A Robust Characterization of Nash Equilibrium

We give a robust characterization of Nash equilibrium by postulating coherent behavior across varying games: Nash equilibrium is the only solution concept that satisfies consequentialism, consistency, and rationality. As a consequence, every equilibrium refinement violates at least one of these properties. We moreover show that every solution concept that approximately satisfies consequentialism, consistency, and rationality returns approximate Nash equilibria. The latter approximation can be made arbitrarily good by increasing the approximation of the axioms. This result extends to various natural subclasses of games such as two-player zero-sum games, potential games, and graphical games

Virtual Bargaining: A new Disagreement Point and Interpretation

Virtual bargaining tries to explain why some actions suggested in games by best response reasoning appear unreasonable and why real players often succeed easily in some coordination problems, although orthodox game theory is unable to resolve them. Yet the original account of virtual bargaining was lacking a proper mathematical formalism, a convincing motivation for players to follow the reasoning as well as a deliberate notion of the feasible agreements and the disagreement point. However, the ideas of two recent papers on virtual bargaining, one of them yet unpublished, can overcome some of the initial problems, while also raising new issues. I will argue here that the latest account rests on an implausible disagreement point, an in general unintuitive assumption of non-spiteful best responses and an inconsistent definition of the worst payoff function. Yet I propose a new disagreement point, which I argue to be convincing and which justifies a slightly weaker assumption than non-spitefulness for an arbitrary number of players such that virtual bargaining accounts for the phenomena, it tries to explain. Moreover, I will adequately generalize the worst payoff function and the virtual bargaining equilibrium (VBE) for n-player games, while also outlining the epistemic conditions for a VBE to be chosen

Situational incompetence: an investigation into the causes of failure of a large-scale IT project

Information technology (IT) projects in the government (public) sector experience significant challenges. Despite decades of research, the adoption of formal methods, the use of external suppliers and packaged software, these remediation attempts have not appeared to have reduced nor mitigated the problems faced when the public sector undertakes large IT projects. Previous studies have examined the causes of IT project failure, in particular these have focused on factor analysis. A relatively limited number of studies have investigated the contribution of IT competence, and even fewer have considered the role and contribution of non-IT executives in IT project outcomes. This study sought a deeper understanding of what drives the behaviour of large scale IT projects. Of particular note was the finding that `the skills required to do the job are the same skills needed to identify competence in others' (Kruger and Dunning 2009). It was this finding which was found to most influence the observed behaviours of executive leadership resulting in IT project failure. This research reports on a qualitative study that investigated 181 interviews and 5,000 pages of project data drawn from a large-scale public sector IT project which resulted in a cost overrun that exceeded AUD$1 Billion. The interview transcripts and project data were analysed using an inductive case study methodology and the research process was influenced by aspects of Grounded Theory. The question of most concern to this researcher has been to uncover why, despite all of the research, publications, education, training and certification that is available to individuals and organisations undertaking project management of an information technology solution, a project could still display all of the mistakes, errors and failings that have been consistently identified in the literature for decades. The theme that was the most consistent throughout the project was that senior management was repeatably made aware of project risks and failings. Reports had been written about the whole-of-government project prior to the creation of the Queensland Health project that specifically enumerated the challenges and risks that needed to be kept front of mind to the QH project and executive team. The literature provided no plausible explanation to describe the fact that senior executives responsible for the direct execution of the project, and departmental executives with governance and oversight accountability apparently ignored all of the advice that they were presented with. A new Theory of Situational Incompetence has been developed as a result of the analysis. The research culminates in a proposed measurement instrument intended to gauge leadership competence in the context of increasing project size and complexity

Pairwise epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium

We introduce a framework for modeling pairwise interactive beliefs and provide an epistemic foundation for Nash equilibrium in terms of pairwise epistemic conditions locally imposed on only some pairs of players. Our main result considerably weakens not only the standard sufficient conditions by Aumann and Brandenburger (1995), but also the subsequent generalization by Barelli (2009). Surprisingly, our conditions do not require nor imply mutual belief in rationality