PERFORMANCE MEASURES OF BIOMETRICS SYSTEMS

The objective of this report is to review existing performance measures of biometrics systems .It also contains the definition on biometrics system as a whole

Transit Performance Measures in California

This research is the result of a California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) request to assess the most commonly available transit performance measures in California. Caltrans wanted to understand performance measures and data used by Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) and transit agencies to help it develop statewide measures. This report serves as a summary reference guide to help Caltrans understand the numerous and diverse performance measures used by MPOs and transit agencies in California. First, investigators review the available literature to identify a complete transit performance framework for the purposes of organizing agency measures, metrics, and data sources. Next, they review the latest transit performance measures documented in planning reports for the four largest MPOs in California (San Francisco Bay Area, Los Angeles, San Diego, and Sacramento). Researchers pay special attention to the transit performance measures used by these MPOs, because these measures are available for the majority of California’s population. Finally, investigators summarize 231 performance measures used by a total 26 local transit agencies in the State of California, based on transit planning documents available on the internet

On Educational Performance Measures

Quantitative school performance measures (QPMs) are playing an ever larger role in education systems on both sides of the Atlantic. In this paper we outline the rationale for the use of such measures in education, review the literature relating to several important problems associated with their use, and argue that they nonetheless have a positive role to play in improving the educational quality. We delineate several institutional reforms which would help schools to respond "positively" to QPMs, emphasizing the importance of agents' flexibility to change the way they work, and the importance of a sound knowledge base regarding "what works" in raising attainment. We suggest that the present institutional setups in both England and the US too often hold schools accountable for outcomes over which they have little control – but that such problems are far from insurmountable.performance measures, education incentives, school quality

Immigration-Related Worksite Enforcement: Performance Measures

[Excerpt] According to the estimates by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), some 11.4 million unauthorized immigrants were living in the United States in 2012.1 The Pew Research Center’s unauthorized alien population estimate for 2012 was 11.2 million, which included some 8.1 million unauthorized workers in the U.S. civilian workforce.2 It is widely believed that most unauthorized aliens enter and remain in the United States in order to work. Six years ago, in 2009, DHS issued new guidance on immigration-related worksite enforcement—the enforcement of prohibitions on the employment of unauthorized aliens in the United States. In the words of DHS at the time, the 2009 guidance “reflects a renewed Department-wide focus targeting criminal aliens and employers who cultivate illegal workplaces by breaking the country’s laws and knowingly hiring illegal workers.”3 Under this guidance, promoting compliance also has taken on a larger role in DHS’s worksite enforcements efforts. Questions arise as to how rigorous and effective DHS’s worksite enforcement efforts are and have been in past years. The department maintains data on several measures that can be used to examine the performance of its worksite enforcement program. Enforcement activity by the Department of Labor (DOL) is also relevant to a discussion of federal efforts to address unauthorized employment. DOL, which is responsible for enforcing minimum wage, overtime pay, and related requirements, focuses a significant percentage of its enforcement resources on low-wage industries that employ large numbers of immigrant—and presumably large numbers of unauthorized—workers

Immigration-Related Worksite Enforcement: Performance Measures

[Excerpt] In the spring of 2009, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued new guidance on immigration-related worksite enforcement—the enforcement of prohibitions on the employment of unauthorized aliens in the United States. In the words of DHS, the updated guidance “reflects a renewed Department-wide focus targeting criminal aliens and employers who cultivate illegal workplaces by breaking the country’s laws and knowingly hiring illegal workers.” According to 2008 estimates, there are some 8.3 million unauthorized workers in the U.S. civilian workforce. Questions arise as to how rigorous and effective DHS’s worksite enforcement efforts have been under the Obama Administration and in past years. The department maintains data on several measures that can be used to examine the performance of its worksite enforcement program. Enforcement activity by the Department of Labor (DOL) is also relevant to a discussion of federal efforts to address unauthorized employment. DOL, which is responsible for enforcing minimum wage, overtime pay, and related requirements, focuses a significant percentage of its enforcement resources on a group of low-wage industries that employ large numbers of immigrant—and presumably large numbers of unauthorized—workers

Immigration-Related Worksite Enforcement: Performance Measures

[Excerpt] Over the past few years, the media have been filled with reports about worksite enforcement operations, commonly referred to as immigration raids. These operations represent the public face of efforts by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to curtail the employment of unauthorized immigrants (illegal aliens). According to 2006 estimates, there are some 7.8 million unauthorized workers in the U.S. civilian workforce. DHS’s U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is responsible for Immigration-related worksite enforcement, or enforcement of the prohibitions on unauthorized employment in Section 274A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The INA §274A provisions, sometimes referred to as employer sanctions, make it unlawful for an employer to knowingly hire, recruit or refer for a fee, or continue to employ an alien who is not authorized to be so employed. Today, ICE’s worksite enforcement program is focused primarily on cases that involve critical infrastructure facilities and cases involving employers who commit “egregious violations” of criminal statutes and engage in worker exploitation. Employers who violate INA prohibitions on the unlawful employment of aliens may be subject to civil monetary penalties and/or criminal penalties. Criminal investigations may result in defendants being charged with crimes beyond unlawful employment and being subject to the relevant penalties for those violations. Various measures are available to examine the performance of ICE’s worksite enforcement program. They include Final Orders for civil monetary penalties, administrative fines, administrative arrests, criminal arrests, criminal indictments and convictions, and criminal fines and forfeitures. In recent years, ICE has generally focused less on administrative fines and more on administrative and criminal arrests, criminal prosecutions, and criminal fines and forfeitures. The data presented here show increases in these latter measures in recent years. At the same time, however, when considered in terms of the estimated size of the unauthorized workforce or the potential number of employers employing these workers in violation of the law, ICE’s worksite enforcement program can seem quite small. Enforcement activity by the Department of Labor (DOL) is also relevant to a discussion of federal efforts to curtail unauthorized employment. DOL, which is responsible for enforcing minimum wage, overtime pay, and related requirements, focuses a significant percentage of its enforcement resources on a group of low-wage industries that employ large numbers of immigrant—and presumably large numbers of unauthorized—workers. Related background information can be found in CRS Report RL33973, Unauthorized Employment in the United States: Issues and Options, and a discussion of related legislation can be found in CRS Report RL34204, Immigration Legislation and Issues in the 110th Congress. This report will be updated when new data become available

Visual object tracking performance measures revisited

The problem of visual tracking evaluation is sporting a large variety of performance measures, and largely suffers from lack of consensus about which measures should be used in experiments. This makes the cross-paper tracker comparison difficult. Furthermore, as some measures may be less effective than others, the tracking results may be skewed or biased towards particular tracking aspects. In this paper we revisit the popular performance measures and tracker performance visualizations and analyze them theoretically and experimentally. We show that several measures are equivalent from the point of information they provide for tracker comparison and, crucially, that some are more brittle than the others. Based on our analysis we narrow down the set of potential measures to only two complementary ones, describing accuracy and robustness, thus pushing towards homogenization of the tracker evaluation methodology. These two measures can be intuitively interpreted and visualized and have been employed by the recent Visual Object Tracking (VOT) challenges as the foundation for the evaluation methodology

Evaluation of Performance Measures for Classifiers Comparison

The selection of the best classification algorithm for a given dataset is a very widespread problem, occuring each time one has to choose a classifier to solve a real-world problem. It is also a complex task with many important methodological decisions to make. Among those, one of the most crucial is the choice of an appropriate measure in order to properly assess the classification performance and rank the algorithms. In this article, we focus on this specific task. We present the most popular measures and compare their behavior through discrimination plots. We then discuss their properties from a more theoretical perspective. It turns out several of them are equivalent for classifiers comparison purposes. Futhermore. they can also lead to interpretation problems. Among the numerous measures proposed over the years, it appears that the classical overall success rate and marginal rates are the more suitable for classifier comparison task

Lyapunov Conditions for Differentiability of Markov Chain Expectations: the Absolutely Continuous Case

We consider a family of Markov chains whose transition dynamics are affected by model parameters. Understanding the parametric dependence of (complex) performance measures of such Markov chains is often of significant interest. The derivatives of the performance measures w.r.t. the parameters play important roles, for example, in numerical optimization of the performance measures, and quantification of the uncertainties in the performance measures when there are uncertainties in the parameters from the statistical estimation procedures. In this paper, we establish conditions that guarantee the differentiability of various types of intractable performance measures---such as the stationary and random horizon discounted performance measures---of general state space Markov chains and provide probabilistic representations for the derivatives

Distorted Performance Measures and Dynamic Incentives

Incentive contracts must typically be based on performance measures that do not exactly match agents’ true contribution to principals’ objectives. Such misalignment may impose difficulties for effective incentive design. We analyze to what extent implicit dynamic incentives such as career concerns and ratchet effects alleviate or aggravate these problems. Our analysis demonstrates that the interplay between distorted performance measures and implicit incentives implies that career and ratchet effects have real effects, that stronger ratchet effects or more distortion may increase optimal monetary incentives, and that bureaucratic promotion rules may be optimal.Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Compensation Packages; Payment Methods; Labor Management.