Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions

We report on the use of a quadratic programming technique in recent and upcoming spectrum auctions in Europe. Specifically, we compute a unique point in the core that minimizes the sum of squared deviations from a reference point, for example, from the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves payments. Analyzing the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we demonstrate that the resulting payments can be decomposed into a series of economically meaningful and equitable penalties. Furthermore, we discuss the benefits of this combinatorial auction, explore the use of alternative reserve pricing approaches in this context, and indicate the results of several hundred computational runs using CATS data.Auctions, spectrum auctions, market design, package auction, clock auction, combinatorial auction

Combinatorial Assortment Optimization

Assortment optimization refers to the problem of designing a slate of products to offer potential customers, such as stocking the shelves in a convenience store. The price of each product is fixed in advance, and a probabilistic choice function describes which product a customer will choose from any given subset. We introduce the combinatorial assortment problem, where each customer may select a bundle of products. We consider a model of consumer choice where the relative value of different bundles is described by a valuation function, while individual customers may differ in their absolute willingness to pay, and study the complexity of the resulting optimization problem. We show that any sub-polynomial approximation to the problem requires exponentially many demand queries when the valuation function is XOS, and that no FPTAS exists even for succinctly-representable submodular valuations. On the positive side, we show how to obtain constant approximations under a "well-priced" condition, where each product's price is sufficiently high. We also provide an exact algorithm for $k$-additive valuations, and show how to extend our results to a learning setting where the seller must infer the customers' preferences from their purchasing behavior

Learning Large-Scale Bayesian Networks with the sparsebn Package

Learning graphical models from data is an important problem with wide applications, ranging from genomics to the social sciences. Nowadays datasets often have upwards of thousands---sometimes tens or hundreds of thousands---of variables and far fewer samples. To meet this challenge, we have developed a new R package called sparsebn for learning the structure of large, sparse graphical models with a focus on Bayesian networks. While there are many existing software packages for this task, this package focuses on the unique setting of learning large networks from high-dimensional data, possibly with interventions. As such, the methods provided place a premium on scalability and consistency in a high-dimensional setting. Furthermore, in the presence of interventions, the methods implemented here achieve the goal of learning a causal network from data. Additionally, the sparsebn package is fully compatible with existing software packages for network analysis.Comment: To appear in the Journal of Statistical Software, 39 pages, 7 figure

A System for Distributed Mechanisms: Design, Implementation and Applications

We describe here a structured system for distributed mechanism design appropriate for both Intranet and Internet applications. In our approach the players dynamically form a network in which they know neither their neighbours nor the size of the network and interact to jointly take decisions. The only assumption concerning the underlying communication layer is that for each pair of processes there is a path of neighbours connecting them. This allows us to deal with arbitrary network topologies. We also discuss the implementation of this system which consists of a sequence of layers. The lower layers deal with the operations that implement the basic primitives of distributed computing, namely low level communication and distributed termination, while the upper layers use these primitives to implement high level communication among players, including broadcasting and multicasting, and distributed decision making. This yields a highly flexible distributed system whose specific applications are realized as instances of its top layer. This design is implemented in Java. The system supports at various levels fault-tolerance and includes a provision for distributed policing the purpose of which is to exclude `dishonest' players. Also, it can be used for repeated creation of dynamically formed networks of players interested in a joint decision making implemented by means of a tax-based mechanism. We illustrate its flexibility by discussing a number of implemented examples.Comment: 36 pages; revised and expanded versio

The Maximum Traveling Salesman Problem with Submodular Rewards

In this paper, we look at the problem of finding the tour of maximum reward on an undirected graph where the reward is a submodular function, that has a curvature of $\kappa$, of the edges in the tour. This problem is known to be NP-hard. We analyze two simple algorithms for finding an approximate solution. Both algorithms require $O(|V|^3)$ oracle calls to the submodular function. The approximation factors are shown to be $\frac{1}{2+\kappa}$ and $\max\set{\frac{2}{3(2+\kappa)},2/3(1-\kappa)}$, respectively; so the second method has better bounds for low values of $\kappa$. We also look at how these algorithms perform for a directed graph and investigate a method to consider edge costs in addition to rewards. The problem has direct applications in monitoring an environment using autonomous mobile sensors where the sensing reward depends on the path taken. We provide simulation results to empirically evaluate the performance of the algorithms.Comment: Extended version of ACC 2013 submission (including p-system greedy bound with curvature