Coverage and Deployment Analysis of Narrowband Internet of Things in the Wild

Narrowband Internet of Things (NB-IoT) is gaining momentum as a promising technology for massive Machine Type Communication (mMTC). Given that its deployment is rapidly progressing worldwide, measurement campaigns and performance analyses are needed to better understand the system and move toward its enhancement. With this aim, this paper presents a large scale measurement campaign and empirical analysis of NB-IoT on operational networks, and discloses valuable insights in terms of deployment strategies and radio coverage performance. The reported results also serve as examples showing the potential usage of the collected dataset, which we make open-source along with a lightweight data visualization platform.Comment: Accepted for publication in IEEE Communications Magazine (Internet of Things and Sensor Networks Series

Game Theory for Secure Critical Interdependent Gas-Power-Water Infrastructure

A city's critical infrastructure such as gas, water, and power systems, are largely interdependent since they share energy, computing, and communication resources. This, in turn, makes it challenging to endow them with fool-proof security solutions. In this paper, a unified model for interdependent gas-power-water infrastructure is presented and the security of this model is studied using a novel game-theoretic framework. In particular, a zero-sum noncooperative game is formulated between a malicious attacker who seeks to simultaneously alter the states of the gas-power-water critical infrastructure to increase the power generation cost and a defender who allocates communication resources over its attack detection filters in local areas to monitor the infrastructure. At the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of this game, numerical results show that the expected power generation cost deviation is 35\% lower than the one resulting from an equal allocation of resources over the local filters. The results also show that, at equilibrium, the interdependence of the power system on the natural gas and water systems can motivate the attacker to target the states of the water and natural gas systems to change the operational states of the power grid. Conversely, the defender allocates a portion of its resources to the water and natural gas states of the interdependent system to protect the grid from state deviations.Comment: 7 pages, in proceedings of Resilience Week 201