Sharing Non-Anonymous Costs of Multiple Resources Optimally

In cost sharing games, the existence and efficiency of pure Nash equilibria fundamentally depends on the method that is used to share the resources' costs. We consider a general class of resource allocation problems in which a set of resources is used by a heterogeneous set of selfish users. The cost of a resource is a (non-decreasing) function of the set of its users. Under the assumption that the costs of the resources are shared by uniform cost sharing protocols, i.e., protocols that use only local information of the resource's cost structure and its users to determine the cost shares, we exactly quantify the inefficiency of the resulting pure Nash equilibria. Specifically, we show tight bounds on prices of stability and anarchy for games with only submodular and only supermodular cost functions, respectively, and an asymptotically tight bound for games with arbitrary set-functions. While all our upper bounds are attained for the well-known Shapley cost sharing protocol, our lower bounds hold for arbitrary uniform cost sharing protocols and are even valid for games with anonymous costs, i.e., games in which the cost of each resource only depends on the cardinality of the set of its users

Approximating Generalized Network Design under (Dis)economies of Scale with Applications to Energy Efficiency

In a generalized network design (GND) problem, a set of resources are assigned to multiple communication requests. Each request contributes its weight to the resources it uses and the total load on a resource is then translated to the cost it incurs via a resource specific cost function. For example, a request may be to establish a virtual circuit, thus contributing to the load on each edge in the circuit. Motivated by energy efficiency applications, recently, there is a growing interest in GND using cost functions that exhibit (dis)economies of scale ((D)oS), namely, cost functions that appear subadditive for small loads and superadditive for larger loads. The current paper advances the existing literature on approximation algorithms for GND problems with (D)oS cost functions in various aspects: (1) we present a generic approximation framework that yields approximation results for a much wider family of requests in both directed and undirected graphs; (2) our framework allows for unrelated weights, thus providing the first non-trivial approximation for the problem of scheduling unrelated parallel machines with (D)oS cost functions; (3) our framework is fully combinatorial and runs in strongly polynomial time; (4) the family of (D)oS cost functions considered in the current paper is more general than the one considered in the existing literature, providing a more accurate abstraction for practical energy conservation scenarios; and (5) we obtain the first approximation ratio for GND with (D)oS cost functions that depends only on the parameters of the resources' technology and does not grow with the number of resources, the number of requests, or their weights. The design of our framework relies heavily on Roughgarden's smoothness toolbox (JACM 2015), thus demonstrating the possible usefulness of this toolbox in the area of approximation algorithms.Comment: 39 pages, 1 figure. An extended abstract of this paper is to appear in the 50th Annual ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing (STOC 2018

Designing Networks with Good Equilibria under Uncertainty

We consider the problem of designing network cost-sharing protocols with good equilibria under uncertainty. The underlying game is a multicast game in a rooted undirected graph with nonnegative edge costs. A set of k terminal vertices or players need to establish connectivity with the root. The social optimum is the Minimum Steiner Tree. We are interested in situations where the designer has incomplete information about the input. We propose two different models, the adversarial and the stochastic. In both models, the designer has prior knowledge of the underlying metric but the requested subset of the players is not known and is activated either in an adversarial manner (adversarial model) or is drawn from a known probability distribution (stochastic model). In the adversarial model, the designer's goal is to choose a single, universal protocol that has low Price of Anarchy (PoA) for all possible requested subsets of players. The main question we address is: to what extent can prior knowledge of the underlying metric help in the design? We first demonstrate that there exist graphs (outerplanar) where knowledge of the underlying metric can dramatically improve the performance of good network design. Then, in our main technical result, we show that there exist graph metrics, for which knowing the underlying metric does not help and any universal protocol has PoA of $\Omega(\log k)$, which is tight. We attack this problem by developing new techniques that employ powerful tools from extremal combinatorics, and more specifically Ramsey Theory in high dimensional hypercubes. Then we switch to the stochastic model, where each player is independently activated. We show that there exists a randomized ordered protocol that achieves constant PoA. By using standard derandomization techniques, we produce a deterministic ordered protocol with constant PoA.Comment: This version has additional results about stochastic inpu