have been viewed as contributing to economic problems in the jute subsector. Price fluctuations were thought to reduce the jute farmers'welfare and there has been concern about the costs of parastatals'stocking operations in attempts to stabilize jute prices and incomes. The authors examine these fluctuations and analyze policies that might reduce them. They find that price fluctuations for raw jute reduce farmers'welfare only slightly because farmers'activities are typically diversified and jute's share in total income is small. Although stocking operations by the parastatals contribute to stability in prices and real income, they have been extremely costly and have crowded out private stocking. The authors contend that if the parastatals had refrained from ad hoc stocking and if the private sector had stocked efficiently, jute prices and incomes would have been just as stable - and at no cost. They argue that the Bangladeshi jute market should be free of government intervention and that a a market-based credit system that allows efficient stockholding behavior by the private sector should be established. They also found that improving the flow of market information to farmers and greater price responsiveness by jute mills to raw jute purchases would significantly improve the stability of raw jute prices and incomes. Having more information available would also make private stocking operations more efficient.Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Crops&Crop Management Systems,Access to Markets,Markets and Market Access

PRIVATIZING MARKETS FOR HETEROGENEOUS, EXPERIENCE GOODS: COFFEE IN NORTHWEST CAMEROON

Reform and privatization of administratively controlled marketing parastatals is always a thorny issue. Reform of public coffee parastatals is one of the most fascinating-and trickiest-exercises in free-market development. Coffee, a heterogenous, experience good, undergoes several processing stages with imperfect quality control, leading to agency problems. Successful privatization must address these problems. This paper analyzes the reform and partial privatization of the North West Cooperative Association (NWCA) parastatal in Cameroon. A conceptual, principal-agent framework informs the analysis. In an interesting twist, the reforms structured the marketing chain so that farmers are the residual claimants to profits from international sales, in effect making them the principals. As is suggested by the conceptual framework, empirical work confirms that farmers as principals have reinvested in coffee quality. However, the evidence also shows that agency problems still exist at later stages of the marketing chain. This is consistent with the principal-agent framework, since incentive-compatible contracts are not used in this marketing chain. The paper concludes by drawing more general lessons about how incomplete information and incentive structure issues arising from imperfect markets might be handled within the context of market liberalization.Marketing,

Consensus, institutions, and supply response : the political economy of agricultural reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa

During the late 1980s and the 1990s, most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa implemented agricultural policy reforms, along with national political and economic reforms. The agricultural reforms focused on opening up processing and marketing activities to increased competition and eliminating export taxes and restrictions to improve producer incentives. In eight of nine country/commodity case studies analyzed in this paper, output responded positively in the short run to the reforms. In many cases, however, the initial supply response was not sustained in the face of subsequent shocks. The studies suggest that stakeholder consensus on the distribution of sector-specific rents is a key variable affecting the sustainability of supply responses. Agricultural sector reforms lead to large changes in income distribution. The greater the acceptance of the distribution of rents following the reforms, the better sectors are able to accommodate subsequent shocks. In cases where the initial consensus on the distribution of rents is weak, shocks lead to reform reversals in some cases or an inability to design necessary support institutions in others. The diversity in outcomes across similar products and countries suggests it is possible to achieve sector and local level results that differ from national ones.Markets and Market Access,Crops&Crop Management Systems,Emerging Markets,Economic Theory&Research,Labor Policies

The Role of the Private Sector in the Farm Input Subsidy Programme in Malawi

The involvement of the private sector in the Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP) has changed over the lifetime of the programme with increasing participation in fertilizer procurement, inclusion and exclusion in fertiliser retail sales, increased participation in seed sales and increased participation in the transportation of fertilisers to various outlets in Malawi. This paper documents changes in private sector involvement in various aspects of the programme since 2005/06 and identifies benefits and challenges of participation of the private sector in the implementation of the programme. The paper reviews the experience of private sector participation using data from the Logistics Unit and household and community surveys conducted in the 2006/07, 2008/09 and 2010/11 agricultural seasons. The analysis shows that commercial sales of fertilisers, although lower than the pre-subsidy levels, have been increasing suggesting that the programme has in the medium term stimulated demand for fertilisers in Malawi. This has occurred at a time when the private sector has increasingly participated in the procurement of subsidy fertiliser but has been excluded from retailing of subsidy fertilisers. The seed component of the subsidy programme, which has always involved the private sector, has attracted additional seed growers and expanded the number of varieties for maize seeds and legumes