Exploiting Lack of Hardware Reciprocity for Sender-Node Authentication at the PHY Layer

This paper proposes to exploit the so-called reciprocity parameters (modelling non-reciprocal communication hardware) to use them as decision metric for binary hypothesis testing based authentication framework at a receiver node Bob. Specifically, Bob first learns the reciprocity parameters of the legitimate sender Alice via initial training. Then, during the test phase, Bob first obtains a measurement of reciprocity parameters of channel occupier (Alice, or, the intruder Eve). Then, with ground truth and current measurement both in hand, Bob carries out the hypothesis testing to automatically accept (reject) the packets sent by Alice (Eve). For the proposed scheme, we provide its success rate (the detection probability of Eve), and its performance comparison with other schemes

Channel Impulse Response-based Distributed Physical Layer Authentication

In this preliminary work, we study the problem of {\it distributed} authentication in wireless networks. Specifically, we consider a system where multiple Bob (sensor) nodes listen to a channel and report their {\it correlated} measurements to a Fusion Center (FC) which makes the ultimate authentication decision. For the feature-based authentication at the FC, channel impulse response has been utilized as the device fingerprint. Additionally, the {\it correlated} measurements by the Bob nodes allow us to invoke Compressed sensing to significantly reduce the reporting overhead to the FC. Numerical results show that: i) the detection performance of the FC is superior to that of a single Bob-node, ii) compressed sensing leads to at least $20\%$ overhead reduction on the reporting channel at the expense of a small ($<1$ dB) SNR margin to achieve the same detection performance.Comment: 6 pages, 5 figures, accepted for presentation at IEEE VTC 2017 Sprin

Shared Secret Key Generation via Carrier Frequency Offsets

This work presents a novel method to generate secret keys shared between a legitimate node pair (Alice and Bob) to safeguard the communication between them from an unauthorized node (Eve). To this end, we exploit the reciprocal carrier frequency offset (CFO) between the legitimate node pair to extract common randomness out of it to generate shared secret keys. The proposed key generation algorithm involves standard steps: the legitimate nodes exchange binary phase-shift keying (BPSK) signals to perform blind CFO estimation on the received signals, and do equi-probable quantization of the noisy CFO estimates followed by information reconciliation-to distil a shared secret key. Furthermore, guided by the Allan deviation curve, we distinguish between the two frequency-stability regimes-when the randomly time-varying CFO process i) has memory, ii) is memoryless; thereafter, we compute the key generation rate for both regimes. Simulation results show that the key disagreement rate decreases exponentially with increase in the signal to noise ratio of the link between Alice and Bob. Additionally, the decipher probability of Eve decreases as soon as either of the two links observed by the Eve becomes more degraded compared to the link between Alice and Bob

Securing the insecure: a first-line-of-defense for body-centric nanoscale communication systems operating in THz band

This manuscript presents a novel mechanism (at the physical layer) for authentication and transmitter identification in a body-centric nanoscale communication system operating in the terahertz (THz) band. The unique characteristics of the propagation medium in the THz band renders the existing techniques (say for impersonation detection in cellular networks) not applicable. In this work, we considered a body-centric network with multiple on-body nano-senor nodes (of which some nano-sensors have been compromised) who communicate their sensed data to a nearby gateway node. We proposed to protect the transmissions on the link between the legitimate nano-sensor nodes and the gateway by exploiting the path loss of the THz propagation medium as the fingerprint/feature of the sender node to carry out authentication at the gateway. Specifically, we proposed a two-step hypothesis testing mechanism at the gateway to counter the impersonation (false data injection) attacks by malicious nano-sensors. To this end, we computed the path loss of the THz link under consideration using the high-resolution transmission molecular absorption (HITRAN) database. Furthermore, to refine the outcome of the two-step hypothesis testing device, we modeled the impersonation attack detection problem as a hidden Markov model (HMM), which was then solved by the classical Viterbi algorithm. As a bye-product of the authentication problem, we performed transmitter identification (when the two-step hypothesis testing device decides no impersonation) using (i) the maximum likelihood (ML) method and (ii) the Gaussian mixture model (GMM), whose parameters are learned via the expectation–maximization algorithm. Our simulation results showed that the two error probabilities (missed detection and false alarm) were decreasing functions of the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). Specifically, at an SNR of 10 dB with a pre-specified false alarm rate of 0.2, the probability of correct detection was almost one. We further noticed that the HMM method outperformed the two-step hypothesis testing method at low SNRs (e.g., a 10% increase in accuracy was recorded at SNR = −5 dB), as expected. Finally, it was observed that the GMM method was useful when the ground truths (the true path loss values for all the legitimate THz links) were noisy

RF Fingerprinting Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

As unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) continue to become more readily available, their use in civil, military, and commercial applications is growing significantly. From aerial surveillance to search-and-rescue to package delivery the use cases of UAVs are accelerating. This accelerating popularity gives rise to numerous attack possibilities for example impersonation attacks in drone-based delivery, in a UAV swarm, etc. In order to ensure drone security, in this project we propose an authentication system based on RF fingerprinting. Specifically, we extract and use the device-specific hardware impairments embedded in the transmitted RF signal to separate the identity of each UAV. To achieve this goal, AlexNet with the data augmentation technique was employed

Wireless Sensor Data Transport, Aggregation and Security

abstract: Wireless sensor networks (WSN) and the communication and the security therein have been gaining further prominence in the tech-industry recently, with the emergence of the so called Internet of Things (IoT). The steps from acquiring data and making a reactive decision base on the acquired sensor measurements are complex and requires careful execution of several steps. In many of these steps there are still technological gaps to fill that are due to the fact that several primitives that are desirable in a sensor network environment are bolt on the networks as application layer functionalities, rather than built in them. For several important functionalities that are at the core of IoT architectures we have developed a solution that is analyzed and discussed in the following chapters. The chain of steps from the acquisition of sensor samples until these samples reach a control center or the cloud where the data analytics are performed, starts with the acquisition of the sensor measurements at the correct time and, importantly, synchronously among all sensors deployed. This synchronization has to be network wide, including both the wired core network as well as the wireless edge devices. This thesis studies a decentralized and lightweight solution to synchronize and schedule IoT devices over wireless and wired networks adaptively, with very simple local signaling. Furthermore, measurement results have to be transported and aggregated over the same interface, requiring clever coordination among all nodes, as network resources are shared, keeping scalability and fail-safe operation in mind. Furthermore ensuring the integrity of measurements is a complicated task. On the one hand Cryptography can shield the network from outside attackers and therefore is the first step to take, but due to the volume of sensors must rely on an automated key distribution mechanism. On the other hand cryptography does not protect against exposed keys or inside attackers. One however can exploit statistical properties to detect and identify nodes that send false information and exclude these attacker nodes from the network to avoid data manipulation. Furthermore, if data is supplied by a third party, one can apply automated trust metric for each individual data source to define which data to accept and consider for mentioned statistical tests in the first place. Monitoring the cyber and physical activities of an IoT infrastructure in concert is another topic that is investigated in this thesis.Dissertation/ThesisDoctoral Dissertation Electrical Engineering 201