The Dilemma of Delegating Search: Budgeting in Public Employment Services

The poor performance often attributed to many public employment services may be explained in part by a delegation problem between the central office and local job centers. In markets characterized by frictions, job centers function as match-makers, linking job seekers with relevant vacancies. Because their search intensity in contacting employers and collecting data is not verifiable by the central authority, a typical moral hazard problem can arise. To overcome the delegation problem and provide high-powered incentives for high levels of search effort on the part of job centers, we propose output-related schemes that assign greater staff capacity to agencies achieving high strike rates.matching unemployment, public employment service, delegation problem, moral hazard, search theory

Linear Hamilton Jacobi Bellman Equations in High Dimensions

The Hamilton Jacobi Bellman Equation (HJB) provides the globally optimal solution to large classes of control problems. Unfortunately, this generality comes at a price, the calculation of such solutions is typically intractible for systems with more than moderate state space size due to the curse of dimensionality. This work combines recent results in the structure of the HJB, and its reduction to a linear Partial Differential Equation (PDE), with methods based on low rank tensor representations, known as a separated representations, to address the curse of dimensionality. The result is an algorithm to solve optimal control problems which scales linearly with the number of states in a system, and is applicable to systems that are nonlinear with stochastic forcing in finite-horizon, average cost, and first-exit settings. The method is demonstrated on inverted pendulum, VTOL aircraft, and quadcopter models, with system dimension two, six, and twelve respectively.Comment: 8 pages. Accepted to CDC 201

Insurance and Taxation over the Life Cycle

We consider a dynamic Mirrlees economy in a life-cycle context and study the optimal insurance arrangement. Individual productivity evolves as a Markov process and is private information. We use a first-order approach in discrete and continuous time and obtain novel theoretical and numerical results. Our main contribution is a formula describing the dynamics for the labour-income tax rate. When productivity is an AR(1) our formula resembles an AR(1) with a trend where: (i) the auto-regressive coefficient equals that of productivity; (ii) the trend term equals the covariance productivity with consumption growth divided by the Frisch elasticity of labour; and (iii) the innovations in the tax rate are the negative of consumption growth. The last property implies a form of short-run regressivity. Our simulations illustrate these results and deliver some novel insights. The average labour tax rises from 0% to 37% over 40 years, whereas the average tax on savings falls from 12% to 0% at retirement. We compare the second best solution to simple history-independent tax systems, calibrated to mimic these average tax rates. We find that age-dependent taxes capture a sizable fraction of the welfare gains. In this way, our theoretical results provide insights into simple tax systems

Inequality, Social Discounting and Estate Taxation

To what degree should societies allow inequality to be inherited? What role should estate taxation play in shaping the intergenerational transmission of welfare? We explore these questions by modeling altruistically-linked individuals who experience privately observed taste or productivity shocks. Our positive economy is identical to models with infinite-lived individuals where efficiency requires immiseration: inequality grows without bound and everyone's consumption converges to zero. However, under an intergenerational interpretation, previous work only characterizes a particular set of Pareto-efficient allocations: those that value only the initial generation's welfare. We study other efficient allocations where the social welfare criterion values future generations directly, placing a positive weight on their welfare so that the effective social discount rate is lower than the private one. For any such difference in social and private discounting we find that consumption exhibits mean-reversion and that a steady-state, cross-sectional distribution for consumption and welfare exists, where no one is trapped at misery. The optimal allocation can then be implemented by a combination of income and estate taxation. We find that the optimal estate tax is progressive: fortunate parents face higher average marginal tax rates on their bequests.

Should Continued Family Firms Face Lower Taxes than other Estates?

Inheritance taxes may induce heirs to discontinue family firms. Because firm dissolution incurs transaction costs, a preferential tax treatment of transferred family businesses seems to be desirable from a macroeconomic viewpoint. The support of dynastic succession, however, entails also a cost on the economy if firm continuation by less able heirs prevents entry into entrepreneurship. Here, we investigate analytically and quantitatively the trade-off between transaction costs saved and creative destruction prevented. We find that a unique general equilibrium exists at which, depending on the institutional setup, low-ability heirs either abandon (Type 1) or continue (Type 2) a family business. A calibration of the model with German data suggests that preferential tax treatment of family firms has severe negative consequences on macroeconomic performance if it causes a threshold crossing from Type 1 to Type 2 equilibrium. It also reveals that the targeted persons, i.e. the entrepreneurs that are caused to continue a business, always lose relative to their status in an economy without continuation-friendly tax policy.bequest taxation, creative destruction, entrepreneurship, family firms, preferential tax treatment

Nash Equilibrium Strategies in Discrete-Time Finite-Horizon Dynamic Games with Risk-and Effort-Averse Players

The objective of this paper is to re-examine the risk-and effort attitude in the context of strategic dynamic interactions stated as a discrete-time finite-horizon Nash game. The analysis is based on the assumption that players are endogenously risk-and effort-averse. Each player is characterized by distinct risk-and effort-aversion types that are unknown to his opponent. The goal of the game is the optimal risk-and effort-sharing between the players. It generally depends on the individual strategies adopted and, implicitly, on the the players' types or characteristics.Dynamic Nash game, optimal path, closed-loop control, endogenous risk-and effort-aversion, adaptive risk-and effort management, optimal risk-and effort-sharing.

Potential utility of future satellite magnetic field data

The requirements for a program of geomagnetic field studies are examined which will satisfy a wide range of user needs in the interim period between now and the time at which data from the Geopotential Research Mission (GRM) becomes available, and the long term needs for NASA's program in this area are considered. An overview of the subject, a justification for the recommended activities in the near term and long term, and a summary of the recommendations reached by the contributors is included

Modeling Storage and Demand Management in Electricity Distribution Grids

Storage devices and demand control may constitute beneficial tools to optimize electricity generation with a large share of intermittent resources through inter-temporal substitution of load. We quantify the related cost reductions in a simulation model of a simplified stylized medium-voltage grid (10kV) under uncertain demand and wind output. Benders Decomposition Method is applied to create a two-stage stochastic program. The model informs an optimal investment sizing decision as regards specific 'smart grid' applications such as storage facilities and meters enabling load control. Model results indicate that central storage facilities are a more promising option for generation cost reductions as compared to demand management. Grid extensions are not appropriate in any of our scenarios. A sensitivity analysis is applied with respect to the market penetration of uncoordinated Plug-In Electric Vehicles which are found to strongly encourage investment into load control equipment for `smart` charging and slightly improve the case for central storage devices.Storage, demand management, stochastic optimization, Benders Decomposition

Equilibrium points for Optimal Investment with Vintage Capital

The paper concerns the study of equilibrium points, namely the stationary solutions to the closed loop equation, of an infinite dimensional and infinite horizon boundary control problem for linear partial differential equations. Sufficient conditions for existence of equilibrium points in the general case are given and later applied to the economic problem of optimal investment with vintage capital. Explicit computation of equilibria for the economic problem in some relevant examples is also provided. Indeed the challenging issue here is showing that a theoretical machinery, such as optimal control in infinite dimension, may be effectively used to compute solutions explicitly and easily, and that the same computation may be straightforwardly repeated in examples yielding the same abstract structure. No stability result is instead provided: the work here contained has to be considered as a first step in the direction of studying the behavior of optimal controls and trajectories in the long run