Attitude Dynamics with Limited Verbalisation Capabilities

This article offers a new perspective for research on opinion dynamics. It demonstrates the importance of the distinction of opinion and attitude, which originally has been discussed in literature on consumer behaviour. As opinions are verbalised attitudes not only biases in interpretation and adoption processes have to be considered but also verbalisation biases should be addressed. Such biases can be caused by language deficits or social norms. The model presented in this article captures the basic features of common opinion dynamic models and additionally biases in the verbalisation process. Further, it gives a first analysis of this model and shows that precision as bias in the verbalisation process can influence the dynamics significantly. Presenting and applying the concept of area of influential attitudes the impact of each parameter (selective attitude, selective interpretation, and precision) is analysed independently. Some preliminary results for combined effects are presented.Opinion dynamics, attitude dynamics, verbalisation, selective attitude, selective interpretation, area of influential attitudes

Collective dynamics of belief evolution under cognitive coherence and social conformity

Human history has been marked by social instability and conflict, often driven by the irreconcilability of opposing sets of beliefs, ideologies, and religious dogmas. The dynamics of belief systems has been studied mainly from two distinct perspectives, namely how cognitive biases lead to individual belief rigidity and how social influence leads to social conformity. Here we propose a unifying framework that connects cognitive and social forces together in order to study the dynamics of societal belief evolution. Each individual is endowed with a network of interacting beliefs that evolves through interaction with other individuals in a social network. The adoption of beliefs is affected by both internal coherence and social conformity. Our framework explains how social instabilities can arise in otherwise homogeneous populations, how small numbers of zealots with highly coherent beliefs can overturn societal consensus, and how belief rigidity protects fringe groups and cults against invasion from mainstream beliefs, allowing them to persist and even thrive in larger societies. Our results suggest that strong consensus may be insufficient to guarantee social stability, that the cognitive coherence of belief-systems is vital in determining their ability to spread, and that coherent belief-systems may pose a serious problem for resolving social polarization, due to their ability to prevent consensus even under high levels of social exposure. We therefore argue that the inclusion of cognitive factors into a social model is crucial in providing a more complete picture of collective human dynamics

Evaluating the role of quantitative modeling in language evolution

Models are a flourishing and indispensable area of research in language evolution. Here we highlight critical issues in using and interpreting models, and suggest viable approaches. First, contrasting models can explain the same data and similar modelling techniques can lead to diverging conclusions. This should act as a reminder to use the extreme malleability of modelling parsimoniously when interpreting results. Second, quantitative techniques similar to those used in modelling language evolution have proven themselves inadequate in other disciplines. Cross-disciplinary fertilization is crucial to avoid mistakes which have previously occurred in other areas. Finally, experimental validation is necessary both to sharpen models' hypotheses, and to support their conclusions. Our belief is that models should be interpreted as quantitative demonstrations of logical possibilities, rather than as direct sources of evidence. Only an integration of theoretical principles, quantitative proofs and empirical validation can allow research in the evolution of language to progress