A Characterization of Undirected Graphs Admitting Optimal Cost Shares

In a seminal paper, Chen, Roughgarden and Valiant studied cost sharing protocols for network design with the objective to implement a low-cost Steiner forest as a Nash equilibrium of an induced cost-sharing game. One of the most intriguing open problems to date is to understand the power of budget-balanced and separable cost sharing protocols in order to induce low-cost Steiner forests. In this work, we focus on undirected networks and analyze topological properties of the underlying graph so that an optimal Steiner forest can be implemented as a Nash equilibrium (by some separable cost sharing protocol) independent of the edge costs. We term a graph efficient if the above stated property holds. As our main result, we give a complete characterization of efficient undirected graphs for two-player network design games: an undirected graph is efficient if and only if it does not contain (at least) one out of few forbidden subgraphs. Our characterization implies that several graph classes are efficient: generalized series-parallel graphs, fan and wheel graphs and graphs with small cycles.Comment: 60 pages, 69 figures, OR 2017 Berlin, WINE 2017 Bangalor

Designing Network Protocols for Good Equilibria

Designing and deploying a network protocol determines the rules by which end users interact with each other and with the network. We consider the problem of designing a protocol to optimize the equilibrium behavior of a network with selfish users. We consider network cost-sharing games, where the set of Nash equilibria depends fundamentally on the choice of an edge cost-sharing protocol. Previous research focused on the Shapley protocol, in which the cost of each edge is shared equally among its users. We systematically study the design of optimal cost-sharing protocols for undirected and directed graphs, single-sink and multicommodity networks, and different measures of the inefficiency of equilibria. Our primary technical tool is a precise characterization of the cost-sharing protocols that induce only network games with pure-strategy Nash equilibria. We use this characterization to prove, among other results, that the Shapley protocol is optimal in directed graphs and that simple priority protocols are essentially optimal in undirected graphs

From Cost Sharing Mechanisms to Online Selection Problems

We consider a general class of online optimization problems, called online selection problems, where customers arrive sequentially, and one has to decide upon arrival whether to accept or reject each customer. If a customer is rejected, then a rejection cost is incurred. The accepted customers are served with minimum possible cost, either online or after all customers have arrived. The goal is to minimize the total production costs for the accepted customers plus the rejection costs for the rejected customers. These selection problems are related to online variants of offline prize collecting combinatorial optimization problems that have been widely studied in the computer science literature. In this paper, we provide a general framework to develop online algorithms for this class of selection problems. In essence, the algorithmic framework leverages any cost sharing mechanism with certain properties into a poly-logarithmic competitive online algorithm for the respective problem; the competitive ratios are shown to be near-optimal. We believe that the general and transparent connection we establish between cost sharing mechanisms and online algorithms could lead to additional online algorithms for problems beyond the ones studied in this paper.National Science Foundation (U.S.) (CAREER Award CMMI-0846554)United States. Air Force Office of Scientific Research (FA9550-11-1-0150)United States. Air Force Office of Scientific Research (FA9550-08-1-0369)Solomon Buchsbaum AT&T Research Fun

Designing Networks with Good Equilibria under Uncertainty

We consider the problem of designing network cost-sharing protocols with good equilibria under uncertainty. The underlying game is a multicast game in a rooted undirected graph with nonnegative edge costs. A set of k terminal vertices or players need to establish connectivity with the root. The social optimum is the Minimum Steiner Tree. We are interested in situations where the designer has incomplete information about the input. We propose two different models, the adversarial and the stochastic. In both models, the designer has prior knowledge of the underlying metric but the requested subset of the players is not known and is activated either in an adversarial manner (adversarial model) or is drawn from a known probability distribution (stochastic model). In the adversarial model, the designer's goal is to choose a single, universal protocol that has low Price of Anarchy (PoA) for all possible requested subsets of players. The main question we address is: to what extent can prior knowledge of the underlying metric help in the design? We first demonstrate that there exist graphs (outerplanar) where knowledge of the underlying metric can dramatically improve the performance of good network design. Then, in our main technical result, we show that there exist graph metrics, for which knowing the underlying metric does not help and any universal protocol has PoA of $\Omega(\log k)$, which is tight. We attack this problem by developing new techniques that employ powerful tools from extremal combinatorics, and more specifically Ramsey Theory in high dimensional hypercubes. Then we switch to the stochastic model, where each player is independently activated. We show that there exists a randomized ordered protocol that achieves constant PoA. By using standard derandomization techniques, we produce a deterministic ordered protocol with constant PoA.Comment: This version has additional results about stochastic inpu

Approximating Generalized Network Design under (Dis)economies of Scale with Applications to Energy Efficiency

In a generalized network design (GND) problem, a set of resources are assigned to multiple communication requests. Each request contributes its weight to the resources it uses and the total load on a resource is then translated to the cost it incurs via a resource specific cost function. For example, a request may be to establish a virtual circuit, thus contributing to the load on each edge in the circuit. Motivated by energy efficiency applications, recently, there is a growing interest in GND using cost functions that exhibit (dis)economies of scale ((D)oS), namely, cost functions that appear subadditive for small loads and superadditive for larger loads. The current paper advances the existing literature on approximation algorithms for GND problems with (D)oS cost functions in various aspects: (1) we present a generic approximation framework that yields approximation results for a much wider family of requests in both directed and undirected graphs; (2) our framework allows for unrelated weights, thus providing the first non-trivial approximation for the problem of scheduling unrelated parallel machines with (D)oS cost functions; (3) our framework is fully combinatorial and runs in strongly polynomial time; (4) the family of (D)oS cost functions considered in the current paper is more general than the one considered in the existing literature, providing a more accurate abstraction for practical energy conservation scenarios; and (5) we obtain the first approximation ratio for GND with (D)oS cost functions that depends only on the parameters of the resources' technology and does not grow with the number of resources, the number of requests, or their weights. The design of our framework relies heavily on Roughgarden's smoothness toolbox (JACM 2015), thus demonstrating the possible usefulness of this toolbox in the area of approximation algorithms.Comment: 39 pages, 1 figure. An extended abstract of this paper is to appear in the 50th Annual ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing (STOC 2018

Generalized Incremental Mechanisms for Scheduling Games

We study the problem of devising truthful mechanisms for cooperative cost sharing games that realize (approximate) budget balance and social cost. Recent negative results show that group-strategyproof mechanisms can only achieve very poor approximation guarantees for several fundamental cost sharing games. Driven by these limitations, we consider cost sharing mechanisms that realize the weaker notion of weak groupstrategyproofness. Mehta et al. [Games and Economic Behavior, 67:125–155, 2009] recently introduced the broad class of weakly group-strategyproof acyclic mechanisms and show that several primal-dual approximation algorithms naturally give rise to such mechanisms with attractive approximation guarantees. In this paper, we provide a simple yet powerful approach that enables us to turn any r-approximation algorithm into a r-budget balanced acyclic mechanism. We demonstrate the applicability of our approach by deriving weakly group-strategyproof mechanisms for several fundamental scheduling problems that outperform the best possible approximation guarantees of Moulin mechanisms. The mechanisms that we develop for completion time scheduling problems are the first mechanisms that achieve constant budget balance and social cost approximation factors. Interestingly, our mechanisms belong to the class of generalized incremental mechanisms proposed by Moulin [Social Choice and Welfare, 16:279–320, 1999]