11,888 research outputs found
Games and Mechanism Design in Machine Scheduling – An Introduction
In this paper, we survey different models, techniques, and some recent results to tackle machine scheduling problems within a distributed setting. In traditional optimization, a central authority is asked to solve a (computationally hard) optimization problem. In contrast, in distributed settings there are several agents, possibly equipped with private information that is not publicly known, and these agents need to interact in order to derive a solution to the problem. Usually the agents have their individual preferences, which induces them to behave strategically in order to manipulate the resulting solution. Nevertheless, one is often interested in the global performance of such systems. The analysis of such distributed settings requires techniques from classical Optimization, Game Theory, and Economic Theory. The paper therefore briefly introduces the most important of the underlying concepts, and gives a selection of typical research questions and recent results, focussing on applications to machine scheduling problems. This includes the study of the so-called price of anarchy for settings where the agents do not possess private information, as well as the design and analysis of (truthful) mechanisms in settings where the agents do possess private information.computer science applications;
Mechanism design for decentralized online machine scheduling
Traditional optimization models assume a central decision maker who optimizes a global system performance measure. However, problem data is often distributed among several agents, and agents take autonomous decisions. This gives incentives for strategic behavior of agents, possibly leading to sub-optimal system performance. Furthermore, in dynamic environments, machines are locally dispersed and administratively independent. Examples are found both in business and engineering applications. We investigate such issues for a parallel machine scheduling model where jobs arrive online over time. Instead of centrally assigning jobs to machines, each machine implements a local sequencing rule and jobs decide for machines themselves. In this context, we introduce the concept of a myopic best response equilibrium, a concept weaker than the classical dominant strategy equilibrium, but appropriate for online problems. Our main result is a polynomial time, online mechanism that |assuming rational behavior of jobs| results in an equilibrium schedule that is 3.281-competitive with respect to the maximal social welfare. This is only lightly worse than state-of-the-art algorithms with central coordination
Interdependent Scheduling Games
We propose a model of interdependent scheduling games in which each player
controls a set of services that they schedule independently. A player is free
to schedule his own services at any time; however, each of these services only
begins to accrue reward for the player when all predecessor services, which may
or may not be controlled by the same player, have been activated. This model,
where players have interdependent services, is motivated by the problems faced
in planning and coordinating large-scale infrastructures, e.g., restoring
electricity and gas to residents after a natural disaster or providing medical
care in a crisis when different agencies are responsible for the delivery of
staff, equipment, and medicine. We undertake a game-theoretic analysis of this
setting and in particular consider the issues of welfare maximization,
computing best responses, Nash dynamics, and existence and computation of Nash
equilibria.Comment: Accepted to IJCAI 201
SELFISHMIGRATE: A Scalable Algorithm for Non-clairvoyantly Scheduling Heterogeneous Processors
We consider the classical problem of minimizing the total weighted flow-time
for unrelated machines in the online \emph{non-clairvoyant} setting. In this
problem, a set of jobs arrive over time to be scheduled on a set of
machines. Each job has processing length , weight , and is
processed at a rate of when scheduled on machine . The online
scheduler knows the values of and upon arrival of the job,
but is not aware of the quantity . We present the {\em first} online
algorithm that is {\em scalable} ((1+\eps)-speed
-competitive for any constant \eps > 0) for the
total weighted flow-time objective. No non-trivial results were known for this
setting, except for the most basic case of identical machines. Our result
resolves a major open problem in online scheduling theory. Moreover, we also
show that no job needs more than a logarithmic number of migrations. We further
extend our result and give a scalable algorithm for the objective of minimizing
total weighted flow-time plus energy cost for the case of unrelated machines
and obtain a scalable algorithm. The key algorithmic idea is to let jobs
migrate selfishly until they converge to an equilibrium. Towards this end, we
define a game where each job's utility which is closely tied to the
instantaneous increase in the objective the job is responsible for, and each
machine declares a policy that assigns priorities to jobs based on when they
migrate to it, and the execution speeds. This has a spirit similar to
coordination mechanisms that attempt to achieve near optimum welfare in the
presence of selfish agents (jobs). To the best our knowledge, this is the first
work that demonstrates the usefulness of ideas from coordination mechanisms and
Nash equilibria for designing and analyzing online algorithms
Agent-based transportation planning compared with scheduling heuristics
Here we consider the problem of dynamically assigning vehicles to transportation orders that have di¤erent time windows and should be handled in real time. We introduce a new agent-based system for the planning and scheduling of these transportation networks. Intelligent vehicle agents schedule their own routes. They interact with job agents, who strive for minimum transportation costs, using a Vickrey auction for each incoming order. We use simulation to compare the on-time delivery percentage and the vehicle utilization of an agent-based planning system to a traditional system based on OR heuristics (look-ahead rules, serial scheduling). Numerical experiments show that a properly designed multi-agent system may perform as good as or even better than traditional methods
Designing cost-sharing methods for Bayesian games
We study the design of cost-sharing protocols for two fundamental resource allocation problems, the Set Cover and the Steiner Tree Problem, under environments of incomplete information (Bayesian model). Our objective is to design protocols where the worst-case Bayesian Nash equilibria, have low cost, i.e. the Bayesian Price of Anarchy (PoA) is minimized. Although budget balance is a very natural requirement, it puts considerable restrictions on the design space, resulting in high PoA. We propose an alternative, relaxed requirement called budget balance in the equilibrium (BBiE).We show an interesting connection between algorithms for Oblivious Stochastic optimization problems and cost-sharing design with low PoA. We exploit this connection for both problems and we enforce approximate solutions of the stochastic problem, as Bayesian Nash equilibria, with the same guarantees on the PoA. More interestingly, we show how to obtain the same bounds on the PoA, by using anonymous posted prices which are desirable because they are easy to implement and, as we show, induce dominant strategies for the players
Comparison of agent-based scheduling to look-ahead heuristics for real-time transportation problems
We consider the real-time scheduling of full truckload transportation orders with time windows that arrive during schedule execution. Because a fast scheduling method is required, look-ahead heuristics are traditionally used to solve these kinds of problems. As an alternative, we introduce an agent-based approach where intelligent vehicle agents schedule their own routes. They interact with job agents, who strive for minimum transportation costs, using a Vickrey auction for each incoming order. This approach offers several advantages: it is fast, requires relatively little information and facilitates easy schedule adjustments in reaction to information updates. We compare the agent-based approach to more traditional hierarchical heuristics in an extensive simulation experiment. We find that a properly designed multiagent approach performs as good as or even better than traditional methods. Particularly, the multi-agent approach yields less empty miles and a more stable service level
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