Optimal Strategy Synthesis for Request-Response Games

We show the existence and effective computability of optimal winning strategies for request-response games in case the quality of a play is measured by the limit superior of the mean accumulated waiting times between requests and their responses.Comment: The present paper is a revised version with simplified proofs of results announced in the conference paper of the same name presented at ATVA 2008, which in turn extended results of the third author's dissertatio

Parity and Streett Games with Costs

We consider two-player games played on finite graphs equipped with costs on edges and introduce two winning conditions, cost-parity and cost-Streett, which require bounds on the cost between requests and their responses. Both conditions generalize the corresponding classical omega-regular conditions and the corresponding finitary conditions. For parity games with costs we show that the first player has positional winning strategies and that determining the winner lies in NP and coNP. For Streett games with costs we show that the first player has finite-state winning strategies and that determining the winner is EXPTIME-complete. The second player might need infinite memory in both games. Both types of games with costs can be solved by solving linearly many instances of their classical variants.Comment: A preliminary version of this work appeared in FSTTCS 2012 under the name "Cost-parity and Cost-Streett Games". The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreements 259454 (GALE) and 239850 (SOSNA

Parameterized Linear Temporal Logics Meet Costs: Still not Costlier than LTL

We continue the investigation of parameterized extensions of Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) that retain the attractive algorithmic properties of LTL: a polynomial space model checking algorithm and a doubly-exponential time algorithm for solving games. Alur et al. and Kupferman et al. showed that this is the case for Parametric LTL (PLTL) and PROMPT-LTL respectively, which have temporal operators equipped with variables that bound their scope in time. Later, this was also shown to be true for Parametric LDL (PLDL), which extends PLTL to be able to express all omega-regular properties. Here, we generalize PLTL to systems with costs, i.e., we do not bound the scope of operators in time, but bound the scope in terms of the cost accumulated during time. Again, we show that model checking and solving games for specifications in PLTL with costs is not harder than the corresponding problems for LTL. Finally, we discuss PLDL with costs and extensions to multiple cost functions.Comment: In Proceedings GandALF 2015, arXiv:1509.0685

Prompt Delay

Delay games are two-player games of infinite duration in which one player may delay her moves to obtain a lookahead on her opponent's moves. Recently, such games with quantitative winning conditions in weak MSO with the unbounding quantifier were studied, but their properties turned out to be unsatisfactory. In particular, unbounded lookahead is in general necessary. Here, we study delay games with winning conditions given by Prompt-LTL, Linear Temporal Logic equipped with a parameterized eventually operator whose scope is bounded. Our main result shows that solving Prompt-LTL delay games is complete for triply-exponential time. Furthermore, we give tight triply-exponential bounds on the necessary lookahead and on the scope of the parameterized eventually operator. Thus, we identify Prompt-LTL as the first known class of well-behaved quantitative winning conditions for delay games. Finally, we show that applying our techniques to delay games with \omega-regular winning conditions answers open questions in the cases where the winning conditions are given by non-deterministic, universal, or alternating automata

Approximating Optimal Bounds in Prompt-LTL Realizability in Doubly-exponential Time

We consider the optimization variant of the realizability problem for Prompt Linear Temporal Logic, an extension of Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) by the prompt eventually operator whose scope is bounded by some parameter. In the realizability optimization problem, one is interested in computing the minimal such bound that allows to realize a given specification. It is known that this problem is solvable in triply-exponential time, but not whether it can be done in doubly-exponential time, i.e., whether it is just as hard as solving LTL realizability. We take a step towards resolving this problem by showing that the optimum can be approximated within a factor of two in doubly-exponential time. Also, we report on a proof-of-concept implementation of the algorithm based on bounded LTL synthesis, which computes the smallest implementation of a given specification. In our experiments, we observe a tradeoff between the size of the implementation and the bound it realizes. We investigate this tradeoff in the general case and prove upper bounds, which reduce the search space for the algorithm, and matching lower bounds.Comment: In Proceedings GandALF 2016, arXiv:1609.0364

Multiplayer Cost Games with Simple Nash Equilibria

Multiplayer games with selfish agents naturally occur in the design of distributed and embedded systems. As the goals of selfish agents are usually neither equivalent nor antagonistic to each other, such games are non zero-sum games. We study such games and show that a large class of these games, including games where the individual objectives are mean- or discounted-payoff, or quantitative reachability, and show that they do not only have a solution, but a simple solution. We establish the existence of Nash equilibria that are composed of k memoryless strategies for each agent in a setting with k agents, one main and k-1 minor strategies. The main strategy describes what happens when all agents comply, whereas the minor strategies ensure that all other agents immediately start to co-operate against the agent who first deviates from the plan. This simplicity is important, as rational agents are an idealisation. Realistically, agents have to decide on their moves with very limited resources, and complicated strategies that require exponential--or even non-elementary--implementations cannot realistically be implemented. The existence of simple strategies that we prove in this paper therefore holds a promise of implementability.Comment: 23 page